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Abstract 
This dissertation explores the effect of intergovernmental fiscal transfers on the fiscal 
operations of the federating units in Pakistan. It is the first attempt to carry out 
disaggregated analysis of the fiscal behavior of each of the four provinces of Pakistan, 
separately and jointly in response to various types and categories of federal transfers, 
grants and borrowings.  Thus it is a noteworthy addition in the empirical literature in the 
context of a less developed and resource constraints country where the sensitivities are 
always attached in the determination of distributional criteria and allocation of transfers 
among federating units. 
 
The study explores whether federal transfers to provinces have been utilized for 
stimulating provincial public expenditures or have largely been substituted for fiscal efforts 
to collect taxes from provincial own resources. The study also investigates the impact of 
unconditional and conditional transfers to determine the varying effects on public 
spending. Moreover, the phenomenon of “Flypaper Effect” which hypothesizes that the 
federal transfers and the provincial gross domestic product (resident income) have similar 
accelerating or multiplier effect on provincial expenditures is also examined. In addition, it 
is also attempted to scrutinize the role of federal transfers in the process of fiscal 
equalization among provinces as regards to the provision of public services.  
 
The government expenditure method is applied to determine the quantity of public service 
provision. To estimate the provincial fiscal response to federal transfers, total provincial 
expenditure is modeled as a function of provincial gross domestic product at factor cost, 
several types of transfers and total borrowings. Various macro, fiscal and demographic 
variables are also used in the estimation process to remove simultaneity in grants and 
provincial expenditures and also to control for diverse socioeconomic characteristics of 
federating units. All variables are adjusted with the respective provincial population and 
measured in constant prices. The expenditure functions are estimated by using Ordinary 
Least Square and Two Stage Least Square estimation techniques through E-VIEWS 
software covering the period between 1973 and 2009.  Various specifications of 
expenditure function are used in this study for testing different hypothesis.  
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The empirical results establish the importance of our thesis as estimated fiscal behavior of 
individual provinces show significantly varied responses. The findings of the study clearly 
highlight that aggregate or joint provincial fiscal response is more similar to the behavior 
of two relatively developed Punjab and Sindh provinces.  The direction, marginal effects 
and the level of significance of coefficients measuring fiscal response to federal transfers 
for these two provinces is significantly different as compared with the other two 
underdeveloped Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan provinces.  Thus, any attempts to 
draw conclusions regarding provincial response to federal transfers based on combined 
data may mislead mainly due the diverse socio and demographic characteristics and also 
because of the varied levels of economic development of federating units. Therefore, to 
design transfer strategies in Pakistan disaggregate analysis of provincial fiscal behavior is 
imperative. 
 
It is affirmed that the conditional grant have a larger and more elastic effect on provincial 
expenditure compared to unconditional grants. Therefore conscious effort is needed to 
design appropriate transfer strategies by attaching conditionality to its spending. The 
findings also suggest that unconditional transfers are heavily utilized for substitution of 
effort to raise revenue from own resources. Hence for rewarding improved provincial fiscal 
effort, some premium may be attached on the achievement of certain level of social 
services. This reward should be in the form of close ended matching grant to avoid its 
likely misuse. Similarly conditional matching incentives may also be given for goods of 
high federal priority but attracts lower provincial investment. Conditional grants though 
compromise the objective of provincial expenditure autonomy but nevertheless these 
greatly enhance the multiplier effect of fund transferred.  
 
The significant and much higher provincial dependence on federal transfers are found in 
Pakistan. It is therefore vital that provinces may have access to some buoyant sources of 
revenue to finance adequately their fiscal needs. Alternatively provinces may be also 
allowed piggybacking on personal income tax, wealth tax or single stage sales tax as 
practiced in number of countries. The unconditional transfers however may be continued 
for meeting fixed cost of running provincial governments without compromising on the 
provincial priorities.  
Intergovernmental Governmental Fiscal Relation – A Case Study of Pakistan 4 
The analysis will facilitate development practitioners, policy makers and planners in 
designing appropriate criteria and allocation strategies for future fiscal framework of 
federal transfers.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Various systems or forms of governance exist to achieve governments ’ ultimate 
development objectives of providing basic services , reducing social and income 
inequalities and for creating economic and social justice for its people.  
The unitary model of governance structures power in such a way that all the decision 
making rests in the hands of the central government. The decisions flow from the 
central or national government to the sub-national or local provinces and these sub 
national units exercise delegated powers by the central government. In this system of 
government, there is uniformity in the decisions, and they apply equally across the 
country. 
The confederate system is at the other end of the spectrum. The power rests in the 
local entities, like states, and the central or national government can only do what the 
confederate association allows.   The basic assumption is the government closest to the 
people would be a better fit to understand what needs to be done. 
The federal model has a strong central or national government as well as strong sub-
national governments. Specific powers reside in the national government, specific 
powers are allocated to the local or sub-national governments, and specific powers are 
shared between the two. In theory, this model provides uniformity when necessary, 
strength   of the unitary system, but allow for diversity and local rule when needed 
which is the strength of a confederate system. The federal system generally has two or 
more levels of government in a country.  First tier, having the highest level of 
authority is national or central government; second tier having subordinate levels of 
authority is sub-national or provincial governments. In most federal countries 
however, a third tier of government also exists in the form of local governments. In a 
federal system, states or other sub national units are sovereign, and their legitimacy 
cannot be unilaterally changed by the central government. These different levels of 
government derive power and functions on the basis of theoretical principles of fiscal 
governance and as per the country’s constitution. 
In a federal system, central governments assign functional authorities to sub national 
governments.  Implicit in this consideration is the better awareness of the constituents’ 
preferences and to find better ways to meet their preferred services. However, question 
Intergovernmental Governmental Fiscal Relation – A Case Study of Pakistan 16 
here arises regarding the specific tasks, assignments, authorities and responsibilities 
among various layers of governments. 
Musgrave (1959) and Musgrave and Musgrave (1989) suggests the functions of 
government should be divided into three branches, macro-economic stabilization, 
income redistribution, and resource allocation. Macro-economic stabilization function 
concern maintaining high levels of employment and price stability – the function is 
assigned to the central government. Sub national governments generally cannot largely 
influence  the macro-economic environment  due restriction of their territorial 
boundaries and limited usage of macro- economic policy instruments , such as 
restrained power to borrow and authority to print money.  Function of income 
distribution is to ensure equitable distribution of income across jurisdiction thus 
primary responsibility of central government. Sub-national attempts to redistribute 
income may fail as they are prone to distort the geographic allocation of funds. 
Additionally, probability of bias may be high in income distribution across different 
regions by sub-nationals due to the presence of interpersonal inequalities that may 
persist across different territorial jurisdictions. Hence, intergovernmental grants by 
central governments should address differences in average income levels of various 
sub-nationals jurisdictions. Finally, the resource allocation function is to manage the 
resources for efficient use for which Musgrave argues that this responsibility ideally 
should reside with sub-national governments as it will allow the local government to 
carry out expenditures in line with the desires of the people. 
The resource allocation function in a decentralized system requires an appropriate 
strategy for fiscal transfers. However, the fundamental step in designing of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations or transfers is to align responsibilities and fiscal 
instruments among various levels of governments (Oats 1999).  The principle of fiscal 
federalism addresses this issue by providing a normative framework of functional 
responsibilities for various layers of public sector including allocation of expenditure 
and revenue assignments along with the instruments of intergovernmental grants and 
borrowing powers. 
Decentralized federation of Pakistan comprises of four federating units (provinces) 
and has a system of parliamentary democracy as laid down in the Constitution of 
Pakistan. Most of the fiscal powers are concentrated within the federal government, 
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and the issue of intergovernmental fiscal relation is understood as a subject of fiscal 
transfers from the federal government to provincial governments. 
Intergovernmental fiscal transfers play an important role to improve the fiscal 
operation of federating units. These transfers directly influence the sub-national 
government fiscal behavior by providing additional resources and thus enhancing their 
ability to provide public goods. Conversely, these transfer receipts may influence the 
ability and willingness of sub-national governments to collect taxes. It is, therefore, 
likely that additional transfer income may partly serve as a replacement of provincial 
fiscal efforts. Therefore an analysis and evaluation of fiscal response of federating 
units with diverse socio-economic and cultural background are important aspects 
which serve as the foundation for this thesis. Before moving on to the specific 
objectives and research methodology of this study on intergovernmental fiscal 
relations , it is worth to look first at important characteristics of Pakistan federating 
units and to have an idea of history of intergovernmental fiscal relations. 
1.1 Federation of Pakistan  
Pakistan came into existence on August 14, 1947 after thorough efforts of the freedom 
movement under the auspicious leadership of Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. 
At the time of independence, the Pakistani nation consisted of two widely separated 
parts – West Pakistan, which is the present country of Pakistan and East Pakistan, now 
independent country of Bangladesh. Pakistan was left without strong, experienced 
leadership due to unfortunate early demise of founder and first Governor General, 
M.A. Jinnah and subsequent assassination of first visionary Prime Minister, Liaquat 
Ali Khan. Thus, a number of political factions maneuvered for control which led the 
nation in turmoil and political instability. Sequence of events in the course of political 
history of Pakistan had dampened the country’s record with parliamentary democracy. 
Pakistan faced three eras of military dictatorship that constitute for almost 33 years 
(1958-71, 1977-88 and 1999-2008) in the country’s 65 years history. Despite these 
military interventions, political leadership has always attempted to reinstate 
parliamentary democracy as laid down in the comprehensive Constitution of 1973.  
The Constitution stipulates that the Federation of Pakistan comprises of President and 
two houses Senate and National Assembly. Senate being the upper house comprises of  
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100-members with an equal number of seats for each territory, whereas National 
Assembly consist of 342 democratically elected members; where seats are allocated to 
provinces, Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Capital Territory of Islamabad on 
the basis of population. President of Pakistan is the Head of the State while popularly 
elected Prime Minister is the Head of the Government.  
 
The population of Pakistan as of July 2012 was approximately 184 million which makes it 
the sixth most populous country in the world. The territory of Pakistan spread over 
796,095 sq km, and shares borders with Afghanistan to the northwest, China to the North, 
Iran to the west and India to the south and east. The valley of Jammu and Kashmir is a 
disputed territory as both India and Pakistan have their claim on the region with its part 
occupation and control at present. Coastline of Pakistan covers the southern and south 
western part of the country that extends up to 1050 km, out of which 250 km falls in Sindh 
province and 800 km in Baluchistan.  
Pakistan as a federation comprises of four provinces Punjab, Sindh, Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), and Baluchistan, a Capital City of Islamabad and Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The four provinces are administered by the 
provincial governments while Islamabad and FATA are governed by Federal 
Government. 
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The provinces are distinct in terms of their topology, geography, demography, socio-
economic characteristics, ethnic and cultural characteristics and economic structure. 
Important dimensions of diversity are briefly described below while a schematic view 
of differences and disparities among federating units is portrayed in Table 1.1. 
The province of Punjab is the most densely populated province with its population 
density of 359 peoples per sq km and a population share of 57.4 percent. On the 
contrary, Baluchistan has the highest share in land area 45.2 percent with the least 
share in population (5.1%). Sindh with a population share of 23.7 percent is the most 
urbanized province as 55 percent of its population lives in urban areas.  
Sindh is considered to be the richest province of the country with its per capita gross 
regional product of Rs. 2348, which is about 65 percent higher compared to lowest 
per capita income province of Baluchistan.  Spatial variation also exists in the value 
added generated from large scale manufacturing with the highest contribution 
(50.6%) of Punjab followed by Sindh 38.9 percent. Underdeveloped provinces of KPK 
and Baluchistan have a meager 8.7 and 1.8 percent share respectively in large scale 
manufacturing. Moreover, Punjab also has the largest agricultural economy 
contributing 56.9 percent of the total agricultural production of Pakistan, contrary to 
Baluchistan which has the lowest (4.9%) share in agriculture. Although KPK has 
relatively smaller (10.7%) contribution in agriculture, it generates most of the hydro-
power in the country 
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Table  1.1 Major Characteristics of Pakistan Federating Units 
[2008-2009] 
Characteristics Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Capital City Lahore Karachi Peshawar Quetta 
Mother Tongue of Major Population Punjabi 
and 
Saraiky 
Sindhi 
and 
Urdu 
Pushto 
and 
Hazarvi 
Balochi  
and  
Pushto 
Number of districts 36 23 24 30 
Administrative Division 9 5 7 6 
Share in Area 26.8 18.3 9.7 45.2 
Share in National Population   57.4 23.7 13.8 5.1 
Density per Square Kilometre   359 216 239 19 
Share of urban Population [Last Census]  31 49 17 24 
Net Primary Enrolment (Age 4-9)  68 53 56 43 
Net Matric Enrolment (Age 13-14) 11 10 6 5 
Access to Piped Drinking Water  28 43 50 38 
     
Per Capita Income 1,979 2,348 1,875 1,418 
Share in Agriculture 56.9 27.6 10.7 4.9 
Yield of Wheat [Per Hectare]  2,438 3,446 1,434 2,116 
Yield of Rice [Per Hectare] 1,907 3,060 2,079 2,433 
Yield of Cotton [Per Hectare] 638 710 500 436 
Share of Large Scale Manufacturing 50.6 38.9 8.7 1.8 
Share in Service Sector 63.7 21.0 12.4 3.9 
Natural Gas Production [MMCFT] 34.0 49.4 1.4 15.3 
Crude Oil Production  [Thousand Barrel] 25.5 56.1 18.3 0.1 
Share in Registered Motor Vehicles  61.0 27.8 8.0 3.2 
Share in  High Quality Roads  40.5 31.5 16.5 11.5 
     
Share in Revenue Generation/Collection  32 64 3 1 
Per Capita Real Expenditure  2,505 3,425 2,654 5,760 
Per Capita Real Current Expenditure 1,469 2,483 1,602 2,926 
Per capita Real  Development Expenditure  1,036 942 1,052 2,834 
Per Capita Real Own Source Revenues  444 409 167 235 
     
Sources: Population and Housing Census, 1998 
 Pakistan Social and Living Standard Measurement Surveys 
 Provincial Budgets  
 Province-wise estimates of Gross Regional Product (Bengali & Sadaqat,  2005)  
 Year Books of Federal Board Of Revenue 
 National Transport Research Centre 
 Statistical Year Book of Pakistan 
 Pakistan Economic Surveys 
 
The province of Baluchistan is being felt to be backward; still the vibrant sector of 
mining of the country is in Baluchistan which has the great potential for the provincial 
and national prosperity. The province also has large gas reservoirs that had fed the 
country’s major gas requirements for almost 40 years. Nonetheless, share of Sindh in 
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the total gas generation in Pakistan has recently increased to about 50 percent and thus 
outpacing Baluchistan. 
Federation and four provinces are varying degree of expenditure need and fiscal 
capacity in terms of own source revenue generation.  The fiscal capacity in terms of per 
capita own revenues collection is the highest in Punjab with Rs. 444 followed by Sindh 
Rs. 409 and lowest in KPK amounting to Rs. 167.  Federal government collects highest 
amount of federal taxes from Sindh which is 64 percent followed by 32, 3, and 1 
percent from Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan provinces respectively. The 
federal government also has a predominant share in tax collection (93 percent) with its 
expenditure responsibilities of about 74 percent. Similarly the four provincial 
governments are at different levels of fiscal capacity; the highest in Sindh and Punjab 
(17 percent) and lowest in Baluchistan (4 percent). The per capita expenditure also 
varies across provinces with highest Rs. 5760 in Baluchistan and lowest in Punjab Rs. 
2505. The picture reflects significant vertical1 and horizontal2
1.1.1 History of Fiscal Transfers in Pakistan 
 imbalances that can be 
addressed through the properly designed inter-governmental fiscal transfer mechanism.  
The mechanism of intergovernmental transfers is enshrined in the 1973 constitution of 
Pakistan. According to the Article 161 of the constitution, it is mandatory to periodically3 
set up National Finance Commission (NFC) by the President of Pakistan to recommend 
on the operation of federal divisible pool4
                                                          
1  Vertival fiscal imbalance measures the difference between revenue sources and expenditures assignments among 
various layers of government, that is, between the federal and provincial governments. 
, borrowing powers, grants in aid and other such 
matters between the federal and provincial governments.  The composition of NFC 
comprises of Federal Finance Minister as Chairman, Four Provincial Finance Ministers 
and four provincial statutory members’ one from each province. NFC takes the decision 
on three matters; which taxes are to be included to determine the size of the federal 
divisible pool; how and in what proportion these taxes are vertically shared between the 
federation and provinces; and how provincial share is horizontally divided among the 
four federating units (provinces).  
2 The horizontal fiscal imbalance measures the differences in the revenue source and expenditure assignments of 
individual provinces. 
3 Through the 1973 constitution, it was made obligatory for the government to compose NFC at an interval extending not 
more than 5 years for the amicable resource distribution among the federation and their respective units. However, the 
NFC award commissions have failed in bringing out regular awards due to the difficulty in finding a formula or 
arrangement which could be acceptable to all the four provinces. 
4 Federal divisible pool comprised of income / corporate tax, wealth tax, capital value tax, sales tax on sales and purchase 
of goods, export duties on cotton, customs duties, and federal excise duties excluding gas. 
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History of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements in Pakistan indicates that there have 
been 9 different Awards in the country since its inception. Nonetheless the award which 
was presented by Bhutto government in 1974 was the first after the 1973 constitution. 
This was the period when the West Pakistan (existing Pakistan) started its journey after 
the separation of East Pakistan. The population was used as a sole criterion for horizontal 
distribution of federal revenue transfers among the four provincial governments in this 
award. However, population based criterion created discomfort among smaller provinces. 
History of financial awards tells that in 1979 and 1985 despite NFC was constituted; no 
awards were declared due to lack of consensus among the four constituent members. The 
next award that was due in 1979 was declared 16 years later in 1990. Similar to 1974, 
Award of 1990 used population as the fundamental basis, along with some backwardness 
grants to KPK (then NWFP) and Baluchistan province. Furthermore, federation also 
accepted rights of provinces on natural resources. On that basis royalty, excise duty and 
gas development surcharge on natural gas, profit on hydroelectricity, extended to 
provinces on origin principles that benefits the smaller provinces. The NFC 1997 award 
included all federal taxes in the divisible pool but reduces provincial share to 37.5 percent 
from 80 percent in the NFC 1990. This arrangement has affected the total size of the 
award but not the distribution among the provinces. Lack of consensus among the 
provincial governments elected in 2002 had again delayed the award and no resolution 
was found till 2006. President of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf then issued revenue order 
2006 replacing 1997 NFC criteria with marginal improvement. The last NFC award 2010 
was the third award, announced by the democratically elected government. This award is 
historic and has many important dimensions including the use of multiple criteria 
contrary to population alone that have been used since 1974.Thus long standing demand 
of smaller provinces for horizontal resource distribution using multiple factors finally 
stands accepted after 36 years due to magnanimity of Punjab (the largest province) which 
helped improve interprovincial harmony and strengthen federation.  
1.2 Objectives of the Study 
This thesis aims to evaluate the revenue sharing arrangements between federal and 
provincial governments in Pakistan. Thus, the emphasis of the thesis would be to 
explore how past arrangements for intergovernmental transfers’ as proposed under 
various awards historically, have influenced fiscal environment and practice in different 
federating units (provinces) of the country. There are several different dimensions for the 
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analysis on the subject of intergovernmental transfers. An important dimension is to 
study if the determination of the size of divisible pool under various awards made an 
economic sense. It is also interesting to see if the distribution of divisible pool among the 
federating units can be evaluated on the basis of equity and efficiency principles. The 
focus of this research however,   is to examine for the first time, the individual fiscal 
behavior of the four provincial governments in Pakistan in response to federal transfers 
and grants. The aggregate provincial fiscal response is also scrutinized to study the 
variation in provincial fiscal behavior. The study, in particular, enquires whether these 
revenue transfers have been utilized for stimulating provincial public expenditures or 
have been largely substituted for provincial fiscal efforts in order to provide tax relief to 
their residents. The study also investigates the impact of unconditional and conditional 
transfers on the provincial fiscal response by decomposing total federal transfers. 
Additionally, the famous phenomenon of Fly Paper effect which asserts “Money Sticks 
where it Hits” is also examined in this thesis. According to this phenomenon, the grant 
disproportionately spent on public goods and resident income on private goods.  
 
Specifically the thesis focuses on the following four hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis I: Federal transfers/grants to provinces stimulate provincial government’s 
expenditures. This hypothesis will be rejected if there is no significant increase in the 
provision of public goods in the provinces as a result of receiving federal revenue 
transfers.  
Hypothesis II: Federal transfers/grants to provinces reduce provincial fiscal efforts.  This 
implies that provinces utilize federal transfers to equalize resources and to relieve the 
residents’ tax burden.  The hypothesis will be rejected if it is found that there is a significant 
increase, in provincial tax revenue collection in response to federal transfer receipts.  
Hypothesis III: Federal Transfers under development grant (conditional) have a greater 
impact on provincial expenditure than non-development or unconditional transfers. This 
hypothesis will obviously be rejected for provinces if a decreasing impact of conditional 
or development grants as compared to other unconditional transfers is found.   
Hypothesis IV: Federal transfers and resident income have similar accelerating effect on 
provincial expenditures. This hypothesis will be rejected if there is a significant 
difference in the magnitudes of resident income of the provinces and the federal 
transfers.  
Intergovernmental Governmental Fiscal Relation – A Case Study of Pakistan 24 
1.3 Importance of the Study  
The thesis examines the federal transfers of revenue to provinces in Pakistan in a 
historical perspective encompassing five National Finance Commission (NFC) awards 
during the period 1972-2009.This is the first comprehensive historical analysis of 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers in Pakistan that will assist decision makers to evaluate 
past strategy of intergovernmental transfers in the light of provincial fiscal and 
expenditure response. Moreover, by examining provincial expenditure and taxation 
behavior in response to federal transfers with respect to all four provincial awards will 
help in determining the appropriate future award strategy that ensure restraint in 
provincial expenditures and increase fiscal efforts. Furthermore, this is the first attempt 
to carry out disaggregated analysis at individual province level to measure the fiscal 
behavior of four provincial governments in Pakistan in response to various forms of 
federal transfers and grants. Thus, the analysis will bridge the gap as none of the 
previous study has empirically measured the individual provincial response to 
conditional and unconditional transfers in the context of Pakistan. Earlier studies 
scrutinized the aggregate (all federating units combined) fiscal response of federal 
transfers. Nonetheless, the responses of Individual provinces to the federal transfers are 
important to design effective mechanism in the context of diverse economic and other 
characteristics of federating units. The study also investigates the impact of conditional 
and unconditional grants and transfers separately on the provincial fiscal behavior by 
decomposing total federal transfers.  Thus, the empirics of this study will assist in 
developing a new strategy by considering the nature and extent of conditional transfers 
to ensure certain minimum standard of services across all federating units.  In a nutshell, 
the study will facilitate policy makers and stakeholders in designing suitable strategies 
(conditional, unconditional, mixture of the two) which are acceptable to all federating 
units for future fiscal transfer framework of the federal government. The task is very 
significant in the context of Pakistan given the sensitivities and discomfort attached to 
the determination and allocation of national fiscal Awards. 
1.4 Research Methodology  
 An econometric analysis of inter-provincial variation in fiscal behavior in response to 
the federal transfers/grants is undertaken separately for each province as well as all 
provinces combined. The empirical literature documenting the effects of transfers/grants 
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on the sub-national government fiscal behavior suggests different estimation techniques. 
The choice of technique is partly dependent upon the nature of grant coming from upper 
tiers of government. The transfers may be unconditional (general purpose) or 
conditional (specific purpose). Based on the relevant empirical literature, conventional 
approach of utility maximization is employed by adopting the Stone Geary utility 
function. To determine the quantity of public service provision, the government 
expenditure method is applied. Specifically, to estimate provincial fiscal response to 
federal transfers, per capita provincial expenditure is modeled as a function of per capita 
provincial gross domestic product, transfers and borrowings. Various control and 
instrumental variables are used to remove simultaneity in grants and provincial 
expenditures. The instrumental variables vary by province and primarily include 
provision of education and health services, changes in federal tax revenue and budget 
deficit, NFC awards and dummy variables to control for economically and politically 
troubled years. Revenue and expenditure variables are defined in real prices of 2001, 
covering data from period 1972 to 2009. The expenditure functions are estimated both 
by using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Two Stage Least Square estimation 
techniques (2SLS). E-VIEWS software is employed to estimate all expenditure 
functions. The results are also corrected for auto- correlation and also for autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity. The results from both techniques are reported to observe 
the sensitivity of magnitudes and summary statistics. However, discussions, findings 
and conclusions are based on particular equations chosen by the criterion of minimum 
standard error.  
 
1.5 Roadmap of the Study  
After providing brief introductory remarks on the background, objectives and research 
methodology in this chapter, the remaining thesis is organized as follows:  
Chapter-2 Literature Review  
The literature review describes the theory and empirics of fiscal federalism with 
reference to principles of revenue and expenditure assignments, intergovernmental 
fiscal transfers and borrowing between various layers of government. The theoretical 
and empirical literature on the effects of various categories of transfers and grants on 
the recipient or sub-national government fiscal behavior and estimation issues are 
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reviewed and discussed for understanding its behavioral implications, strength and 
shortcomings. 
Chapter-3 Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations  
The chapter traces the evolution of intergovernmental fiscal relations in Pakistan with 
special reference to the development of intergovernmental fiscal transfer arrangements 
between the federal and provincial governments. The allocation of expenditure 
assignments, revenue assignments and borrowing powers of the levels of governments 
also reviewed and evaluated. Important issues are highlighted and wherever possible 
similarities and differences with other country’s experiences are given. A major section 
of this chapter is devoted to intergovernmental fiscal transfer arrangements routed on the 
recommendations of National Finance Commission awards. The analysis draws various 
tables to describe the main features of these transfer arrangements and highlights 
important issues arisen in various NFC awards overtime. Magnitude of the extent of 
vertical and horizontal imbalances between various constituent members (federal and 
provincial governments), access and share of transfers by each source and borrowings for 
each government is reported for determining its differential access that would have 
varying implications on intergovernmental fiscal behavior and on equity and efficiency. 
Chapter-4 The Model  
This chapter describes the model, used to estimate provincial fiscal behavior in response 
to intergovernmental fiscal transfers and grants in Pakistan.  Various econometric model 
and estimation method are reviewed which were earlier used to study the sub-national 
government fiscal and expenditure response to intergovernmental transfers.  A feasible 
model and estimation technique in the context of Pakistan’s environment is used that 
enable us to test the above mentioned hypothesis. 
Chapter-5 Data Description  
This chapter gives the description of the data used for the analysis in the thesis. It 
provides the detail    explanation of each variable and method of its construction for the 
analysis. The chapter reports all data sources for the variables utilized in this research. 
The summary statistics and graphs of all important variables to highlight the trend are 
also annexed. 
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Chapter-6 Empirical Findings   
This chapter presents the empirical results of exploring the fiscal behavior of four 
provincial governments in response to federal transfers. The aggregate provincial 
behavior is also examined to compare findings with the earlier study as well as to show 
comparison of individual province behavior.  The chapter provides the result of the key 
inquiry whether fiscal transfers to provinces are used for stimulating provincial public 
expenditures or are largely being substituted for provincial fiscal efforts by providing tax 
relief to residents.  The chapter also gives results regarding the effect of conditional 
versus unconditional transfers in terms of accelerating effect on provincial expenditures. 
The similarities and differences in inter provincial fiscal response with various forms of 
transfers are also highlighted to draw the conclusions. 
Chapter-7 Fiscal Equalization 
This chapter examines the implications of intergovernmental fiscal transfer on horizontal 
fiscal equalization in Pakistan. It scrutinizes the effects of overall and various forms of 
federal transfers and grants to see whether or not these are intended to reduce inter 
provincial inequalities in the public service provision. The equalizing role is examined 
for various sources of transfer and grants including its decomposition into conditional 
and unconditional transfers and for each NFC award announced during the period 1972-
2009. 
 
Chapter-8 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter summarizes the main findings of this research. Contributions of research and 
policy implications are also highlighted. This chapter also provides study limitation and 
possible further research for the future in this area.   
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
The term fiscal federalism provides normative framework of functional responsibilities for 
various layers of the public sector in terms of allocation of expenditure and taxation 
assignments. It also deals with the instruments of intergovernmental transfers and 
borrowing powers at varying levels of government.  
This chapter presents a review of the literature on fiscal federalism by covering a variety of 
aspects. Section 2.2 provides brief theory of fiscal decentralization and focuses on the 
principles of expenditure and taxation assignments. An important part in the 
intergovernmental fiscal relation is the system of transfer of payments or grants by which a 
central government shares its revenues with lower levels of governments. Section 2.3 deals 
with issues related to the design and system of intergovernmental transfers.  The term 
Fiscal Equalization refers to reduction in fiscal disparities and inequalities exist among 
federating units by the means of efficient and effective resource allocation by the national 
government. Section 2.4 highlights the important theoretical aspects of redistribution and 
equalization. Most of the empirical research on intergovernmental transfers examines the 
impact of various types of grants on the fiscal behavior of recipient sub-national 
governments. To get an idea regarding the fiscal response, firstly the behavior of 
recipients’ government is conceptually examined in section 2.5 and the relevant empirics 
are then presented in section 2.6. The crux of contemporary and pertinent research on the 
subject of this thesis is provided in section 2.7. 
2.2 Decentralization and Fiscal Federalism  
Several definitions exist for the term “decentralization” in literature. However the most 
general definition is the one defined by Rondinelli and Nellis (1986) who state that 
“decentralization as the transfer of responsibility for planning, management and resource 
raising and allocation from central government and its agencies to the lower levels of 
government”. “Decentralization in fiscal federalism”, according to Oates (1999) is 
concerned with "understanding which functions and instruments are best centralized and 
which are best placed in the sphere of decentralized levels of government".  
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There are two conceptual aspects of decentralization: Revenue and Expenditure 
decentralization. The tax decentralization is reflected by the share of sub-national 
government taxes in the total national taxes. It is a reasonable measure of revenue side 
decentralization in a country where local governments have autonomy to set tax rates and 
tax bases. Expenditure side decentralization refers to the share of sub-national government 
expenditures in total national expenditures. A significant share gives sub-national 
government’s greater say in the level and mix of public services provided (Bird, 2002). 
 
Several arguments have been made in favor of fiscal decentralization, most important 
being that fiscal decentralization positively impacts on economic efficiency, accountability 
and autonomy. With regards to economic efficiency it has been argued that fiscal 
decentralization moves the decentralized government closer to the people, thus enhancing 
efficiency in the provision of public goods.  
It is also argued that decentralized tax structure may enlarge the rate of revenue 
mobilization. As usually more buoyant tax sources like individual and corporate income 
tax, value added tax and excise duties are pre occupied by the centre. Most small firms and 
a good number of individuals particularly self-employed are under-represented due to high 
entry threshold of these taxes. This small tax base can be expanded by local governments 
using variety of instruments due to their familiarity with the local tax base. 
The ‘Welfare Increment Argument’ was put forward by Oates (1972) in his famous 
decentralization theorem which states 
 “In the absence of cost savings of a [local public] good and of inter-jurisdictional 
externalities, the level of welfare will always be at least as high (and typically 
higher) if Pareto-efficient levels of consumption are provided in each jurisdiction 
than if any single, uniform level of consumption is maintained across all 
jurisdictions”. 
 
Thus the efficient and more effective decentralization increase welfare of people though 
three significant outcomes subject to the presence of strong regional and locally elected 
governments. These governments ought to have considerable functional autonomy with 
adequate expenditure responsibilities and taxing and tax administration capacity. These 
conditions are linked to better governance and institutional structure as observed in most 
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advance countries. In decentralized developing and transition countries, these systems are 
found deficient and relatively weak. These outcomes are outlined below.  
• Public needs are managed effectively. 
• Adequate level of public services is provided by governments. As a result people 
are more willing to pay taxes. 
• Autonomy to perform more efficient level of services is assured through 
appropriate assessments of expenditure and tax assignments.  
Still there exist arguments against such claims. The supply efficiency, for example, is 
neglected in the economic efficiency argument made in the favor of decentralization. 
Kranton (1990) and Heggie (1995) point out that the assumption that supply would always 
be efficient is not acceptable as there may also be both cost advantages and disadvantages 
involved in decentralization. If costs of service provision increase as a result of 
decentralization then it would represent a welfare loss in comparison to centralization 
equilibrium. Further, Lkhagvadorj (2010) states that there is no theory that shows evidence 
of any strong relationship between decentralization and economic growth. 
More so the empirical evidence regarding impact of decentralization produces mixed 
results. Crook and Manoor (1998)5
 
 found a positive effect of decentralization on public 
services but more significantly in Indian state of Karnataka. The public rating of service 
improvement levels in Karnataka yielded “good” results ranking whereas similar survey in 
Ghana produced “poor” ranking. The study also reveals that only selective poor groups 
benefit from decentralization. Conveyers (2007) did not find a positive significant 
influence of decentralization on quality of local public services in the case of Sub –Saharan 
Africa. He attributes this to poorly designed government policies and implementation 
mechanism rather than ineffectiveness of decentralization per se.     
Schneider (2003) found no correlation between fiscal decentralization and poor spending 
in his cross country study of 108 countries while Vedeld (2003), on the contrary, found 
little positive linkage between democratic decentralization and short run poverty reduction. 
He reveals that decentralization could only be effective when extended participatory and 
accountability systems are in place which is capable of addressing the local needs and 
reaches the poor. 
                                                          
5 The study covers four countries, State of Karnataka in India, Ghana, Bangladesh and Cote d’Ivoire. 
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Prud’homme (1995) supports the view that local governments are widely found to be 
kleptocratic. This is due to exercise of undue influence and dominance on the power 
structure of local governments by the locally elected politicians. However, Fauguet (2004) 
found the contradictory evidence in case of Bolivia revealing that “local government 
neither found corrupt nor institutionally weak or prone to interest group capture to improve 
upon central government’s allocations of public resources”. His conclusion is based on the 
data of 250 municipalities, which shows that following devolution, local investment in 
human capital and social services in their priority areas changes and increase significantly 
and unambiguously in every municipality.  
Moreover, national priorities for capital investment may not match with the choices of 
local government. Therefore, many proponents of centralization in developing and 
transition economies believe that investment in social services largely being made in an 
identical way in a country. That is why programs that limit the local government autonomy 
in choosing the service levels are proposed. An example of this is being put forward by 
Martinez-Vazquez (1994) for the former Soviet states who recommended the use of 
"expenditure norms" by limiting6
Expenditure decentralization is, however criticized because it usually does not take into 
consideration the obligatory conditions imposed by donor government on transfer and 
grants recipient jurisdictions. In addition, it does not have the dynamism to account for 
seasonal or yearly variations in local autonomy that might have an effect. 
 local autonomy to guide budgets.  It is also suggested by 
Musgrave (1959) that a trio of economic justifications should be for public sector 
involvement in the economy, which include economic stabilization, redistribution of 
income and allocation of goods and services to prevent market failures. Thus, it is 
generally argued that the central government has an advantage in the first two of these 
functions whereas sub-national governments can provide many public services more 
efficiently (Musgrave 1959, McLure and Martinez-Vazquez 2000).  
Bahl and Nath (1986) and Davoodi and Zou (1998) compared the level of expenditure 
decentralization among countries; their findings are summarized as under:  
                                                          
6 This was recommended as clear assignments of expenditure responsibilities to sub-national governments was lacking  in 
the earlier years of transition in Russia and associated other countries which caused inefficiency and instability. In earlier 
years most central governments were busy in reworking allocation of fiscal assignments in order to control fiscal deficit. 
As formal expenditure assignments are necessary for budget planning in decentralized countries (McLure & Martinez-
Vazquez 2000). 
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• Industrialized countries are about twice as decentralized as developing countries 
(Bahl and Nath 1986). The finding of Davoodi and Zou (1998) show (33% vs 20%) 
respectively for the industrialized and developing countries.  
• Decentralization and level of economic growth are positively correlated in both 
industrialized and developing countries (Bahl and Nath 1986). On the contrast 
Davoodi and Zou (1998) found a negative association in the case of developing 
countries and none for industrialized countries.   
• Large7 geographical area and heterogeneity in populations or in culture8
• Countries exposed to war or threats of war are more centralized. 
 and 
religion causes countries to be more decentralized (Bahl and Nath 1986).  
An overview of the dynamics of expenditure and revenue assignments under various 
arrangements of fiscal federalism and decentralization are discussed below. 
2.2.1 Expenditure Assignment 
The allocation of expenditure assignment is the first and basic step in the design of a 
decentralized system of intergovernmental finances (McLure and Marinez-Vazquez, 
1999). The traditional approach is that local governments should be assigned allocative 
expenditure activities on the benefit principle (Musgrave 1959).  In other words a given 
service should be provided by a level of government that most closely represents the 
region that benefits from such service9. However, many public goods do not clearly 
categories as either pure local good or national good due to its unclear benefit regions, 
externalities or nationwide re-distributional implications. Education and health are 
examples of these mixed goods that carry both local and national importance. . For such 
goods, decentralization to some extent along with some centralized policy coordination is 
both desirable and feasible (Ahmad, Hewitt and Ruggiero, 1997).  Expenditures 
undertaken by government for equity are generally thought to be the domain of the central 
government. Local redistribution programs will attract the poor from other areas and 
distract the rich who must bear the additional tax burden (Oates, 1999)]10
                                                          
7 Examples of large decentralized countries are China, Russia, India, Brazil, South Africa and Nigeria. Advance 
industrialized countries include, USA, Canada, Germany and Australia. 
. Moreover such 
8 A good example of a decentralized country having population of diverse culture and religion is India. 
9 Under benefit principle, local public goods (primary education, primary health, water supply, street lights etc.) should 
be provided by the local government and the national public goods (like defense, international trade, foreign relations, 
currency, etc.), by the central government. 
10 For US, Feldstein and Wrobel [1998] have shown that redistributory measures of state governments have resulted in 
inefficient locational decisions and thus deadweight losses. 
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spending will be sub-optimal due to the external benefits conferred on other jurisdictions in 
shape of reduced number of poor residents (Brown and Oates, 1987). Also such spending 
will be sub-optimal as the exodus of poor population from migrant jurisdictions conferred 
external benefits to them without sharing the cost burden (Brown and Oates, 1987). 
The best expenditure assignments should change over time with changes in costs, 
technology and preferences. Some local public services, e.g., primary education and 
primary health services may also be considered a responsibility of the central government 
because of their relevance in welfare and income redistribution. These expenditures co-
sharing without clear demarcation of intra-sectoral responsibilities are likely to cause 
confusion leading to inefficiencies and under provisions. This suggests that wherever co-
sharing is warranted, it should be accompanied with clarity in expenditure assignments 
across various levels of governments. This may also help in devising a clear revenue 
assignment or stable system of intergovernmental transfers between different layers of 
governments. 
Unclear expenditure assignment may cause adhoc transfer of responsibilities and may 
become a source of conflict between the central and sub-national governments. With a 
vague expenditure assignment, it is the revenue availability that dictates the responsibilities 
of each level of government. As a consequence, the inefficient provision of public services 
may result. The conceptual basis of expenditure assignment with respect to the provision 
of policy design and administration oversights by levels of governments is provided in 
Table 2.A which is reproduced form (Shah, 1994). 
2.2.2 Revenue Assignment 
On the revenue side, standard optimal tax theory proposes that lower levels of government 
should tax mobile tax bases with a benefit tax and tax non-mobile tax bases with a non-
benefit tax11
                                                          
11 Non benefit taxes are those which impose on ability to pay principle whose description is that, the amount of tax 
payment should be equivalent to taxpayers’ level of economic wellbeing. Non-benefit taxation of mobile tax units is 
better suited for the central level of government. .Benefits tax principle states that citizens who derive greater benefit for 
a service should also pay more in taxes to the government. Capital or corporate income is an example of mobile tax base 
and property and natural resource and taxes imposed upon them are non-mobile tax bases.  
.  The famous Tiebout model is the most well known application of distortions 
inherent benefit and non-benefit taxation. For decentralization to be successful, sub-
national governments should empower enough self financing capabilities for delivering 
regional and local public services considerably. The tax assignment problem involves the 
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debate which revenues should be assigned to local governments and which taxes should 
remain with the national or central government. Thus it is vital to explore which revenue 
sources are appropriate for sub-national governments given their economic, institutional 
and demographic distinctiveness.  
In this regards, Musgrave [1983] highlights following points in revenue assignments: 
• Sub national government should avoid taxation on mobile bases. As taxes that do 
not represent benefits derived might have cause locational displacement of 
economic activity.  
• Sub-national governments may refrain herself by imposing progressive tax 
structure particularly when income redistribution function is centralized. As 
progressive tax structure would led to cause investments, capital and more 
productive human resource away from sub-national location. 
• For efficient allocation of resources, sub-national governments should finance 
services through benefit taxes on their citizens. Few examples of sub-national taxes 
and user charges are: motor vehicle tax, land tax, irrigation charges, and license 
fees. 
• Sub-national governments require adequate resources if critical re-distributional 
services like education and healthcare are assigned to them. The potential own 
revenue sources to meet this objective could be: income tax (piggy backing), sales 
tax and general business taxes. Since as a rule, finance follows functions, the 
appropriate allocations of revenue sources would depend upon level of functional 
responsibilities at sub-national levels. 
• The allocation of revenue assignments at sub-national level must protect the central 
government stabilization objectives. The system should have a built-in flexibility to 
accommodate counter-cyclical rate adjustments in order to avoid undue use of sub-
national government fiscal power. 
• Uneven distribution of tax bases between sub-national jurisdictions causes citizens 
of one jurisdiction to bear undue burden of taxes levied by the other sub-national 
jurisdiction. One of the prime examples in practice is taxation of natural resources. 
In Pakistan for example, revenues from gas production royalties and development 
surcharges are fully transferred to provinces on collection principle. These taxes 
translate into nationwide gas prices which are similar across provinces and that puts 
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extra tax burden on citizens and businesses in gas deficient provinces. More-or-less 
similar practices can also cited in case of countries like India, Nigeria, Brazil, USA 
and Australia for the petroleum and other natural resources.  
There are many options available while deciding about the financing design of sub-
national governments. In different environments different taxes are suitable. As a rule, 
Bahl (1999) states that “…the tax must be visible to local voters, large enough to impose a 
noticeable burden, and the burden must not be easily exported to residents outside the jurisdiction”. 
In the light of the laid down principles put forward for allocation and design of taxation 
assignments at different levels of government the following summary emerge: (Musgrave 
1983, Bhal 1999) 
• Taxes should be assigned to each level of governments on the basis of derived 
benefits from its expenditures, which in turn related to their expenditure 
responsibilities. 
• The central government should take care of expenditures that have spill over 
benefits across jurisdictions or having significant economies of scale.  
• Sub national governments at its own may concentrate on provision of goods and 
services that may have narrow inter jurisdictional implications on benefits spill 
over and on economies of scale. 
There is broader agreement in the literature that value added tax (VAT), international trade 
tax, corporate and personal income taxes are most appropriately assigned to the central 
government (McLure, 1994, 1998; Musgrave, 1983). A basic rational for this rule is that 
extensive administrative capabilities are required to operate these taxes12. It is also 
emphasized that the VAT conforms to destination principle13
                                                          
12 Despite the strong arguments in favor of VAT collection at national basis, in some countries it is also collected at local 
level like for example in Brazil. In Brazil this has led to administrative problems and to economic distortions [Ter-
Minassian, 1997b]. 
. Border control between 
jurisdictions is required for implementation of this principle if the tax is to be levied by 
sub-national governments requiring large administrative costs. Another question in this 
regard is who should receive the revenues from VAT on imports and who should bear the 
13 Destination principle means that the tax is levied by the jurisdiction in which consumption takes place as opposed to 
the origin principle, according to which the VAT is levied by the jurisdiction in which production takes place 
[Norregaard, 1997]. 
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burden of VAT refunds on exports. Therefore, it is recommended that comprehensive 
VAT’s should be collected by the central government14
If VAT is collected at the national level with a uniform rate and the base structure, sharing 
of revenue on a derivation basis may not be suitable. Derivation principle would benefit 
resource rich and processing areas more while exporting jurisdictions’ those located in the 
zero-rated area would accumulate small net revenue (McLure, 1994)
.  
15
Barring some exception, mostly personal income taxes are levied at the central level. The 
diversity in assignment is due to the fact that there are both advantages and the 
disadvantages associated with the tax. Among the advantages are the facts that it can be 
relatively easy to administer, it can be linked to the central government income tax bases
. Piggybacking by 
sub-national governments can be a good option conditional to the good central 
administration and a uniform tax base. However, as these conditions usually are not 
available in many developing countries so this option may not be workable. 
16 
and it is resident-based17
                                                          
14 In China and Russia, import VAT goes to central government and domestic VAT is shared with the sub-national 
governments [Norregaard, 1997a]. 
. Moreover there are major administrative problems with taxing 
the self-employed and small businesses, which results in revenue losses. However it is 
plausible to assume that local governments may have relatively more information about 
small businesses and therefore in a better position to exploit this tax base more efficiently. 
(Norregaard, 1997). Among the criticisms of using personal income tax at sub-national 
level is the fact that depending on the level of tax threshold many people may not pay the 
tax, although they receive the local services. Moreover, the more developed the country, 
the higher is the likelihood that individuals receive income from different sources derived 
from different jurisdictions (Norregaard, 1997). More importantly, it should be the central 
government prerogative if revenues are shared with the intention for redistribution and 
stabilization policy. 
15 Central government in China paid the zero rating credits thus problems associated with VAT sharing on derivation 
basis are somewhat reduced. Nevertheless in some Chinese provinces protectionist policies are still pursued.    
16  Local governments in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland and Iceland piggyback on the federal income tax [Lotz, 
1997b]. 
17 Resident-based taxation ensures that this tax is in accordance with the principle of benefit taxation i.e. burdened of tax 
falls upon those who benefit from the local services financed from this taxation. 
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Ideally excises, retail sales taxes, property and land taxes, motor vehicles and user charges 
meets the tests of a good sub-national tax. However, property tax collections are meager in 
developing countries18
A schematic view of tax assignment which is proposed by Bird and Smart (2010) is 
reproduced in Table 2.1, while summary of conceptual basis of tax assignment to different 
levels of governments with respect to the distinction in administrative responsibilities is  
furnished  in Table 2.B of the appendix. This summary is taken from Shah (1994). 
 mainly due to the problems with its application (Dillinger, 1994). 
Table  2.1 Tax Assignment in a Federal State: The Standard Approach 
Revenues Type Center State/Province Local 
Personal Income Taxes Yes Possible Piggyback No 
Payroll Taxes Yes Possible Piggyback No 
Enterprise Profit taxes Yes No No 
Natural Resource Taxes Yes Limited No 
Value Added Taxes Yes No No 
Retail Sales Taxes Yes Yes No 
Custom Duties Yes No No 
Excise Taxes Yes Possible Piggyback No 
Property Taxes No No Yes 
Source:  Adapted from Bird and Smart (2010) 
 
In the next section, intergovernmental fiscal transfers are examined especially to reveal the 
sub-national government fiscal response to transfers and grants with special reference to 
study hypothesis. 
2.3 Intergovernmental Transfers 
Inter governmental transfers are the major source of sub-national government financing in 
majority of developing and transition countries.  After agreement on the expenditure 
assignments it is important to determine how the financing of these services may be 
insured. For this purpose level of taxation power and design of intergovernmental transfers 
for the sub-national levels of governments are critical aspects of financing. Transfers is one 
way to ascertain some centralize control on the overall public financing system besides 
channeling funds to the budgets of regional and local governments. These transfers are 
generally channel through various public financing instruments like intergovernmental tax 
                                                          
18 Collections are rarely more than one percent of total national revenues and about 3 percent of the GDP [Norregaard, 
1997]. 
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sharing, grants (conditional and unconditional) subsidies and subventions. An appropriate 
design for intergovernmental transfers is important due to the following reasons: 
• First, sub-national governments’ revenue raising powers are inadequate due to their 
limited access to more productive and buoyant tax bases. As a result own source 
revenues fell short of meeting their expenditure obligations. The resulting gap 
(Vertical Imbalances) may be bridged through three possible ways. First, either 
reducing sub-national governments’ expenditure obligation. Second, by enhancing 
their fiscal powers and third, by transferring funds from upper level of 
governments. It is difficult however, to enhance the sub-national governments own 
source revenue powers due to stabilization or administrative considerations. 
Expenditure responsibilities also may not be assigned to upper level because it may 
reduce the local governments’ responsiveness to local demands due to interrelated 
nature of development activities especially in urban areas (Bahl and Linn, 1992). 
Thus, transfers are often the most suitable option to remove vertical imbalance. 
disparity 
• Second, sub-national governments own source revenue mobilization capability 
(fiscal capacity), differs across same levels creating Horizontal Imbalances.  So 
there can be substantial inter jurisdictional disparity in the quantity and quality of 
public services.  Intergovernmental grants can help mitigate these horizontal 
imbalances. Boadway and Flatters (1982) argued in favor of horizontal equalization 
to reduce differences in the level and quality of public services to the poorer 
jurisdictions in comparison to richer jurisdictions which generally have 
comparative advantage due to their better location and resource endowments. As 
Mieszkowsli and Musgrave (1999) noted, there are two views about equalization. 
First view seeks to equalize fiscal performance of each jurisdiction at a common 
tax rate, while the second point of view seeks to equalize the services in each 
jurisdiction. 
• Third, some services yield benefits or impose costs to other jurisdictions. As a 
result these services are under provided by the jurisdictions that generate positive 
externalities for the other jurisdictions without imposing the costs on their residents 
(Musgrave and Musgrave, 1984). For example, environment related health services 
or education services may generate significant spillover benefits for adjacent 
jurisdictions. However as Samuelson (1955) argued that for the efficient allocation 
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of the public goods, the marginal costs of service provision to residents should be 
equal to marginal benefits they derived from this service. Therefore in order to 
ensure optimal service provision, central government may provide conditional 
grant to sub-national governments for its utilization on services generating 
spillovers and that may also carry high central priority. 
Fourth, it is generally thought that central government usually has better tax administration 
capabilities to assess and collect taxes more efficiently. It can be true for many buoyant 
taxes, such as, value added tax, income tax, custom duties, excise taxes. However sub-
national governments do have a comparative advantage in collecting taxes of local origin 
such as property and land taxes and various user charges and fee due to their better 
knowledge of tax bases. 
2.3.1 The Design and Framework of Intergovernmental Transfer System 
Intergovernmental grants are intended to improve the operation of a federal system and 
have become an important source of sub-national government revenues.  The presence of 
vertical fiscal imbalance offers one justification for intergovernmental grants19
Conditional grants are directed at specific, narrowly defined activities and are distributed 
either through formulas or specific by project with or without any matching requirements. 
This grant usually serves to achieve efficiency
.  In general 
these grants are of two types, conditional (categorical) grants or unconditional grants. 
20
Unconditional grants are generally extended without any strings attached to its use by the 
recipient governments. These are broad functional grants tend to be distributed by statutory 
formula or some ad-hoc or discretionary basis by the donor governments. These may be 
considered grant of choice for equalization purposes. Further both conditional and 
unconditional grants are either mandatory or discretionary. Mandatory grants are rule 
based regulatory grants extended on the basis of laid down criteria with legal entitlement 
and timely and assured availability. The magnitude of grant and criterion of its provision 
are legally assured. On the contrary, discretionary grants and its size or level of grants are 
 objectives 
                                                          
19Correction of externalities, tax structure substitution, and macroeconomic stability are among other rationales for the 
distribution of intergovernmental grants (Fisher 1996). 
20 In case of South Africa Makube (2010) pointed out options for the service delivery improvements through the use of 
conditional grants which was recommended by South Africa National Treasury. Conditional grants should serves to 
promote innovation through appropriate incentives support for better and improved public service delivery amongst the 
sub-national governments.  
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not determined by rules but as name suggests it is largely ad hoc and more often temporary 
in character.  
Three issues; determination of grant pool, allocation of grant pool and condition of its use 
must be evaluated while designing any transfer system. These aspects are briefly discussed 
in the following sub-sections. 
2.3.2 Determination of Grant Pool 
Literature describes three methods for determining the size of the grant pool:   
Rule-based pre-defined determination: in which the pool is based on a specific portion of 
the central revenues. Certainty is the main advantage of this scheme.  Furthermore 
buoyancy also results if pool is tied to buoyant revenue sources.  However, inflexibility in 
this method, particularly when large portion of national revenues are transferred to sub-
national governments, may cause less centralized control over macroeconomic and fiscal 
policies. 
Sub-national spending plan dependent: in which total transfers are based on sub-national 
governments’ spending plans.  The pool can either be closed-ended or open-ended. Closed-
ended pool imposed maximum ceilings on the amount of funds available while the size of 
open-ended pool is decided using only the approved spending plan.  However, such feature 
of transfer design may be dangerous in case of expenditure restraint. 
The third method of quantifying the size of the grant pool is rather ad hoc and based on the 
central government annual budget. This approach provides maximum flexibility to the 
central government to adjust quickly in response to underline economic situation. 
However, it may cause budgetary cuts which may create uncertainty for the sub-national 
governments to adhere to their planned spending.  
2.3.3 Allocation of Divisible Pool 
Allocation of funds among sub-national governments may be done in one or the 
combination of following different ways: 
One is the system of tax sharing transfers in which taxes are transferred following origin 
base tax collection principle.  Although this approach is likely to be preferred by resource 
rich and better endowed sub-national governments due its more elastic impact but it is 
characterized by counter-equalizing.  
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Another system is formula-based transfer arrangement in which specific proportion of 
national divisible pool taxes are transfer to sub-national jurisdictions on the basis of pre 
specified formula. Though, this involves transparency there may be lack of timely and 
adequate transfers. For this system to be effective, the formula must not be complex and 
should include an important measure of relative demand for services, e.g., due to high 
population. Other measures which are usually employed include; fiscal capacity21
The third system is cost-sharing transfers which are designed to reimburse recipient 
governments costs on particular priority activities. These transfers may involve either total 
or partial cost sharing (matching grant) or either restricted to a pertinent sector or for the 
other specific purpose uses. Matching grant has the advantage of encouraging sub-national 
governments to mobilize their own resources. Nonetheless, this also offsets the incentive to 
substitute grants for own source revenues
, tax 
effort, and geographical area. In addition, a formula should not encourage 
“grantsmanship”, i.e. underestimation of revenues or overestimation of expenditures or 
expenditure profligacy on part of sub-national governments. 
22
Ad-hoc transfers are the fourth type of transfers; this depends on the discretion of the 
granting government. Given the arbitrary nature of these transfer it lack transparency and 
may trigger uncertainty for the recipient governments. 
. Full cost reimbursement grants greatly reduce 
sub-national autonomy and incentives for resource mobilization arbitrary. 
General purpose allocation permits full spending discretion to the receipts. Sectorally 
limited block allocations permit recipients to utilize it within a particular sector given their 
own priority needs. These grants are more appropriate for spillover services. Specific 
purpose grants are highly restrictive and can only be use for the purposes it provided. 
2.3.4 Suggested Criteria for Grant Allocation 
Resources should be allocated by taking into account a comprehensive integrated formula-
based mechanism. There are some desirable features for allocating grants that should be 
considered when evaluating various grant mechanisms, otherwise appropriate service 
provision may be jeopardized. 
                                                          
21 Tax effort is usually measured by tax to gross regional product (GRP) ratio and fiscal capacity by GRP that may reflect 
development status of a region. 
22 However, sub-national governments may raise only the required amount for receiving matching grant. For US, Bezdek 
[1986] reports that state-local governments spend only the minimum amount necessary to receive the maximum federal 
grant in four of the eleven programs which accounted for 46 percent of total state-local expenditures on programs with 
matching requirements. 
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Transfers should provide adequate resources to cover unmet revenue need with proper 
growth over time. It should be based on simple formula ensuring certainty and 
transparency to promote better fiscal planning. Transfers should not jeopardize recipient 
government autonomy for its use of their own priorities provided that there are no 
spillovers. Thus criterion of allocative efficiency should be fulfilled. Further transfer 
promotes inter-jurisdictional equity i.e. to ensure horizontal equalization to distribute 
resources across jurisdictions. Therefore transfers should be allocated keeping in view 
differences in expenditure needs and fiscal capacity.  Nonetheless, there is no consensus 
that what measures need and what constitutes fiscal capacity. In addition, the design of 
transfer should not permit recipient governments to consider transfers as substitutes for 
their own revenue effort to seek political gains by reducing sub-national taxes. 
These objectives are often in conflict with each other for example, encouraging spending 
on spillovers can conflict with the objective of sub-national spending autonomy.  
Similarly, rewarding sub-national resource mobilization can result in further horizontal 
imbalances. Therefore, constructing a grant system requires a careful consideration of the 
tradeoffs among the various goals the system is to attain. Furthermore, the macroeconomic 
implications of redistributions and fiscal equalization should also be paid due attention. 
2.4 Redistribution and Equalization 
Equalization of resources and redistribution are the major concerns of intergovernmental 
transfer systems. However, there is no universal definition of fiscal equalization.  
According to Mieszkowski and Musgrave (1999), fiscal equalization is defined either 
through the use of equalizing fiscal performance of the sub-national jurisdictions at a 
common tax rate. An alternative view is based on the principle of equal treatment of equals 
regardless of where they live.  The first view is known as "fiscal capacity equalization23
                                                          
23 Generally advance countries or countries having higher level of decentralization with significant fiscal autonomy 
usually follow this approach.  
", 
which is widely practiced in U.S and Canada. The alternative is called "horizontal equity 
equalization". Many countries using intergovernmental transfers for equalization purposes 
usually adopt any of the two approaches. The end objective is to ensure a certain minimum 
level of public service in the recipient sub-national jurisdictions by equalizing fiscal 
capacity or by equalizing actual spending on that service. The issues related to vertical and 
horizontal equalization are briefly discussed below. 
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2.4.1 Vertical Balance 
The issue of vertical inequities is the outcome of the expenditure and revenue assignment 
decisions. Bird (2002) defines vertical imbalance as the difference between expenditures 
and own source revenues at different levels of government.  It is observed generally that in 
many developing countries sub-national governments have limited fiscal power which is 
insufficient to finance their expenditure needs for the allocated services. 
A good measure of vertical imbalance and method for correction should be evaluated for 
removing this imbalance. A simple indicator of vertical fiscal balance is the ratio of own 
source revenues to current expenditures of different sub-national governments. Ahmed and 
Craig (1997) computed such ratios in case of some federal and unitary countries. Their 
results generally showed that local governments self financing of their expenditures were 
very limited. 
This indicator may result in lower ratios due to recipient governments’ mismatch of 
expenditures and revenues and/or due to under exploitation of their own tax bases. 
Similarly, high ratios do not show whether spending is of adequate level. Therefore more 
appropriate measure will be a ratio of spending necessary for some minimal standard of 
service provision to fiscal capacity (Schroeder and Smoke, 2002). However, the correct 
assessment of fiscal capacity is difficult due to severe data limitations. 
Many governments statutorily set aside a certain proportion of all or some of central 
revenues for sub-national governments. Transferring a fixed share involve less fiscal 
flexibility available to the central government and greater certainty about funds for sub-
national governments. However, an undesirable effect of allocating some revenue sources 
for sharing is that the donor government may choose to do greater fiscal efforts on taxes 
outside the purview of sharing formula and hence vertical balance is further deteriorated. 
Finally, a grant mechanism using only gap-filling approach is not theoretically preferable 
from a macroeconomic perspective. Such “gap financing” has strong incentives for 
expenditure profligacy. To overcome this problem some governments require centralized 
approval of sub-national budgets but this is not without cost and efficiency implications. 
2.4.2 Horizontal Equalization 
Inter-jurisdictional differences in wealth, income, or consumption result in differential 
abilities for sub-national governments to raise revenues. This difference in fiscal capacity 
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among same tier governments is called horizontal imbalance. Federal government usually 
aims to bring all sub-national governments at such a fiscal position that a standard 
minimum set of services could be provided. Horizontal equalization is crucial to level the 
playing field for poorer jurisdictions. It is also required to offset the distorted locational 
incentives available to richer jurisdictions (Boadway and Flatters, 1982). However, there is 
no consensus in the literature as what are the best measures of need and capacity. 
Therefore designing a system that incorporates horizontal equalization is a thorny issue. 
Fiscal equalization is approached either through the use of equalizing fiscal capacity of 
each sub-national jurisdiction at an average tax rate or to equalize level of public services 
across sub-national jurisdictions. First approach of equalization concentrates on the 
differential fiscal capacities and seeks for relatively greater transfers to localities with 
lower fiscal capacities. Generally level of gross regional product is commonly used to 
assess the fiscal capacity of each jurisdiction.24
The listing of revenue sources should include all legally assigned taxes with common 
definition of revenue base. In some cases common definitions can create difficulties, for 
example, if residential based property taxes in one jurisdiction are based entirely on site-
values while in other jurisdiction based on the cost of land and improvements. Clark 
(1997) suggests that a “weighted average” of the bases be used in such instances. Given 
the complications involved with constructing a representative tax system, few countries 
also utilize tax capacity from a particular base as an alternative measure for general fiscal 
capacity.  
. Alternatively, revenue raising capacity of 
each sub-national tier is assessed based on the average standard tax rate of all jurisdictions. 
Second approach towards horizontal equalization considers differences on the basis of 
varying fiscal needs of sub-national jurisdiction and transfer relatively higher amount to 
jurisdictions which have a higher horizontal imbalance.  Rye and Searle (1997) argued that 
a standard basket of public service needs must be specified first for each jurisdiction25
                                                          
24GRP may not reflect the actual differential fiscal capacities since the level of economic production in one locality is not 
necessarily equal to the income flowing to the local factors that created that production due to outside residence of 
some factors. Moreover, reasonably accurate measures of gross regional product are often not available in developing 
countries.  
. 
Certainly, there may be differences in the cost of provision of this standard basket across 
25Schroeder and Smoke [2002] note that given difficulties in conceptualizing and measuring capital deficiencies, it may 
be preferable to exclude capital spending from equalization effort and rely on specific purpose capital grants to target 
infrastructure deficiencies. 
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jurisdictions due to differential in prices as well as disparity in population density, 
topology of area and in extent of inefficiency.  
Indicators like population, backwardness, and area are also used to assess fiscal needs. 
Using population based assessment as a criterion reduces the extensive requirement of the 
pertinent data. It allocates an equal per capita in each jurisdiction. In contrast, there may be 
disagreement over what constitutes backwardness because it is conceptually a relative 
phenomenon. Consideration of area may be justified due to the fact that per capita cost of 
service provision is greater in vast areas.  
In some countries (for example, in the Philippines) a portion of grant funds are distributed 
on an equal-share basis. One rationale for this feature is that there are fixed cost 
requirements that do not differ substantially. Ahmad and Craig (1997) articulate for the 
allocation of specific grants across localities that would be indicative of the area relative 
needs. 
Equalization goals, allocation factors and international practices of fiscal equalization in 
the design of intergovernmental fiscal transfers of various countries are elaborated in 
tabular form by Boex and Martinez, (2004), which is reproduced in Table 2.C in the 
appendix.  
2.4.3 Behavior of the Sub-national Governments 
In a decentralize system of governance an important policy dimension for the sub-national 
jurisdiction is to decide whether to pursue its own policy objectives or compromise it by 
facilitating centralize policy preferences to a certain extent.  Thus, it is imperative for the 
donor government to keep an eye on the behavior of the sub-national governments to 
ascertain what policy objective is being followed.  In a multiple jurisdiction, where 
compound policy mix are practiced, the problem is how to get sub-national governments to 
trade one policy for another in a way that will attain the national objective (Hanf and 
Toonen, 1985). Various studies have been conducted on the behavior of the state 
governments. One class of studies focuses at the state’s decision of aid to local 
governments. Islam (1998), Ladd (1991), Yinger and Ladd (1989), Bradbury, Ladd, 
Perrault, Reschovsky and Yinger (1984), Craig and Inman (1982, 1986 are examples of 
this kind of empirical studies for the US. Another class of studies concentrates on the 
effects of federal grants at state revenues and expenditures are by Lee and Vaultion (2012), 
Gorden (2004), Grossman (1989). 
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However, an extensive literature is on the fiscal response of federating units, especially on 
the issue that whether sub-national governments spend more out of resident’s income or 
federal grants. Following subsections provide abstract of this literature. 
2.4.4 Flypaper Effect 
Bradford and Oates’ (1971) equivalence theorem states that a lump-sum grant to a sub-
national jurisdiction is equivalent to a highly specific program of individual tax reductions 
by the central government, not simply in the sense that programs generate the same 
provision of public good, for in addition they generate precisely the same after tax income 
for each member. However the proposition that the allocative and distributional 
consequences of an increased lump-sum grant and increased personal income of the 
inhabitants of the sub-national unit are same is controversial. Fly paper has been explained 
in different frameworks. These include fiscal illusion, mechanisms of public choice and 
fiscal competition.  
 
Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfield (1979) and Oates (1979) explain this phenomenon in 
terms of perceived prices of local public expenditure.  They argued that existence of 
flypaper effect hinges upon whether or not voter or public officials perceive the price of 
public expenditures is an average price rather than a marginal price.  In both these models 
increase in lump-sum grants would result fly paper effect even if this grant increase is 
compensated through equivalent rise in federal tax collection. This reduces the average 
price and thus increases the demand for local public goods. 
 
Criticizing earlier models, Filimon, Romer and Rosenthal (1982) present the grant-illusion 
model in which the amount of intergovernmental aid is under-perceived by individuals (or 
hidden by the officials). Therefore their desired expenditure is based upon this wrong 
perception. Public officials are assumed to be budget maximizing, spend this as well as any 
other unperceived aid. Thus aid generates more public spending then resident’s income. 
Here, individuals misperceive the amount of aid due to their lack of information about the 
actual magnitude of intergovernmental aid. However, after empirical investigation 
Filimon, Romer and Rosenthal (1982) claimed their model superiority over the earlier two 
models. 
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Romer and Rosenthal (1980) through public choice mechanism present an institutional 
theory of the effects of grants. They argued that budget maximizing officials offer specific 
amount of public expenditure to the voters who if declined have to accept an exogenously 
set reversion of expenditure amount. Romer and Rosenthal (1980) show that if this 
reversion amount is greater than the median optimal expenditure at the increased income, 
then the lump-sum grant will increase expenditure proportional to its size, while an 
increase in resident income would have no effect on public expenditures.  
 
Fiscal competition in a decentralized system improves the accountability of governments 
to their system but also negatively affect the level and pattern of economic activity, Oates 
(2005). In fiscal competition, jurisdiction compete for relatively mobile capital resources 
and government intervention is desirable in a way that it could collect taxes from the 
mobile tax bases and allocate corrective matching grants to jurisdictions that are losers 
from such competition (Cai and Treisman, 2004). In addition Baretti, Huber and Lichtblaw 
(2002), highlighted that when state income rises, a system of equalizing transfers imposes 
a penalty on the state if transfers are reduced when tax revenue rise. This creates an 
incentive for the grant recipient jurisdiction as the jurisdiction avoids this penalty by 
slacking the enforcement of federal tax regulations; this weakens the federal government’s 
ability to use transfers to counter any externalities created by inter jurisdictional 
competition. Expenditure competition between jurisdictions worsens redistributive 
outcomes in these jurisdictions and raises the question of the appropriate form of 
intervention by the federal government in such situation. Revenue sharing is recommended 
as it is on net encourages regions to raise their taxes but expenditure sharing is 
recommended for correcting the externalities created by competition on public expenditure 
among jurisdiction (Figuieres, Hindriks and Myles, 2004). 
There is some estimation problem in measuring fly paper effect which arises due to the use 
of various functional forms. The more often cited problem is treating all grants as lump 
sum grants while there are some matching grants. This is because of difficulty in 
separating both grants (see for example Fisher, 1982) or treating all grants as exogenous. 
Fisher (1980) also show that if revenue sharing grants allocation has some tax effort 
element then these grants can have substitution effect, which if neglected can result in 
large income effects. Linear and logarithmic estimation has also resulted in different 
magnitude of grants and income. McGuire (1978) found flypaper effect and Zampelli 
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(1986) none just because of different functional forms in their otherwise similar studies. 
Chernick (1979) illustrates another source of bias in flypaper estimation. He argued that 
budget maximizer bureaucrats increase the level of public output by favoring jurisdictions 
offering higher self-financing. This may result simultaneity in the federal and local 
decisions and matching rates are not exogenous for the local governments. Therefore, 
simple OLS estimation may give results that show excessive simulative effect of federal 
grants. Alternatively, instrumental variable technique may be used. 
 
Various empirical studies have examined the phenomenon of fly paper effect. Aragon 
(2013), Sour (2013), Islam and Chaudhry (1989) and Stine (1985) have found that 
expenditure response of local governments to unconditional grants is greater than the equal 
increase in personal income of residents. Cournat, Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1979) term 
this stimulative effect of intergovernmental grants as “flypaper Effect”  money sticks 
where it hits i.e. money given to local governments remains with them and is not used to 
decrease tax liabilities. Other studies which include Amusa, Mabunda and Mabugu (2008), 
Becker (1996), Megdal (1986), Zampelli (1986) have contended the proposition that sub-
national governments spend more out of unconditional grants. They found little or no 
evidence in support of flypaper effect. The evidence of flypaper effect can be seen in the 
summary table 2.3, where one can observe the presence of fly paper effects by comparing 
coefficients of unconditional grants and income. Detailed results of various forms of 
intergovernmental grants and transfers to both developing and advance countries are 
reported in Appendix26
2.4.5 Soft Budget Constraint 
 table 2.D. 
Decentralization of this allocation function in public service provision enhances the 
efficiency in public sector (Oates, 1972). But to cover the fiscal gap which rises due to 
insufficient revenue capacity of lower-level jurisdiction to meet expenditures, federal 
government use inter governmental transfers. These transfers create soft budget constraint 
if not designed appropriately and expectations that the federal government will “bail out” 
the falling sub-national governments. Inter governmental mechanisms at best provide 
revenue support to local government without creating the expectations of a bail out in case 
the costs to the federal government are significant enough to warrant a federal bailout?  
                                                          
26  This table partly adopted from Gamkhar and Shah Chapter 8, “The Impact of Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers: A 
Synthesis of the Conceptual and Empirical Literature, (eds.) Robin Boadway and Anwar Shah “Intergovernmental Fiscal 
Transfers: Principles and Practice” The World Bank, Washington DC..  
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Oates (2005) and, Ihori and Itaya (2004) examined various arguments favoring a bailout. 
Also the study by Ihori and Itaya (2004) examined these options as experienced in Japan. 
Authors recommend a revenue sharing system to stop the rent-seeking and free riding 
behavior of sub national government that creates soft budget constraint.  
2.5 Review of Empirical Studies 
Most of the empirical research on intergovernmental transfers examined the impact of 
grants on sub-national and/or local government behavior primarily in the context of local 
governments spending and own source revenues. In this section, a selected review of 
research analyzing effects of various types of unconditional27 and conditional28
2.5.1 Unconditional Grants 
 grants on 
sub-national government spending, own source revenue behavior and empirics of fiscal 
equalization is presented in a summary Table 2.3; a schematic view of major findings are 
furnished in Table 2.D in the appendix. 
Various empirical studies have examined the effects of unconditional grants on the sub-
national governments’ expenditure behavior.  Aragon (2013) examined Peru, while Sour 
(2013) studied Mexico; Lee and Vuletin (2012) looked at the case of China while Amusa, 
Mabunda, and Mabugu (2008) looked at South Africa to examine the effects of 
unconditional transfers on the sub-national governments expenditure behavior. All these 
studies found inelastic spending response to fiscal transfers’ implying that sub-national 
governments have partly utilized intergovernmental transfer receipts for providing tax 
relief to their residents. However the extent of fungibility vary across countries with the 
highest provision of resident tax relief (at 52%) being in  South Africa while the minimum 
is in Peru which ranges between 6% to 25% depending upon the use of two techniques,  
OLS and TSLS (see Table 2.3).   
Dahlberg, Maork, Rattso & Agren (2006) analysed discontinuity in the Swedish grant 
system where municipalities who observed net out migration rate of above 2 percent are 
entitled for grant receipts; whereas all remaining municipalities do not qualify for these 
grants. The study result supported the fly paper effect for Sweden as crowding in federal 
grants shifted more local spending without reducing local taxes. 
                                                          
27 These include general purpose open ended grants, lump-sum and revenue sharing transfers and grants. 
28 Specific purpose open ended grant and specific purpose closed ended grants 
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Deller and Maher (2005) in case of local government29 of Wisconsin, Canada examined if 
“local government treat state grant during periods of stability and instability in a systematic 
manner” The empirical research indicates that different category of expenditures30
Bergstorm, Dahlberg & Mork (2004) studied the effects of federal grant on municipal 
employment situation (proxy for municipal expenditures) when federal grants changes 
from specific purpose to general purpose non matching grants (during the 1993 reforms). 
They estimated municipal employment differentials due to change in grant type in 
comparison to private income. Results show the declining influence of grants on municipal 
employment generation: before 1993 it was $0.63 after 1993 it was $0.33 and for private 
income it was $0.17. The computed estimates of municipal employment elasticity before 
1993 was 0.06 and after 1993 it was 0.03, reflecting lower impact of grant on municipal 
employment. This result shows that specific purpose or conditional grant has a larger effect 
on municipal employment than unconditional general purpose grant with greater 
fundability.  
 has 
different flypaper effects displaying that local government officials treated federal 
unconditional grant differently at the end of the period as compared to start of the period. 
Positive and significant coefficient of change in federal grants indicates that local 
government replaces federal grants with declining own source revenues. Thus grant is used 
as fungible revenue source to provide tax relief to residents. For the sub category of 
expenditures, findings give the evidence of fly paper effect but at different magnitudes (see 
Table 2.D, appendix).  
Islam (1998) examined the local expenditure response to grants from higher government to 
analyze the fiscal illusion31
                                                          
29 There empirical investigation have based on median voter theory i.e. government spending will affect the demand of 
the median voter and unconditional aid will substitute local money with no impact on spending. 
. The grant coefficient was found to be inelastic and positively 
significant in 10 small and negatively significant in 11 large size municipalities. Positive 
inelastic coefficient of provincial grants implies residents are getting some tax relief from 
their governments, whereas negative coefficient shows that grants reduce local 
expenditures. Positive estimated coefficient of income may use to interpret fiscally-
induced tax price effect of grant on expenditures (see Appendix Table 2D). 
30  Service includes protective services, roads construction, waste disposal and treatment and quality of life services 
(culture, education including public libraries, parks and recreation). 
31 A generalized two stage least square procedure adjusting for auto correlation and addressing simultaneity between 
grants and expenditures was applied 
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Gamkhar and Oates (1996) studied the asymmetry effect of federal non-welfare grants32
Stine (1994) estimated asymmetric hypothesis that local government response to decrease 
in federal grant differently from that to increases in grant on own revenues. Results 
indicate that increase in federal grant extends limited fiscal relief to local government and 
its decrease resulted in a propensity to lower local revenue. Significant relationship 
between federal and state grants has also been predicted by the study as state grant aid 
substitutes decreasing federal grants at higher rate than a symmetrical response. However, 
response to local government to decrease in state aid is quite different, i.e. local 
government increased local revenue due to decrease in state aid (Appendix Table 2D). 
 on 
combined state and local government expenditure in United States. They tested the 
asymmetry effects of federal grants on the spending behavior of state and local 
governments. Their estimates show a higher marginal effect of grants (0.60) compared to 
private income (0.27) and did not find asymmetry in response in the event of increase or 
decrease in grants. They used time series data covering 1952-91 period and derived the 
results using Ordinary Least Square (OLSQ) and Two-Stage Least Square (TSLS). 
Craig and Inman (1982) similarly examined the effects of federal pass through education 
grant, matching education grant and general revenue sharing unconditional grant on school 
expenditures and local school taxes. They found that these conditional matching grant has 
the highest impact on school expenditure with its coefficient of 0.89, followed by 0.73 of 
pass through education aid and -0.053 effect of general purpose grants indicating that the 
conditionality significantly improved the provision of local education services as compared 
to unconditional grant that influenced negatively (see Table 2.3 and Table 2D appendix).   
Weicher (1972) studied the effects of non matching grants that routed through federal and 
combined state and local government, on the education expenditure of municipal 
government and school districts as well as on other services expenditures. The results 
reveal relatively higher marginal change in municipal education expenditure from grant of 
state government (0.58), followed by combined grant of state and local government (0.28). 
In case of school district education expenditure, the combined effect of state and local 
government were (0.40) and of federal grant (-0, 59) indicating that possible monitoring of 
adjacent government increases the utilization pattern of grant (see partial result in Table 
2.3 and details in Appendix Table 2D).  
                                                          
32 These are general purpose non matching grants  
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Henderson (1968) analyzed the effect of grant on the expenditure behavior of metropolitan 
and non-metropolitan counties using TSLS and OLS, drawing three conclusions. First 
grant response to expenditure is elastic and high in case of large metropolitan (1.42) 
compared to almost equal increase (1.03) in expenditure of non metropolitan areas. Second 
resident consumption of local public goods from their income is relatively high (0.08) in 
non metropolitan areas compare to metropolitan residents (0.04) that reflects relatively 
higher preference for consumption of private goods. Third conclusion of the study is that 
grants have a larger influence of public expenditure than private income (fly paper effect). 
The common conclusion is derived by reviewing empirical studies measuring effects of 
unconditional grants on the sub-national governments spending behavior as these inelastic 
expenditure responses. This suggests that irrespective of the studies undertaken in either 
advance or in developing countries, unconditional grants are largely being served as a 
major fungible source to provide tax relief to residents by substituting recipient 
government taxes. The extent of fungibility however varies in different studies (see Table 
2.3 and Appendix Table 2D). 
2.5.2 Conditional Grants (Non-Matching) 
There is literature available for examining the effect of specific purpose non matching 
grants on sub-national government fiscal and expenditure (Gorden 2004, Fisher and Papke, 
2000). These grants usually take the form of either lump-sum grants or non-matching 
grants on formula basis. Gordon (2004) estimated that federal education grants for income-
disadvantage students initially increase total school district revenue and instructional 
spending. Afterwards by the third year due to the changes in the intergovernmental grant 
structure, the initial effects are completely displaced. Gordon observed significant drop in 
support services (-0.43) year after the grant is received. The phenomenon indicates that the 
additional spending on instructional uses does hurt support services. These specific 
purpose grants from grantors aims at offsetting inter jurisdictional inequities stimulating 
sectoral spending by recipient governments. However, empirical evidence indicates that it 
has partly being used to enhance other expenditures and partly for substituting tax 
reduction. However, opposing evidence of increased fiscal incidence also exists. 
Levaggi and Zanola (2003) estimates the response of specific purpose non matching 
healthcare grant on regional health care expenditure in Italy and find that estimated 
marginal effect is $0.84 for grants and $0.01 for private income (large flypaper effect) in 
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the presence of soft budget constraint. In fact these effects were higher than the effects 
without budget constraint. They also found the evidence of “super flypaper effect” (when 
all soft budget constraint is ignored) i.e. strong retrenchment-type asymmetry response 
when grants are deceased. Nonetheless, evidence of milder-type asymmetry is found when 
soft budget constraints are controlled. 
Fisher and Papke (2000) using data of school district of state and local government of 
United States examined the local government expenditure response in the context of state 
block grant (specific purpose non-matching grant). They found that one dollar change in 
state aid stimulates local government expenses in a range of $0.30 to $0.70. Respective 
impact of federal aid is from 0.2 to 0.9 ranges (Fisher and Papke 2000). The result 
demonstrates that despite increases in local education sector expenditure the substantial 
proportion of specific purpose grants were also being used to provide tax relief and/or 
partly spend on other sectors. Duncombe and Yinger (1998) also found a corroborative 
result respectively of schools located in New York and Oregano. 
2.5.3 Conditional Grants (Open Ended) 
Baicker (2005), Riber and Wilhelm (1999), Shroeder (1995) and Moffitt (1990) mainly 
address the key policy issue in the welfare programs of US and Canada. They explored 
whether the changes in these programs limiting the federal aid contribution. Also they 
looked at whether the conversion of matching open ended grants to block grants will lower 
the welfare benefit level and effect the state level/provincial level redistribution. Above 
mentioned studies suggest that increase in welfare spending are attributable to an increase 
in the benefit level. In the US, aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) – a 
matching grant program was converted into nation-wide block grant program in 1996 with 
no matching.  This program caused as much as 120 percent increase in state cost of 
running program (Baicker, 2005). Many studies have also attempted to estimate the effect 
of this conversion on the key outcomes of the program, such as benefit levels, price and 
income elasticity estimates, total spending etc. 
2.5.4 Conditional Grants (Closed Ended Matching) 
The specific purpose close ended matching grants are imposed to the programs with ceiling 
on matching rate. In the US recipient governments own spending on the program is greater 
than the lower matching grant ceilings (Bezdek and Jones 1988). Thus the grant has 
marginal effect similar to a non-matching grant (Gamkhar, 2000, 2003 and Knight, 2000). 
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Shah (1989), Zampelli (1986), and McGuire (1973) suggest that price and income effect of 
specific purpose closed ended grants are endogenously determined; therefore two step 
estimation techniques require estimating the impact of conditional grant. Moffitt (1984) 
also highlighted that use of ordinary least square or two-stage least square technique in 
case of closed ended matching grants or other nonlinear intergovernmental grants is 
inappropriate.  Instead maximum likelihood method33
 
 will provide the reliable estimate 
given the nonlinearity in parameters and error terms. 
Significant proportion of state and local highway spending in US was based on federal 
grants. Therefore reductions in federal highway grants have impact on state-local 
government highway programs. Gamkhar (2000) determined whether state and localities 
responded symmetrically (similar in sign and magnitude) to change in federal grants. Results 
of the study indicates combined effect of the three highway obligation terms34
McGuire (1973) found local government response to federal grants in US as strongly 
fungible (64-69%) of education grant and 76% of non-education grant. This indicates that 
bureaucracies are becoming increasingly proficient at circumventing nominal restrictions 
on grant use. Shah (1989) and Zampelli (1986) analyzed the same model to estimate the 
local government response to provincial/state grants for US. They found statistically 
insignificant fungibility parameters. However, findings of McGuire’s study support the 
phenomenon of flypaper effect and Zampeli’s study does not, while Shah’s study finds no 
relevance. 
 on state-local 
government highway expenditure as $0.76, federal grant obligation, with spending effect of 
current period highway obligation is $0.18 and combined effect of one and two periods lag 
as $0.76 of $1 grant. Gamkhar (2003) explored asymmetric response on endogeneity 
corrected state and local spending. She found the impact of $1 of federal highway 
expenditure on state highway spending including grants was 0.037 (see Table 2.3).  
Craig and Inman (1982) examined the consequences of federalist structure for the 
financing and provision of education. Public education was financed using four types of 
grants (1) pass-through aid (2) by-pass education aid (3) matching educational aid (4) 
                                                          
33  This argument however is not valid now, because EView software solves parameters of equation of first and second 
stages simultaneously with the help maximum likelihood estimation method. Thus parameters estimated through 
TSLS directly in EView are unbiased, efficient and consistent.       
 
34  Current, one period lag and two period lag.  
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general revenue sharing aid.  Three conclusions were drawn from the study: first, a 25 
percent cut in federal education aid reduces national spending on public education by 8 
percent per child; second, new federalism structure shifts financial responsibility of public 
education to local government from federal and state governments; and third, the 
withdrawal of grant-in-aid spending requirements alter the mix of public dollars between 
the upper and lower levels of government and mix of national income allocated between 
private and public sectors. 
There are also studies that examine the effects of both conditional and unconditional grants 
on the sub-national provision of public goods. Lewis (2013) in case of Indonesia, 
Grossman (1989), Craig and Inaman (1982), Duncombe & Yinger (1986), Gramlich and 
Galper (1973) in case of US and Slack (1980) in case of Canada have deduced the 
common pattern. First, in all empirical studies who examined the effects of both 
conditional and unconditional categories of grants found a comparatively higher spending 
response in case of conditional grants relative to unconditional grants. In most cases 
conditionality led to elastic expenditure response. These researches demonstrate that 
attaching conditionality in the provision of grants from the donor governments provide a 
higher stimulant to the recipient’s provision of public goods. Recipient governments also 
have to make additional fiscal efforts through mobilizing own source revenues. However 
the impact of unconditional grants generally depicts inelastic expenditure response 
reflecting that the recipient governments utilizing it in for the resident tax relief. These 
empirical researches provide an effective tool for the donors to influence public provisos of 
goods in the desired direction in line with their priorities (see selected studies in summary 
Table 2.3 in the text, and details in Appendix Table 2D). 
2.5.5 Few Empirics of Fiscal Equalization  
Albouy (2010) noted that transfers aiming at equitable redistribution amongst various 
jurisdictions are expected to be directed towards the areas where individuals have 
relatively low income and are subject to greater inequalities. Examining Canadian system 
of intergovernmental fiscal transfers and current practices, it may be deduced that federal 
transfers to provinces are neither efficient nor equitable but aggravate the existing 
inefficiencies. 
Examining the case of Canada, Shah (1994) concluded that the equalization arrangements 
focusing on equalizing per capita tax burden and neglecting expenditure side can never 
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lead to equity and economic efficiency in resource distribution. On the other hand he 
emphasized that equalization must be viewed as phenomenon of political taste and 
advocating his remarks by examining that no equalization program has persuaded to-date 
in the US despite the presence of varying fiscal capacities across states 
Feld (2005) noted that there is no horizontal equalization program is in practice in 
Switzerland except for a system of specific inter–cantonal payments for particular services. 
However, the vertical programs are creating significant horizontal equalization impact 
because financial burden of the system is on the shoulders of rich cantons. 
In the context of Pakistan, Pasha, Pasha & Zubair (2010) concluded with the help of a 
Fiscal Equalization Index that the revenue transfer from federal divisible pool has neutral 
impact on inter provincial equalization. Further their study also evaluated the impact of 
other transfers on the fiscal equalization. Finding of this study is summarized in Table 2.2. 
Table  2.2 Impact of Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers of Fiscal Equalization in Pakistan 
Financial Awards Divisible Pool Transfers 
Straight 
Transfers 
Special 
Grants 
Total 
Transfers 
NFC - 1991 Neutral Yes No Yes 
NFC - 1996 Neutral Yes Yes Yes 
PO - 2006 No No No No 
NFC - 2009 Yes No Yes Yes 
Source: Fourth Annual Report (2011) State of Pakistan Economy, Devolution in Pakistan, 
National Institute of Public Policy, Beaconhouse National University, Lahore.  
2.6 Research on Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in Pakistan 
There is very limited empirical research on the subject of intergovernmental transfers on 
Pakistan. Few studies that have been published largely focuses on providing historical 
commentary on the NFC awards and horizontal distribution of transfers criterion and 
sharing arrangements.  Jaffery and Sadaqat (2006), Ahmed, Mustafa & Khalid (2007) and 
Shah (1997) drew attention on the issues of institutional framework for improving the 
quality of governance in Pakistan and thus proposed reforms for institutional restructuring. 
Ahmad and Wasti (2002) analyzed the NFC transfers arrangements covering period 1985-
2000 with a focus on estimating vertical and horizontal imbalances and extent of self 
financing by provinces without making an explicit proposal how to effectively improve the 
intergovernmental transfers arrangements in Pakistan. 
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Pasha and Ghaus (1994) examined the aggregate provincial expenditure response to federal 
transfers and borrowing using nominal data of 1972-93. They modeled provincial total 
expenditure (net of debt servicing) as a function of per capita GDP, per capita total federal 
transfers, per capita borrowings, dummy variable for social action programs, dummy 
variable to capture raise in the salaries and pensions of government employees, consumer 
price index, and public expenditure index as proxy for inflation.  Applying OLSQ 
technique on the model, they found that a one-rupee increase in federal transfers and grants 
will raise provincial expenditure by 0.61 rupee, whereas remaining 0.39 rupees substitutes 
for provincial fiscal efforts. The effect of provincial borrowings stimulates provincial 
spending as high as 0.89, while the marginal effect of per capita GDP remains low (0.029). 
Similarly Sabir (2001) studied the provincial expenditure response on social and other 
sectors given the 1997 financial award. He employed limited data and captured only 
aggregate provincial response using OLS technique. He found greater negative impact of 
reduced transfers on social sector spending and concluded that the strategy of 1997 award 
failed to protect the social sector expenditures.  
 
The studies in the context of Pakistan, undertaken by Pasha and Ghaus (1994) and Sabir 
(2001) concentrated only on aggregate provincial expenditure behaviour (all four 
provinces combined) and ignored an important dimension that fiscal response may likely 
differ across provinces due to significant differences in income level, socio-economic 
characteristics, level of development, and culture.  Another major shortcoming of previous 
studies is the very low degree of freedom in the regression analysis, being limited to 20 
observations (1973-93) only. Thus with less than 15 degrees of freedom and also ignoring 
simultaneity among grants and expenditures, the results of these studies are highly 
questionable.
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Table  2.3 Empirical Evidence of the Effects of Intergovernmental Transfers and Grants on Sub-national Government Expenditures 
Author Year Country Dependent Variable Technique 
Independent Variable Remarks / Instruments & Control 
Variables used Income Grant Conditional 
Grant 
Unconditional 
GRANTS UNCONDITIONAL 
Aragon 2013 Peru PC LG Spending OLS - - 0.752*** uses variable ADDTRANSFER (all other transfers) TSLS - - 0.943*** 
Sour 2013 Mexico PC Municipal Recurring Exp 
FE 0.162 - 0.825   
RE 0.1695 - 0.823 
Lee & Vuletin 2012 China Prov. Exp PC OLS 0.127* - 0.883* population density, year dummy FE 0.133* - 0.772* 
Amusa, Mabunda, 
Mabugu 2008 
South 
Africa 
LG Exp Per Capita 
(Ln) OLS 0.878** - 0.484*** 
Indicators of fiscal need, fiscal capacity and 
demographic Characteristics 
Gamkhar & Oates 1996 United States 
Combined State & Loc 
Gov Exp OLS 0.14 - 0.47 
unemployment, share of pop school-aged, % pop 
urban 
GRANTS CONDITIONAL 
Wagstaff 2011 Vietnam Prov. Health Sect. Spend   
-
0.003** 1.275** - 
Net provincial revenues and net provincial 
expenditures 
   Prov. Other Sect. Spend   0 1.060*** -  
Lewis 2005 Indonesia Tot Exp Pre Decentralized TSLS - 1.009* - 
PC tot household exp,  % Poor pop , % Urban pop 
Log Pop, Log Area, Cost of Const Index, Log GLP 
and dummy for rich loc gov 
Deller & Maher 2005 Sweden Change in Tot Exp AR1 -0.005 3.42* - 
Share of employment in professional industries, % of 
pop with college degree,  % under 20 yrs, % 
household > $15K, no. of household, Change in no. 
of household, PC property tax revenue & median 
value of house 
Gordon 2004 United States 
Loc School Dst. Edu 
Spending TSLS - 1.4* - 
Total revenues includes; state (formula and 
categorical aid), local & federal revenues 
Total expenditures includes; Instructional spending, 
support services and capital outlays 
SR/Lr,  Short and Long Run respectively 
Gamkhar 2003 United States 
State & Loc Govt. 
Highway Exp TSLS 0.01 0.37 -   
Levaggi & Zanola 2003 Italy State Health Spending TSLS 0.01 0.84 -   
Knight Brian 2002 United States State Spending 
TSLS 0.01* -0.87* - % of states in Senate transportation committee, 
Senate Majority Party, Senate Committee Chair, 
House tenure LIML 0.01* -1.115* - 
Intergovernmental Governmental Fiscal Relation – A Case Study of Pakistan 60 
Author Year Country Dependent Variable Technique 
Independent Variable Remarks / Instruments & Control 
Variables used Income Grant Conditional 
Grant 
Unconditional 
Gamkhar & Olson 2001 United States 
PC Real State & Loc 
Highway Exp AR1 0.02* 0.76 - 
Asymmetry response 0.87 for grant and 0.81 for 
income 
Riber & Wilhein 1999 United States 
AFDC Benefits 
Family size: 4 OLS 0.593* 0.26* - 
real values at 1987 personal consumption 
expenditure deflator 
Gamkhar & Oates 1996 United States 
State & Local Govt. 
Exp 
OLS 0.11 0.62 - Unemployment, Share School Age in Total Pop, 
Share of Total Pop residing in metro area TSLS 0.28 0.73 - 
Pasha 1994 Pakistan PC Tot Prov Exp OLS 0.0299 0.6137 - CPI, Public Exp Index are used as a proxy of inflation, yearly dummy variable 
Moffitt 1990 United States 
AFDC Guaranteed 
Benefits OLS 
79.6 
[+ve 
Sig] 
-14117.5 
[insig] - 
this equation also used state specific variables but 
appear same signs with  different magnitude of 
explanatory variables 
Shah 1989 Canada, Alberta 
Transport Exp LG LES 0.06 3.17 - TR, Transportation Exp, NTR, Non Transportation 
Exp Non-Transp Exp LG LES 0.94 -0.11 - 
Craig & Inman 1986 United States 
Fed Edu Exp OLS 0.003 0.43 -   
Other Stat Exp OLS 0.019 1.19 - 
Gramlich & 
Galper 1973 
United 
States State & Loc Govt. Exp 
FE 0.1 0.43 - grant price effect, suburban taxes 
OLS 0.05 0.25 - 
Gramlich 1969 United States 
Comb State Local Gov 
Exp TSLS 0.054 1.12 - price, pop, interest rates 
Henderson 1968 United States 
Tot Gen Exp PC 
Metropolitan OLS 0.0439 1.4231   
population 
Tot Gen Exp PC Non-
Metropolitan OLS 0.0819 1.0371   
GRANTS CONDITIONAL & UNCONDITIONAL COMBINED 
Wasti  2013 Pakistan Provincial Govt. Spending 
OLS .013-.062 0.564- 1.320 0.613-0.914 
Pc Real GRP, Pop, Pop.Growth, Pop Density, 
Primary enrollment, teachers, school,# hospitals,, 
beds, doctors, nurses, health personnel, institutions, 
Own Revenues, Borrowing, award period dummies, 
federal fiscal policy indicators, budget deficit, 
expenditures, revenues 
TSLS .004-.061 0.693-1.370 0.473-0.916 
Lewis 2013 Indonesia LG Tot. Capital Spending 
FE - 1.298* -0.0835* PC real GRP, Pop. Urban Pop (%), Work age Pop 
(%), Poor Pop (%), 1st and 2nd Lag of LG Capital 
Spending, Own Source Revenues. GMM - 1.208 -0.0009 
Duncombe & 
Yinger 1998 
United 
States 
Education Outcome 
Index TSLS -7.8947 3.1814 0.4637* 
Teacher Salaries, Enrollment, Children in Poverty, 
Female Headed Household, Handicapped Students, 
Limited English Proficiency 
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Author Year Country Dependent Variable Technique 
Independent Variable Remarks / Instruments & Control 
Variables used Income Grant Conditional 
Grant 
Unconditional 
Grossman 1989 United States Dir Exp State Gov PC OLS 0.033* 1.513* 1.14 
Pop, % state pop in SMSAs, % reduction in state tax 
share, % urban pop 
Craig & Inman 1985 United States 
State Welfare 
Spending GLS - 0.05 -0.25* Tax Price, Taste, political structure & fiscal income 
Craig & Inman 1982 United States 
Local School 
Spending GLS - 0.734 -0.251 
local school spending is sum of average school 
employee wages, total school personal, non personal 
exp and equip exp 
Slack 1980 Canada, Ontario Total Municipal Exp 3SLS 0.014* 2.28 0.014* 
pop, lagged taxes, % change in exp, tax burden, 
school taxes 
McGuire 1978 United States 
Comb State Loc Edu 
Exp OSR TSLS 0.026* -0.494* 0.283*   
Gramlich 1977 United States State OS Dir Exp 
FE 0.05 - 0.25 
  
OLS 0.1 - 1 
Gramlich & 
Galper 1973 
United 
States Tot Current Exp OLS 0.095 0.799 0.428 
relative price of capital, # school children, # Female 
Headed Household, Robbery Rate 
Weicher 1972 United States LG Exp on Edu OLS - 0.4018 0.2787 
retail sales, manufacturing estbl, pop, 
unemployment, pop growth, pop density, housing 
characteristics, % pop school aged, less than age 21, 
nonwhite foreign 
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2.7 Epilogue 
The reviews of literature discuss a number of studies that examined the consequences of 
fiscal allocation using different models viz: Public Choice Models (Median Voter Model), 
Standard Demand Model, Public Expenditure Model, Budget Constraint Model, 
Community Welfare Maximization Model, etc. These specified models are estimated by 
applying specific utility function (Stone Geary and Translog Indirect Utility) and by using 
different econometric techniques (Ordinary Least Square, Two Stage Least Square, Three 
Stage Least Square, Generalized Least Square etc.). 
 
Due to the advantages of taxation at federal level, and the spending at decentralized level, most 
countries ends up with vertical imbalances as decentralization of expenditures is typically not 
accompanied by equivalent revenue raising responsibilities. Thus there is an imbalance 
between where the money is spent and from where revenues are collected. Inter governmental 
grants consequently are an important part of financing decentralized government. 
 
One of the most cited phenomena in fiscal federalism literature is “fly paper effect” which 
refers to situation where increases in unconditional grant results in a stimulatory effect on 
recipient government expenditure greater then equivalent change in personal income. The 
empirical literature has accepted the presence of flypaper effect and also supports the 
presence of asymmetric in flypaper effect i.e. recipient governments do not similarly act 
when aid is cut as they do when the level of aid increases. The finding of flypaper effect 
does not necessarily indicate irrational behavior of lower level government. But it seems 
realistic to assume that the existence of a fly paper effect depends on the fiscal institutions. 
There may be a rational flypaper effect where federal government has better tax 
instruments than local governments, while local governments have advantage in service 
delivery. An extensive literature has been developed on the impact of Federal/Central 
government transfers on budgetary decisions of local governments. The empirical research 
also suggests that unconditional grants to local government increase local government 
expenditures in some cases by the same amount and in some studies by the amount less 
than the aid. Thus the transfers or aid is essentially used as a fungible revenue source. 
However, results on expenditures response to conditional grants are not very conclusive. 
However, higher and elastic response was generally found as compared to unconditional 
grant. 
Intergovernmental Governmental Fiscal Relation – A Case Study of Pakistan 63 
 
The impact of a typical system of a redistributive “fiscal equalization” transfers on the tax 
effort of the local jurisdiction is also extensively analyzed in the literature. The empirics 
suggest that an increase in the tax base reduces transfers, while the volume of grants 
received is likely to be inversely related to tax rate. Regardless of the approach taken in the 
studies, the empirical analysis supports the prediction of theoretical analysis. 
 
Federalist public structure evolved where federal government is primarily act as a supplier 
of grants and the sub-national governments essentially engaged with the provision of 
public services. However, empirical research raises the doubts about the efficiency of 
federalist structure in the presence of higher fiscal imbalances at sub-national levels of 
governments. Any improvement in the existing allocations of donor grants must be 
carefully assessed including the consequence of grants on the sub-national governments’ 
fiscal choice. Therefore any empirical analysis of sub-national provision of public goods 
must consider that these governments are after all political institutions and the provision of 
aids is vitally important for the overall strengthening of these institutions. It confirms the 
importance of grants as a structural determinant of state budgetary choice. Thus the task 
should be to study how this structure works and how to exploit that knowledge to improve 
public sector resource allocations? 
 
The above empirical reviews elucidate that unconditional or general purpose non matching 
grants largely being utilized by the receipt governments as a fungible revenue source to 
provide tax relief to their residents. However findings of extent of fungibility vary in 
different studies. The empirical studies also highlight that relatively higher and more 
elastic expenditure response of conditional or specific purpose grant in comparison to 
unconditional grant. The effect of conditional grant also varies with respect to the nature 
and type of grant. In most cases the phenomenon of fly paper effect is clearly evident; this 
suggests that the effect of grants on public expenditure is much higher compared to 
equivalent increases in resident private income. 
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3 INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS 
3.1 Introduction 
The 1973 Constitution of Pakistan in the Fourth Schedule (under Article 4), demarcates the 
functional responsibilities and revenue raising powers to different tiers of governments. It 
also regulates the distribution of revenues and borrowing powers between the national and 
sub-national governments. After providing a brief political and economic history of 
Pakistan especially in the context of governance of public finance, the chapter traces the 
evolution of intergovernmental fiscal relations in Pakistan in terms of expenditures 
assignments, taxation powers, revenue sharing arrangements, intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers and borrowing powers between the federal and provincial governments in 
Pakistan.  
The chapter is structured as follows:  Brief economic and political history of Pakistan is 
described in three subsections. The first sub-section 3.2.1 traces the roots of governance 
structure of Pakistan from the pre-partition history till its independence in 1947. The post 
independence political and economic history and its influence on the structure of 
governance and intergovernmental relations in Pakistan are presented in section 3.2.2, 
which covers the period from 1947 to 1971, before the disintegration of Pakistan into two 
separate countries; Bangladesh (former East Pakistan) and present Pakistan (former West 
Pakistan). The post1972 economic and political history is narrated in subsection 3.2.3.  
Expenditure and tax assignment by levels of government are summarized in sections 3.3 
and 3.4 respectively. Revenue sharing awards are evaluated in section 3.5, while all forms 
of federal to provincial transfer flows are presented in section 3.6 with a focus on National 
Finance Commission awards announced to date.  Provincial access to federal borrowing is 
also discussed in this section. The last section summarizes the key findings of the chapter.  
3.2 Brief Political and Economic History   
Pakistan structure of governance and federal institutions can be traced from the history of 
British colonial rule in Indian sub continent. Various political and historical development 
over a period of two centuries help shape up the structure of public finance and 
intergovernmental fiscal relations in Pakistan. The post independence political and 
economic history of Pakistan is described in two parts. First part covers the events during 
1947-1971, while   the second period covers the period 1972 onwards.  
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3.2.1 Pre-Independence History and Governance Structure 
The British was registered their arrival in Indian Subcontinent in 1605 when the vessels of 
British East India Company35
The Indian Act 1858 had the system of governance of India under Crown rule. The act 
focused centralization of functional authority with restricted decentralization. The 
centralization was evident in the powers of London based Secretary of State of India who 
enjoyed all sovereign powers (executive, judicial and financial) and with its delegation to 
Viceroy/Governor General as principle administrator for running the affairs of India.  
Under the Viceroy there was a team of Governors who were responsible for sub national 
levels presidencies (Bombay and Madras)  along with Chief Administrative Offices at 
district levels.  Districts were the third tier of government during colonial rule in India. 
 (BEIC) arrived at Indian port city Calcutta to secure the 
permission of Mughal Emperor Jehangir for extension of business ties and setting up of 
industries in India. BEIC by capitalizing the offer had built several factories and businesses 
in Indian port cities of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras. Their business had grown rapidly 
with the grant of fiscal concessions and custom duties waiver on their tradable goods by 
the Emperor Jehangir. With continuous expansion in trade and industry and provision of 
credit and jobs to locals, BEIC succeeded in expanding their influence in the locals and 
sooner with the help of their own private army had secured the control of Presidencies of 
Bengal, Maysore and Bombay. With the continued patronage and support of British Crown 
and with the use of BEIC own private army the Company eventually secure the 
administrative control of large areas of Indian subcontinent by the end of 18th century. The 
Company rule was effectively established in India after the 1757 Battle of Plassey and 
lasted till 1857 mutiny (Indian Rebellion of 1857) that had culminated on the defeat of the 
Mughal Muslim rulers of India. The governance of entire Indian Sub-Continent came 
under the direct control of British Crown, which declared closure of the Company (BEIC) 
rule by promulgating the Government of India Act 1858. 
Decentralization was manifested in the judicial power assigned to Prince (head of 
recognized Princely States) for resolution of disputes under their state. In the second half 
of the 19th century district local governments under the control of Deputy Commissioner 
(Official of Central bureaucracy) were established with the limited functional role 
pertaining to primary education and other minor works (Tinker 1968). At upper echelon 
                                                          
35  East India Company was a joint stock company who granted Royal Charter in 1600 was established to pursue trade 
with the East Indies but later ended up trade mainly with Indian Subcontinent. The company had its own private army. 
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Presidencies/Provinces were assigned limited functions inclusive of health, education, 
roads, police, jail and registration. There revenue sources comprised law and order, justice 
and public works receipts that were insufficient to finance their expenditure obligations. 
Therefore these governments were also relied on central government grants that later was 
replaced with revenue sharing arrangements where some central taxes (excise duties, 
stamps, forests and registration charges) were shared vertically (between the Centre and 
Provinces) and horizontally (among provinces).   
The emergence of nationalist and communal movements and the outbreak of World War-I 
reinforced the need to reform in the governance structure of Indian by British 
Administration. The Montagu-Chelmsford had recommended multi prone reforms in 
political, administrative and financial structure of India in Government of India Act 1919. 
These reforms were aimed at holding of elections of provincial legislative assemblies, 
relocation of local governments under Provincial Minister and allocation of revenue 
sources to provinces including irrigation charges, land revenue, forestry and judicial stamp 
duties. These reforms had protected provincially governments’ authority on these subjects 
legally. However Indian nationalist leaders rejected these reforms and their struggle and 
agitation for greater provincial autonomy was continued during late 20’s to mid 30’s. After 
growing discomfort and failure of talks with the Indian nationalists the British Government 
promulgated Government of India Act 1935 that granted limited political, administrative 
and fiscal authority to Indian provinces.  
On the political front Indian Act 1935 recommended bicameral system with two legislative 
chambers36 (i.e. Council of States and Federal Assembly) and elected legislative assembly 
for provinces. The Central Bank and federal judicial courts were established respectively 
for exercising financial control and for vertical and horizontal settlement of disputes 
between the governments. The Indian Act 1935 also specified the federalism structure for 
the governance of India. It specified allocations of expenditure responsibilities and revenue 
raising powers along with the system of revenue sharing arrangements between the Centre 
and the provinces. Expenditure assignments contain federal list and a list of concurrent37
                                                          
36 The Council of States was a permanent body, one third of its members were to be elected triennially whereas federal 
assembly duration was fixed for five years.  
 
functions. Federal list include functions of national defense, foreign affairs, 
37  Joint responsibility of centre/national and provincial/sub-national governments 
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communication and currency whereas agriculture, industry, health, education and law and 
order functions falls in the concurrent jurisdictions.  
Revenue assignments were divided into four categories. First category included taxes that 
were exclusively assigned to central government (import duties and earnings of railways, 
posts and telegraphs). Second group comprised taxes that falls under the purview of 
provincial governments (sales tax, land revenues, irrigation charges, succession duties on 
agricultural property, tax on agricultural income, pay roll taxes, charges on goods and 
passenger movement through inland water channels, tolls, excises, entertainment and 
mineral levies). Third category contained taxes that were centrally levied but shared with 
provinces (export duties from jute, excise duties and income taxes other than agriculture 
income). Fourth group comprised taxes that were levied by the centre but onwards fully 
distributed among provinces (stamp duties on various instruments of credit, succession 
duties excluding levy on agricultural property and freight earnings from goods and 
passenger movement by air or train). Moreover fiscal transfers’ arrangements under 
Niemeyer Award (1937) allocated 50 percent share from central income tax along with 
some fixed subventions to a few provinces38
The conflicting political views of two major communities (Hindus and Muslims) based on 
religious ideologies led to serious differences among the people of India in the mid 30’s. 
The outbreak of Second World War in 1939 further fuels these communal differences that 
had accelerated the pace of freedom movement in India. The Pakistan Resolution of 1940 
and Objective Resolution for the demand of separate homeland for Muslims where they 
can practice their religion with full liberty and freedom without any economic 
discrimination had put the foundation of the division of India in to two countries, 
Hindustan (India) for Hindus and Pakistan for Muslims. The last British Viceroy Sir Lord 
Mountbatten on 3rd June 1947 announced the partition plan for the division of India into 
two independent dominions by declaring Muslim dominated provinces
.   
39
                                                          
38 Two provinces of Pakistan (KPK then NWFP and Sindh) were allocated Rs. 10 million and Rs. 10.5 million 
respectively as subventions in Niemyar award (1937) due to their insufficient resources. Subsequently on improved 
resource position of Sindh the grant payable was capitalized and used in settlement of federal debts. 
 as Pakistan and 
39  The geographical sub divisions of Bengal and Punjab provinces of Indian Subcontinent were based on concentration 
of population in to predominantly Hindu and Muslim areas. On that basis East Bengal, West Punjab, Sindh, KPK 
(formerly known as NWFP) and Baluchistan were declared as Pakistan under the 1947 Mountbatten Plan. Kashmir State 
which comprised 80 percent of Muslim population but his ruler Sikh Maharaja gave his consent for joining Hindustan 
that became the major dispute and led to three Wars afterwards between the two countries.  East Pakistan physically 
located thousand miles away from West Pakistan 
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the remaining part as Hindustan. These two countries appeared on the world globe on 14th 
August, 1947.    
3.2.2 Political and Economic History during 1947-1971 
Pakistan acquired independence on 14th August, 1947 not before the massacre of nearly 
two million lives of Muslims and Hindus/Sikhs in cross border migration during the 
partition of India. Almost 17 million Muslims migrated from Indian minority provinces to 
settle in Pakistan. Thus resettlements of huge migrant population were the main challenge 
confronted by the then government of Pakistan.   
The lack of national constitution at the time of independence reinforced the need to adopt 
pre independence governance structure in Pakistan as specified in Indian Act 1935. The 
early demise of the founder and the first Governor General of Pakistan40 and subsequent 
assassination of the first Prime Minister41
The dismal state of economic development, rising political instability and evidence of 
alleged corruption of politicians and civil bureaucrats paved the way for military 
intervention. General Ayub Khan, armed force Commander in Chief after overthrowing 
civilian government had declared “Martial Law” in the country. Many politicians and 
bureaucrats were arrested in charges of bribery and corruption. Subsequently Ayub Khan 
 left the country in turmoil. The landlords and 
bureaucrats succeeded in forming the ruling nexus which fuels political disorder and 
instability in the country. This not only led to dismissal of six civilian governments in a 
short span of few years but also delayed the agreement on national constitution by the year 
1956, when Pakistan eventually became the constitutional republic. The first decade of 
Pakistan thus represent the period of political power struggle and maneuvering rather than 
devising consensus on the political system. Time and again unelected groups of politicians 
became the head of states that lacked vision for the country’s development, which 
remained largely rural and backward and lacked adequate infrastructure. When politicians 
failed to deliver, civilian and military bureaucracy emerged as better organized and modern 
institutions. In both these central institutions, West Pakistan clearly over represented 
despite East Pakistan share of 56 percent in the national population. This prejudice 
cultivates the discriminatory feelings among the people of East Pakistan. 
                                                          
40  The founder Quaid –e- Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah died on 11th September 1948 in Karachi, Pakistan 
41  Liaquat Ali Khan was killed in a firing incidence in Rawalpindi city while addressing the large congregation in 
October 1951 
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in 1962 after forming a new political party42 gave a country new presidential form of 
constitution. He also introduced hierarchical four tier system of local government43 and 
had managed to get himself elected as President of the country. His era initiated many 
structural reforms including ceilings on agriculture land holdings and two five years 
development plans (1960-65 and 1965-70). These measures contributed significantly in 
raising the overall economic growth particularly in large scale manufacturing, agriculture, 
social and infra structure sectors. This development was more noticeable in province of 
West Pakistan. East Pakistan was discriminated not only in overall planned investment 
allocations which was lower but also in NFC central resource sharing distribution 
formula44
Yahya Khan after assuming charge as President and Chief Martial Law Administrator had 
hold parliamentary elections in 1970. The election results revealed clear polarization in the 
mandate of the two provinces. Awami League on her six
 between the two provinces.  In 1965 the outbreak of war with India on territorial 
disputes of Jammu and Kashmir and subsequent cease fire agreement coupled with rising 
prices and charges of patronizing corruption, made him unpopular. His ten years dictatorial 
era (1958-1969) came to an in 1969 when he handed over power to another military 
dictator General Yahya Khan who declared Martial Law in the country. 
45 point agenda won 160 National 
Assembly (NA) seats except 2 (53% of total NA seats) whereas Pakistan People’s Party 
emerged with its 81 seats as main party of West Pakistan. Neither of these parties had won 
any seats from other than their province of influence. President Yahya Khan despite 
Awami League’s clear majority denied46
                                                          
42 Pakistan Muslim League 
 handing over power to its leader Shaikh Mujib Ur 
Rahman and instead got him arrested. This decision fueled the crises in East Pakistan 
which converted into large scale violence and revolt. Pakistan military forces attempted to 
curb this volatile and indigenous liberation movement with full use of force which results 
large scale killing and arrests of thousands of militant activists.  East Pakistan finally fell 
on 16th December, 1971 with the support of India and Soviet Union and its independence, 
new country Bangladesh emerged on the globe.  
43 Union Council and Town Committee are the lowest tiers and District council and Municipal Corporation is the upper 
most tiers of local governments in rural and urban areas respectively. Altogether 80,000 local governments’ members 
were elected called “Basic democrats”. 
44 NFC awards had advocated parity principle for central divisible pool taxes despite East Pakistan relative under 
development and higher national population share of 54%. 
45 Six points include separate currency, banking system, complete control on export earnings and revenue collection 
within their control. Federation should only control country defense and foreign affairs.  
46 The people of East Pakistan got denied their due rights despite their majority in the national population. They 
significantly underrepresented in civilian and military bureaucracy and financial arrangements in federal resource 
transfers and allocations of development funds also biased in favor of affluent West Pakistan 
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3.2.3 Political and Economic History of Present Pakistan after 1971 
In consequence of the tragedy of fall of East Pakistan President General Yahya Khan had 
resigned by handing over powers to Mr. Bhutto, the majority party leader of West 
Pakistan. Mr. Bhutto after taking over charge as President of Pakistan had delivered highly 
spirited and promising speech for the moral uplift of the nation and armed forces which 
was at the lowest ebb after separation of East Pakistan. Later Mr. Bhutto got elected as 
Prime Minister of Pakistan by the national parliament and relinquished the charge of 
President.  
After assuming charge as Prime Minister his government gave country the first 
unanimously approved Constitution in 1973, in which Pakistan was declared a federation 
comprising of four provinces and three federally administered areas. His government that 
predominantly comprised of rural landlord later pursued party’s socialist agenda and 
nationalized heavy industry, including some large scale industries, ports and shipping and 
even schools, colleges and rice mills. His nationalization policy created detrimental effect 
on overall industrial and economic climate that led to economic stagnation. His era also 
witnessed emergence of serious political crises in provinces of Baluchistan and KPK due 
to the removal of their elected and legitimate government of ANP. This accelerated the 
crises in these two provinces, in particular, in the province of Baluchistan it created 
mutinous situation during 1974-76. The federal government tried to control this chaotic 
situation with the use of force including aerial bombing on the rebellions hideouts in the 
mountainous region of Baluchistan.  The era of PPP government came to an end after the 
1977 parliamentary elections in which PPP was declared victorious but opposition parties 
refused to accept the results due to evidence of massive rigging in the election polls.  After 
failure of negotiation, Bhutto ordered arrest of his political opponents that led to large scale 
chaos and serious law and order situation in the country. At this stage army intervened and 
arrested Bhutto in charges of maneuvering election results after imposing Martial Law in 
the country on 5th July, 1977.  In Bhutto’s period NFC award 1974 was declared which 
distributed federal divisible pool of taxes among the federation and the provinces and 
between the provinces in Pakistan. 
Chief of Army Staff General Zia ul Haq suspended the 1973 Constitution after assuming 
charge as Chief Martial Law Administrator. He announced holding fresh elections in three 
months that were later postponed. In the meantime Bhutto was charged against murder 
conspiracy of one of his political opponent during his tenure and executed on 4th April 
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1979 by military establishment despite numerous mercy and pardon appeals by several 
Heads of States.  
After the death of Bhutto, military regime had suppressed all democratic movements with 
by arresting several hundred political workers. These movements did not sustain and faded 
away with time in 1984. In the same year Zia ul Haq had managed to get himself elected as 
President in the controversial referendum.  He held non party based parliamentary 
elections and nominated Mohammad Khan Junejo as Prime Minister which considered as 
puppet parliament. Zia through this parliament had first secured legitimacy of all his 
previous decision through securing parliamentary approval of 8th constitutional 
amendment. Later he lifted “Martial Law” and restored fundamental rights for 
commencement of political activities in the country. In the meantime Junejo government 
pursued their five point program of social justice and socio economic uplift of the people 
by developing health, education and rural road infrastructure. His Social Action Program 
(SAP) of building schools and health sector infrastructure were criticized due to remote 
and wrong selection of construction sites and lack of adequate recurring budgetary 
provisions. Subsequently Junejo was removed by Zia after emergence of serious 
differences among them on Afghan policy issues. Zia’s ten year dictatorial regime finally 
ended on 17th August, 1988, with his death in plane crash along with many other top 
ranking army officials and dignitaries. In Zia’s era two NFC’s were constituted (1979 and 
1985) but were inconclusive due to failure to secure consensus on resource sharing 
arrangements. Zia reversed Bhutto’s nationalization strategy and instead pursued 
denationalization and deregulation policies. His tenure witnessed elimination of Baloch 
insurgency and strengthening of Pakistan nuclear program. He used religion as a tool of his 
survival and supported Afghan Mujahedeen with US support against soviet occupation in 
Afghanistan.  This caused far reaching and detrimental effects on Pakistan’s security and 
economy with infusion of militancy, drugs and armed culture in the country.     
After the demise of General Zia, PPP emerged successful in the national election and its 
leader Benazir Bhutto was sworn in as Prime Minister on 2nd December 1988 and formed a 
coalition government. In her tenure she tried to restore 1973 Constitution in original form 
by quashing all amendments included in Zia’s regime but failed due to lack of adequate 
parliamentary support. She took some steps to modernize the economy and focused on 
Pakistan nuclear program but her government was dismissed on corruption charges by the 
President in August 1990, who later announced parliamentary election.  
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The Pakistan Muslim League (PML) emerged victorious in the national elections held in 
1990 and its leader Nawaz Sharif took over as Prime Minister on 6th November, 1990. He 
initiated multi dimensional reforms for economic and financial deregulation, privatization, 
banking and telecommunication sector with emphasis on private sector led growth. In his 
tenure Nawaz Sharif redressed concerns of smaller provinces and announced NFC 1991 
award that significantly benefit these provinces particularly from the provision of straight 
transfers. Before his reforms started to bear fruits, his government was dismissed by the 
then President on charges of extra judicial47
Both earlier democratic government of PPP and PML did not complete their constitutional 
tenure of five years and were dismissed by the President on account of various charges. In 
the parliamentary elections of 1993, PPP again emerged as leading party and its 
Chairperson Benazir Bhutto became the Prime Minister with the coalition support. Her 
party worker Farooq Laghari was elected as President in November, 1993. In her tenure 
Pakistan economy did not perform well and charges of corruption and money laundering 
against her husband and several cabinet ministers not only affected her reputation but also 
weakened her government. On 5th November 1996 her government was removed by their 
own party President Laghari, who later nominated Mairaj Khalid as caretaker Prime 
Minister and announced holding of national elections. Under this caretaker setup, NFC 
1996 award was announced for vertical and horizontal distribution of federal resources 
between federation and provinces and amongst provinces respectively.  
 killings, corruption and nepotism. Later, 
despite restoration of Nawaz Sharif’s government by superior judiciary its smooth 
functioning became difficult due to continuity of the same President. This political standoff 
finally came to an end in July 1993 with resignation of both President and Prime Minister 
on the intervention of Pakistan Armed Forces. After their departure caretaker Prime 
Minister Moeen Qureshi was instituted to hold fresh parliamentary elections in a country. 
In 1997 parliamentary election PML achieved land slide victory by winning over 2/3rd NA 
seats and its leader Nawaz Sharif again sworn in as Prime Minister. With 2/3rd Majority his 
government had restored the Prime Minister’s original powers as specified in 1973 
Constitution for the dismissal of the government, appointments of services chiefs and of 
provincial governors which now linked again with the advice of Prime Minister. The PML 
government developed some major infrastructure projects including Pakistan largest 
                                                          
47 Several political workers of their Sindh base political ally party were also killed 
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motorway M2, and had made the country a nuclear power. After Pakistan nuclear 
detonation in 1999, it confronted international sanctions that badly hit economy and 
growth including foreign reserves and balance of payments. In this tenure Nawaz Sharif 
had developed serious differences with the President as well as Chief Justice of Supreme 
Court and both were forced to resign. Lastly when he attempted to remove the army Chief 
General Pervaiz Musharraf, his loyalist army arrested the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and 
removed his government on 12th October, 1999. Later Nawaz Sharif and family were 
exiled. 
When General Pervaiz Musharraf took over as Chief Executive the state of Pakistan 
economy was in shambles and in dismal state due to severe international sanctions. The 
foreign exchange reserves equivalent of $ 300 million were left. General Musharraf 
announced seven48
President Musharraf announced parliamentary election in 2008 and both main stream 
political leaders Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif returned to the country to participate in 
the national politics. Unfortunately during the election campaign PPP leader Benazir 
Bhutto was killed in an unfortunate suicidal bomb attack on 27th December, 2007. Her ill-
fated death fueled the sympathy
 point reforms agenda for economic reconstruction and socio economic 
development of the country. His policy reforms of economic and financial liberalization 
and better governance significantly improved Pakistan economic and fiscal outlook. As a 
result Pakistan managed to achieve 6 to 8 percent economic growth with rapid expansion 
in telecommunication, banking and financial services sector and in federal tax revenue 
collection which also quickly had doubled during 2000 and 2007 period. His devolution 
program aimed at better local governance and improved service delivery also brought good 
results which were successful in improving local public services. The President using his 
constitutional power had also announced NFC (PCO 2006) award by amending NFC 1997 
award formula for federal resource sharing among the constituent members. Government 
of Sindh, however, showed its reservation on this revised resource distribution formula due 
to its declining share as compared to what it was getting earlier.  
49
                                                          
48 Rebuild national confidence, Strengthen federation, Revive economy, Ensure law and order and speedy justice. 
Depoliticize state institutions. Devolution of power to grass root level, Ensure swift and across the board accountability 
 wave for her party PPP who emerged as a leading 
national party in the parliamentary elections. Her party formed the government in the 
Centre and in three provinces (Baluchistan, KPK and Sindh) with the support of their 
49 Her father former Prime Minister of Pakistan Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was also hanged under Martial Law termed as 
judicial murder, her two younger brothers were also killed under planned conspiracy against the family. 
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political allies. PPP leader Yousuf Raza Gilani took oath as Prime Minister in coalition 
government. Few months later General Musharraf due to rising pressure of democratic 
forces resigned and in his place Mr. Asif Zardari, was elected as President of Pakistan. 
There were few major successes and failures of this PPP led government. First important 
success was elimination of concurrent list that had transferred 41 functions to provinces 
thus markedly decentralize responsibilities which since long been demanded by provinces 
thus strengthen federation. Second major success was NFC 2010 award that had 
significantly increased (plus 10%) the magnitude of overall fiscal transfers to provinces 
using multiple factors. However the main weaknesses of this government were its failure 
to control rampant corruption by elected officials and ministers, favoritism in awarding 
contracts and jobs, poor law and order and increase crime, severe energy crises, poor 
governance and huge financial losses in public sector enterprises. The severe floods in the 
country in 2009-10 also damaged agriculture and livestock output and loss of roads and 
housing infrastructure. As a whole during the completed four years tenure of this 
government the economy did not perform well and grew with below 4 percent, besides 
high inflation and increased poverty and unemployment. 
The following sections analyze the fiscal structure of Pakistan and examine how it evolved 
over time.  Intergovernmental fiscal relations between federal and provincial governments 
are discussed with respect to the allocation of expenditures assignments, taxation powers, 
revenue sharing awards, intergovernmental fiscal transfers and borrowing powers of 
federating units.  
3.3 Expenditure Assignments by Level of Governments 
The Article 70(4) fourth Schedule of constitution of Pakistan demarcates the functional 
assignments and revenue raising powers of federal and provincial governments. The 
constitution contains two lists - the federal legislative list that specified functions falling 
under the exclusive purview of federal government and concurrent legislative list that can 
be performed by either level of government; be it federal or provincial. All residual 
functions not specified in any of the lists are the responsibility of provincial governments. 
Over the years Pakistan had adopted three different constitutions50
                                                          
50 Constitution of 1956, 1962 (for a brief period) and 1973 constitution which is currently  in place despite several 
amendments. 
 but functional 
allocation between different tiers of government were more or less remained unaltered.  
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The examination of legally assigned functions to different levels of government follows 
more or less theoretical principle of fiscal federalism. In general, federal government dealt 
with functions of macroeconomic stability, to those whose benefits spillovers stretches 
beyond particular jurisdictions and to functions assigned in view of economic efficiency 
consideration. Federal functions, concerned with macroeconomic stability consists of  
defense, external affairs, international trade, currency, coinage, stock exchange, central 
bank, insurance and banking, foreign loans and foreign aids. National highways, strategic 
roads, railways, port and shipping, air transport, post and telegraph, nuclear energy, census, 
geological and metrological surveys, minerals and natural gas are assigned to federation on 
grounds of cost efficiency and benefits spillover considerations. The functions of law and 
order, justice, highways, urban transport, secondary and college education, agriculture 
extension services, irrigation, land reclamation and mineral resources were allocated to 
provinces based on residuary principle (See Table 3.1) 
Local government institution historically being weak with limited functional role and their 
existence lacked continuity51and linked critically with the status of democracy in Pakistan. 
It assumed greater importance during the dictatorial army rule which they used to lengthen 
their stay in power, and contrary in the democratic regimes (Cheema, Khwaja & Qadir, 
2005). During the last army rule of General Musharraf, local government52 received 
constitutional recognition with somewhat greater functional and financial autonomy in 
hierarchal three tiers system of local government. However, since 2008 local 
governments53
 
 are effectively nonexistent and dysfunctional in all four provinces of the 
country. 
The joint occupancy of functional responsibilities (concurrent lists) existed at all three 
levels of governments in Pakistan as also practiced in various federal countries. 
Historically federal provincial concurrent54
 
 jurisdiction includes functions of social 
welfare, population planning, labor exchange and training establishments, tourism, 
education, curriculum and syllabus planning, centre of excellence, conservation of 
historical monuments and sites and electricity. The provincial local concurrent functions 
                                                          
51 Local government institutions gain relatively greater importance in military regime (1958-71, 1979-1988 and 2001-06 
periods. 
52 Local governments were protected under Local Government Ordinance (LGO) 2001 under 1973 constitution. 
53 After the last parliamentary elections of 2008 the subject of local government transfers to provinces. 
54 These powers are transferred to provincial governments under 18th constitutional amendment in 2010-11. 
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Table  3.1 ALLOCATION OF FUNCTIONS BETWEEN LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT 
FEDERAL 
GOVERNMEN
T 
FEDERAL / 
PROVINCIAL 
GOVERNMENT 
(Concurrent) 
PROVINCIAL 
GOVERNMENT 
PROVINCIAL / 
LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT 
(Concurrent) 
LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT 
Defense Population Planning * Law & Order Curative Health ** Link Roads 
External Affairs Electricity (Except K.E.S.E) * Justice 
Land Development 
** 
Intra – Urban 
Roads 
Post and 
telegraph 
Curriculum 
Development * Highways Primary Education Street Lighting 
Telephones Syllabus Planning * Urban Transport Preventive Health Solid Waste Management 
Radio and TV Centers of Excellence * 
Secondary & 
Higher education 
Farm–to-Market 
Roads Fire Fighting 
Currency Tourism * Agriculture Extension 
Water Supply, 
Drainage and 
Sewerage 
Parks, 
Playgrounds 
Foreign 
Exchange Social Welfare 
Distribution of 
Inputs   
Foreign Aid Vocational / Technical Training Irrigation   
Institutes for 
Research 
Employment 
Exchange Land Reclamation   
Nuclear Energy Historical Sites & Monuments    
Ports and 
Aerodromes     
Shipping     Air Service     Stock Exchange     National 
Highway     
Geological 
Surveys     
Censuses     Meteorological 
Surveys     
Railways     Mineral oil and 
Natural gas     
Industries     
* PERFORMED BY FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
     ** PERFORMED BY PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT 
Source: Author’s summarizes using 1973 Constitution of Pakistan 
include elementary education, curative health, farm-to-market roads and rural development 
which were largely pre empted by provincial government. Concurrent jurisdictions cause 
ambiguity due lack of clear responsibilities as either government may allocate lower 
budgets or altogether pullout from its service coverage due to budgetary constraints. 
Earlier research on allocation of functional assignments (Shah 1997) indicates that federal 
government in Pakistan were more instrumental in policy making, planning and execution of 
concurrent functions of population planning, manpower and labour management, social 
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welfare and social security and tourism. In contrast, provincial role is more pronounced in 
services provision of education and health, food and agriculture, irrigation and transport and 
communication. The higher federal role in concurrent functions is due to its superior 
institutional capacity and efficiency in service provision. Further in Pakistan federal 
government is also involved in services55 that can be more efficiently delivered by the 
private sector in developing countries and market failure is given as the justification of their 
involvement. In Pakistan, governments also own various public sector enterprises56
Recently, amendment XVIII (the Eighteenth Amendment) of the Constitution of Pakistan 
was passed by the National Assembly on April 8, 2010. This was a major step towards 
fiscal decentralization and has far reaching implication for intergovernmental fiscal 
relation in Pakistan.   
 and 
many among those have been throwing up huge deficits due to inefficient governance and 
evidence of rampant corruption whose deficits largely being subsidized by federal 
government. During the last two decades (90’s and to mid 2000) different governments have 
actively pursued privatisation and deregulation policies and many public sector enterprises 
were privatised which previous government subverted after assuming power in 2008.  
The Eighteenth constitutional amendment has abolished federal-provincial concurrent list 
and 41 of its functions out of the 47 has now been transferred to provinces. This 
amendment has brought clarity in functional assignments besides providing needed 
autonomy. These 41 transfer functions subsumed in 15 federal ministries57 which are 
planned to download to provinces in three phases58 and also reduced number of federal 
ministries to 32 from 47 (Fourth Annual Report59
                                                          
55  Banking and insurance, manufacturing and even wholesale and retail trade 
, 2011). With these additional provincial 
responsibilities appropriate balance in the functions of provincial-and local government is 
now required to improve the public service delivery. This could be done by restoring either 
earlier local government ordinance LGO 2001 or by proposing suitable amendments in the 
light of federalism principles and country’s own past experience and international 
practices.  
56 Pakistan Steel Mill, Pakistan International Airline, Pakistan Railways, Water and Power Development Authority, 
National Oil Refinery etc. 
57 These ministries are Ministry of Special Initiatives, Zakat and Ushr, Youth Affairs, Population Welfare, Local 
Government and Rural Development, Education, Social Welfare and Special Education, Health, Culture, Tourism, 
Livestock and Dairy Development, Food and Agriculture, Labor and Manpower, Women Development and Sports.   
58  In the first phase 5 ministries have devolved with others to follow in due course. 
59 Fourth Annual Report 2011, State of Pakistan Economy Devolution in Pakistan, National Institute of Public Policy 
Beaconhouse National University Lahore. 
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The implementation of 18th constitutional amendment will have an effect on future size of 
governments with significant expansion in provincial expenditures, and with some other 
associated implications. How to share assets and liabilities of devolved functions both 
vertically and horizontally among provinces, how to absorb existing manpower working 
under now devolved ministries, and how to transfer ownership and share of future 
liabilities of ongoing development projects between federation and among various 
provinces. However provinces are currently resisting taking on these responsibilities 
without federal assurance of additional sustainable financing to address these issues. For 
the amicable settlement of these issues, Council of Common Interest (CCI) is set up, which 
is headed by the Prime Minister with all provincial Chief Ministers as their members. 
Despite having three meetings these issues are still unresolved. 
To conclude, legislative divisions of functional responsibilities in Pakistan at various tiers 
of government follow subsidiary principle. This emphasis that the responsibility to be 
assign to a lowest level of government unless it justified for higher government tier based 
on the efficiency, equity or economic union arguments (Shah 1994). Federal government 
dealt with the functions of macroeconomic stability, to those whose benefits spillovers 
stretches beyond particular jurisdictions and to functions assigned in view of economic 
efficiency consideration.  
Contrary to legislative allocation the actual responsibilities reflect centralization and 
encroachment from higher government tiers for goods and services that can be more 
efficiently delivered either by the private sector or local government. The domination of 
higher governments is visible in areas of concurrent responsibilities due to relatively better 
institutional capacity of higher government and efficiency and market failure are reasons 
for increased centralization. The 18th constitutional amendment although eliminates 
concurrent list and bring clarity in functional assignments but still issues related to 
distribution of assets and liabilities of the devolved functions, absorption of existing 
manpower and sharing of future and ongoing development projects liabilities requires 
resolution among  constituent members. 
Local governments historically performed limited role in public services provision and 
lack constitutional recognition before 2001. Their existence also critically linked with the 
presence and absence of democracy in Pakistan with empowerment during army rule and 
absent and limited functional role in the democratic era. LGO 2001 assigned somewhat 
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enhanced functions with limited fiscal powers but is nonexistent since 2008. With transfer 
of concurrent list functions to provinces in 2010, it is desirable to relocate provincial and 
local responsibilities based on efficiency consideration with commensurate fiscal powers 
in order to bring clarity in the roles of all levels of government in Pakistan.  
3.4 Tax Assignments by Level of Governments 
The literature on fiscal federalism provides few important justifications for allocation of 
tax assignments to various tiers of government. First, expenditure needs and tax 
assignments should ideally be matched so that each government tier conveniently performs 
their expenditure mandate by ascertaining accountability. Second, taxes are assigned to 
different levels of governments in due considerations of collection efficiency, national 
equity and for ensuring free movement of goods and services within country. On these 
principles central government is responsible to levy taxes on mobile factors of production 
with the aim of maintaining tax harmonization and to prevent distortion in location of 
economic activity. Central government controls direct redistributive taxes (income, wealth) 
and to those assessed at unequally distributed bases (taxation on natural resources). Sub 
national governments (provincial and local government) on the other hand assign taxes on 
immobile factors (property and other residence based taxes) on benefit principle to 
ascertain that the costs of sub national services to be financed from taxes, the burden of 
which falls on the resident population. Sub national governments may allocate tax bases 
exclusively or shared some tax fields with higher governments. The benefits of joint 
occupancy of tax bases60
The taxation structure of Pakistan has been influenced by the economic growth and trade 
policies and onwards reforms agenda persuaded over the years. In the earlier years 
Pakistan adopted import substitution policies under high tariff shield which led to 
inefficient industrialization at the cost of efficient export oriented industries in the presence 
of high domestic taxation. The federal government in the 80’s had followed the economic 
liberalization and privatization policies and signed an structural adjustment agreement with 
IMF aimed at promoting competitiveness through rationalization of domestic taxation and 
tariff structure, broad basing and cascading of direct and indirect taxes, improvement in 
fiscal administration and lowering national budget deficits. These reforms brought down 
 are to maintain tax harmonization across the nation besides 
decentralizing some revenue powers to lower tier governments.  
                                                          
60 When higher (federal and provincial) government involved in setting and administering taxes 
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import tariff rates61
The allocation of taxation assignments in Pakistan initially follows principle of 
separation
 from a high advalorem rate of 110% to 35% in five years with higher 
rates on finished goods followed by intermediate goods and raw material respectively. 
Contrary to expectation, these reforms had reduced tax to GDP ratio to nearly 10 percent 
from an earlier 13 percent which resulted recorded increase in public expenditure to GDP 
ratio and therefore budget deficit.  
62 as per Indian Act 1935. Central government revenue authority consist of taxes 
on income (personnel and corporate) excluding agriculture income, excise duties (jute and 
cotton), succession duties and receipts of public sector undertakings. Provincial 
governments were responsible for sales tax, land revenue, irrigation charges, agriculture 
income tax, succession duties on agriculture property, excises, employment and profession 
tax, entertainment duties and tolls. Sales tax which was the provincial revenue source 
earlier was centralized63
Onwards three constitutions (1956, 1962 and 1973) were enacted with few changes in tax 
jurisdictions. Federal government has now occupied all broad based direct taxes (income 
tax, corporation tax, wealth tax, capital value tax on property), indirect taxes (sales tax on 
goods, excise duty, custom duties, and foreign travel tax) and receipts from development 
surcharges of petroleum, natural gas and fertilizer. Similarly federal non tax sources 
include receipts from property and enterprises (profit of Pakistan telecommunication 
authority, profit of post office, profit of State Bank of Pakistan, trading profit), civil 
administration and defense (general administration, law and order, social, economic and 
community services and defense) royalties and sales proceeds from oil and gas, airport and 
foreign travel tax and other miscellaneous receipts 
 in 1948 and since then it found a permanent place in the federal 
legislative list of the Constitution. 
On the contrary, provincial government revenue jurisdictions include many taxes but 
mostly low yielding, such as property tax64
                                                          
61 Except luxurious goods like motor cars that continue to be charge at higher tariff rates. 
, transfer of property tax, land revenue, 
agriculture income tax, capital gains tax, profession trade and callings tax, stamp duty, 
62 Taxes were assigned exclusively to either central or provincial government  
63 Sales tax administration was centralized after an agreement with provinces up to31st March, 1952 with its 50 percent 
share allocation to provinces and remaining 50 percent retained by the centre. This was done due to rising resource needs 
of country defense and in settling Muslim immigrants who arrived in large numbers in Pakistan after partition of India. 
64 After LGO 2001,  Property tax transferred to  local government 
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motor vehicle tax, entertainment tax, excise duty, electricity duty and infrastructure65
The tax assignment between federal and provincial governments in Pakistan is summarized 
in Table 3.2. It is clear that buoyant sources of revenues mostly fall under the exclusive 
purview of federal government. These include corporate profit tax, custom duties and 
natural resource taxes. Resident based property tax is the responsibility of sub national 
government in Pakistan. Some tax bases are shared both by federal and sub national 
government. These include income tax, sales tax and other fee and charges. These bases 
sharing some time originate important issues and concerns. 
. 
Provincial non taxes and user charges consist of revenues from social services (education, 
health, manpower management, housing and physical planning, social security and social 
welfare), economic services (agriculture and food, irrigation, industrial and mineral 
resources), and community services (civil works, public health and other community 
services), income from property and enterprises (profits, interest and dividend), and 
receipts from general administration, and law and order.  
 
Table  3.2 TAX ASSIGNMENTS OF NATIONAL AND SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS 
Functions Type of Tax National Sub national 
Corporate Direct Corporate Profit Tax --- 
Income Direct Personal Income Tax Agriculture income Tax 
Natural Resource Direct Royalties and Surcharges on Gas, Oil --- 
Property Direct Capital value Tax Property Tax Stamp Duty 
Custom Duties 
[Import and Export] Indirect  --- 
Excises Indirect Tobacco, Sugar, Cement and other industrial output 
Liquor and contraband 
items, industry 
Fees Indirect Many Licenses and Fee Many Licenses and Fees 
Sales Indirect GST on Goods GST on Services 
Others Direct / Indirect 
Capital-Value Tax/ Foreign 
Travel Tax 
Land Revenue/Motor 
Vehicle Tax 
Source: Author’s summarizes using 1973 Constitution of Pakistan. 
                                                          
65 This tax is levy only in province of Sindh at the rate of 1 percent on value of non oil imports clevenue bases ared at 
Karachi port. 
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3.4.1 Concerns in Tax Assignments 
Various tax bases are shared in Pakistan that causes problems due to its varying treatment 
by different levels of government that exerts additional burden on some tax bases beside 
increase in tax payers’ compliance costs. For example personnel income tax base is shared 
between federal and provincial governments with higher federal levy on its tax of personal 
and corporate income where as provincial government charge lower rates on agriculture 
income as a separate income block. Different treatment and variations income tax rates 
offers conduit of tax evasion. Lack of a harmonized rate structure across provinces also 
problematic as higher agriculture income tax rate in Punjab and lower in other provinces 
led to demand by Punjab farmers of uniform agriculture tax structure in line with other 
provinces. However it is likely that higher agriculture income tax rate in Punjab is 
intentional to collect greater revenues for better provision of provincial services. 
The tax base bifurcation also causes problems as GST on goods fall under federal domain 
whereas GST on services resides with provincial government. The GST base bifurcation 
has become a critical bottleneck in launching of comprehensive value added tax in 
Pakistan as provincial governments refuse to leave legal jurisdiction of GST services. 
Further property related tax base sharing involving all three tiers of government raises the 
overall tax incidence and compliance cost. According to fiscal power federal government 
levy tax on property sales, provincial on its transaction and local government on its 
transfer. Involvement of three level of government each independently dealing with this 
tax is inefficient and costly.  
User charges and fee are levied by all level of government. The main issues in user charges 
are its lower collection not covering operation and maintenance cost. The provincial 
services that receive subsidy by not covering its recurring costs were health, education, 
irrigation and agriculture extension services. It is somewhat acceptable in case of social 
services but subsidizing economic service like irrigation service (covers 24% O & M costs) 
in province of Sindh cannot justify. (Wasti, Siddiqui & Jawaid, 2002; Kardar 2003). The 
low cost recovery was due to lower irrigation charges and poor fiscal efforts from tax 
administration. Policy of full cost recovery or targeted cross subsidy with nil and low levy 
to poorer and progressive structure for medium to large size farmers could be adopted. 
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3.4.2 Key Aspects of Provincial Resource Mobilization  
Besides above elaborative issues that emerge due to sharing and bifurcation of tax bases, 
there are few other aspects of provincial taxation in order to improve provincial resource 
mobilization (Wasti, Siddiqui & Javaid, 2002: Kardar, 2003). These are related to the 
reasons of lower yield of provincial taxes as compared to its true potential and measures 
for its improvement. Lack of documentation of provincial economy and tax bases beside 
poor quality of fiscal administration, lack of necessary equipments and incentives for 
rewarding efficiency and honesty are the main reasons for lower yield of provincial taxes. 
The lack of documentation of provincial economy was due to the presence of strong nexus 
between the ruling elites and the bureaucrats, who resisted documentation for their undue 
financial gains. Records of urban properties, agriculture land holding, agriculture crop 
production and other tax bases neither fully computerized nor integrated. The earnings 
from agriculture income tax are also marginal due to difficulty in correct assessment of 
income contrary to its significantly higher share provincial gross regional product. 
Similarly revenue generation from stamp duties and property tax are lower compare to its 
true potential. If this could be appropriately documented with proper levy and with 
improve fiscal administration, the overall provincial resource generation will be enhanced 
significantly. Further, federal government has encroached on provincial services base by 
levying excise duties that leaves a little leeway for the provinces to impose GST on 
services that falls under their constitutional domain. In NFC 2010 the decision of federal 
withdrawal of excise duty on services finally taken, which enhance the provincial tax base 
further. Moreover provincial resources could also be improved by proposing piggyback 
levy on federal income tax as practiced in number of countries. The above proposed 
measure if implemented would likely to minimize revenue leakages and improve overall 
provincial own revenues. 
3.5 Evolution of Revenue Sharing Awards in Pakistan  
This section describes the historical evolution of revenue sharing arrangements between 
the federal and provincial governments in Pakistan as prescribed by National Finance 
Commission (NFC) awards. The section will examine the composition of federal divisible 
pool of taxes that is shared vertically between federal and provincial governments and 
horizontally among provinces by covering all NFC awards declared since Pakistan 
independence. 
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3.5.1 National Finance Commission 
NFC is the constitutional body set up under Article 160 of the 1973 Constitution66
NFC headed by federal Finance Minister with four provincial Finance Ministers and four 
non-statutory members representing one from each province are its members. The federal 
Finance Secretary assists the commission as an expert. The federal Ministry of Finance 
provides secretariat support to NFC. 
 by the 
President of Pakistan after every five years to declare revenue sharing arrangements 
between federal and provincial government and among provinces in Pakistan. The 
principle task of NFC is to determine the composition of taxes that form the federal 
divisible pool, proportions in which it should be shared between federal and provincial 
governments and criteria of its distribution among provinces. In addition NFC also takes 
decision for the provision of federal subventions and grants in aid to provinces and 
exercise of the borrowing powers of federation and provinces.  
3.5.2 Types of Federal Transfers/Grants  
Four different forms of federal transfers and grant flows are available to provinces. The 
decision of three of these transfer flows is taken by the NFC. First, NFC recommends 
revenue sharing transfers from federal divisible pool of taxes which is shared between 
federation and provinces in specified proportions, and among provinces on the basis of 
provincial population share. Second include straight transfer67 receipts which formally 
instituted from NFC 1991 after federal acceptance of provincial rights on their natural 
resources. These straight transfers directly remitted to provinces by the collecting authority 
after retaining 2 percent as cost of collection. Both NFC divisible pool and straight 
transfers are unconditional formula based transfer with no strings attached to its use. The 
third form of federal transfers include special non-development grant that have historically 
been recommended by NFC award for backward provinces68
                                                          
66 Article 118 of 1956 constitutions and Article 144 of 1962 constitution dealt with the formation of NFC. 
 or to all provinces in some 
fixed proportion or on the basis of sharing distribution. Moreover non development grants 
were also extended to provinces from federal consolidated funds to finance provincial 
67  Straight transfers instituted under Article 161 and include royalty on crude oil and gas, excise duty and surcharges on 
natural gas, hydro electricity profit of WAPDA and general sales tax on services. 
68 Fixed backwardness grants were provided to Baluchistan and KPK in NFC 1970 and 1974 and in NFC 1997. 
Backwardness grants also indexed with inflation and 11 percent annual growth. In NFC (PRO) 2006 the special GND 
were extended to all provinces in following proportion (Baluchistan 33 %, KPK 35 %, Sindh 21 % and Punjab 11 % of 
Rs 27.5 billion). 
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emergent needs, revenue deficits69 or to provide ad-hoc relief in account of certain 
damages. Since 1999-2000 Octroi and Zila Tax grant (OZT)70
3.5.3 Post Independence Revenue Sharing Arrangements  
 
to provinces commenced 
under GND head which predominantly characterized as unconditional. Fourth, federal 
development grant (GD) is provided to finance provincial annual development program 
and specific purpose projects and/or for performing agency functions. These grants were 
allocated year to year and being funded from federal consolidated fund. All GD are 
characterized as conditional.  
The pre independence financial structure is adopted by Pakistan after its independence in 
1947. Few changes in the intergovernmental financial arrangements were made in 1948-49 
to cater increase resource needs of country defence and in account of resettlements of 
Muslim refugees in Pakistan who arrived in large numbers from India after partition. The 
changes were made in sharing of central income tax whose sharing with province has now 
suspended. Also sales tax which was earlier a provincial subject was taken over by federal 
government with 50% of proceeds to be transferred to provinces on derivation principle. 
Moreover Centre also exercised borrowing authority for raising loans with complete 
restrictions on provincial borrowing. Later, on improvement in federal revenues, federal to 
provincial revenue sharing arrangements was announced in1951 award. 
3.5.3.1 Raisman Award 1951 
Raisman71 Award (1951) was the first formal award of Pakistan that distributed divisible pool 
taxes between the centre and provinces72
 
 and amongst provinces.  The award allocated 50 
percent share among constituents’ members (provinces and other federating units) from the 
central divisible pool of income tax, sales tax and excise duties (See Table 3.3).  
                                                          
69 Revenue deficit grant were at its peak in late 80’0 and accounted for nearly 30 percent of the total unconditional grant. 
70 OZT which was a local levy imposed on goods entered in/exported out of district jurisdiction was abolished by federal 
government in 1999 due to reduce  tax payers compliance cost. Federal Government granted its compensation by 
imposing 2.5% additional GST levy on the base amount of each province. 
71 The award was prepared by Sir.J Raisman in 1951 on the request of Government of Pakistan which was made effective 
from April, 1952. 
72 The provinces are East Pakistan, Punjab, Sindh, KPK (formally NWFP); Baluchistan States and federating states are 
Bhawalpur, Khairpur. Remainders include those Princely States who were not physically acceding in Pakistan but their 
rulers (Princes) have given the consent in favor of Pakistan. 
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Table  3.3 REVENUE SHARING ARRANGEMENTS UNDER VARIOUS NFC AWARDS 
DIVISIBLE POOL 
RAISMAN NATIONAL FINANCE COMMISSION (NFC) 
 Before 1971 1971 Onwards 
1951 1962 1964 1970 1974  1990 1997 20062 2009 
--------------------------- Provincial Share in Percentages ---------------- 
A. Income Tax and  Corporation Tax 1 50 50 65 80 80 80 37.5 42.5-46.253 56.0- 57.5 
B.  Wealth  Tax       37.5 42.5-46.25 56.0- 57.5 
C.  Sales Taxes 50 60 65 80 80 80 37.5 42.5-46.25 56.0- 57.5 
D.  Excise Duty       37.5 42.5-46.25 56.0- 57.5 
- Tea 50 60 65 80 - -  42.5-46.25 56.0- 57.5 
- Tobacco 50 60 65 80 - 80  42.5-46.25 56.0- 57.5 
- Sugar - - - - - 80  42.5-46.25 56.0- 57.5 
- Betelent 50 60 65 80 - -  42.5-46.25 56.0- 57.5 
E. Export Duties       37.5 42.5-46.25  
- Cotton - 100 65 80 80 80  - - 
- Jute 62.5 100 65 80 - -  42.5-46.25 - 
F. Import Duties       37.5 42.5-46.25 56.0  57.5 
G.   Estate/Succession  Duties - 100 - 100 - - 37.5 42.5-46.25 - 
H.   Capital Value Tax on Immovable 
Properties 
- 100 - 100 - - 37.5 42.5-46.25 Devolved  
Divisible Pool Transfers  
(Percentage of federal Tax Revenue 
12.8 23.1 27 33.4 22.8 38 35 36.7 ? 
Source: Report of The National Finance Commissions (Various years)) Summary of Recommendations and Explanatory Memorandum, Government of Pakistan NFC Secretariat, Government 
of Pakistan. 
Notes: 1. This exclude income tax share of federal government employees collected from federal capital Islamabad. 
 2.  This NFC award promulgated through the ordinance announced by the then President Pervaiz Musharraf and called amendment in the NFC Order 2006. 
 3.  Other than 1/6th of sales tax transfer to the province in lieu of Octroi /Zila Tax to the province of origin. 
 4.  Sales tax on Services devolved to provinces as per the constitution. 
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The former two taxes were shared among provinces on the basis of pre assigned shares73 
where as division of sales tax was done using derivation principle74
 
 (Table 3.4). Moreover, 
award also allocated 50% sales tax earnings of Karachi sea port among provinces of West 
Pakistan with no allocation for East Pakistan (see Appendix Table 3.3A, columns 3). 
Raisman award also enhanced the allocation of recurring grant to KPK province (formerly 
North West Frontier Province) to Rs 12.5 million from an earlier amount of Rs. 10 million. 
As a whole Raisman award broadened the overall size of the DP by sharing more taxes 
compare to earlier period. It horizontally shared revenues using two principle 
considerations; pre assigned shares and derivation principle. East Pakistan was 
discriminated in division of sales tax collection of Karachi with no share to it. In other DP 
taxes East Pakistan also received comparatively less transfers (45%) compare to its 56 
percent population thus benefits more affluent West Pakistan. Further sales tax which 
earlier was a provincial revenue source was taken over by the central government. 
Table  3.4 ASSIGNED SHARES TO PROVINCES UNDER NFC AWARDS 
SHARES 
RAISMAN NATIONAL FINANCE COMMISSION (NFC) 
1951 1970 1974 1990 1997 2006 2009 
-----------------------------------------Percentages----------------------------------------- 
PUNJAB 
Pre Assigned 59.39 56.50 60.25 57.87 57.88 57.36 51.74 
Population Share (63.58) (62.23) (60.10) (57.87) (57.88) (57.36) (57.36) 
SINDH 
Pre Assigned 24.14 23.50 22.50 23.29 23.29 23.71 24.55 
Population Share (18.71) (20.45) (22.62) (23.29) (23.29) (23.71) (23.71) 
KPK [FORMERLY NWFP] 
Pre Assigned 15.32 15.50 13.39 13.54 13.54 13.82 14.62 
Population Share (14.10) (14.01) (13.40) (13.54) (13.54) (13.82) (13.82) 
BALUCHISTAN 
Pre Assigned 1.15 4.50 3.86 5.30 5.30 5.11 9.09 
Population Share (3.61) (2.31) (3.88) (5.30) (5.30) (5.11) (5.11) 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Note: Due to one unit no share is reported for these provinces in NFC 1962 and 1964. In these awards, divisible pool was 
distributed among provinces using following shares; East Pakistan 54%, West Pakistan 46%. 
 
Source:  Reports of the National Finance Commission (various years), “Summary of Recommendations and Explanatory 
Memorandum”, Government of Pakistan N.F.C Secretariat 
                                                          
73 Pre assigned share were as follows; East Pakistan (45 %), Punjab (27 %), Sindh (8 %) and Baluchistan (0.6 %) (See 
table 5.1, column 2). 
74 With a minimum guaranteed share of Rs.18 million for East Pakistan. 
Intergovernmental Governmental Fiscal Relation – A Case Study of Pakistan 89 
3.5.3.2 National Finance Commission 1961-62 
The next award that required to be declared in 1956 was announced in 1962 due to 
deteriorating law and order and dismal political environment of the country. The NFC 
1962 was constituted by the President75 to determine the tax jurisdiction of the Centre and 
the provinces, taxes that formed the divisible pool and its vertical and horizontal sharing 
arrangements among constituent members. The exercise of borrowing power and 
modification in the terms of provincial debt liabilities was also part of the NFC agenda. 
This award was made effective from 1st July 1962 after formation of one unit76
The NFC 1962 have broadened the federal divisible pool by including all major taxes 
(income and corporate tax, sales tax, federal excise duties on tea, tobacco and betel nut, 
export duties on jute and cotton, estate and succession duties on agricultural land and 
capital value tax on immovable property). It transferred 50% share of central income tax, 
60% of sales tax and excise duties and 100% of all remaining taxes to provinces. 
 that 
divided Pakistan in to two provinces; East Pakistan and West Pakistan.  
The horizontal resource sharing of federal divisible pool of taxes varies by tax using two 
principle considerations; pre assigned share (close to population share) and on derivation 
principle. Sales tax was the only tax distributed using both considerations i.e. from 60% of 
sales tax allocable share, 30% was distributed using origin principle and remaining 70% on 
pre assigned shares. The remaining taxes (income and excise tax) were divided among 
provinces using pre assigned shares (East Pakistan 54% and West Pakistan 46%) and 
others (export duties, succession duties and capital value tax) taxes were fully transferred 
to provinces on collection principle (Table 3.5). This award granted 50% waiver on all 
federal outstanding loans and converted the remaining 50% in to one loan after July 1962 
to be payable in 25 years at 3.5 percent markup. 
As a whole, NFC 1962 increased the overall magnitude of divisible pool by including new 
taxes and by enhancing the provincial vertical share in these taxes. It almost doubled the 
magnitude of federal transfer to provinces from an earlier 12 .1 percent to 23.1 percent of 
the federal taxes in this award (see Table 3.3). The award distributed the federal divisible 
pool among provinces using collection principle and pre-assigned shares.  
                                                          
75 General Ayub Khan on 19th December, 1961 
76 The one unit was formed in 1955 by merging four western wing provinces (i.e. Punjab, Sindh, KPK (NWFP) and 
Baluchistan along with other federating units) as one unit called province of West Pakistan. NFC 1962 and NFC 1964 
awards were announced under one unit regime for two provinces East Pakistan and West Pakistan. 
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Table  3.5 REVENUE SHARING FORMULAS UNDER VARIOUS NFC AWARDS 
Awards 
Divisible Pool 
Taxes 
Distribution Criteria 
Collection 
Pre - Assigned 
Shares*** 
Population Backwardness 
Revenue 
Collection / 
Generation 
Inverse 
Population 
Density 
1951 
Sales Tax 50%* 50% N/A K  Rs.12.5 M N/A N/A 
Income Tax and 
Excise Duties 
N/A 100% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Export Duties N/A 100% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1962 Sales Tax 30% 70% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1964 All Other Taxes N/A 100% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1970 
Sales Tax 30% 70% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
All Taxes N/A 100% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1974 
All Taxes Less 
Import Duties 
N/A N/A 100% N/A N/A N/A 
1990 
All Taxes Less 
Import Duties 
N/A N/A 100% 
P 1000/3Y 
S 700/5Y 
N/A N/A 
1996 All Taxes N/A N/A 100% B    4410M  K 3380M N/A N/A 
2006 All Taxes N/A N/A 100% 3%** N/A N/A 
2009 All Taxes N/A N/A 82% 10.3%**** 5% 2.7% 
Source: Author prepared using National Finance Commission Awards Reports 
*  Sales Tax collections from Karachi were distributed on the basis of pre-assigned shares. 
**  From total 3% charge on federal consolidated fund, grant allocated among four provinces as follows Punjab [11%], Sindh [21%], KPK [35%] and Baluchistan [33%].  
*** Pre 1970 the allocation of federal divisible pool revenues were on the basis of pre assigned share which are slightly different than  provincial population share.  
****       Weights of poverty and backwardness is as follows (Punjab 23.4%, Sindh 23.2%, KPK 27.8%), Baluchistan 25.6%.  
 
P, S B and K indicate provinces of Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces respectively. 
N/A indicates that the criterion is not applied in the particular award. 
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3.5.3.3 National Finance Commission 1964 
The National Finance Commission77
The NFC 1964 award allocated relatively high 65% share to provinces in federal divisible 
pool comprised of income and corporate tax, sales tax, excise duties and export duties (see 
Table 3.3). The horizontal distribution of federal divisible pool of taxes followed the previous 
award criterion of pre-assigned shares i.e. East Pakistan (54%) and West Pakistan (46%). 
From the 65% provincial allocable share of sales tax, 30% was horizontally distributed among 
provinces on collection of principle and remaining 70% on pre assigned shares (Table 3.5). 
The recommendations of the commission were for the five years starting from 1st July 1695 to 
30th June 1970. After the abolishment of one unit in 1969, West Pakistan share of 46% get 
divided among four provinces as follows; Punjab 56.5%, Sindh 23.5%, KPK 15.5% and 
Baluchistan 4.5%. However, The allotted share of East Pakistan remained at 54%.  
 was constituted by the President General Ayub Khan to 
decide the distribution of federal divisible pool of taxes vertically between federal and 
provincial governments and horizontally among provincial governments respectively.  
3.5.3.4 National Finance Committee 1970 
Following dissolution of one unit President General Yahya Khan constituted National Finance 
Committee78 under the Chairmanship of federal Finance Minister to review the existing inter-
governmental fiscal transfer arrangements and to make recommendations of sharing of federal 
divisible pool of taxes between federal and provincial governments and amongst provincial 
governments respectively. The NFC committee enhanced the federal divisible pool79
 
 by 
including more taxes and by enhancing provincial share to 80% compare to 65% earlier. The 
horizontal distribution criterion, however, remained unaltered as per the preceding award. The 
1970 award had transferred 33% of the total federal taxes to provinces in comparison to 27% 
in the 1964 award (See table 3.3). 
                                                          
77 In pursuance of clause (1) of the Article 144 of the new 1962 constitution 
78 For the first time the committee was constituted on 17th  April, 1970 for recommending the revenue sharing arrangements 
among constituent members contrary  to high powered commission earlier 
79 Divisible pool comprises of income tax, excise duties on tea, tobacco and betel nut, sales tax, export duties on jute and 
cotton, estate and succession duties and capital value tax on immovable properties. 
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Following separation of East Pakistan in 1971 its share was retained by the federal 
government whereas 46% share of West Pakistan distributed among four West Pakistan 
provinces as follows, Punjab 56.5%, Sindh 23.5%, KPK 15.5% and Baluchistan 4.5%.  
3.5.3.5 National Finance Commission 1974 
The second phase in the history of intergovernmental fiscal relations relates to the period after 
1971 following separation of East Pakistan. West Pakistan thus became present Pakistan and 
was administratively set up into four provinces; Punjab, Sindh KPK and Baluchistan and three 
federally controlled areas; Federal capital Islamabad, Federally Administrative Tribal Areas 
(FATA), Northern Areas (now Gilgit province) and Azad Kashmir. This award was 
announced in the democratic regime of Prime Minister Bhutto following the approval of the 
1973 Constitution. 
The President of Pakistan has appointed80
The 1974 NFC award was the first award declared in the democratic regime of Prime Minister 
Bhutto after separation of its Eastern wing (now Bangladesh).Three important changes were 
noticed in the 1974 NFC award compared to those declared previously under united Pakistan. 
First, composition of federal divisible pool now comprised fewer taxes (i.e. personal and 
corporate income tax, sales tax and export duties on cotton). Second, provincial population
 the NFC under Article 160 (1) of the 1973 
constitution to decide the composition of federal divisible pool of taxes to be shared vertically 
between federal and provincial governments and horizontally among provinces including the 
criteria of its distribution. In addition, the commission was also mandated to recommend 
grants in aid provision to provinces besides determining the borrowing powers between levels 
of governments within the provision of the constitution.  
81
                                                          
80 On 9th February 1974. 
 
now considered as a sole criterion for horizontal sharing of federal divisible pool of taxes 
compared to pre assigned shares and collection principles used earlier. Third, sales tax 
revenues that were earlier partly (30 percent) shared on origin principle have now been 
discarded as criterion. Vertical sharing ratios between provinces and federation have however 
remained at previous levels of 80:20 percent respectively. 
81 Provincial population share were:  Punjab 60.25%, Sindh 22.5 %, KPK (formerly NWFP) 13.39 % and Baluchistan 3.86 % 
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Moreover, fixed federal subventions82
The 1974 award was criticized primarily on the use of population as a sole criterion for 
horizontal resource sharing among provinces. Following were the main arguments against the 
distribution criterion.  First, the costs of public service provision do vary by province due to 
the differences in population density and typology of province. Second the level of services 
varies by province as some provinces are relatively more backward. Third emphasis on 
population based allocations alone may encourage population growth contrary to national 
policy objective to control population. Fourth it gives no incentive to provinces to raise taxes 
or increase their fiscal efforts. The recommended backward areas subvention to province of 
Baluchistan and KPK has been also criticized as being low and symbolic.   
 were allocated to provinces of Baluchistan and KPK 
given their relative backwardness. Maintenance grants for provincial strategic roads/highways 
and cost reimbursement of agency work also recommended in this award. Continuations of 
borrowing arrangements with no statutory limits were granted for both tiers of governments. 
The award was made effective from 1st July 1975. 
3.5.3.6 National Finance Commission 1979, 1985 
NFC 1979 was constituted83
On 25th July 1985 Zia constituted NFC 1985 but even after nine meetings in three years no 
consensus was developed on the distribution of horizontal transfer criteria. Therefore NFC 
1974 population based award arrangements remained intact. 
 under the Martial Law regime of President General Zia-ul-Haq 
but did not conclude due to lack of any meeting. Thus NFC 1974 award arrangements were 
continued with only one revision in relative share of provincial population which was 
warranted after 1981 population census. 
The lack of declaration of NFC award in 1979 and again in 1985 inflicted the discriminatory 
feelings among three smaller provinces (Baluchistan, KPK and Sindh) against Punjab due its 
non acceptance of multiple criteria other than population alone for the horizontal resource 
sharing. This damaged the interprovincial harmony and weakened the federation.  
                                                          
82 Annual subventions to Baluchistan were Rs.50 million and KPK Rs. 100 million. 
83 On 11th February, 1979 
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3.5.3.7 National Finance Commission 1990  
The NFC 1990 was constituted by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan on 23rd July 1990 whose four 
non-statutory members were later replaced with new members on the request of newly elected 
government of PM Nawaz Sharif. NFC terms of reference in addition to the vertical and 
horizontal sharing arrangements for the distribution of federal divisible pool of taxes84
It is mandatory for the President to constitute NFC with a regular interval of every 5 years but 
this award was declared after a delay of 12 years due to the failure of reaching an agreement 
between constituent members on horizontal resource sharing arrangements in two earlier 
inconclusive NFC awards of 1979 and 1985. Therefore, the 1974 award criteria of sharing 
divisible pool revenues on population bases remained operative for over 17 long years until 
June 1991. This caused resentment among constituent members for being discriminated, 
besides damaging interprovincial harmony as population based criteria disproportionately 
favors Punjab, given its 57% share in national population with better quality of life of its 
residents compared to relative backward provinces of Baluchistan and KPK.  
 also 
included transfer arrangements for the division of natural resource tax proceeds from royalties 
on crude oil, royalties, excise duties and surcharges on natural gas and hydro electricity profit 
with provinces. Moreover, the commission also mandated to recommend federal grants in aid 
to provinces and to work out the borrowing powers for the federal and provincial 
governments. 
Realizing the need of increase resource transfers and to curb the feelings of injustice among 
smaller provinces political government of PM Nawaz Sharif introduced significant changes in 
the overall fiscal transfer arrangements. First, NFC 1991 significantly broadened the divisible 
pool by including new taxes; excise duty on tobacco, tobacco manufactures and sugar in 
addition to previously contained taxes of income and corporate tax, sales and purchase tax, 
export duties on cotton (Table 3.3). Second and more importantly, NFC 1991 award also 
accepted the provincial rights on their natural resources85
                                                          
84 These taxes includes income and corporate tax, sales tax on goods imported, exported, produced, manufactured and 
consumed,  excise duty on tobacco and tobacco manufacturers, and sugar, export duties on cotton. 
 and royalty on crude oil, 
85 The net amount of royalty from crude oil, royalties, excise duties and development surcharge on natural gas paid to the 
provinces on production basis. 
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development surcharge on natural gas and profit on hydro electricity86 also added along with 
royalty and excise duty on natural gas87
The 1990 NFC award instituted fixed
 sharing earlier. The natural resource taxes called 
“Straight Transfers” as its revenues were directly remitted to the provinces on origin principle 
by collecting agency. These straight transfer proceeds considerably expanded provincial fiscal 
base that disproportionately benefits three smaller provinces due to the presence of its large 
resource base there. However, vertical sharing of federal divisible pool of taxes remained at 
80:20 split between the federal and provincial government respectively (Table 3.3) and 
population share continued to use as sole criterion for horizontal sharing (Table 3.5).  
88
As a whole this award significantly increased the overall magnitude of NFC formula based 
transfers (divisible pool transfer and straight transfer) and ceased the onward financing of 
revenue deficit grants. However its impact dampened due to federal government 
announcements of significant increase in salary and perks of all government employees from 
1991-92, the burden of which falls on the provincial exchequers. Further inclusion of straight 
transfers disproportionately benefits smaller provinces and thus helped equalizing resources. 
However, fiscal equalization assessments of the overall transfers to provinces were not 
undertaken by the commission.  
 special annual grants by replacing ad-hoc revenue 
deficit grants which became the feature in the 80’s. This award thus ceased revenue deficit 
grant and made provinces accountable now for their future revenue deficits/surpluses.   
3.5.3.8 National Finance Commission 1997 
The NFC 1997 was first constituted by President Laghari under the democratic regime of PM 
Benazir Bhutto on 23rd July, 1995. As her government was sacked89
                                                          
86 The net hydro electricity profit paid to provinces on the location of power stations on estimated profit of Rs. 6087 Millions 
in 1989-90 with annual growth of 10%.  Under the Federal Government guarantee the amount of hydro electricity profit 
directly remitted to provinces by power agency WAPDA. 
 by the President in 1996 
and no meeting were held till that time, the NFC was reconstituted on 10th December, 1996 to 
announce revenue sharing arrangements between the federal and provincial governments, the 
87 The royalty and excise duty on natural gas is not part of the federal consolidated fund has now resumed for payment to 
provinces.  
88 The fixed grants of Rs 700 million to Sindh for five years, Rs1000 million to Punjab for three years, Rs 200 million and Rs 
100 million respectively to provinces of KPK and Baluchistan for three years.   
89  In charges of corruption and nepotism and large number of extra judicial killings of Sindh based political party workers in 
Karachi. 
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provision of grants in aid to provinces and exercise of the borrowing powers of two levels of 
governments within the constitutional parameters. 
As the NFC 1997 award was based on the new fiscal strategy as compared to the earlier 
revenue sharing arrangements, it is worth to highlight important changes initiated. The 
following subsections provide brief features and implications of this fiscal award.  
3.5.3.8.1 New Award Strategy of 1997 
Earlier revenue awards used a gap filling approach that estimate the magnitude of transfer by  
establishing bench mark of provincial revenues (tax+ non tax+net capital receipts) with that of 
provincial current expenditures using growth rates (based on past trends in provincial revenues 
and expenditures) during the award period. The basic drawback of this approach was that 
estimates of provincial expenditures and revenues did not necessarily correspond to the 
estimates of national budgetary deficit target. The 1997 NFC award were based on devising 
the National Resource Picture that aimed to project combined tax and non tax revenues of 
federal and provincial governments, adding in to this the funds available through borrowings 
to finance target level of national budget deficit.  Expenditure projections for both levels of 
government are made consistent with the available national resources. The proposed strategy 
also protected the priority expenditures of federal and provincial governments (defense, debt 
servicing and social sector and development expenditures) in line with the estimates of 
national budget deficit target. 
Two main changes were noticed in 1997 award. First, divisible pool has now expanded to 
cover all federal taxes90
                                                          
90 Divisible pool now consists of taxes of personnel and corporate income, wealth tax, capital value tax, sales tax, custom 
duties (imports and exports), excise duties (excluding excise duty on gas charged at wellhead). 
 including custom duty that was earlier excluded (see Table 3.3). 
Second after expansion in federal divisible pool the vertical shares proportions also altered 
from an earlier 20:80 percent to 62.5:37.5 percent respectively for federal and provincial 
governments. The earlier awards allocated larger shares with reduced number of taxes as 
compared to now when all federal taxes are included in the federal divisible pool to share with 
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the provinces. Further in this award straight transfer revenues are continued to be paid to 
provinces as per earlier agreed formula91
This award also allocated annual subventions
.  
92 of Rs 4,080 million and Rs 3,320 million to 
backward provinces of Baluchistan and KPK respectively which were more judgmental93
During the tenure of the award, Octroi and Zila Tax (OZT) which was a local levy was 
abolished by the federal government in order to reduce the compliance costs and for insuring 
free movement of goods in the country. To compensate for these revenue losses, federal 
government increased the GST rate from 12.5 percent to 15.0 percent. This 2.5 percent GST 
additionally transfer to provinces on the basis of their OZT share in the base year (1999). This 
amount was given to the provinces in the non-development grant head.  
 
rather than based on some valid statistics or research. This NFC also recommended closed 
ended matching incentives for provincial fiscal effort subject to minimum own revenue 
growth of 14.2% and a maximum ceiling of Rs 500 millions for Punjab and Sindh and Rs 100 
million for Baluchistan and KPK. However, no province had achieved this matching incentive 
as provincial fiscal efforts only counts increase in tax rates and user charges, withdrawal of 
exemptions and imposition of new taxes that enhance the overall tax incidence on residents 
which governments usually avoids. As such no incentive was offered for increase revenues 
through improve tax administration.  
The post evaluation of the 1997 NFC award undertaken earlier (Wasti & Siddiqui, 2003) 
highlighted two major insinuations. First, that revenue transfer should reflect stable revenue 
source for the recipient governments without any fear of drastic budgetary revisions and 
second, all federating units must be taken into confidence of any reform or changes that would 
have implications on fiscal transfers.  
3.5.3.8.2 Instability in Revenue Transfers in NFC 1997 
In NFC 1997, none of the federal tax (barring exception of GST) attained projected revenue 
growth. Thus customs and excise duty revenues recorded a negative growth. As a result 
                                                          
91 Royalties, excise duty and development surcharge on natural gas after deduction of 2% collection cost. Royalty from crude 
oil be paid on production level of each province and net hydel profit on power station location for KPK at Rs. 6 billion. 
92 Proposed to increase annually with 11 percent growth and indexed with inflation.  
93 The NFC 1997 award proceedings did not mention any statistics for the assessment of relative backwardness or poverty in 
these provinces. 
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federal revenue shortfall of Rs. 1083 billion (projected 2863 billion versus actual 1780 billion) 
and consequential declines of Rs 379 billion in federal transfer were recorded during 1997-
2002. The reasons for this revenue short fall was optimistic targets set for GDP growth and of 
federal revenues as Pakistan during that period was pursuing IMF structural reform program 
that also aimed drastic reduction in domestic tax and tariff rates from 110% to 35% in 3 year 
time span. The economic growth also partly slowed down due to Pakistan nuclear detonation 
in May 1999 and onward international sanctions. The global recession was also the reason for 
low economic growth. Provinces thus suffered financial losses due to revision in their vertical 
share which was reduced down to 37.5% in NFC 1997 as compared to 80% in NFC 1990.  It 
was estimated that if 1990 award arrangements were continued provinces would have received 
additional Rs. 286 billion during 1997-2002 as compared to what they had received under 
1997 award arrangements. This depicted uncertainty in provincial transfer receipts contrary to 
what federalism principles proposed that transfer should reflect stability. One important lesson 
that can be inferred from the experience of NFC 1997 award was that any reform or agreement 
have far reaching implications on federal revenues and transfers must be brought to 
knowledge of all federating units to have clarity on relevant issues. 
3.5.3.9 National Finance Commission 2006 
The President General Musharraf constituted 6th NFC in the year 2000 and again reconstituted 
it in 2003 but no recommendations came forward due to lack of consensus among constituents 
member on vertical and horizontal resource sharing despite having 11 meetings in 3 years. The 
reasons were first, the federal denial to increase provincial vertical share to 50% as demanded 
by province and second three smaller province emphasis of using multiple criteria for sharing 
of federal divisible pool of taxes contrary to Punjab who insisted only for population and some 
allocation for backwardness. For example; Baluchistan demanded the inclusion of inverse 
population density or area for horizontal sharing, Sindh province asked to include revenue 
collection as additional criterion and KPK insisted to integrate the criterion of extent of 
poverty and backwardness. Due to this deadlock President Musharraf constituted 7th NFC in 
2005 but stalemate94
                                                          
94 One of the critical bottlenecks for judicious distribution of NFC resource sharing arrangements was that all concerns 
stakeholders (federal and provincial government representatives) are members and deciding their own stakes. Given the 
economic rational every stakeholder tries to maximize his/her benefits. It seems difficult at times as few may lose in terms of 
their percentage shares despite higher receipts as compared to what they are getting before. There is a need to include 
 still persisted. As a result, four provincial Chief Ministers relinquished 
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their authority to President for the judicious declaration of the NFC award. The President 
using his constitutional95
Three main changes were proposed in PCO 2006. First, revenue sharing from federal divisible 
pool of taxes
 authority had proposed vertical and horizontal revenue sharing 
arrangements NFC (PCO 2006) by issuing amendments in the Distribution of Revenues and 
Grants in Aid Order, 1997.  
96 (see table 3.3) had increased provincial vertical share to 41.5 percent in the first 
year and with proposed annual increments97 it reached to 46.25 percent in the terminal year 
2010-11. The horizontal distribution arrangements have remained unaltered and population 
continued to be used as a sole criterion for horizontal resource sharing. The other change was 
revision in the formula of 1/6th distribution of sales tax to compensate provincial OZT losses. 
The revised formula augments relative weights of collection98 and population99 in the 
proportion of 50:50 as compared to earlier 62.5:37.5 percent for collection and population 
respectively. This formula revision benefits Punjab and KPK given their higher population 
weight compare to collection whereas province of Sindh was at the losing end as its weightage 
of collection is higher than population. The unchanged sharing criteria of federal divisible 
pool and augmented 2.5% sales tax distribution formula offers less transfers to Sindh compare 
to what they ought to receive.  Third, NFC (PCO 2006) have opened window of federal 
subventions to all four provinces100provinces in a strange and arbitrary101
As a whole promulgated PCO 2006 provided projected transfers to provinces due to better 
performance of country’s economy with higher GDP growth and federal revenues. Despite an 
manner on which 
province of Sindh had shown reservations.  
                                                                                                                                                                                      
economists and other technocrats as members of the commission as successfully practiced in India and Australia and few 
other countries. These technocrats were members in their respective finance and grants commissions. They can prepare the 
case for the commission based on valid, simple and acceptable statistics in the context of courtiers overall fiscal situation and 
in light of constituents correct assessments of fiscal needs and fiscal capacity The case may widely debate for consensus and 
amicable resolution.  
95 President under Article 160(6) of the constitution issued Revenue Order, No 1 of 2006 by making amendments in NFC 
1997 formula.  
96 Divisible pool consists all taxes included in the previous award i.e. personal and corporate income, wealth tax, capital 
value, sales and purchase tax on goods, sales tax on services (central excise mode), export duties on cotton, customs duties 
and excise duties excluding gas. 
97 Revenue order 2006 had proposed 1 percent increment in federal divisible pool transfers to provinces in the second year 
and 1.25 percent annual increase in the remaining three years. 
98(Punjab 50.0%, Sindh 37.5%, KPK 9.93%, Baluchistan 5.22%). 
99 (Punjab 57.36%, Sindh 23.71%, KPK 13.82%, Baluchistan 5.11%). 
100The allocated share of four provinces were as follows; Punjab (11%), Sindh (21%), Baluchistan (33%), NWFP (35%).  
101 It is judgmental in character rather based on some studies or data.  
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increase in provincial vertical share the award was criticized as provincial shares were not 
increased to 50 percent which provinces unanimously demanded. Moreover smaller provinces 
of Baluchistan, KPK and Sindh have also shown their reservations for continuation of 
population based criterion for horizontal distribution of divisible pool as opposed to their 
advocacy for multiple indicators. The formula revision of 2.5 percent GST distribution 
favored largest province of Punjab in particular. Also the distribution of federal subventions to 
all provinces in varying proportions seems rather judgmental instead basing some valid 
benchmarks. This inflicted feeling of discontent among smaller provinces. 
3.5.3.10 National Finance Commission 2010 
The NFC award 2010 was the third award which was announced by the democratically elected 
government after the NFC award of 1974 and 1990. The democratically elected President 
Zardari constituted the NFC 2010 to make recommendations for the distribution of net 
proceeds of certain taxes between the federation and the provinces and from provincial share 
its distribution among provinces. It also specified federal grants in aid provision to provinces 
and exercise of the borrowing powers of the two levels of government in Pakistan as per the 
constitution. 
The NFC 2010 award has many important dimensions. First the award offers record transfer to 
provinces from the federal divisible pool102
The second distinction of the award was its horizontal sharing arrangements using multiple 
factors contrary to population alone that have been used since 1974. Thus long standing 
demand of smaller provinces for horizontal resource distribution using multiple factors finally 
stands accepted after 36 years due to magnanimity of Punjab which possibly would help 
improve interprovincial harmony and strengthen federation.  
 to 56% in the first year and 57.5% in the 
subsequent four years as compared to 47.5% before. Correspondingly the federal share has 
declined to 44% in the first and 43.5% in the following four years. This fiscal space of 10% 
was partly possible due to federal claim of 1% in account of cost of collection as opposed to 
its 5% deductions earlier.  
                                                          
102 Federal divisible pool comprised of income/ corporate tax, wealth tax, capital value tax, Sales tax on sales and purchase of 
goods, export duties on cotton, customs duties, and federal excise duties excluding gas.  
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The factors and relative weights that have been used to distribute federal divisible pool across 
provinces were as follows; population 82%, poverty/backwardness103 10.3%, revenue 
collection104 2.5%, revenue generation105 2.5% and inverse population density106
The award also offers special grants-in-aid
 2.7%.  
107
This award also accepted constitutional domain of provinces on GST services tax and has 
recommended withdrawal of federal excise duties from these services
 to province of KPK to compensate the damages 
of its infrastructure and peoples hardship as a result of their role as a frontline state in war on 
terror. The award also recommends 0..66% annual grant to province of Sindh to compensate 
its OZT losses that would be charged at federal consolidated fund.  The resulting shares of 
provinces using multiple criterions and considering special needs were; Punjab 51.74 percent, 
Sindh 24.55 percent, KPK 14.62 percent and Baluchistan 9.09 percent. Principal principle 
108
The main shortcoming of this award was that political government disbursed significant share 
to provinces unconditionally, without making provinces either more accountable, and/or 
which encouraged them to improve their own revenue mobilization through better fiscal 
efforts. Altogether NFC award 2010 had further decentralized revenue base. It remained to be 
seen that how provinces utilize these funds and how far award help to mitigate interprovincial 
inequities and what impact will it have on overall federal fiscal position. 
. It is argued that this 
will help broadened the provincial fiscal base.  
3.6 Analysis of the Inter Governmental Transfer System of Pakistan 
Earlier section examines the intergovernmental fiscal transfers arrangements proposed in 
various NFC awards. It explains the composition of taxes that forms the federal divisible pool 
and how and in what proportions it was shared between federal and provincial government 
and amongst provincial governments in Pakistan. It also describes the provision of straight 
                                                          
103 The shares of poverty/backwardness are derived by taking average of three studies. On that basis the estimated average 
share of Punjab was (23.2%), Sindh (23.4%), KPK (27.8%), Baluchistan (25.6%). 
104 This 2.5% share is determined using the average magnitude of last three years federal tax revenue collection from each 
province (i.e. Punjab 27%, Sindh 70%, KPK 3% and Baluchistan 1%). 
105 Revenue generation share of 2.5% is determined by taking proxy of withholding income tax on Electricity (i.e. Punjab 
63%, Sindh 28%, KPK 7% and Baluchistan 2%) 
106 The share of Inverse Population Density were; Punjab 4.4%, Sindh 7.2%, KPK 6.2%, Baluchistan 80.1%. 
107 Allocated 1% share from federal divisible pool prior to its disbursement among provinces. 
108 These include Banking, Insurance and Telecommunication.  
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transfers and special non-development grants that routed towards provinces on the 
recommendation of NFC awards.  
This section focuses on the analysis of total transfer flows to provinces (divisible pool transfer 
(DPT), straight transfer (ST), non-development grant (GND) and development grants (GD)) 
either on the recommendation of NFC award and/or from federal consolidated funds. In 
addition, the magnitude and share of each individual province separately and to all provinces 
combined will be analyzed.  The importance of federal borrowings109
Based on the allocation and composition of expenditure and revenue responsibilities between 
levels of governments this section first quantifies the level of vertical and horizontal fiscal 
imbalances and then estimates the share of various sources of transfer to bridge these 
imbalances. This will determine relative importance of each source in case of every individual 
province and to all provinces combined. This analysis is critical due to the differential access 
of various transfer sources to each individual province that will have varying behavioral 
implications on provincial expenditures, fiscal efforts and of equalization due to the presence 
of conditionality and un-conditionality of each source of transfer. 
 to each individual 
province is also determined for each province.  
The analysis is undertaken on all NFC awards announced during 1970 and 2009-10 and is 
broken down with the effective duration of respective awards. The periods of analysis are as 
follows: NFC 1970 award covers 1972-1975 period, NFC 1974 which spans over 1975-91 is 
broken down into two periods, 1975-81 and 1981-91 to incorporate the changes in provincial 
shares after the 1981 national population census which has affected the relative share of 
provinces in divisible pool transfers, award of 1991 covers 1991-97 period, NFC 1997 include 
1998-2006 period, and finally NFC 2006 is analyzed for the years 2007-2009. 
3.6.1 Fiscal Imbalances between Federal and Provincial Governments  
The fiscal federalism theory offers two important rationales for intergovernmental transfers. 
First, transfer bridge the vertical fiscal gap arisen due to the mismatch in revenue raising 
powers and expenditure assignments at different levels of government. In an ideal federal 
                                                          
109 Prior to 1991 exercise of federal control on provincial borrowing was weak due to lack of non statutory borrowing limits. 
Each province borrowings limit was prescribed by federal government in 1991 with no recourse to market and other sources 
of loans without prior approval of the federal government.  
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system each tier of government should be able to raise sufficient own revenues to meet its 
expenditure obligations without any recourse to intergovernmental transfers. However fiscal 
imbalance is a common feature, observed in most federations that occurs due to over 
centralization of revenue authority and often larger spending responsibilities at sub-national 
levels of government. This resulted in vertical fiscal gap which needs to bridge the 
intergovernmental transfers. Also horizontal fiscal imbalance provides another rationale for 
intergovernmental transfers. 
The allocations of tax and expenditure assignments between levels of governments in Pakistan 
clearly reflect lack of balance and over centralization of taxation and expenditure 
responsibilities. This is reflected by the fact that federal share in aggregate revenues has been 
high hovering between 85-93% contrary to their share in expenditure responsibilities of 69-
75% (Table 3.6). The dominating federal tax authority is due to its occupation of most buoyant 
and elastic tax sources, whereas provincial governments essentially rely on most low yielding 
and partly under exploited tax bases.  
Table  3.6 FISCAL IMBALANCE BETWEEN FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL 
GOVERNMENTS 
NFC 
Award  
Period 
REVENUE SHARES EXPENDITURE SHARES IMBALNCES 
FEDERAL PROVINCIAL FEDERAL PROVINCIAL FEDERAL PROVINCIAL 
1972-75 85.8 14.2 45.5 54.5 40.3 -40.3 
1976-80 89.9 10.1 63.1 36.9 26.7 -26.7 
1981-91 92.6 7.4 75.0 25.0 17.6 -17.6 
1992-97 94.3 5.7 73.4 26.6 20.9 -20.9 
1998-06 94.0 6.0 72.9 27.1 21.1 -21.1 
2007-09 Author 93.1 6.9 69.2 30.8 23.9 -23.9 
  Source: Author own calculation using the data 
The pattern of expenditure obligation reveals increasing provincial share in combined 
expenditure from 25% in 1981-91 to 30.8% in 2007-09 contrary to their revenue share of 7-
15%. The resulting vertical fiscal imbalance shows that provincial own revenues were not 
enough to self finance their expenditure obligations. The extent of imbalance has increased 
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from 17.6% in 1981-91 to 23.9% in 2007-09. This gap needs to be bridge with the provision 
of federal transfers to provinces. The empirical evidence of various countries also depicted 
similar pattern of vertical imbalances but that vary by country as reported by Fjeldstad (2001) 
for some countries; Argentine (2.8), Brazil (5.2), France (7.8), India (17.2), Italy (18.9), Kenya 
(1.6), Malaysia (16.7), South Africa (44.5), United Kingdom (23.4) and United States (13.5).  
3.6.2 Self Financing of Provincial Government Expenditures   
The previous analysis revealed that provinces combined are not been able to meet their 
expenditure obligations from their own revenues. It further elaborates here to determine how 
far each individual province is being able to self finance their expenditure obligations using 
Shah (1997) index of provincial autonomy110
Table  3.7 SELF FINANCING OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES 
 . This index is computed for combined provinces 
as well as for each individual provincial government separately. The estimates of extent of self 
financing of expenditure vary by province due to varying fiscal capacity and expenditure 
needs of provinces. The estimated indices representing the extent of self-financing are 
displayed in Table 3.7. 
Years Baluchistan KPK Punjab Sindh All Provinces 
1972-75 1.2 14.2 31.9 28.2 13.6 
1976-80 4.3 11.3 24.0 27.8 13.1 
1981-91 4.2 10.5 19.7 20.0 17.6 
1992-97 3.1 11.2 16.4 12.2 16.0 
1998-06 3.4 10.8 16.8 12.8 15.4 
2007-09 3.7 10.5 16.6 12.0 14.3 
Source: Author’s own calculation using the data 
The extent of self financing is computed as 1001 X
TE
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Where: 
FTA represents federal divisible pool transfer and straight transfer receipts 
TG represents non development and development grant combined 
PB represents provincial borrowing 
TE represents total provincial expenditures 
 
                                                          
110 This index is computed after deducting provincial transfer and grants and borrowing from total provincial receipts and then 
dividing this figure with total provincial expenditures to obtain extent of self financing after multiplying it with 100. Its 
inverse (100- Self Financing share) represents the extent of horizontal imbalance. 
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The extent of self financing of expenditures has been low ranging 13.1% to 17.6% throughout 
in case of combined provinces (Table 3.7). As was expected due to varying provincial fiscal 
capacity and expenditure needs, extent of self financing vary across province and over time. It 
was relatively high in every province prior to NFC 1991 and declined afterwards. It seems that 
provincial own revenues has not maintained the pace in line with the growth of their 
expenditure. As a result share of own source financing recorded a decline. The expenditure on 
self-financing is highest in province of Punjab ranging 16.4% to 16.8% after NFC 1991 and 
surpasses Sindh, which earlier self-financed higher expenditures. The backward province of 
Baluchistan has been able to meet only 3 to 3.7% of their self financing obligations, 
representing its dismal fiscal position among all provinces.  
The Table 3.6, displayed above can also be used to represent horizontal fiscal imbalance111
3.6.3 Magnitude and Importance of Overall Federal Transfers to Provinces  
 
measured as the extent to which provincial total expenditures are not covered by its own 
revenues.  The horizontal imbalance is highest in Baluchistan as 96.3% of its expenditures are 
not covered by own revenues (reflected with self financing of 3.7 %) followed by KPK 
province with a horizontal gap of 89.5 percent during 2007-09. The province of Punjab by 
meeting 16.6% of its expenditures obligations from self financing is considered relatively 
better off province. This horizontal gap (83.4% in Punjab in 2007-09) normally bridges the 
provision of federal transfers and grants including borrowing to provinces. 
The significance of overall federal transfer112
The average per capita nominal and real transfer increases with each successive award. The 
estimates shows that nominal transfer receipts to provinces has recorded increase by many 
fold,  whereas per capita real transfers has shown eight-fold rise from Rs 279 in 1972-73 to Rs 
 to provinces of Pakistan is worked out by 
quantifying its share with respect to some key macro indicators; gross domestic product 
(GDP), total federal revenues (tax, non tax and user charges and fees), total federal taxes, total 
provincial expenditures and provincial own revenues (tax, non tax and user charges and fees). 
The per capita magnitude of transfer at nominal and real prices of 2001 is also reported in 
Table 3.8 by period of NFC award. 
                                                          
111 Horizontal Imbalance can be derived by (100- Magnitude of extent of Self Financing) in Table 7.1. 
112 NFC divisible pool transfers and straight transfers, non development grant and development grant 
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2,113 in 2008-09. The magnitude of federal transfer to provinces with respect to GDP was 
initially low at 2.1% which has increased to 6.9% of GDP during 1992-97 and falls to 5.7% in 
2007-09. As percentage of federal revenues and (federal taxes), provincial transfers continue 
to grow from a share of 15.0% and (20.3%) in NFC 1970 to 40% and (56.1%) in NFC 2006. 
This reflects that overtime federal government has decentralized its fiscal base by transferring 
greater funds to provinces for financing their expenditure obligations. As proportion of 
provincial own revenues the volume of federal transfer is substantial (nearly six times of 
provincial revenues) indicating higher dependence of provinces on federal transfers.  
Table  3.8 SIZE AND IMPORTANCE OF FEDERAL TRANSFERS TO PROVINCES 
 
Period of NFC Awards 
1972-
75 
1976-
80 
1981-
91 
1992-
97 
1998-
06 
2007-
09 
Per Capita Transfer – Nominal 27 79 323 954 1,702 3,505 
Per Capita Transfer – Real 2001 279 447 1,066 1,624 1,617 2,113 
Transfer as % of GDP 2.1 3.6 5.8 6.9 5.6 5.7 
Transfer as % of Federal Tax Revenue 20.3 31.0 44.3 51.7 52.8 56.1 
Transfer as % of Federal Total Revenues 15.0 21.7 29.0 35.1 35.4 40.0 
Transfers as % of Own Source Revenues 91.1 184.5 360.8 580.2 553.3 540.2 
Source: Author’s own calculation using the data 
Note: Transfers include sum of Divisible Pool Taxes, Straight Transfers, Non Development and Development Grant 
 
3.6.4 Importance and Distribution of Different Forms of Transfer to Provinces   
The importance of federal transfer to provinces is derived by determining the volume and 
share of each transfer source in the overall transfer receipts of provinces at aggregate level 
(four provinces combined) and individual province level by period of NFC award.  These 
transfer receipts are formula based divisible pool transfers, straight transfers, non development 
grants and development grants. The former three sources are categorized as unconditional 
transfer and the last development grants as conditional transfer. These two broader sources of 
transfers (unconditional and conditional) would likely to have differential implications on the 
provincial fiscal behavior. 
The importance of federal divisible pool (DPT) is clearly established as it emerged as a major 
source of transfer in all awards declared so far with a share of above 60% of provincial total 
transfers.  DPT achieved its peak during NFC 1991 with a share of 73.9% due to inclusion of 
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new taxes in the divisible pool. The increase in share of divisible pool in 1991 award is partly 
the result of federal closure of revenue deficit grants to provinces. That’s why the share of 
GND has reduced to 2.3% in 1991 award as compared to 31.1% prior to that (Table 3.9). The 
straight transfers with a share of 17.7% have assumed greater importance in 1991 award. Its 
importance gradually declined to reach at 12.8% of the total transfer in 2007-09. Both federal 
divisible pool and straight transfer are unconditional formula based transfers which ensure 
greater certainty and autonomy for provinces. Its increased share in 1991 partly attributable to 
declining grants (development and non development). 
Table  3.9 FEDERAL TRANSFERS TO PROVINCES UNDER VARIOUS NFC AWARDS 
 
Period of NFC Awards 
1972-75 1976-80 1981-91 1992-97 1998-06 2007-09 
Total Transfer 
[Million rupees at 2001 Prices] 17,282 35,408 94,286 175,179 217,737 338,036 
All Provinces – Percentages 
      
Divisible Pool Tax Transfer 61.0 62.1 52.5 73.9 66.0 61.7 
Straight Transfer 5.0 5.9 3.8 17.7 16.0 12.8 
Development Grant 16.1 12.9 12.6 6.1 4.9 7.5 
Non Development Grant 17.9 19.1 31.1 2.3 13.0 17.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Author’s own calculation using the data 
 
The non development grants constitute a record 31.1% of the total provincial transfer in 1981-
91 periods. This was due to the federal financing of provincial revenue deficit as provinces 
constitutionally did not have option of deficit financing. Thus automatic access to revenue 
deficit grants created perverse incentives for provincial resource mobilization beside it exerted 
strain on federal finances. GND share declined to 2.3% in 1991 due to complete federal 
prohibition of revenue deficit grants.  Special provision of backwardness grants to KPK and 
Baluchistan in NFC 1997 and its extension to all four provinces in 2006 award increased its 
share to 11.6% and 17.7 respectively in the last two awards. 
The provincial access to development grant (conditional grant) for financing of its annual 
development program or specific purpose projects historically being lowest among all transfer 
categories with a maximum share of 9.5% in 1981-91. This implies that federal government 
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kept her restricted to fulfill its constitutional obligations focusing on transfer through NFC 
awards.  
To sum up, federal divisible pool transfers dominate in all transfer categories with its high 
overall share. The straight transfer receives greater importance after 1991 award. The 
magnitude of non development grants before 1991 was highest in all years due to greater 
access to revenue deficit grant in the period between mid to late eighties. It assumed next 
important category of federal transfers with a share of 17.9% surpasses straight transfers (12.8 
%) recently. The share of conditional development grant was lowest in provincial transfer 
receipts indicating that federal government kept it restricted to constituently committed 
obligations of mandatory transfers.    
3.6.5 Distribution of Federal Transfers to Individual Provinces 
The above analysis examines the importance of various sources of federal transfer to 
combined provinces. This subsection determines its relative importance for each individual 
province by working out the share of each transfer source in the total transfer receipts.  
The divisible pool transfers as a predominant source is clearly established in case of every single 
province though its share differs considerably across provinces. It occupies the highest 
importance in Punjab with its share increased from 71.0% in 1972-75 to a peak at 91.3% in 
1992-97 before it settled at 76.2% in 2007-09 (Table 3.10). The formula based straight transfers 
contributed the least in Punjab government finances with its share of less than 4% in total 
provincial transfer receipts. The non development grant constitutes 1/4th of the total transfers of 
Punjab during 1981-91 and that declined to 1.5% in (1992-97) following restriction on federal 
revenue deficit grants. Due to provision of GND in NFC (PCO 2006) Punjab share rises to 
15.9% in 2007-09. The access to development grant has been continuously declining during 
1972-2006 period before a marginal increase to reach at 4.5% in 2007-09. 
Similar to Punjab divisible pool transfer dominates in Sindh but contributes relatively less in 
the total transfer receipts with a peak share of 69.3% in 1992-97 and then settled at 48.3% in 
2007-09. Straight transfer becomes a next important source due to its higher receipts in 
account of gas royalties and development surcharge. This was due to its continuously rising 
share in national gas production, nearly reached at 60% in the last decade. Straight transfer 
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that contributes 18.3% in 1992-97 increased to almost one fourth of total federal transfer 
receipts of Sindh in 2007-09. Cumulatively the formula based unconditional transfers 
(divisible pool and straight transfer) accounts for 3/4th of the total transfers’ of Sindh in 2007-
09. The relative share of non development grant followed the same trend as of Punjab with a 
peak at 28.1% in 1981-91 and then decreases to 18.1% in 2007-09. The access to development 
grant has been low and declining to reach at 5.6% in NFC 1997 before a slight increase to 7.9 
% more recently.  
Table  3.10 AVAILABLE FEDERAL RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION BY PROVINCE UNDER 
VARIOUS NFC 
Provinces 
 
Period of NFC Awards 
1972-75 1976-80 1981-91 1992-97 1998-06 2007-09 
 
Total Transfer  
[Million rupees at 2001 
Prices] 
8,454 17,145 44,907 81,303 99,648 151,685 
        
Punjab 
Divisible Pool Transfer 71.0 77.1 64.4 91.3 82.8 76.2 
Straight Transfer 0.6 0.9 0.3 2.9 4.3 3.4 
Development Grant 14.7 12.2 11.1 4.2 3.0 4.5 
Non Development Grant 13.7 9.8 24.1 1.5 9.8 15.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Sindh 
Total Transfer  
[Million rupees at 2001 
Prices] 
3,940 72,55 21,712 43,788 60,220 100,648 
Divisible Pool Transfer 64.6 68.7 52.5 69.3 55.2 48.3 
Straight Transfer 0.0 1.4 3.2 18.3 27.7 25.7 
Development Grant 25.3 14.9 16.1 8.1 5.6 7.9 
Non Development Grant 10.1 14.9 28.1 4.3 11.5 18.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
KPK 
Total Transfer  
[Million rupees at 2001 
Prices] 
2,660 6,425 17,343 31,528 34,337 53,467 
Divisible Pool Transfer 60.1 45.6 38.2 55.9 57.4 59.4 
Straight Transfer 0.0 0.0 0.0 35.3 18.4 11.4 
Development Grant 11.4 12.3 8.8 8.1 8.0 8.4 
Non Development Grant 28.5 42.2 53.0 0.7 16.1 20.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Baluchistan 
Total Transfer  
[Million rupees at 2001 
Prices] 
2,228 4,583 10,324 18,551 23,530 32,231 
Divisible Pool Transfer 20.1 18.5 24.6 37.6 35.0 38.9 
Straight Transfer 35.0 39.7 26.6 52.1 31.7 19.9 
Development Grant 10.9 13.0 17.9 6.6 7.0 19.4 
Non Development Grant 34.0 28.7 30.9 3.7 26.3 21.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Author own calculation using the data 
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The divisible pool transfer has been a major source for KPK after NFC 1991 with its share 
floating around 55 % to 60%. The province is the major beneficiary of the straight transfer 
receipts (with electricity profit) reflected by its share of 35.3% in NFC 1991. Overtime its 
importance considerably declined and accounts for 11.4% during 2007-09. The formula based 
divisible pool and straight transfers’ accounts for 71% of the total transfer receipts of KPK in 
2007-09 that reflects greater certainty in transfers. The KPK province has been the main 
beneficiary of federal non development grant in 1981-91 primarily due to the extension of 
federal revenue deficit grant that accounts for high 53% of the total provincial transfers. The 
share of non development grant recorded a decline following imposition of ban on revenue 
deficit grants in NFC 1991. Its share increased to 16 % to 21 % in the following awards due to 
special provision of backward areas grants. The provision of development grants has been low 
and continuously declining to reach at 8% of the total transfer of province more recently.  
The federal divisible pool was not an important source of transfer receipts for Baluchistan 
until more recently (NFC 1997 and 2006) when its share was hovering around 35% to 39%. 
Baluchistan is the key beneficiary of straight transfer receipts following NFC 1991 award as 
acknowledged by its share of 52.1%. This was due to the presence of major gas reserves of the 
country at that time and their corresponding transfer receipts in account of gas royalties and 
development surcharge. Due to depleting gas resources afterwards relative importance of 
straight transfer has declined to reach at 19.9 % in 2007-09.  Historically province of 
Baluchistan also has been the major beneficiary of special non development grant with its 
share of 30 to 34 % prior to 1991. Following ban on revenue deficit grant in NFC 1991, its 
share again increased to 1/4th of the total provincial receipts due to the special provision of non 
development grants in the NFC 1997 award and to 1/5th afterwards. The province of 
Baluchistan being backward also has had comparatively greater access to development grants 
(19.4%) in the recent period 2007-09.  
As a whole, the importance of federal divisible pool transfers clearly establish by its 
dominating share in all provinces in particular after NFC 1991. However its relative 
importance varies across province with highest share in Punjab (91.3% in 1992-97 to 76.2% in 
2007-09) followed by Sindh (69.3% in 1992-97 and 48.3% in 2007-09) and in KPK (55.9% in 
1992-97 and 59.4% in 2007-09) and hovering in between 37.6% to 38.9% in Baluchistan. The 
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divisible pool transfers rises considerably over time because of its continued expansion in 
terms of number of taxes in successive awards. Straight transfer disproportionately benefits 
two backward provinces of Baluchistan and KPK since its first formal institution in NFC 
1991. This was due to their better resource base with its share of 52.1% and 35.3% 
respectively. Afterwards the importance of straight transfer gradually declined for Baluchistan 
(19.9%) and KPK (11.4%) in 2007-09 due to depleting gas reserves. In contrast, Sindh 
receipts from straight transfers steadily increased from 18.3% in 1992-97 to about 1/4th of 
provincial total transfer in 2007-09 due to increase volume of gas production and its derived 
receipts from gas development surcharge and royalties.  Punjab is the least beneficiary 
province of straight transfer with its share hovering around 3-4 % after 1991.  Non 
development grant assumed greater importance in Baluchistan and KPK after NFC 1997 with 
its share of 26.3% and 18.4% respectively due to access of special backwardness grants. Prior 
to 1991 relatively developed Punjab and Sindh province also benefits with the provision of 
revenue deficit grants along with backward province of KPK and Baluchistan. The share of 
non development grant is therefore higher in each province total transfer receipts during the 
periods 1981-91. Punjab and Sindh share also rose more recently due to the special grants in 
aid provisions in PRO 2006 and with continued OZT grant receipts since 1999-2000.  The 
share of development grant (conditional grant) was low in every province with the exception 
of Baluchistan with its share of 19.4% followed by KPK (8.4), Sindh (7.9%) and Punjab 
(4.5%) in 2007-09. 
3.6.6 Provincial Access to Federal Borrowing  
Beside access to intergovernmental transfers’ provincial governments also acquires federal 
loans for financing their current and development expenditure requirements. Federal 
government has prescribed statutory borrowing limits for each provincial government in 1991 
which were earlier not prescribed. For meeting their day to day recurring requirements 
provincial governments can borrow from State Bank of Pakistan up to their prescribed limits. 
Moreover provinces also have access to federal loans to finance provincial annual 
development program and other specific purpose projects. Provincial governments cannot 
either raise and/or acquire loans from the market or any other source without prior approval of 
federal government. 
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Table 3.11 gives the share of each province in federal borrowing during the period of NFC 
award announced between 1972 and 2009. Provincial access to borrowing seems significantly 
higher in the decade of 70’s due to lack of statutory borrowing limits for provinces. Moreover 
higher borrowings in the 70’s were also the result of extremely worsened law and order 
situation in the province of Baluchistan due to removal113
Table  3.11 LEVEL OF PROVINCIAL BORROWING UNDER VARIOUS NFC AWARDS 
 of democratically elected 
government of PM Bhutto in 1974. This halted the level of economic activities and high 
borrowings results due to budgetary overruns. The magnitude of borrowing declined after 
1991 due to greater access of other forms of transfers and imposition of provincial borrowing 
limits. 
Province 1972-75 1976-80 1981-91 1992-97 1998-06 2007-09 
 
Million Rupees at 2001 Prices 
Federal Borrowings 181,689 147,507 32,686 35,412 28,192 43,942 
 
Provincial Share (percentages) 
Punjab 7.6 10.0 43.3 32.3 42.0 57.6 
Sindh 4.9 4.1 17.4 23.4 14.7 17.1 
KPK 2.7 4.5 14.2 14.9 19.0 6.8 
Baluchistan 84.8 81.4 25.1 29.4 24.3 18.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Author own calculation using the data 
 
The share of Baluchistan in the total federal borrowing of provinces has been 
disproportionately high during the disturbed period of 1972-80, despite its limited population. 
The provincial access of federal borrowing registered a continuous decline afterwards in 
Baluchistan to reach at 18.5% in 2007-09. On the contrary the share of the largest province of 
Punjab in the earlier period was low proportional to its population share which has now 
reached to 57.6% in 2007-09. The share of federal loans to finance provincial expenditure 
appears to be lowest in KPK as compared to other provinces.  
                                                          
113 The province of Baluchistan during the period 1974-77 remained disturbed due to emergence of serious crises arisen due to 
removal of their democratically elected government by PM Bhutto in 1974 in numerous charges of corruption, bad-
governance and perceived mutiny. This created detrimental effects on provincial economy and finances and led to overruns 
budgets and increased borrowing. 
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As a whole the provincial access to federal borrowing vary across provinces with predominant 
share of Baluchistan prior to 1980. More recently Punjab share in total federal loans accounts 
proportional to its population in 2007-09. In province of Sindh access to borrowing vary and 
in KPK it recorded a lowest share among all provinces.  
3.7 Conclusion 
The history of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements in Pakistan indicates that there have 
been 9 different Awards in the country since 1951. The NFC awards criteria served as a major 
point of conflict among provinces; as the NFC award commissions have failed time and again 
in finding an appropriate resource sharing formula for federal resource distribution that could 
be acceptable to all federating units.  
Intergovernmental fiscal transfer arrangements prior to 1971 highlight mounting discomfort 
among people of East Pakistan with the resource sharing arrangements that were biased in 
favor of more affluent West Pakistan province. Before 1971 the resource sharing from NFC 
awards have followed parity principle (50:50). Sales tax was also partly shared using 
derivation principle thus negatively biased towards East Pakistan given their higher share in 
population (54%) with negligible base of sales tax and being more backward. Also significant 
under representation of East Pakistan in national bureaucracies, limited planned investment 
and subsequent denial of their political rights created disenchantment and revolt against 
central government, which ultimately led to separation of East Pakistan in 1971 and a birth of 
a new country Bangladesh.  
The second phase of the history of intergovernmental fiscal relations commenced following 
separation of East Pakistan when country western province named Pakistan. In 1973, Pakistan’s 
first constitution was granted approval and the country was declared as federation comprises of 
four provinces and three federal territories. The NFC 1974 award was declared using population 
as a sole criterion for horizontal resource sharing which created discontent among smaller 
provinces. The award was criticized as it encourages population growth; ignore differences in 
unit cost of public services and in poverty levels across provinces. No revenue sharing award 
was declared in 1979 and 1985 due to lack of consensus on horizontal resource sharing 
arrangements amongst the constituents. The NFC 1990 award was declared after a gap of 17 
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years with considerable expansion in federal divisible pool by including new taxes. However 
population based horizontal revenue sharing criterion remained unchanged. NFC 1990 award 
also instituted straight transfer (natural resource taxes) proceeds to be distributed between 
provinces on origin principle. This disproportionately benefits smaller provinces (Baluchistan 
and KPK) which may help equalize resources to reduce interprovincial inequities. Federal 
financing of provincial revenue deficit grants has ceased and instead, fixed revenue grant to all 
four provinces was promulgated. The NFC 1997 included all federal taxes in the divisible pool 
but reduces the provincial share to 37.5% from an earlier share of 80% in 1990. This award has 
affected the total size and not the horizontal resource sharing arrangements which was continued 
on population. This award also allocated special backwardness grants to provinces of 
Baluchistan and KPK.  Closed ended matching grant for rewarding provincial fiscal efforts has 
introduced in 1997 award which was a welcome step. Lack of consensus amongst constituent 
members delayed the award again and in 2006, the President had issued revenue order (PCO 
2006) with a proposed enhancement in a provincial vertical share to 42.5% from earlier 37.5 %. 
President also revised the sharing allocations of 2.5% GST. It also allocated non development 
grants to all the four provinces in an arbitrary manner with highest share to KPK and 
Baluchistan and lowest to Punjab. NFC 2010 award has integrated for the first time multiple 
factors for the distribution of federal divisible pool. This award raised the provincial vertical 
share to (57.5%), a significant increase of (11.5%) in federal transfer receipts to provinces. The 
multiple factors used for horizontal resource sharing are population, poverty/backwardness, 
revenue generation/collection and inverse population density. 
The distribution of tax and expenditure assignments between levels of governments in Pakistan 
show high vertical imbalance of 24% due to dominating share of federal revenues of 93% and 
provincial share of 7% in contrast to their expenditure responsibilities of 69% and 31% 
respectively. This fiscal gap of (-24%) at provincial levels indicates that provinces are not 
generating sufficient own revenues to self finance their expenditure obligations. This fiscal gap 
meted out with federal transfers and which shows their heavy reliance on this financing source. 
Similarly extent of horizontal fiscal imbalance (gap between each province own revenues and 
expenditures) vary by province with highest imbalance observed in backward province of 
Baluchistan as 96% of its expenditure financed from federal transfers and only 4% from own 
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revenues. KPK province fulfilled 90% of its expenditure needs from federal transfers and only 
10% from own source revenues. The relative dependence of Punjab on federal transfer is low as 
its self financing of expenditures is as high as 17% reflecting a horizontal fiscal gap of 83%. 
An eight-fold increase is recorded in real per capita federal transfers to provinces which 
increased from Rs 279 to Rs 2,113 during in 1972-2009 periods. The magnitude of transfers as 
a percentage of national GDP has been more or less constant hovering around 5% to 7%. As a 
percentage of total federal revenues, it increased from (15.0 % to 40%), and for federal taxes 
(20.3% to 56.1%), and for provincial own revenues (.91% to 540%) during the period 1972-73 
to 2008-09. This demonstrates rising and higher financial dependence of provinces and 
substantial decentralization of federal fiscal base over time. 
The analysis of federal transfers to provinces clearly establishes the importance of federal 
divisible pool transfer with its highest share in almost all provinces after 1991 award. 
However its importance varies by province with highest dependence of Punjab (91% in 1992-
97 to 76% in 2007-09) followed by Sindh (69% and 48%), KPK (56% and 59%) and 
Baluchistan 38% and 39% for the respective years. The divisible pool transfers rises 
considerably over time because of its continued expansion (with greater number of taxes to be 
included) in successive awards. Straight transfer primarily benefits two backward provinces of 
Baluchistan and KPK since its first formal institution in NFC 1991 due to the greater resource 
base. More recently Sindh ST receipts increased rapidly due to greater gas production base. 
Punjab is the least beneficiary of ST. Non development grant assumed greater importance in 
Baluchistan (53%) and KPK (31%) due to significantly higher flow of federal revenue deficit 
grants during 1981-91. After restrictions on federal revenue deficit grants in NFC 1991 its 
share raised again in NFC 1997 due to special backwardness grants to these provinces. Punjab 
and Sindh also appear to be the main beneficiary of federal revenue deficit grants with higher 
share in 1991. Their share also rose more recently due to the special grants in aid provisions in 
NFC 2006 and with continued receipts of OZT grants. The share of development grant 
(conditional grant) was low in every province barring exception of Baluchistan with relatively 
higher share of 19% in 2007-09. 
The provincial access to federal borrowing varies across provinces with predominant share of 
Baluchistan prior to 1980 whereas Punjab’s share in total federal loans is proportional to its 
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population share in 2007-09. In province of Sindh access to borrowing vary and in KPK it 
recorded a lowest share among all provinces.  
As a whole significant interprovincial differences exist in access and share of four categories 
of federal transfers and grants flows and of borrowing to provinces during the 37 years long 
period (1972-2009).  The formula based unconditional NFC transfers and straight transfers 
provide greater certainty and therefore more stable revenue source for provinces. On the 
contrary greater fluctuation prevails in access to unconditional non development grants and 
conditional development grants due to its ad-hoc and discretionary nature and its flow also 
hinges upon federal budgetary constraints. These four forms of transfers can be classified into 
conditional and unconditional grants that have a varying implication on the provision of 
provincial public goods. This lay a solid base for an interesting analysis in the following 
chapters to examine “the provincial fiscal response to various categories of transfers”. 
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4 THE MODEL 
4.1 Brief Description of the Theoretical Model 
The foregoing discussion on the characteristics of provincial governments clearly highlights 
dissimilarities and diversities in fiscal, economic and demographic structure of the four 
provinces of Pakistan. This chapter describes the specifics of theoretical model which is 
applied to determine the provincial response in various categories of transfers. The detailed 
mathematical derivation of the model and its application to various classifications of transfers 
and grants is provided in the appendix. 
In deriving the model114 to analyze the fiscal behavior of lower tier of governments (provincial 
governments), the conventional approach of utility maximization is employed. It is assumed 
that the utility function for the residents of a province is of a Stone-Geary115
𝑈(𝐺 − 𝐺0,𝐶) = 𝛽 𝐿𝑛(𝐺 − 𝐺0) + (1 − 𝛽)𝐿𝑛𝐶 
 type. Each 
resident consumes available public good 𝐺 and private good 𝐶𝑖 . There are 𝑁 residents in the 
province or i = 1, 2, 3,…, N. Thus, the Stone-Geary utility function with minimum 
consumption parameter 𝐺𝑂 for all the residents of the province can be written as:  
 (1) 
Private good's consumption of an individual resident in the province can be defined as 
𝐶𝑖 = 𝑌 − 𝑡  (2) 
Where Y is individual resident's income and t is lump-sum taxes paid by the resident therefore 
𝐶𝑖 accounts for the disposable income of an individual resident in a province. 
Therefore, consumption of the private good by all the residents of the province can be written as;  
𝑁𝐶𝐼 = 𝑁𝑦 − 𝑁𝑡  (3) 
 
                                                          
114 The theoretical model which is applied to determine provincial fiscal response to federal transfers in Pakistan is partly 
adapted from Knight (2000 and 2002).  
115  McGuire (1978),  Slack (1980), Shah (1989), Pasha and Ghaus (1994),  Islam (1998) Knight (2002) and many others have 
used Stone Geary utility function in modeling the sub-national governments behavior  in response to intergovernmental  
transfers and grants.  
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It follows from equation (3) that; 
𝐶 = 𝑌 − 𝑁𝑡  (4) 
Where C is the total consumption of the private good by all residents in the province and Y is 
the total income of the residents before paying provincial government taxes116
Provincial government faces a resource constraint. The provincial governments own revenues 
are modeled here as lump sum taxes. However, a major component of the provincial 
governments resources are composed of the transfers that it receives from the federal 
government. Provincial governments may also borrow to meet their expenditure plan.   
. 
Thus in a simplified way, the resource constraint for the provincial government can be written as; 
𝑃𝐺 = 𝑁𝑡 + 𝐹𝑇  (5) 
Where 𝑃𝐺 is the price of public good relative to the price of private good 𝑃𝑃  
i.e. �𝑃 = 𝑃𝐺
𝑃𝑃
� and 𝐹𝑇 represents the provincial government's receipts as federal transfers and 
grants. 
Substituting equation 4 into equation 5 gives a combined resource constraint 
𝑃𝐺 + 𝐶 = 𝑌 + 𝐹𝑇  (6) 
Where, Y represents the total income of all the residents in the province and FT represents the 
federal transfers to provinces. For the purpose of this study all nominal variables are taken in 
real term using deflator of 2001 and analysis is based on all variables on per capita basis. 
Now provincial government's objective is to maximize utility of its citizen (equation 1) subject 
to the combined resource constraint equation (6). The optimization problem can be set up as 
follows: 
𝑙 = 𝛽 𝐿𝑛(𝐺 − 𝐺0) + (1 − 𝛽)𝐿𝑛𝐶 + 𝜆[(𝑌 + 𝐹𝑇) − 𝑃𝐺 − 𝐶)]  (7) 
                                                          
116 It is assumed for simplicity that income Y is net of all taxes and charges that the consumer has to pay to other tiers of the 
governments. Therefore the model uses a simplifying assumption that Y will be fully spent on provincial taxes and charges, 
and on the private good.  
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Substituting117
𝑃𝐺 = 𝛽(𝑌 + 𝐹𝑇) + (1 − 𝛽)𝑃𝐺0 
 the optimization solution of equation (7) into equation (6) gives us the final 
model of provision of public goods (PG) or expenditure function of the provincial government 
as follows:  
 (8) 
Taking partial derivative of the above equation with respect to Y (private income118
The expenditure function implies that provincial government’s provision of public good is 
influenced by the income of the community, various types of federal transfers accrues to 
provincial government i.e. development grant, non – development grant, NFC transfers etc 
and  the value of subsistence public good consumption.  
 of 
residents) and FT (Federal transfers and grants to provinces) we get, 
𝜕𝑃𝐺
𝜕𝑌
= 𝛽 
𝜕𝑃𝐺
𝜕𝐹𝑇
= 𝛽 
The expenditure function in equation (8) predicts that there is equivalence between private 
income and transfers/grants. This equivalence implies that the marginal propensity to consume 
(MPC) of public goods from public income i.e. federal transfers and grants should equal that 
from private income and hence both the MPCs are represented as 𝛽.  
In contrast, however, empirical investigations by many authors (Bradford and Oats, 1971, 
Gramlich and Galper, 1973, Slack, 1980, Romer and Rosenthal, 1982, Becker, 1996, Gamkhar 
and Oates 1996, Lee and Vuletin, 2012, Sour, 2013) suggest that effect of private income is 
different from the effect of grants on the consumption of public good. They concluded that the 
private income is disproportionately spent on private consumption while a federal grant is 
primarily spent on public good.  
Thus, for evaluating of expenditure function empirically, equation (8) can be written as 
𝑃𝐺 = 𝛽𝑌 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇 + (1 − 𝛽)𝑃𝐺0  (9) 
 
                                                          
117  Detailed derivation is provided in the appendix of the Chapter in table 4.A.. 
118  Per capita Gross Regional Product of province is taken as proxy for private income  of residents 
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Now the following hypothesis may be tested by estimating equation (9); 
𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝐻0 :𝛽𝑌 =  𝛽𝐹𝑇 
𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒  𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝐻1 :𝛽𝑌 ≠  𝛽𝐹𝑇 
The rejection of null hypothesis would imply that the MPC of public good with respect to 
private income is not the same as it is with respect to transfers/grants from the upper tier of 
government. 
 In reality, a regional government would try not to increase the tax burden on its residents (due 
to political reasons) and will try to get larger grants from the upper tier of the government. 
Furthermore, this political aspect is influenced by socio–economic characteristic of the region 
and the regional government’s ability to raise resources through tax revenues119
Thus the above framework for empirical investigation of provincial responses to federal 
transfer will not only help to answer the question regarding the effect of federal transfers on 
the provision of public good in a province, but also will facilitate to test whether resident 
income and federal transfer have similar impacts on the provision of the public good. 
.  
4.2 Customization of the Model   
The model equation (9) is then customized for this study to investigate empirically the fiscal 
responses of four provincial governments of Pakistan to federal transfers and grants. Basic 
specification is extended to incorporate the nature of fiscal transfer and also the provincial 
borrowings. 
In equation (9) the term (1 − 𝛽)𝑃𝐺0 contains subsistence public good consumption 𝐺0 and 
price of public good relative to the private good 𝑃. Knight (2002), Slack (1980) and several 
other authors have dropped this term while estimating the model assuming that the term (1 − 𝛽)𝑃𝐺0 varies randomly across various geographies in a country.  
                                                          
119 Slack (1980) has demonstrated that by incorporating some variables in the expenditure function to control diversity in 
socio-economic characteristics and fiscal abilities of the regional or local governments, the estimated equivalence in the 
impact of private income and federal transfers on the provision of public goods may be improved. 
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Alternatively, one can assume that subsistence consumption of public good varies overtime 
directly with the total provision of the public good in a province. Thus the relationship can be 
expressed as follows; 
𝐺0 = 𝑣𝐺 
Using this assumption the public expenditure model described in equation (9) may be 
expressed as:  
𝑃𝐺 = 𝛽𝑌 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇 + (1 − 𝛽)𝑣𝑃𝐺  (10) 
The equation (10) can be simplified120
𝑃𝐺 = 𝛽𝑌 ∗ 𝑌 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇 ∗ 𝐹𝑇 
 as follows; 
 (11) 
Equation (11) provides basic structure of the final form of the model for this study. It provides 
ability to test the equivalence hypothesis as outlined above.  
4.2.1 Segregating the Nature of Transfers 
The nature of transfer (conditional v/s unconditional) is widely addressed in the literature of 
intergovernmental finances, in order to design appropriate and effective resource transfer 
strategy. Some of these studies which examined the sub-national government expenditure 
response to various categories of transfers and grants includes Lewis (2013), Duncombe and 
Yinger (1998), Gamkhar and Oates (1996), Craig and Inman (1982), Slack (1980) and 
Macquire (1978).  Many others, and Slack (1980) in his widely referred article in the field of 
intergovernmental transfer, analyzed the impact of conditional and unconditional provincial 
grants on municipal expenditures of the 50 upper tier municipalities. He concluded that 
unconditional grants have a substitution effect in the sense that these grants are used to reduce 
the local tax burden on the local resident. This finding is also important for our analysis as 
bulk of the federal transfer/grants to provinces in Pakistan is of unconditional nature.  
Thus keeping the study objective, the model is expanded by disaggregating federal 
government’s transfers/grants into conditional and unconditional as follows:  
 
                                                          
120  Proof is given in the appendix. 
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𝑃𝐺 = 𝛽𝑌 ∗ 𝑌 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝑐 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝐶 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝑈𝐶 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝑈𝐶  (12) 
where subscripts C and U C represent conditional and unconditional grants respectively. 
The reason for decomposing the federal transfer receipts or public income into component of 
conditional transfers, unconditional transfers etc, is primarily to analyze their separate and 
overall effect on provincial expenditure. It aims to evaluate that which form of transfers has 
more elastic impact and whether the Pakistan’s empirics substantiate the international 
literature. According to economic theory however, a priory expectations suggest that the 
conditional grant has more significant impact as compared with unconditional grant. 
4.2.2 Borrowing as a Variable for Provision of Public Goods 
The literature on intergovernmental fiscal relation highlights the need for incorporating 
borrowing as a component in the provision of public goods for a balanced budget. Buiter 
(2003) advocates that public consumption can directly be smoothen through public borrowings 
by governments or indirectly by public sector capital formation. Rodden (2002) also 
emphasized that growing sub-national deficits result in higher central government 
expenditures. Lewis (2013) studied the effects of borrowing and intergovernmental transfers 
and grants on the local government capital expenditures in Indonesia. Gramlich and Galper 
(1973) and Gramlich (1969) in case of United States examined the effects of grants and 
relative cost of capital/interest rate on expenditures of combined state and local governments 
and local governments respectively. Rais and Anwar (2012) in case of Pakistan concluded that 
all tiers of governments confront a negative budgetary gap due to mismatch between revenues 
and expenditures and to meet the deficit one of the source is public borrowing. Pasha and 
Ghaus (1994) also incorporated the effects of borrowing and total federal transfers and grants 
on the aggregate provincial government expenditures.  
Literature also highlights that increased public debt burden is a worldwide phenomenon.  
However, empirical studies on the subject show that public borrowing is only effective in case 
where right policies are in practice. Conditional lending against the unconditional borrowing 
with policy reform is the most appropriate option. 
The general equation for current budget is   𝑇 − 𝐺 = 𝑆  , where T = Current revenue from 
taxation, G = current public expenditure, S represents saving or deficit. There is a need for 
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additional investment if the expenditures are not met from revenues; therefore this can be 
financed by a resource mix; 
𝛥𝐼 = 𝑃𝐵 + 𝐹 
Where 𝛥𝐼= additional investment to finance deficit,  𝑃𝐵 = public borrowing and F denotes 
other funding sources e.g. taxes and fees, domestic and foreign grants‐in‐aid, donations etc. 
As borrowing is a significant determinant of size of public expenditure, the combined resource 
constraint for a sub-national government is extended and the effect of borrowing is 
incorporated as an exogenous variable  
Now, the extended resource constraint would be 
𝑃𝐺 + 𝐶 = 𝑌 + 𝐹𝑇 + 𝑃𝐵  (6a) 
Following the process described in equation (7) and (8) above, the ensuing equation after 
incorporating public borrowing as a variable would be;   
𝑃𝐺 = 𝛽𝑌 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇 + 𝛽𝑃𝐵 + (1 − 𝛽)𝑃𝐺0  (9a) 
After differentiating with respect to independent variables and simplification, the above 
equation results as: 
𝑃𝐺 = 𝛽𝑌 ∗ 𝑌 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝑐 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝐶 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝑈𝐶 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝑈𝐶  + 𝛽𝑃𝐵 ∗ 𝑃𝐵  (13) 
Thus the final model predicts equivalence between private income and unconditional transfers 
and grants (show Flypaper effect) as well as provincial borrowings. It examines the partial 
influence of conditional grant and provincial borrowing on the provision of public goods 
besides the impact of unconditional transfers121
                                                          
 
.  
121 Professor Brian Knight commented on this extended model with borrowings and above stated results in correspondence 
with author as: “Yes, I concur with idea that one should expect equivalence between all three factors: aid, income, and 
borrowing”. 
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4.2.3 Controlling Socio-Economic Diversities in Federating Units  
To capture the impact of transfer due to dissimilarities in the characteristics of provinces and 
following Slack (1979), a term in equation (13) is introduced which reflects a vector of control 
variables. These control variables may vary by province, and are based on demography, 
provincial income, services and infrastructure levels, and some indication of provinces ability 
to generate tax revenue. Final control variables for each province are selected on the basis of 
statistical significance in the econometric results.  
Assuming that K represents the column of control variables included in the expenditure 
function of a province, the final form of the expenditure function for a province is presented in 
equation (14) below. 
𝑃𝐺 = 𝛽𝑌 ∗ 𝑌 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝐶 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝐶 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝑈𝐶 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝑈𝐶 + 𝛽𝑃𝐵 ∗ 𝑃𝐵 +  𝛾 ∗ 𝐾  (14) 
To address the problem of simultaneity of expenditures and transfers/grants, Two Stage Least 
Square (TSLS) estimation method is employed in estimating provincial equations. These 
provincial level control variables are used as instruments while estimating provincial 
equations.  
This specification (equation 14) is used to estimate provincial expenditure functions for this 
study. Separate as well as aggregate (four province combined) expenditure function are 
estimated using time-series public finance and macro data.  With the help of estimated 
expenditure functions, one can easily predict the effect of federal transfers, grants and 
borrowings on the provision of public good in a province. The model is also appropriate to test 
whether resident income and federal transfer have similar impacts on the provision of public 
good. 
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5 DATA DESCRIPTION 
This chapter provides definition, descriptive statistics and visual presentation of time series 
data used in the empirical analysis of relationship among provincial expenditures, federal 
transfers and provincial borrowings.   The details of data sources, unit of measurement and 
variable description are given in the Table 5.N of the appendix of this chapter.  
5.1 Income and Population Data  
5.1.1 Population  
National and provincial population data is taken from Population Census Reports which were 
conducted in 1951, 1961, 1972, 1981 and 1998 in Pakistan. The census reports population data 
and inter census growth rates at national, provincial and for urban and rural areas. To acquire 
annual estimates, the relevant inter-census population growth rates are used to interpolate or 
extrapolate population .for federation and federating units. The population of Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Islamabad federal capital that are under federal 
control are separately projected on similar basis. The census also exclude these two federal 
areas from population of KPK province (excluding FATA) and Punjab province (excluding 
Islamabad) respectively. The province wise disbursement of federal NFC transfer on 
population basis also excludes the population of these federally controlled areas. Finally, 
provincial population of Sindh, Baluchistan and Punjab (excluding Islamabad) and KPK 
(excluding FATA), and aggregation of all four provinces combined are used. The estimated 
population with variable names are provided in Chart  5.1. 
5.1.2 Nominal Provincial Gross Domestic Product  
Statistics on Gross National Product (GNP) and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are taken 
from published National Income Accounts of Pakistan. However, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics 
or any other government department or agency has yet compiled the historical accounts of 
Provincial Gross Domestic Product (PGDP) in Pakistan. 
The estimates of Provincial Gross Domestic Product (PGDP) were computed for the first time 
by Dr. Kaiser Bengali in his PhD dissertation that was later published with the title: Regional 
Accounts of Pakistan, Methodology and Estimates 1973-2001 (Bengali and Sadaqat, 2005). 
The authors decomposed National Gross Domestic Product (GDP) into provincial and 
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quarterly components. The PGDP estimate122
As the empirical analysis of this research requires data up to 2009, the provincial (PGDP) 
figures of Bengali and Sadaqat (2003) are employed to derive estimates
 and its provincial shares prepared by these 
authors are available for the period 1972-2000 and are widely used in research due to 
nonexistence of any official published statistics on PGDP.  
123
5.1.3 Real Provincial Gross Domestic Products  
 of PGDP for the 
years 2001-09. The estimated shares of PGDP are then applied on the national GDP at 
constant factor cost 2001 to get the provincial estimates of PGDP of the entire period 1972-
2009.  
In Pakistan province-wise price indices are not available; therefore GDP deflator is used 
instead to convert nominal values into real values. GDP deflator [GDPDF01] is computed 
using the ratio of nominal GDP to real GDP of Pakistan at the base year 2000-01.  
To obtain per capita real GDP, individual province (PGDP) and national GDP are divided with 
the respective population and adjusted with the GDP deflator 2001. The estimated time series 
of real per capita provincial Gross Domestic Product are portrayed in Chart  5.2. 
                                                          
122 This PGDP exercise of author of decomposing Pakistan’s GDP into its provincial components is based on UN 
conventions, international practices and in particular Pakistan-specific data constraints as reported by the author. 
123 Using 1972-2000  provincial PGDP estimates of Bengali and Sadaqat,  regression coefficient “β“ is projected to estimate 
provincial PGDP for the year 2001-09. Estimated provincial shares for the projected years then applied to national GDP 
estimates for 2001-09 to arrive at the estimate of provincial gross domestic product at factor cost and market prices. 
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Chart  5.1 ESTIMATED ANNUAL POPULATION OF PAKISTAN 
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Chart  5.2 PER CAPITA REAL GROSS REGIONAL PRODUCT 
[Pakistan - All Provinces Combined] Variable Names  [As Appeared in the Regression Output]  
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5.2 Fiscal and Financial Data 
Most of the fiscal data is taken from federal and provincial governments’ published budgets, 
which have been procured from various economics libraries and offices of relevant ministries. 
The historical data from 1972-73 to 2008-09 has been compiled and computerized from these 
published budget documents.  None of the government agencies have so far computerised the 
detailed historical financial and fiscal database. 
Important fiscal and financial variables which are compiled include: level of federal and 
provincial governments recurring budgets, development and total expenditures by sector, 
magnitude of federal and provincial taxes, non-tax revenues and user charges by type, 
magnitude of intergovernmental transfers from federal to provincial governments in Pakistan 
that include revenue sharing transfers from federal divisible pool of taxes under the 
constitutionally mandated NFC Award and from straight transfers. It also includes data on 
federal grants to provinces in two broader forms; i.e. federal development grant and federal 
non development grant. The extent of federal and provincial borrowings and their level of debt 
servicing are also taken and compiled from these budgets.  
This database is prepared for four provincial governments, viz., Punjab, Sindh, Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Baluchistan.  The combined four provinces data is aggregated by 
summing up relevant variables of each of the four provincial governments. In addition, federal 
government data on relevant fiscal indicators124
5.2.1 Provincial Total Expenditure  
 (revenues, expenditures and budget 
surplus/deficits) is also compiled. The methods of constructions of these variables as well as 
descriptive statistics for the analysis period are briefly depicted below. In addition, appendix 
of this chapter also provides descriptive statistics arranged according to the various NFC 
awards (Tables 5.2.1A to 5.2.5A).  
Provincial total expenditure is the sum of provincial current revenue expenditures, current 
capital expenditures, development revenue expenditures and development capital 
expenditures. Provincial per capita real total expenditure is computed by dividing nominal 
values with province respective population using GDP deflator 2001. This variable is used as 
                                                          
124 Data description with variable names and data sources are provided in Appendix of this chapter in Table 5.1.1 A. 
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dependent variable in the model. The aggregate and province-wise descriptive statistics are 
reported in Table  5.1, while time series data are plotted in Chart  5.3.  
Table  5.1 - REAL PER CAPITA TOTAL EEXPENDITURE - [1973-2009] 
 Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan Mean 2,299 1,559 2,088 2,163 6,926 
Std. Dev. 1,131 453 774 601 29,078 
Maximum 6,974 2,647 3,578 3,045 142,882 
Minimum 1,296 900 1,065 1,048 2,984 
 
Variable Names [As Appeared in the Regression Output]  
 Provinces Provincial Total 
 
 
Population Real Per Capita 
 
X Y Z=X/Y 
All Provinces EXPTAR POPXA EXPTAR/ POPXA 
Punjab EXPTPR POPP EXPTPR/ POPP 
Sindh EXPTSR POPS EXPTSR/ POPS 
KPK EXPTNR POPXN EXPTNR/ POPXN 
Baluchistan EXPTBR POPB EXPTBR/ POPB 
 
5.2.2 Provincial Own Source Revenues 
Provincial own source revenues comprise of direct and indirect taxes and non-tax revenue 
including user charges.  These taxes are imposed through an Act of Provincial Assembly or by 
an Ordinance issued by the Provincial Governor. Non-tax revenues and user charges are levied 
by the concern Administrative Department after obtaining approval by the Provincial Chief 
Minister. 
Direct taxes consists of urban immovable property tax, transfer of property tax and taxes on 
agriculture, land revenue, capital gains tax and tax on professions, trade & calling. Indirect 
taxes include provincial excise tax, stamp duties, motor vehicle tax, tax on hotels, cotton fees 
and electricity duty.  All four provinces more or less have the same sources of revenue tax and 
non-tax earnings except of Sindh that  also collect development and maintenance of 
infrastructure that is levied at ad valorem rate of 0.5 percent on  value of imports (excluding 
oil)  that land at Karachi sea/air ports.  
Non-tax revenues and user charges consist of revenues from social services (education, health, 
manpower management, housing and physical planning, social security and social welfare), 
economic services (agriculture and food, irrigation, industrial and mineral resources), and 
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community services (civil works, public health and other community services), income from 
property and enterprises (profits, interest and dividend), and non-tax revenues from general 
administration, and law and order including justice, police, jail and civil defense.  
In provincial budgets, federal revenue transfer from hydro electricity profits is shown up to 
1992 as non-tax revenue. However the decision to transfer hydro electricity profits at well 
head location has been taken in the meeting of NFC 1991 and Water and Power Development 
Authority (WAPDA) transferred the agreed amount directly to the provinces where these well 
heads are located. As such, receipts of hydro electricity profit is excluded from provincial own 
non-tax receipts and shown as federal straight transfer. Earlier studies in Pakistan also have 
shown this category under straight transfer receipts (Shah 1997, Ahmad and Wasti 2002).  
Finally the real per capita provincial own source revenues (i.e. sum of provincial taxes, non 
tax/and user charges) is obtained by dividing it with their respective population and deflated 
by GDP deflator 2001. The aggregate and province-wise descriptive statistics related to own 
source revenue are reported in Table  5.2, while time series data are plotted in Chart  5.4.  
Table  5.2 - REAL PER CAPITA OWN SOURCE REVENUE - [1973-2009] 
 Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 293 293 328 200 388 
Std. Dev. 37 55 37 69 288 
Maximum 403 480 436 507 958 
Minimum 235 234 253 127 109 
 
Variable Names [As Appeared in the Regression Output]  
 Provinces Provincial Own Source 
 
Population Real Per Capita 
 
X Y Z=X/Y 
All Provinces OWNREVAR POPXA OWNREVAR / POPXA 
Punjab OWNREVPR POPXP OWNREVPR / POPXP 
Sindh OWNREVSR POPS OWNREVSR / POPS 
KPK OWNREVNR POPXN OWNREVNR / POPXN 
Baluchistan OWNREVBR POPB OWNREVBR / POPB 
5.2.3 Forms of Federal Transfers to Provinces 
Federal transfers and grant flows to provinces comprise; federal divisible pool of taxes (DPT), 
straight transfers (ST), Non-development grant (GND) and development grant (GD). The 
decision of the first two of these transfers flows are exclusively taken by the National Finance 
Commission (NFC). Provision of GND is also recommended by the NFC on certain formula 
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or in fixed proportions, beside allocation of GND is also recommended by the federal 
government either on an adhoc basis and/or for financing g provincial emergent needs. 
The divisible pool125
Third type of federal transfers is the provision of non-development grant. These are 
historically being provided on the recommendation of NFC on the basis of backwardness 
either as fixed amount or on some formula, for meeting provincial need of emergent nature 
and to finance province current account deficit. Special non-development grants were 
extended to province of Baluchistan and KPK in the NFC 1974 Award, to four provinces for a 
specified period in NFC 1991 Award and to Baluchistan and KPK in NFC 1997 Award. 
However, in NFC 2006 Award (PRO 2006) relative backwardness was used as a criterion to 
allocate non-development grant to all four provinces. 
 is the first and major source of federal transfers which are shared 
between federation and provinces as specified and recommended by the NFC Award.  Second 
type of transfer is the Straight Transfer (i.e. taxation on natural resources and include royalty 
on crude oil, royalty, excise duty and surcharges on natural gas, hydroelectricity profit and  
general sales tax on services) whose decision also taken in the NFC according to the Article 
161 of the Constitution. Revenues from straight transfers do not credit to the Federal 
Consolidated Fund. It remitted directly by the collecting authority to the provincial 
governments, that is why; such transfers are `straight' in character. These straight transfer 
receipts are allocated to provinces on collection principle after retaining 2 percent as collection 
cost. Transfers from both of these sources (i.e. divisible pool taxes and straight transfers) are 
formula based and unconditional in character as no string attached to its use. 
 Beside these transfers, federal government also extended Octroi and Zila Tax (OZT) grants to 
provinces to compensate the provincial losses accrued due to the OZT abolishment by the 
federal government on the pretext of reducing the tax payers’ compliance cost. The OZT 
compensation was made by imposing 2.5 percent additional general sales tax (GST) levy that 
meant to transfer to provinces given their share in base year 1999 when it eliminated.  Non 
development grant is predominantly characterized as unconditional though a part of it may 
also be termed as conditional.  
                                                          
125 Federal divisible pool consists of almost all federal taxes on income, wealth, capital value tax, sales tax, federal excises 
and customs duties. The main exceptions are excise duties on natural gas, income tax of federal employees and revenues from 
petroleum surcharges. 
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Federal transfers under the head of development grant provide financing to provinces for their 
development projects and provincial annual development program and/or for performing 
agency functions. The development grants are characterized as conditional as it is meant to 
finance specific purpose projects. The details of these four forms of federal transfers to 
provinces are given as under. 
5.2.3.1 NFC Federal Divisible Pool Tax Transfers 
Federal divisible pool transfers, recommended by the NFC are shared vertically between the 
federal and provincial governments and from the provincial share horizontally among 
provinces using specified formula. The composition of DPT varied in different NFC award but 
currently it comprise direct taxes (personal and corporate income, wealth tax) and indirect 
taxes (general sales tax, excise duties on cotton, custom duties, and federal excise duties 
excluding gas). The provincial share of DPT is divided among provinces on the basis of their 
share in the national population during 1974- 2009 period. In the recent NFC 2010 Award 
population based criterion for the distribution of DPT has been replaced with the multiple 
factors i.e. provincial population share in the national population, level of 
poverty/backwardness, inverse population density and federal revenue generation/collection 
for transferring divisible pool funds to provinces.  
As NFC divisible pool transfers are formula based and provinces enjoy full spending 
discretion on the use of these funds thus categorized clearly as unconditional transfer. Finally 
individual province divisible pool transfer receipts are added to obtain aggregate figure for all 
provinces. The individual and aggregate divisible pool transfer receipts are adjusted with the 
GDP deflator 2001 and respective population to arrive at real per capita transfer from this 
source. The aggregate and province-wise descriptive statistics related to divisible pool 
transfers (DPT) are presented in Table  5.3, while time series data are plotted in chart 5.5. 
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Table  5.3 - REAL PER CAPITA NFC DIVISIBLE POOL TRANSFERS - [1973-2009] 
 Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan Mean 750 751 740 750 785 
Std. Dev. 380 377 371 386 453 
Maximum 1,387 1,359 1,337 1,499 1,620 
Minimum 143 134 149 166 160 
 
Variable Names [As Appeared in the Regression Output]  
 
Provinces Federal Divisible Pool Transfers 
Population Real Per Capita 
 X Y Z=X/Y 
All Provinces NFCDPAR POPXA NFCDPAR / POPXA 
Punjab NFCDPPR POPXP NFCDPPR / POPXP 
Sindh NFCDPSR POPS NFCDPSR / POPS 
KPK NFCDPNR POPXN NFCDPNR / POPXN 
Baluchistan NFCDPBR POPB NFCDPBR / POPB 
5.2.3.2 NFC Straight Transfers 
The straight transfers are formally started from NFC 1991 Award when provincial right on 
their natural resources was first recognized by the federal government. Straight transfer are 
collected by federal government on behalf of the provincial governments and consists of 
royalty and development surcharge on gas, royalty on crude oil, excise duty on natural gas, 
and sale tax on services. It also includes WAPDA hydro electricity profit to KPK and Punjab 
that was recommended by NFC 1991. This is a straight transfer receipt and thus excluded 
from non tax revenue receipts126
                                                          
126 Fiscal federalism principle considered own source revenues where government has enjoyed full authority not only to levy 
but also set the tax/non tax rate. In case of Pakistan resource taxes falls in the federal domain that’s why it will be considered 
as federal tax rather than provincial tax. 
 of provinces. Straight transfers are shared with the provinces 
on origin principle after deduction of 2 percent collection cost by the federal government. This 
source of transfer disproportionately benefits three smaller provinces, i.e. Sindh, Baluchistan 
and KPK, as compared to the province of Punjab, which is the largest and most thickly 
populated province of Pakistan. The revenues from straight transfers are formula based 
without any associated condition to its use thus in line with divisible pool transfers it is also 
termed as unconditional. The real per capita straight transfers (aggregate and province wise) is 
computed by adjusting nominal values with the GDP deflator 2001 and their respective 
aggregate and individual province population.  
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The aggregate and province-wise descriptive statistics related to straight transfers (ST) are 
presented in Table  5.4, while time series data are plotted in Chart 5.6 
Table  5.4 - REAL PER CAPITA STRAIGHT TRANSFERS  - [1973-2009] 
 Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan Mean 145 25 232 226 882 
Std. Dev. 121 25 254 286 492 
Maximum 338 72 854 899 2,118 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Variable Names [As Appeared in the Regression Output]  
 Provinces  NFC Straight Transfers  Population Real Per Capita 
 X Y Z=X/Y 
All Provinces NFCSTAR POPXA NFCSTAR / POPXA 
Punjab NFCSTPR POPXP NFCSTPR / POPXP 
Sindh NFCSTSR POPS NFCSTSR / POPS 
KPK NFCSTNR POPXN NFCSTNR / POPXN 
Baluchistan NFCSTBR POPB NFCSTBR / POPB 
5.2.3.3 Non Development Grants 
Besides divisible pool tax and straight transfer receipts, provincial governments also have 
access to federal non development (recurring) grant and development grant to finance their 
recurring and development needs. 
Federal transfers under the non-development grant (GND) historically being made to two 
backward provinces of Baluchistan and KPK in fixed amount on the recommendations of NFC 
Award of 1974. GND also have been allocated on the basis of emergent needs of the province; 
for example; losses accrued due to natural calamity, disaster and certain other damages, if any, 
and for meeting provincial revenue deficit127. Since 1999, federal government also extended 
Octroi and Zila tax grant (OZT) to provinces to compensate their losses accrued due to the 
OZT abolishment by the federal government  in order to reduce the tax payers compliance 
cost. The compensation was made by imposing 2.5 percent GST additionally128
                                                          
127 During the period 1986-1989, disbursement of federal revenue deficit grants to provinces reaches at its peak and accounted 
for nearly 30 percent of the total unconditional grant. 
. This OZT 
128 Federal Government enhanced its GST rate from 12.5% to 15 % to compensate OZT losses of each province. This 2.5 % 
GST additionally transfer to provinces as follows: 62.5 percent on the basis of each province population share and remaining 
37.5 percent on the basis of OZT base year (1999) collection share of each province. From NFC 2006, this weight-age of 
population and collection was altered and equally split 50:50 for OZT transfer. In NFC 2010 the OZT transfer to provinces 
was discarded.   
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grant is federal pass through aid which provinces transmitted onwards to their respective local 
governments. The OZT grant may partly be treated as conditional. 
The NFC 1991 Award had allocated fixed revenue grant to each province for a specified short 
period, while NFC 1997 Award (1997-2006) recommended a revenue grant129 for Baluchistan 
and KPK provinces based on their relative backwardness province. However, in NFC 2006, 
the scope of federal non-development grant130
The nominal figures were converted in to real per capita by its division with the provincial 
population and adjustment with the GDP deflator 2001. The aggregate and province-wise 
descriptive statistics related to non-development grand are presented in Table  5.5, while time 
series data are plotted in Chart  5.7. 
 expanded to cover all four provinces of 
Pakistan according to their level of backwardness. The major part of the non-development 
grant is unconditional as provinces enjoy full spending autonomy. The detailed breakup of 
various types of non-developments is historically not available in the provincial budgets.  
Table  5.5 - REAL PER CAPITA NON DEVELOPMENT GRANTS  - [1973-2009] 
 Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan Mean 192 118 190 367 571 
Std. Dev. 173 138 189 321 361 
Maximum 672 523 628 1,185 1,229 
Minimum 11 0.4 - 0.4 2 
 
Variable Names [As Appeared in the Regression Output]  
 Provinces  Non Development Grant Population Real Per Capita 
 X Y Z=X/Y 
All Provinces GNDAR POPXA GNDAR / POPXA 
Punjab GNDPR POPXP GNDPR / POPXP 
Sindh GNDSR POPS GNDSR / POPS 
KPK GNDNR POPXN GNDNR / POPXN 
Baluchistan GNDBR POPB GNDBR / POPB 
5.2.3.4 Development Grants 
The fourth category of intergovernmental transfer is federal government’s provisions of 
development grants to provinces.  This grant category is meant to finance provincial specific 
                                                          
129 Rupees 4.2 billion and Rs 3.8 billion annual grant to province of Baluchistan and KPK for five years. This grant which is 
started from 1997-98 based on their relative backwardness compare to other two provinces and is indexed with the inflation. 
130 Three percent of the federal divisible pool tax revenues are exclusively earmarked for provincial grants whose horizontal 
sharing proportions are: Punjab 11 %, Sindh 21%, Baluchistan 33 % and KPK 35 % 
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purpose projects and annual development program on submission of project documents by the 
provinces, subsequently by approval of the federal planning commission. It  is also extended 
to finance high priority federal vertical programs such as Social Action Program (SAP)131
In practice there is no specified formula for disbursement of federal development grant
 in 
education, health, water supply and sanitation projects in individual provinces, for meeting the 
costs of urban, rural infrastructure projects of provinces and for financing flood and disaster 
relief emergencies arisen due to basic infrastructure damaged  in any province. Besides these 
heads, Prime Minister discretionary funding also has been available to provinces time to time.  
Moreover Members of National Assemblies, Senate and Members of Provincial Assemblies 
also were being provided funds from national exchequer to finance development projects in 
their provinces.  
132
Overall nominal development grants are converted into real per capita prices by adjusting with 
the GDP deflator 2001 and its division with their respective population. The aggregate and 
province-wise descriptive statistics related to development grand are presented in Table  5.6, 
while time series data are plotted in Chart  5.8. 
 to 
provinces, it is largely discretionary in character. Provincial budgets publish aggregate 
information on development grant rather than provide project by project and/or detailed 
development program break downs on its entire component. It is clear that all federal 
development grants is conditional in character as it is provided to finance specific purpose 
projects and program of provinces.  
 
Table  5.6 - REAL PER CAPITA DEVELOPMENT GRANTS  - [1973-2009] 
 Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 95 61 121 124 285 
Std. Dev. 70 58 90 99 216 
Maximum 349 307 399 388 851 
Minimum 22 0 1 4 43 
                                                          
131 For financing of SAP programme, federal government extended 75% of the cost of sectoral programme subject to the 
conditional matching ratio of remaining 25% to be financed by the province. 
132 Notionally, 90 percent disbursement of development grant is made on the basis of provinces population share in the 
national population. The remaining 10 percent development grant allocation is equally distributed among two backward 
provinces viz: KPK and Baluchistan. In practice however this does not follow and difficult to compute in the absence of detail 
breakdown of inter provincial project figures and spill over projects.(See Ahmed and Wasti 2002)  
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Variable Names [As Appeared in the Regression Output]  
 Provinces  Development Grant Population Real Per Capita 
 X Y Z=X/Y 
All Provinces GDAR POPXA GDAR / POPXA 
Punjab GDPR POPXP GDPR / POPXP 
Sindh GDSR POPS GDSR / POPS 
KPK GDNR POPXN GDNR / POPXN 
Baluchistan GDBR POPB GDBR / POPB 
5.2.3.5 Conditional and Unconditional Transfers 
The above four133
5.2.3.6 NFC Transfers 
 forms of federal transfer and grant flows to provinces are also classified on 
the basis of the conditional and unconditional characteristics of transfers.  For the purposes of 
analysis these transfers’ flows are divided into three broad categories. First category termed as 
NFC transfers that combines NFC divisible pool transfer and straight transfer to provinces 
which are formula based, pre-determined and categorize as unconditional transfer since 
provinces enjoys full expenditure autonomy. Second, development grants which are specific 
purpose transfers and come with or without the matching requirements are clearly classify as 
conditional. Third, non-development grant as reported in provincial budgets are predominantly 
unconditional but it partly caters some grant of conditional character, for example; meeting 
specific purpose needs like provision of ad-hoc relief in specific heads and earmark OZT grant 
to provinces. However provision of non-development grants in various NFC Awards (1974, 
1991, 1997 and 2006) in clearly unconditional as no string attached to its use by the provinces.  
This variable as described above combines the NFC formula based divisible pool tax receipts 
and straight transfer receipts. To arrive at provincial real per capita NFC Transfer, nominal 
amount is divided with the respective population and adjusted with GDP 2001 deflator. The 
aggregate and province-wise descriptive statistics related to NFC unconditional transfers are 
presented in Table  5.7, while time series data are plotted in Chart 5.9. 
  
                                                          
133 These are NFC divisible pool tax transfer, NFC straight transfer, development grant and non development grant. 
Intergovernmental Governmental Fiscal Relation – A Case Study of Pakistan 141 
Table  5.7 - REAL PER CAPITA NFC TRANSFERS (DPT+ST) - [1973-2009] 
 Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 896 776 972 976 1,667 
Std. Dev. 492 399 600 620 838 
Maximum 1,601 1,404 2,006 1,959 3,127 
Minimum 151 135 149 166 206 
Variable Names [As Appeared in the Regression Output]  
Provinces  NFC Transfers  Population Real Per Capita 
 X Y Z=X/Y 
All Provinces NFCTAR POPXA (NFCDPAR+NFCSTAR) / POPXA 
Punjab NFCTPR POPXP (NFCDPPR+NFCSTPR) / POPXP 
Sindh NFCTSR POPS (NFCDPSR+NFCSTSR) / POPS 
KPK NFCTNR POPXN (NFCDPNR+NFCSTNRR) / POPXN 
Baluchistan NFCTBR POPB (NFCDPBR+NFCSTBR) / POPB 
5.2.3.7 Total Unconditional Transfers 
This variable is computed to ascertain the level of overall unconditional transfers. It includes 
NFC formula based transfers as above (i.e. sum of divisible pool taxes and straight transfers) 
and non- development grants which are predominantly unconditional. As explained before, 
first two forms of transfers are clearly unconditional; however some of the non-development 
grant over the years was extended to finance few earmark functions. Still a predominant part 
of it remains unconditional as provinces enjoy full expenditure autonomy on the use of these 
funds. 
Finally real per capita unconditional grant variable is computed by adding (divisible pool tax 
transfer + straight transfer + non development grant) and by adjusting it with the GDP deflator 
2001 and dividing by respective population. The aggregate and province-wise descriptive 
statistics related to total unconditional transfers are presented in Table  5.8, while time series 
data are plotted in Chart  5.10 – PER CAPITA UNCONDITIONAL NFC TRANSFERS. 
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Table  5.8 - REAL PER CAPITA UNCONDITIONAL TRANSFERS (DPT+ST+GND  
 [1973-2009] 
 Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 1,132 894 1,162 1,343 3,121 
Std. Dev. 541 427 676 586 1,323 
Maximum 1,997 1,667 2,412 2,236 5,286 
Minimum 192 165 157 196 269 
Variable Names [As Appeared in the Regression Output]  
Provinces  
Total 
Unconditional 
Transfers  
Population Real Per Capita 
 X Y Z=X/Y 
All Provinces NFCTGNDAR POPXA (NFCTAR+GNDAR) / POPXA 
Punjab NFCTGNDPR POPXP (NFCTPR+GNDPR) / POPXP 
Sindh NFCTGNDSR POPS (NFCTSR+GNDSR) / POPS 
KPK NFCTGNDNR POPXN (NFCTNR+GNDNR) / POPXN 
Baluchistan NFCTGNDBR POPB (NFCTBR+GNDBR) / POPB 
5.2.3.8 Total Grant [Development + Non development] 
The total grant variable is computed by aggregating provincial development and non 
development grant excluding NFC unconditional formula based divisible pool and straight 
transfer receipts. This variable is computed as certain part of unconditional grant during the 
period of study also partly caters some grant of conditional character extended to provinces for 
meeting specific purpose needs like provision of ad-hoc relief in specific heads and earmark 
OZT grant. Due to non availability of the breakdown of unconditional grant during the earlier 
period of study, total grant variable is computed by aggregating both conditional and 
unconditional grant on the assumption that it may reflect behavior to that of a conditional 
grant. Per capita real total grant is estimated by adjusting nominal total grant with GDP 
deflator 2001 and its division by each province respective population. The construction of 
variables is given below. The aggregate and province-wise descriptive statistics of total grants 
are displayed in Table  5.9, while time series data are plotted in Chart  5.11. 
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Table  5.9 - PER CAPITA TOTAL GRANTS (GD + GND) - REAL [1973-2009] 
 
GTAR GTPR GTSR GTNR GTBR 
 Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 287 179 312 491 856 
Std. Dev. 218 170 249 350 489 
Maximum 1,004 798 954 1,571 2,023 
Minimum 57 18 35 56 153 
Provinces Total Grant  
 
 
 
               
 
Population Real Per Capita 
 
X Y Z=X/Y 
All Provinces GTAR POPXA GTAR / POPXA 
Punjab GTPR POPXP GTPR / POPXP 
Sindh GTSR POPS GTSR / POPS 
KPK GTNR POPXN GTNR / POPXN 
Baluchistan GTBR POPB GTBR / POPB 
5.2.3.9 Total Federal Transfer to Provinces 
This variable represents the overall magnitude of total transfers by summing up all four forms of 
federal transfer receipts (i.e. divisible pool taxes, straight transfers, non-development grant and 
development grant).  Finally, per capita total transfer (aggregate and province wise) is obtained 
by adjusting respective magnitude of total transfer with GDP deflator 2001 and dividing by 
respective population. The aggregate and province-wise descriptive statistics related to total 
transfers are presented in Table  5.10, while time series data are plotted in Chart  5.12. 
Table  5.10 - REAL PER CAPITA TOTAL RANSFERS (DPT+ST+GND+GD)  
[1973-2009] 
 Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 1,183 955 1,284 1,467 2,523 
Std. Dev. 553 436 714 638 1,001 
Maximum 2,122 1,741 2,646 2,417 4,166 
Minimum 239 201 240 223 359 
Variable Names [As Appeared in the Regression Output] 
Provinces  
Total 
Federal 
Transfers 
Population Real Per Capita 
 X Y Z=X/Y 
All Provinces NFCTGAR POPXA (NFCTGNDAR+GDAR) / POPXA 
Punjab NFCTGPR POPXP (NFCTGNDPR+GDPR) / POPXP 
Sindh NFCTGSR POPS (NFCTGNDSR+GDSR) / POPS 
KPK NFCTGNR POPXN (NFCTGNDNR+GDNR) / POPXN 
Baluchistan NFCTGBR POPB (NFCTGNDBR+GDBR) / POPB 
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5.2.4 Provincial Borrowings 
In addition to the above transfers, provinces also have access to federal borrowing. This 
borrowing is reported in the current capital receipts of the provincial budget which primarily 
reflect two main sources; first new debts acquired by provincial governments and second, 
recoveries on their past debts. The federal borrowing of the province historically been reported 
under four major heads and subheads; viz., public debt, capital development debt, permanent 
debt (both domestic and foreign) and floating debt. Floating debt is the temporary borrowing 
of provinces from State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) for meeting day to day cash shortages if any. 
The federal government prescribed the borrowing limits for each province. The permanent 
debts had been extended by federal government for financing provincial development budget 
under two categories; First Normal Cash Development Loans (CDLs) and second, Salinity 
Control and Reclamation Project (SCARP) CDLs. Normal CDLs are directly provided to 
provinces to finance provincial government general development portfolios where as SCARP 
CDLs are advanced directly by the federal government to the executing agency Water and 
Power Development Authority (WAPDA) for laying down the tube well network in the 
province. Public debts for financing Normal and SCARP projects were primarily being 
available during 1972 to 1999 which was discontinued in 1999 -2000 and since then task for 
the financing of Annual development Program rests with the provincial governments. 
The figures of public debt and cash development debt are added to compute the total 
borrowing of each province. To arrive at per capita real borrowing total borrowing amount of 
each province is divided by their respective population and adjusted with the GDP deflator 
2001. The aggregate and province-wise descriptive statistics related to borrowing are 
presented in Table  5.11, while time series data are plotted in Chart  5.13. 
 
 Table  5.11 - REAL PER CAPITA BORROWINGS –  [1973-2009] 
 Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 737 242 274 382 10,997 
Std. Dev. 1,356 109 178 197 30,699 
Maximum 6,335 469 1,109 981 142,278 
Minimum 92 42 45 - 356 
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Variable Names [As Appeared in the Regression Output]  
Provinces  Provincial Borrowings 
Population Real Per Capita 
 X Y Z=X/Y 
All Provinces BORTAR POPXA BORTAR / POPXA 
Punjab BORTPR POPXP BORTPR / POPXP 
Sindh BORTSR POPS BORTSR / POPS 
KPK BORTNR POPXN BORTNR / POPXN 
Baluchistan BORTBR POPB BORTBR / POPB 
 
5.2.5 Debt Servicing 
Debt servicing is the provincial repayment of debt in account of interest payment on the loans 
obtained earlier. This amount is reported in the provincial current expenditures account.  The 
provincial per capita real debt servicing is calculated by dividing nominal debt service amount 
with the provincial population after adjusting with the GDP deflator 2001. The aggregate and 
province-wise descriptive statistics related to debt servicing are presented in Table  5.12, while 
time series data are plotted in Chart  5.14. 
Table  5.12 - REAL PER CAPITA DEBT SERVICING –  [1973-2009] 
 Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 228 183 252 318 375 
Std. Dev. 106 89 118 155 149 
Maximum 392 331 436 544 626 
Minimum 30 27 36 19 78 
Variable Names [As Appeared in the Regression Output]  
Provinces  Debt Servicing 
Population Real Per Capita 
 X Y Z=X/Y 
All Provinces DSAR POPXA DSAR / POPXA 
Punjab DSPR POPXP DSPR / POPXP 
Sindh DSSR POPS DSSR / POPS 
KPK DSNR POPXN DSNR / POPXN 
Baluchistan DSBR POPB DSBR / POPB 
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5.2.6 Provincial Self Financing of Expenditure [SELFINSR]  
This variable is computed by dividing provincial own source revenues with the total provincial 
government expenditure and by adjusting it with the GDP deflator 2001 i.e 
(REVOWNTSR/EXPTSR) for its conversion to real prices.  
5.2.7 Population Density (POPDENP) 
This variable is calculated by dividing the annual estimate of population with per-square 
kilometer of geographical area of a province.   
5.2.8 Provincial Population Growth (POPGP) 
Inter census population growth is reported in provincial population censuses. These growth 
rates are taken from the three censuses undertaken during the period of this study which are 
population census of 1972, 1981 and 1998.      
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Chart  5.3 - PER CAPITA TOTAL EXPENDITURES  
[Pakistan - All Provinces Combined] 
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Chart  5.4 – PER CAPITA OWN SOURCE REVENUE 
[Pakistan - All Provinces Combined] 
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Chart  5.5 – PER CAPITA DIVISIBLE POOL 
[Pakistan - All Provinces Combined] 
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Chart  5.6 – PER CAPITA STRAIGHT TRANSFERS  
[Pakistan - All Provinces Combined] 
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 Chart  5.7 – PER CAPITA NON DEVELOPMENT GRANTS   
[Pakistan - All Provinces Combined] 
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 Chart  5.8 – PER CAPITA DEVELOPMENT GRANTS   
[Pakistan - All Provinces Combined] 
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Chart  5.9 – PER CAPITA NFC TRANSFERS   
[Pakistan - All Provinces Combined] 
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 Chart  5.10 – PER CAPITA UNCONDITIONAL NFC TRANSFERS    
[Pakistan - All Provinces Combined]  
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Chart  5.11 – PER CAPITA TOTAL GRANT (TG=GD+GND) 
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 Chart  5.12 – PER CAPITA TOTAL  TRANSFERS [NFC plus Grants]   
[Pakistan - All Provinces Combined]  
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Chart  5.13 – PER CAPITA BORROWINGS    
[Pakistan - All Provinces Combined]  
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 Chart  5.14 – PER CAPITA DEBT SERVICING     
[Pakistan - All Provinces Combined]  
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5.3 Social Indicators 
The annual Provincial Development Statistics are used to procure data on social indicators 
related to education and health. The indicators on which province-wise historical consistent 
data is available include number of; health institutions (hospitals, clinics, dispensary, basic 
health units), beds in health institutions, doctors, nurses, health personnel, primary and 
secondary schools, teachers in primary and secondary schools, students enrolled in primary 
and secondary schools. These variables are also used as instrumental and control variables in 
different provincial equations when using 2SLS and OLS techniques respectively. Following 
table provides the list with names as appeared in the regression output.  
 
Variables 
Variable Names [As Appeared in the Regression 
Output] 
All Provinces Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
 Health Sector Indicators 
Number Hospital Beds HBA HBP HBS HBN HBB 
Number of Doctors HDA HDP HDS HDN HDB 
Number of Hospital HHA HHP HHS HHN HHB 
Number of Health Institutions HIA HIP HIS HIN HIB 
Number of Nurses  HNA HNP HNS HNN HNB 
Number of Health Personal  HPA HPP HPS HPN HPB 
 Education Sector Indicators 
Primary School PSA PSP PSS PSN PSB 
Primary School Enrolment PSEA PSEP PSES PSEN PSEB 
Primary School Teacher PSTA PSTP PSTS PSTN PSTB 
 
5.4 Qualitative Dichotomous Variables 
Various qualitative (dummy) variables have been also used that are likely to influence 
provincial public expenditures. Some variables represent important events in Pakistan related 
to provincial fiscal and political history and some just to eliminate discrepancies in the data. 
The nature of fiscal governance during political and military regimes in the country is also 
represented by qualitative variables. Moreover, to judge whether award arrangements as 
proposed in different NFC awards have influenced differently134
                                                          
134 For example, following 1990 award, ban on provincial deficit financing grant and with the simultaneous provision of 
straight transfers, and in NFC 1997 and PCO 2006 award provision of non-development grant to two backward provinces and 
to all four provinces respectively that may have different behavioral influences on provincial utilization of funds in the 
 in various provinces in the 
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provision of provincial public goods, NFC award dummy qualitative variables have been 
created for the respective period of these awards. The list of these qualitative variables which 
have been tested for statistical significance in the empirical regression analysis is provided 
below: 
 
Qualitative Variable 
to Represent 
Variable Names as 
Appeared in the 
Regression Output 
Period of Presence Period of Absence 
  
NFC Award 1974 DUMNFC74 1974-1991 = 1 Other = 0 
NFC Award 1991 DUMNFC91 1992-1997 = 1 Other = 0 
NFC Award 1997 DUMNFC97 1998-2006 = 1 Other = 0 
NFC Award 2007 DUMNFC07 2007-2009 = 1 Other = 0 
Other Qualitative Variables 
These qualitative 
variables have been 
used to represent 
political disturbance, 
unrest, and natural 
calamities in various 
parts of the country. In 
addition some variables 
have been created to 
eradicate the 
inconsistency in the 
data. 
 
DUM76 1976 =1 Other = 0 
DUMNWFP85 1985=1 Other = 0 
DUMNWFP99 1999=1 Other = 0 
DUMNWFP03 2003=1 Other = 0 
DUMNWFP05 2005=1 Other = 0 
DUMSINDH91 1991=1 Other = 0 
5.5 Federal Fiscal Policy Indicators 
In some cases federal fiscal policy indicators are also used as instruments when applying 
2SLS technique. The brief description of these variables is provided below while the relevant 
time-series data is plotted in Chart  5.15.   
                                                                                                                                                                                      
provision of public goods. Use of asymmetry and region, event and period specific dummies are commonly used in the 
literature. 
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5.5.1 Federal Government Tax Revenue [FTOTTEXR] 
Federal tax revenues include income from direct and indirect taxes. Real per capita federal tax 
revenue is derived by adjusting the nominal figure with the GDP deflator and with the 
combined four provinces population.  
5.5.2 Federal Government Total Revenues [FTOTREVR]   
Federal government total revenue comprises of federal taxes, non taxes and surcharges. It is 
converted in to real per capita by adjusting nominal magnitude of total revenues with GDP 
deflator 2001 and with aggregate four provinces population.  
5.5.3 Federal Government Total Expenditure [FTOTEXP]  
This comprises federal current revenue and capital expenditure and federal current 
development and capital development expenditures. Real per capita figure is calculated by 
adjusting nominal federal total expenditure with the GDP deflator 2001 and with the total four 
provinces population.  
5.5.4 Federal Government Net Revenue [FNETREVR] 
This is computed by adjusting nominal value of net federal receipts (Gross Revenue minus Transfers to 
provinces) as available in federal budgets with GDP deflator 2001. 
5.5.5 Federal Budget Deficit [FBDR] 
The amount of federal budget deficit is reported in the federal budget. Its real magnitude is 
derived by adjusting the nominal value of federal budget deficit with the GDP deflator 2001.  
5.5.6 Federal Budget Deficit to GDP Ratio [FBDGDP1]  
This variable is computed to reflect federal budget deficit to GDP ratio and is obtained by 
dividing the magnitude of federal budget deficit with the GDP market prices and multiplied by 
100. 
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 Chart  5.15 – FEDERAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE DATA     
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6 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
6.1 Introduction 
Intergovernmental fiscal transfers play an important role to improve the fiscal operation of 
federating units. These transfers directly influence the sub-national governments’ fiscal 
behavior by providing additional resources and thus enhancing their ability to provide public 
goods. Conversely, these transfer receipts may influence the ability and willingness of sub-
national governments to collect taxes. It is, therefore, likely that additional transfer income 
may partly serve as a replacement of provincial fiscal efforts. Therefore, an analysis and 
evaluation of fiscal behavior of federating units with diverse socio-economic and cultural 
background is an important addition to the empirical research in the area of public finance. 
This thesis is in this direction and empirically evaluates, for the first time, individual fiscal 
behavior of the provincial governments in Pakistan in response to federal transfers and grants. 
Specifically, the analysis in this chapter is revolved around the following four hypotheses:  
1. Federal transfers/grants to provinces stimulate provincial government 
expenditures. This hypothesis will be rejected if there is no significant increased 
in the provision of public goods in the province as a result of receiving federal 
revenue transfers. 
2. Federal transfers/grants to provinces reduce provincial fiscal efforts. This 
implies that province utilises federal transfers to equalize resources and to 
relieve tax burden of residents. Hypothesis will be rejected if it is found that 
there are significant increases in provincial tax revenue collection in response to 
federal transfer receipts. 
3. Conditional federal transfers under development grant have a greater impact on 
provincial expenditure than non-development or unconditional transfers. This 
hypothesis will be rejected for provinces where relatively lower impact of 
conditional or development grant is found as compared to other unconditional 
transfers. 
4. Federal transfers and resident income have similar accelerative effect on the 
provincial expenditure. This hypothesis will be rejected if there is a significant 
difference in the magnitudes of resident income and federal transfers. 
 
These hypotheses are tested for each province of Pakistan separately and for all provinces 
combined using time-series macro data and data on federal and provincial public finance. This 
comprehensive historical analysis covering all NFC awards periods during 1973-2009 will not 
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only assist decision makers to evaluate past intergovernmental transfers strategies, which have 
been pursued in Pakistan, but will also be more beneficial in designing future strategies of 
transfers with the help of provincial disaggregated analyses.  Both aggregated and 
disaggregated provincial analyses provided below will definitely be a valuable addition in the 
empirical literature on fiscal federalism in Pakistan. 
6.2 Estimation Approach and Strategy 
Various approaches are being used in determining the effect of transfers and grants on the 
provision of public goods. One of the approaches is to link intergovernmental transfers with 
service delivery, which is typically known as output-based135
 
 transfers.   It is plausible that 
once it is known that transfers/grant is linked with output, its incentives to comply in line with 
the intended objectives are increased and thus efficient use of public funds is made possible.  
The efficient utilization of public funds not only enhances the provision of public goods but 
also causes reduction in the debt burden. Government’s output can be measured by using three 
broad forms:  First, it can be measured with the size of government spending on a particular 
service. Second, output can be determined by directly produced quantity, for example; student 
enrolments in primary and secondary schools, patients treated in hospitals, etc. Third, 
government output may be result oriented, based on the calculations, for example, time taken 
by firemen to control a fire. In contrast, the expenditure method approach is based on inputs 
which are indirectly linked with the actual service delivery. This measure is generally used for 
assessing government goods and services by comparing output overtime and across localities.  
Thus following Fisher (1996), real provincial government expenditure is used in this thesis to 
measure the quantity of government service provision. Total provincial expenditure is 
modeled as a function of provincial gross domestic product at factor cost, transfers and total 
borrowings to evaluate the fiscal response to federal transfers. All variables are defined in 
terms of per capita and at real prices of 2001, covering the period between 1973 and 2009.  
Various specifications of expenditure function are used in this study for testing different 
hypothesis.  
 
                                                          
135 See for example Bergstrom, Dahlberg and Mork 2004 and Duncombe and Yinger 1998 who respectively have used 
“Municipal Employment” and Index of Education Outcome” as dependent variable. 
Intergovernmental Governmental Fiscal Relation – A Case Study of Pakistan 166 
Provincial total expenditure includes current and development expenditures. Its aggregation is 
justified as it is really complicated to clearly distinguish the differences among these two 
categories of expenditures in practice136
 
. Moreover, it is argued that the recurring expenses on 
human resource development (education, health) may be treated as development expenditure, 
which enhances the productive capacity of the economy. On the contrary, a part of the 
development expenditure is reported in the provincial recurring budget, such as salaries and 
perks of ongoing projects under completion. 
Given that development grant may be endogenous to total provincial expenditure and may 
influence each other137, the expenditure functions are estimated by using both Ordinary Least 
Square (OLSQ) as well as Two Stage Least Square (TSLS) estimation techniques138. Various 
instrumental variables (number of primary school, primary enrolments, primary student to 
teacher ratio, number of hospital, hospital beds, doctors and nurses, population growth, 
population density, per capita GDP, per capita provincial borrowings, per capita total federal 
tax revenues and federal budget deficit to GDP ratio with appropriate lag periods etc.) are used 
for TSLS estimation. In the literature139
 
 examining sub-national governments’ fiscal response 
to intergovernmental transfers more or less similar instruments belonging to socio-economic, 
demographic, fiscal, political, region and event specific variables have been utilized. These 
variables are used in particular regression specification on the basis of theoretical and 
empirical considerations (See table 2.1 and Appendix table 2.1 for the list of instrumental and 
control variables used in few selected studies).   
E-VIEWS software is employed to estimate all expenditure functions.  The results from both 
techniques are reported and compared to check the sensitivity of magnitudes and summary 
                                                          
136See Pasha & Ghaus, 1994 
137The estimates obtained in the presence of likely correlation (endogenity) between the stochastic explanatory variable and 
the stochastic disturbance terms are econometrically inconsistent. To correct the inconsistency, the method of TSLS is used 
which find a “proxy” in the first stage of OLS for the stochastic explanatory variable. This proxy variable which is also 
known as an instrumental variable is uncorrelated with stochastic disturbance term. As the name indicates, the method of 
TSLS involves two successive applications of OLS. At the second stage, this proxy or instrumental variable is used instead of 
actual variable. E-VIEW software estimates both stages simultaneously using instrumental variable technique. The detail 
methodology regarding TSLS may be found in any econometric book. See for instance “Basic Econometrics” by Damodar N. 
Gujarati. 
138 See Dahhlberg, Maork, Rattso and Agren 2006, Gordon 2004, Gamkhar 2003, Levaggi and Zanola 2003, Knight 2002, 
Riber and   Wilheim 1999, Gamkhar and Oats 1996, Slack 1980. 
139 See for example; Gamkhar 2003, Duncombe and Yinger 1998, Gamkhar and Oates 1996, Gorden 1994, Stine 1994, 
Becker 1996, Islam and Chaudhry 1990, Slack 1980. 
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statistics.  Subsequently, the results derived from the best equations, according to the 
minimum standard error, are finally considered for discussion.  
6.3 Major Findings 
The studies in the context of Pakistan so far concentrated only on the impact of federal 
transfers on the aggregate140
6.3.1 Aggregate Provincial Response to Fiscal Transfers 
 provincial expenditures (all federating units or provinces 
combined). The aggregate analyse is no doubt important for determining vertical sharing of 
federal divisible pool revenues and transfers/grants. However, for horizontal sharing it is 
critically important to examine the individual province behaviour in response to federal 
transfers/grants, especially in the presence of diverse socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics of federating units. It is plausible to expect dissimilar fiscal response of each 
federating unit. As such, this study is the first attempt to carry out disaggregated analyses in 
the context of Pakistan and examine the individual province’s fiscal response to federal 
transfers/grants. This section initially provides the results and analyses based on aggregated 
provincial data, which is then followed by the analyses of individual provinces behaviour in 
response to federal transfers.  
To compare consistency and uniformity with earlier research work in Pakistan, aggregate 
provincial fiscal response to federal transfers (NFC divisible pool tax transfers, straight 
transfers, non development grant and development grant) is estimated, first, by combining the 
data of all four provinces in one place.  Thus, per capita total provincial expenditure 
(EXPTAR/POPXA) is modeled as a function of provincial gross domestic product at factor 
cost (GDPFCAR/POPXA), total transfers (NFCTGAR/POPXA) and total borrowings 
(BORTAR/POPXA). 
 
Table 6.1 portrays the estimated results derived from both estimation techniques (OLS and 
TSLS).  All coefficients turned out statistically significant at 1% level, with a high adjusted R2 
and a significant F-statistics.  Moreover, both equations are also corrected for autocorrelation.  
According to the table, stimulatory effect of total federal transfers on the provincial 
                                                          
140  This may be due to the non- availability of consistent time-series of provincial Gross Domestic product, which is critical 
for estimating expenditure functions. 
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expenditure is large. A one rupee increase in federal transfers augmented provincial 
expenditure by 92 paisas. The remaining 8 paisas have been substituted with the reduction of 
fiscal efforts. Provincial borrowings also contribute in stimulating provincial expenditures by 
96 paisas out of a rupee increase in provincial borrowing. This is because development 
program of the provinces financed primarily through borrowings. The borrowings demand for 
funds is inelastic with respect to current expenditures. This reflects a constraint tightening and 
thus increases borrowings from the provinces that lead to raise provincial expenditure.  It is 
also evident from the table that the per capita income (residents’ income) has a marginal 
contribution (Rs. 0.018) in increasing provincial public goods in comparison to total transfers.  
 
Table  6.1 Province Response to Federal Transfers in Pakistan 
[All Provinces Combined, 1973-2009] 
Dependent Variable: 
 
Total Expenditure (All province combined) 
 Estimation Method 
Real Per Capita OLSQ 
Coefficients 
TSLS 
Coefficients 
Explanatory Variables:     
    
GDP - Factor Cost Real Per Capita 0.017 *** 0.017 ** 
All Federal Transfers  Real Per Capita 0.929 ***  0.944 *** 
Provincial Borrowings Real Per Capita 0.967 *** 0.970 *** 
      
Summary Statistics:      
Adjusted R-squared  0.991  0.991  
S.E. of regression  105.872  107.898  
Durbin-Watson statistics  1.571  1.878  
F-statistic  1,358.179  760.559  
 Notes: 
** Denotes statistical significance at 5% 
*** Denotes statistical significance at 1% 
 Equations are estimated with the constant term and corrected for auto-correlation. 
Detail regression results with constant term, standard errors, t-statistics and list of instrumental variables are 
provided in the annexure of this chapter. 
 
This finding corroborate with earlier results that demonstrate that private income is 
disproportionately spent on private goods and public income (i.e. government transfers and 
grant receipts) on public goods.  The comparison of income coefficient with that of transfer 
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coefficient depicts a phenomenon of flypaper effect (money sticks where it hits). The flypaper 
effect results when a rupee of exogenous transfer/grant leads to significantly greater public 
spending than an equivalent rupee of resident income (here per capita GDP). 
 
These results confirm our a priori hypothesis that federal transfers and grants increases 
provincial government expenditures but with an amount less than the transfer/grant (0.92 
rupee). Second hypothesis that federal transfers reduce fiscal efforts is also confirmed as out 
of a rupee increase in transfer 8 paisas (0.08 rupee) are absorbed in providing tax relief to the 
provincial residents. In case of combined provinces our first two hypotheses are not rejected, 
while the third hypothesis of fly paper effect is rejected as provincial receipts from federal 
transfers are disproportionately spent on public consumption represented by a high value of 
this coefficient (0.92). On the other hand, marginal propensity to consume provincial public 
goods out of the residents private income is low as 0.017.   
 
Pasha and Ghaus (1994) however estimated expenditure function for the period 1973-1992 by 
using different specification in terms of dependent variable. They defined dependent variable 
after excluding provincial debt servicing payment from total expenditure. They argued that 
debt servicing do not contribute in increasing provincial services and thereby do not directly 
benefit the resident population.  In fact, this is a strong assumption as debt servicing payment 
is due for retiring past debt which were obtained by provincial governments primarily for 
financing provincial development program and/or for partly meeting their recurring 
expenditure requirements up to a specified limits prescribed by the federation, and may, thus 
positively contribute in provision of provincial services. However, only for the purpose of 
comparison with the earlier work, this study also estimates similar specifications of fiscal 
response model with the similar definition of dependent variable but with the expanded data-
set (1973-2009). Table 6.2 reports the comparative estimates. 
 
The results demonstrate that an increase of one rupee in federal transfers alter provincial 
expenditure (less debt servicing) with 69 paisas. The remaining 31 paisas are absorbed in the 
reduction of provincial fiscal efforts. These estimates are in line with the findings of Pasha and 
Ghaus [1994], where a marginal effect of federal transfers on provincial expenditure is 0.61, 
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and remaining 0.39 paisas have been used in absorbing declining provincial fiscal efforts. 
Estimates of this study using an expanded sample (1973-2009) are pretty close to the finding 
of Pasha and Ghaus with the sample of 1973-92. With 18 additional years bring an 
incremental change of only 8 paisas in provincial expenditures (less debt servicing). Similarly 
the effect of per capita private income is as usual low 0.032 versus 0.029 earlier and to that of 
borrowing pretty close to unitary elastic (0.98) as compare to (0.89) recorded in the earlier 
study141
Table  6.2 Province Response to Federal Transfers in Pakistan 
. 
[Comparison with earlier empirical work] 
 
Dependent Variable: 
All province combined 
Author’s 
Estimates 
[1973-2009] 
Pasha and Ghaus 
Estimates 
[1973-1992] 
Total Expenditure Less Debt Servicing Real Per Capita   
Explanatory Variables:  Estimated Coefficients 
Estimated  
Coefficients 
 GDP - Factor Cost Real Per Capita 0.032 *** 0.029 *** 
All Federal Transfers  Real Per Capita 0.689 *** 0.614 *** 
Provincial Borrowings Real Per Capita 0.981 *** 0.896 *** 
Summary Statistics:      
Adjusted R-squared  0.990  0.997  
S.E. of regression  118.980         ---  
Durbin-Watson statistics  1.994  2.600  
F-statistic  853.051            ---  
 Notes: 
*** Denotes statistical significance at 1% 
 
 Equations are estimated with the constant term and corrected for auto-correlation. 
Detail regression results with constant term, standard errors, t-statistics and list of instrumental variables 
are provided in the annexure of this chapter. 
 
 
However, these estimates are not comparable in any way with the results provided in Table 6.1 
due to different dependent variable. The estimated coefficients in these results show response 
to provincial expenditures excluding debt servicing, while in Table 6.1, estimated responses 
are provided with respect to overall provincial expenditure. 
                                                          
141Sabir [2001] has also estimated the effect of federal transfers on social and other sector expenditures using combined 
provincial data. His estimated coefficients are not directly comparable as Sabir decomposed the provincial expenditures into 
provincial social sector and other sectors separately and analyzed the transfer impact on these two categories of expenditures. 
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6.3.1.1 Extension in Empirical Work on Combined Provincial Aggregate 
Data 
After examining the impact of total federal transfers on provincial total expenditure, it would 
be beneficial to decompose the federal total transfer flow on the basis of conditional and 
unconditional characteristics. As these two forms of transfers have important policy 
dimensions and can be used by the federation to influence fiscal behavior of federating units in 
the desired direction. For example, conditional grant for specific purpose projects or programs 
with or without matching condition are usually provided to influence recipient government 
expenditures with high and more elastic expenditure response. These conditional grants 
particularly matching grants impose binding on recipients’ state or provinces to spend on the 
particular activity. Contrary, non-development grants which are for general purposes and/or 
revenue sharing types provide expenditure autonomy to recipients for utilizing it for any 
combination of goods and services or by relieving tax burden of residents. Its influence 
therefore is inelastic as part of it is used to increase provision of public goods and to a certain 
extent; it affects the provincial fiscal efforts (See Boadway & Shah 2007, pp 2-3).   
 
Federal transfer flows to provinces in Pakistan can be classified in three broad categories: 
First, unconditional transfers, which include the NFC formula-based divisible pool tax 
transfers and formula-based straight transfers to provinces. These transfers are pre-determined 
and provinces enjoy full expenditure autonomy.  Second, development grant, which is 
categorized clearly as conditional, are specific purpose transfers that may come with or 
without matching requirements. Third, non-development grant, as reported in provincial 
budgets may normally categorized as unconditional but partly it has been conditional as it is 
historically being provided for meeting specific purpose needs such as financing revenue 
deficit or provision of ad-hoc relief in certain accounting heads.  Following the 1997 NFC 
Award, non-development grants have been provided to provinces with full expenditure 
autonomy, and is thus, obviously unconditional. Due to the lack of detailed breakdown on 
non-development grant it may be considered as the mixture of both conditional but largely 
unconditional grant. 
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For the purposes of analysis, first, the total federal transfers have been decomposed into two 
broad categories. Receipts from NFC divisible pool taxes and straight transfer combined are 
made as one category, “NFC Transfers”, on the premise that both of these categories are 
predetermined, provinces enjoys expenditure autonomy and thus, being unconditional. The 
second category, “Total Grants”, variable is made by pooling together remaining two forms 
of transfer/grant i.e. development and non development which are discretionary in character in 
most part of the Pakistan’s fiscal history.   
 
Given the composition of non-development grant over the years, the picture is not clear 
because of lack of detailed breakdown. For example, non-development grant have taken the 
form of explicit transfers for performance of earmarked functions thus provinces can only 
utilize it to meet the particular function.  Therefore, up to these extents, grants may be 
characterized as conditional. This include need based revenue deficit grant and need based 
emergency grant.  In 1999, Octroi and Zila Tax (OZT) which was a local tax have been 
abolished on the federal government’s directives to reduce the tax payers compliance cost.  A 
new federal grant flow was started to compensate the losses to the provinces incurred due to 
the abolition of OZT. This grant is in the nature of federal pass through aid provided to 
provinces for onward transmission to their respective local governments, and may also be 
characterized as conditional grant.  However, non-development grant of unconditional 
character started from 1974 NFC when province of Baluchistan and KPK were allocated fixed 
annual grant of Rs.100 and Rs 50 million respectively. Its size further expands in 1997 NFC 
Award with the provision of Rs. 4.2 billions and Rs. 3.8 billion (with 11 percent annual 
growth that indexed with inflation rate) to Baluchistan and KPK respectively on the basis of 
their backwardness. Since 2006, the scope was expanded to cover all four provinces i.e. 3 
percent equivalent federal divisible pool taxes are earmarked annually, to be disbursed among 
provinces with the following sharing ratio: Punjab 11 percent, Sindh 21 percent, KPK 35 
percent, and Baluchistan 33 percent for backwardness.  Given the non-availability of explicit 
breakdown that may help in the demarcation of conditional and unconditional part of non 
development grants, both type of grants are merged to form a total grant variable. This 
variable reflects largely discretionary grant with an expected behaviour to that of conditional 
transfers. 
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Thus for this specification, total provincial expenditure (EXPTAR/POPXA) of combined 
provinces is modeled as a function of provincial gross domestic product at factor cost 
(GDPFCAR/POPXA), NFC transfers (NFCTGAR/POPXA), total federal grant 
(GTAR/POPXA) and total borrowing (BORTAR/POPXA). All variables are defined at per 
capita and on real prices of 2001 covering periods 1973-2009.  
 
Table 6.3 provides the results of this specification derived from both estimation techniques 
(OLSQ and TSLS). The estimates obtained from TSLS regression are discussed below as 
TSLS results have slightly lower standard error of regression.  All variables turned out 
significant at 1 percent level except per capita gross domestic product, which is significant at 5 
percent level. The adjusted R2 of the equation is high and also F-statistics turned out 
statistically significant.  
Table  6.3 Province Response to Federal Transfers in Pakistan 
[All Provinces Combined, 1973-2009] 
Dependent Variable: 
Total Expenditure (All province combined) 
 Estimation Method 
Real Per Capita OLSQ 
Coefficients 
TSLS 
Coefficients 
Explanatory Variables:    
GDP - Factor Cost Real Per Capita 0.019 *** 0.016 ** 
NFC Transfers Real Per Capita 0.864 *** 0.950 *** 
Provincial Borrowings Real Per Capita 0.967 *** 0.977 *** 
Grant Receipts   
(Development & Non Development combined) 
Real Per Capita 1.044 *** 1.146 *** 
      
Summary Statistics:      
Adjusted R-squared  0.992  0.993  
S.E. of regression  101.365  99.550  
Durbin-Watson statistics  1.672  1.901  
F-statistic  1,112.242  1,113.273  
 Notes: 
** Denotes statistical significance at 5% 
*** Denotes statistical significance at 1% 
 Equations are estimated with the constant term and corrected for auto-correlation. 
Detail regression results with constant term, standard errors, t-statistics and list of instrumental variables 
are provided in the annexure of this chapter. 
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Estimated aggregate province expenditure response present some evidence whether federal 
transfer are used to increase service demands of the resident population or provincial 
governments consider these funds as a fungible revenue source.  The evidence of both these 
possibilities is evident in the estimated expenditure equation as reported in Table 6.3. In the 
case of a one Rupee increase in unconditional NFC transfers raises provincial government 
expenditure by 0.95 paisas indicating provincial government partly use this as a fungible 
source as 0.5 paisas are absorbed in providing resident tax relief. As expected the effect of 
conditional transfers (GTAR/POPXA) on provincial expenditure turns out to be elastic. It 
clearly suggests that federal conditional grant served enough incentives for provincial 
government that fetches additional own source revenues Rs. 1.15 as opposed to conditional 
transfer worth rupee one. This finding indicates that provinces prefer not to compromise with 
the federal policy objective for spending on specific projects and/or programs, but in fact, the 
provinces prefer to utilize their own resources, which enhances these objectives of federal 
conditional spending effectively taxing provincial residents.  
 
Provincial borrowings also stimulate provincial expenditure almost equivalent to size of 
borrowing (0.98). The magnitude of the coefficient of the per capita gross domestic product 
confirmed the notion that provincially provided goods are regarded as normal goods. As one rupee 
increase in per capita income augments provincial expenditure by 0.016 rupee.  Finally it is 
observed that total grant, which is assumed as conditional grant, shows elastic response with 
respect to provincial spending.  Thus federal policy objective of increase spending in specific 
purpose projects and development program seems to be better served through grants. From the 
policy stand point, conditional grant with or without matching requirement plays a greater 
stimulatory role in raising provincial expenditure in specific-purpose activities or plans. The NFC 
transfers or unconditional grant is used as a fungible source as part of the increase are being 
utilized in subsidizing provincial services, a phenomenon commonly observed in empirical 
literature (Shah 2007, Ghamkhar and Oats 1996, Bergstorm, Dhalberg and Mork 2004). 
 
The model is extended further by decomposing the federal transfer flows into three categories. 
Besides NFC transfers (divisible pool plus straight transfers), total grant have now been 
broken down into two separate categories: non development grant and development grant, as 
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originally reflected in the provincial budgets. One would expect that non-development grant 
and NFC transfer variables would illustrate behaviour patterns to that of unconditional grant. 
This implies that provincial governments treat this as fungible source.  Development grants 
being specific purposes would depict responsiveness to that of conditional grant. Table 6.4 
presents results obtained from both estimation techniques (OLSQ and TSLS). Both equations 
have almost similar standard error of regression (SSE), therefore results derived from TSLS 
are preferred to discuss here.  
 
Table  6.4 Province Response to Federal Transfers in Pakistan 
[All Provinces Combined, 1973-2009] 
Dependent Variable: 
 
Total Expenditure (All province combined) 
 Estimation Method 
Real Per Capita OLSQ Coefficients 
TSLS 
Coefficients 
Explanatory Variables:    
GDP - Factor Cost Real Per Capita 0.020 *** 0.018 *** 
NFC Transfers Real Per Capita 0.846 *** 0.908 *** 
Provincial Borrowings Real Per Capita 0.967 *** 0.975 *** 
Grant Receipts (Development) Real Per Capita 1.176 *** 1.380 *** 
Grant Receipts (Non-Development) Real Per Capita 0.989 *** 1.035 *** 
Summary Statistics:      
Adjusted R-squared  0.992  0.993  
S.E. of regression  102.119  102.156  
Durbin-Watson statistics  1.686  1.896  
F-statistic  868.206  855.132  
 Notes: 
*** Denotes statistical significance at 1% 
 Equations are estimated with the constant term and corrected for auto-correlation 
 
Detail regression results with constant term, standard errors, t-statistics and list of instrumental variables 
are provided in the annexure of this chapter. 
 
The marginal effect of NFC unconditional transfer on provincial expenditure declined to 91 
paisas from 95 paisas (see Table 6.3) after decomposing of total grant into development and 
non development grant. The phenomenon reflects increase fungibility of NFC transfers. Non 
development grant stimulate provincial expenditure almost equivalent to the size of grant. The 
elastic impact of development grant (conditional) is clear as its coefficient turns out to be 1.38 
for provincially provided public services implying that provincial government is adhering 
federal policy objective of increase provision of public goods and services in which 
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conditional grant is given.  The estimated magnitude associated with borrowing variable also 
shows high stimulation in provincial expenditure (0.98). However, the marginal influence of 
per capita private income on provincially provided public services is 0.02 and quite close to 
earlier findings.  As a whole, we may conclude that conditionality associated with specific 
purpose development grant increases provincial expenditure more than the grant amount. Thus 
provincial governments respond positively in meeting the federal policy prescriptions of 
increase consumption of provincially provided goods and services.  
The third equation is modified to include all unconditional transfers to form one category. The 
categories which are combined include NFC transfers and non development grant. The 
mergers of both these categories give the combined effect of federal unconditional 
transfers/grants. Development grant as being for specific purpose remains separated and 
assumed to display such behaviour to conditional grant. Results of this specification which are 
derived from both estimation techniques are reported in Table 6.5, while coefficients 
estimated through TSLS technique are discussed below. 
 
Table  6.5 Province Response to Federal Transfers in Pakistan 
[All Provinces Combined, 1973-2009] 
Dependent Variable: 
 
Total Expenditure (All province Combined) 
 Estimation Method 
Real Per Capita OLSQ 
Coefficients 
TSLS 
Coefficients 
Explanatory Variables:    
GDP – Factor Cost Real Per Capita  0.021 *** 0.017 ** 
NFC Transfers  plus  Non-Development Grants Real Per Capita 0.845 *** 0.939 *** 
Provincial Borrowings Real Per Capita 0.967 *** 0.978 *** 
Grant Receipts – Development Real Per Capita 1.340 *** 1.581 *** 
Summary Statistics:      
Adjusted R-squared  0.992  0.992  
S.E. of regression  103.325  104.523  
Durbin-Watson statistics  1.676  1.882  
F-statistic  1,070.133  1,014.167  
 Notes: 
** Denotes statistical significance at 5% 
*** Denotes statistical significance at 1% 
 Equations are estimated with the constant term and corrected for auto-correlation 
 
Detail regression results with constant term, standard errors, t-statistics and list of instrumental variables 
are provided in the annexure of this chapter. 
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The combined unconditional grant variable (NFCTAR+GNDAR)/POPXA) shows that for a 
marginal rupee increase in unconditional federal transfers/grant boost all province expenditure 
by 0.94 rupee, whereas remaining 6 paisas seems to have absorbed in the reduction of 
provincial fiscal efforts  This result is in line with the earlier finding (Table 6.4) where NFC 
transfers and non development grant while used separately have shown to increase provincial 
expenditure less than the increase in these transfers. This is an important finding and reflect 
that provincial administration considered these unconditional non development grant/transfers 
as fungible source, as it not only spent on increase provision of provincially provided public 
goods but also on provision of tax relief to the residents. The impact of development 
(conditional) grant on provincial expenditure is elastic (in both estimation techniques) 
implying that for every one rupee increase in conditional grant transfer brings more than 
proportionate change in provincial expenditure (1.58). This reflects that provincial 
governments respond positively to specific purpose grant by matching additional resources to 
increase the consumption of specific provincial goods and services. 
 
 These estimated behavioral patterns with respect to conditional and unconditional grant 
would have important policy dimensions for setting up of future design of intergovernmental 
fiscal transfer policy in Pakistan. With the intended objectives of transfer/grant, federation can 
decide how much of the federal grant should be passed on to recipient governments in the 
form of conditional and/or unconditional or an appropriate mix of two. 
 
The effect of borrowing also turned out statistically significant. Out of a one rupee marginal 
increase in provincial borrowing 98paisas are utilized for increasing provincial consumption. 
The marginal consumption effect of per capita private income is 0.017rupee depicting those 
provincial services are normal goods. It is also clear that private income is disproportionately 
spent on consumption of private goods and public income (transfers/grants) on consumption 
of public goods/services describing a phenomenon of fly-paper effect in Pakistan. Thus these 
results confirm our a priori hypotheses.  
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6.3.2 Individual Provincial Response to Fiscal Transfers 
The analysis presented above highlights the aggregate provincial fiscal response to various 
forms of federal transfers/grants when the fiscal and macro data of all the four federating units 
are combined (considered as one unit). This analysis will assist policy makers in designing 
future federal transfers/grants policies as aggregate provincial analysis is important for 
determining vertical sharing of federal divisible pool revenues and transfers/grants. For 
horizontal sharing, however, it is vital to examine the individual province’s behaviour in 
response to federal transfers/grants given the diverse socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics of the four provinces in Pakistan. It is expected that response or fiscal 
behaviour of each province is likely to be different. 
 
Similar to the aggregate analysis above, three variants of expenditure functions are estimated 
for each province separately using both estimation techniques. These variants incorporate 
different breakdown of intergovernmental grants/transfers. Equation ‘one’ hypothesize that 
per capita total expenditure is a function of real provincial GDP, all NFC real transfers, real 
overall grant and provincial borrowings.  In equation ‘two’, grants are decomposed into 
development and non-development.  Equation ‘three’ estimates combined impact of all NFC 
transfers and non-development grants besides provincial GDP, borrowings and development 
grants. All variables are in terms of per capita and at constant prices of 2000-01. 
6.3.2.1 The Province of Punjab 
This section examines the fiscal behavior of Province of Punjab in response to federal 
transfers/grants. Table 6.6 and Table 6.7 report results of all three set of equations using 
OLSQ and TSLS techniques respectively. The results which have a minimum standard error 
of regression142
 
 are chosen to discuss. The exercise will highlight how far individual province 
fiscal response produce similar or differential results compared to those obtained from 
analysis of aggregate province fiscal response to federal transfers/grants. 
                                                          
142 In model selection, highest adjusted R2 is used where number of regressand are same. However, where the models have 
different specifications or number of regressors, standard error of regression or any other statistic which is based on residual 
sum of square is preferred (see “Basic Econometrics” by Gujarati, Page 536, and fourth edition).  Nonetheless, the choice here 
is among techniques (OLSQ v/s TSLS) and not among different specifications in a particular technique.   
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As evident from equation ‘one’ (Table 6.6) that a one rupee increase in NFC transfers 
augment provincial government expenditure by 0.87 rupee showing that provincial 
government have been using  these unconditional block transfers as a fungible source as 
nearly 13 paisas of this marginal rupee increase is being substituted for providing tax relief to 
their resident population.  
 
Table  6.6 Province Response to Federal Transfers in Pakistan Punjab (OLS) 
[Punjab Province , 1973-2009 – Method: OLSQ] 
Dependent Variable: 
 
Total Expenditure  
    
Real Per 
Capita  
 
 
  Equations 
Explanatory Variables:  One  Two  Three  
  Estimated Coefficients 
GDP - Factor Cost Real Per Capita 0.014 ***  0.021 *** 0.017 *** 
All NFC Transfers Real Per Capita 0.870 *** 0.774 ***   
Provincial Borrowings Real Per Capita 1.292 *** 1.173 *** 1.374 *** 
Grant Receipts – Overall Real Per Capita 1.092 ***     
Grant Receipts – Development Real Per Capita   1.270 *** 1.513 *** 
Grant Receipts - Non-Development Real Per Capita   0.916 ***   
        
All NFC Transfers plus Non-Development 
Grant  
Real Per Capita 
 
 
 
 
0.851 
*** 
Summary Statistics:       
 
Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.961 
 
0.960 
 
0.958 
 
S.E. of regression  89.384  89.786  91.216  
Durbin-Watson statistics  1.844  1.829  1.891  
F-statistic  223.560  119.703  161.796  
 Notes: 
*** Denotes statistical significance at 1% 
 
 Equations are estimated with the constant term and corrected for auto-correlation 
 
Detail regression results with constant term, standard errors and  t-statistics are provided in the annexure of 
this chapter. 
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Table  6.7 Province Response to Federal Transfers in Pakistan Punjab (2SLS) 
[Punjab Province , 1973-2009 – Method: TSLS] 
Dependent Variable: 
 
Real  Per Capita Total Expenditure 
Real Per Capita  
 
  Equations 
Explanatory Variables:  One Two Three 
  Estimated Coefficients 
GDP – Factor Cost Real Per Capita 0.013 *** 0.015 *** 0.0134 ** 
All NFC Transfers Real Per Capita 0.911 *** 0.891 ***   
Provincial Borrowings Real Per Capita 1.316 *** 1.361 *** 1.453 *** 
Grant Receipts – Overall Real Per Capita 1.132 ***     
Grant Receipts – Development Real Per Capita   1.256 ** 1.195 *** 
Grant Receipts – Non-Development Real Per Capita   1.036 ***   
All NFC Transfers plus Non-
Development Grant Real Per Capita     0.943 *** 
Summary Statistics:       
 
Adjusted R-squared 
  
0.957  0.956 
 
0.953 
 
S.E. of regression  90.695  91.325  93.523  
Durbin-Watson statistics  1.878  1.819  1.773  
F-statistic  184.220  147.822  165.183  
 Notes: 
** Denotes statistical significance at 5% 
*** Denotes statistical significance at 1% 
 
 Equations are estimated with the constant term and corrected for auto-correlation 
 
Detail regression results with constant term, standard errors, t-statistics and list of instrumental variables 
are provided in the annexure of this chapter. 
 
 
As expected, the marginal effect of total federal grant on provincial expenditures is elastic. A 
one rupee increase in federal grants raises provincial expenditure by 1.09 rupees indicating 
that Punjab province has been devoting their own funds by either diverting from other 
activities or by taxing residents beside complying effective utilization of grants/transfers. As 
these grants are largely meant for financing specific purpose projects/needs thus may attached 
a high federal priorities and province of Punjab by adhering these priority restrictions are also 
allocating additional funds from their own revenues. 
 
Intergovernmental Governmental Fiscal Relation – A Case Study of Pakistan 181 
Borrowing impact on provincially provided services also turned out elastic as one rupee 
increase in provincial borrowing increases provincial expenditure by Rs. 1.27. The higher 
multiplier impact of borrowing highlights the fact that Punjab economy as being more 
developed and egalitarian in character, is successful in productively absorbed the provincial 
borrowing in their priority areas. Punjab is utilizing its own funds along with borrowing to 
raise the level of economic activities.   
 
The coefficient of real per capita gross domestic product of Punjab indicates that provincially 
provided goods/services are termed as normal goods. As one rupee increase in gross domestic 
product raises provincial expenditure by 0.014 rupee only. 
 
As a whole NFC revenue sharing block transfers which are unconditional in character increase 
provincial spending by an amount less than these transfer receipts, part of this unconditional 
transfers substituted provincial own source revenues highlighting fungibility of this source 
with tendency to provide tax relief to their residents. Federal total grant shows an elastic 
impact on the provincial expenditure indicating a positive response of provincial governments 
towards meeting federal policy objectives of increasing expenditures in specific purpose 
activities. Thus conditional grant with or without matching requirement can be a useful tool in 
influencing specific purpose activities that incentives provincial governments to match 
additional own resources. Provincial borrowing also plays an important role in influencing 
provincially provided public goods. In case of Punjab, the government is utilizing their own 
funds in activities generated through borrowings. The effect of per capita income on 
provincial expenditure is low which is in line with the most empirical findings reported in the 
literature. 
 
The hypothesis that “the effect of conditional grant is elastic and unconditional grant is 
inelastic” is confirmed. Thus it can be argued that stimulatory impact of conditional transfers 
is higher compare to non-development or unconditional grant. The results also support the 
hypotheses that “unconditional grant increases provincial expenditure but with an amount less 
than the federal grant/transfer”  and “part of the unconditional transfers/grant is substituted for 
provincial fiscal efforts or is utilized for tax relief provision to resident population”.  
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In equation ‘two’ provincial expenditure (EXPTPR) is modeled as a function of NFC revenue 
sharing transfers (NFCTPR) which reflect unconditional block grant, non development grant 
(GNDPR), though partly include both specific purpose as well as general purpose revenue 
grants with an expected behavioral response to that of unconditional grant, and development 
grant (GDPR) which are specific purpose grants for development projects or program and 
likely to depict a behavior to that of conditional grant. In addition, provincial gross domestic 
product (GDPPP01) and provincial borrowing (BORTPR) also included in the expenditure 
function. All variables are measured in per capita term and at real prices of 2001. 
 
Equation ‘two’ (Table 6.6) shows that when total grant is decomposed into development and 
non-development grant it affects the provincial fiscal behavior in two ways. First the marginal 
impact of NFC formula transfers on provincial expenditures is reduced to 0.77 as compared 
with 0.87 in equation ‘one’. Second, marginal effect of non-development grant raises 
provincial expenditures with 92 paisas, while remaining 8 paisas of the increase is absorbed in 
reduced fiscal efforts. The effects of development or conditional grant when separated from 
total grant show a more elastic expenditure response. It implies that Punjab government is 
more responsive of the federal conditional grant as it not only fully utilized this grant but also 
match additional revenues from own resources as a unit increase in development grant 
augment the provincial expenditure by 1.27 rupee. The marginal effect of borrowing on 
provincially provided goods and services is also changed from 1.29 to 1.17. 
 
Thus the breakdown of overall grant into development and non-development confirm a priori 
expectation that marginal effect of conditional transfer/grant on provincially provided 
goods/services is greater as compare to unconditional transfer/grant.  
 
In the third step, provincial fiscal response of government of Punjab is examined after 
combining NFC formula transfer/grant with non-development grant. This combined variable 
reflects overall unconditional transfers. As such total provincial expenditure (EXPTPR) is 
estimated as a function of combined NFC revenue sharing transfers plus non development 
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(unconditional) grant (NFCTPR plus GNDPR), development (conditional) grant (GDPR), 
provincial gross domestic product (GDPP01) and provincial borrowing (BORTPR). 
  
The estimates derived from equation ‘three’ (Table 6.6) indicate an upward movement in the 
marginal effect of provincial borrowings and development expenditure. The estimates of these 
coefficients are quite high as compared with other equations in the table.  The marginal impact 
of conditional transfer/grant on provincially provided goods and services is more elastic (1.57 
v/s 1.3 in equation ‘two’). Similarly, the marginal impact of borrowings on provincial 
expenditure is 1.37 as against 1.2 and 1.3 in equation ‘two’ and ‘one’ respectively.  
 
The estimated results of all three equations in Table 6.6 clearly support the hypotheses that 
“unconditional federal transfer/grant stimulates provincial government expenditure” and 
second “unconditional federal transfer/grant reduces provincial fiscal efforts”.  The third 
hypothesis that “marginal effect of conditional transfer/grant on provincially provided 
goods/services is greater compare to unconditional transfer/ grant” also turns out to be correct 
given the reported results in the table.  Finally, the fourth hypothesis that “private (resident) 
income and receipts from unconditional transfers, have a similar impact on provincial 
expenditure” may be easily rejected as the results clearly reveal that unconditional transfers 
receipts are disproportionately spent on provincial public goods (0.85 rupee) and private 
income excessively spent on private good as its coefficient for public expenditure is low at 
0.017. Thus, the phenomenon of fly paper effect is evident as the coefficient of private income 
which is consistently low to coefficients of all forms of transfer/grants, depicting that “money 
sticks where it hits”.  
6.3.2.2 The Province of Sindh 
This section examines the fiscal behavior of province of Sindh in response to federal 
transfers/grants. Similar to the analysis of Punjab province, three set of equations are 
estimated using various breakdown of federal grants/transfers. Table 6.8 and Table 6.9 report 
results of all three set of equations using OLSQ and TSLS techniques respectively. The results 
derived using OLSQ have a relatively lower standard errors and therefore Table 6.8 is finally 
chosen to discuss.  
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In case of Sindh province, one rupee increase in NFC revenue sharing transfers (unconditional 
transfer) enhances provincial government expenditure by 65 paisas, whereas total grant (i.e. 
combined non development and development grant) augments the expenditure by 94 paisas 
(Equation ‘one’, Table 6.8). Thus contrary to the aggregate response, both conditional and 
unconditional grant are used as fungible revenue source. The remaining 35 paisas and 6 paisas 
respectively are absorbed in reduction in provincial fiscal efforts. The findings suggest that in 
Sindh province a higher premium is attached with the rise in provincial expenditure rather 
than on a decline in fiscal efforts. 
 
The coefficient of real per capita gross domestic product of Sindh show that provincially 
provided goods/services are termed as normal goods. As one rupee rise in per capita gross 
regional product of Sindh changes provincial expenditure by 0.033 rupee. The coefficient is 
slightly higher as compared to the aggregate fiscal response (Table 6.3).  
 
The coefficient of borrowing is estimated at 0.89 in case of Sindh province indicating that it is 
not fully absorbed an increase in provision of provincial public goods and services. Instead of 
borrowing, it has been partly served to provide tax relief to the resident population equivalent 
to 11 paisas out of one rupee. 
 
The results of “equation One, Table 6.8” support the hypothesis that “effect of conditional 
grant on provincial expenditure is higher and/or elastic”. Thus stimulatory impact of 
conditional transfers is higher as compared to non development or unconditional grant. The 
hypothesis that “unconditional grant increases provincial expenditure but with an amount less 
than the federal transfer/grant” and that “unconditional transfers/grant reduces provincial 
fiscal efforts” are confirmed as estimated magnitude of provincial tax reduction is 0.35 paisas.  
Similarly as in the case of aggregate response, the hypothesis that “federal transfer/grant have 
similar impact on provincial expenditure as of per capita private income”, may be rejected on 
the basis of estimated coefficients. The federal transfers/grants have a greater stimulatory 
impact (conditional: 0.94 and unconditional: 0.65) than the resident income (0.033), a finding 
that seems consistent and in line with the contemporary empirical relevant research. 
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Equation ‘two’ estimates separate impact of development and non-development grants on 
provincial expenditure. According to estimates first, marginal impact of NFC formula transfer 
on provincial expenditures is increased to 0.73 compare to 0.65 in equation ‘one’, reflecting 
that provincial government expenditure response to NFC transfer receipts became relatively 
more inelastic and now 27 paisas are used to substitute provincial tax efforts as compared to 
35 paisas, earlier. Second, marginal effect of non-development grant on provincial 
expenditures is higher at 0.94 rupee.  This demonstrates that along with NFC transfers, non 
development grant also partly serves as a fungible source and about 6 paisas are absorbed in 
provincial government tax reduction. Third, the effect of development or conditional grant 
after extrication from total grant illustrates an elastic expenditure response (1.32) as opposed 
to 0.94 shown earlier in the case of total grants. It implies that Sindh province is 
comparatively more responsive to federal conditional grants, as for every one rupee increase 
in federal conditional grant augments provincial spending by 1.32 rupees.  
 
Table  6.8 Province Response to Federal Transfers in Pakistan Sindh (OLS) 
[Sindh Province , 1973-2009 – Method: OLSQ] 
Dependent Variable: 
 
Total Expenditure 
    
  Equations 
Explanatory Variables:  One  Two  Three  
  Estimated Coefficients 
GDP - Factor Cost Real Per Capita 0.033 *** 0.033 *** 0.031 ** 
All NFC Transfers Real Per Capita 0.646 *** 0.725 ***   
Provincial Borrowings Real Per Capita 0.893 *** 0.927 *** 0.976 *** 
Grant Receipts – Overall Real Per Capita 0.942 ***     
Grant Receipts – Development Real Per Capita   1.32 *** 1.516 *** 
Grant Receipts - Non-Development Real Per Capita   0.948 ***   
All NFC Transfers plus Non-
Development Grant Real Per Capita     0.694 *** 
Summary Statistics:       
Adjusted R-squared  0.976  0.974  0.972  
S.E. of regression  117.791  123.323  128.059  
Durbin-Watson statistics  2.039  1.995  1.801  
F-statistic  217.875  198.403  214.146  
 Notes: 
** Denotes statistical significance at 5% 
*** Denotes statistical significance at 1% 
Equations are estimated with the constant term and corrected for auto-correlation 
Detail regression results with constant term, standard errors and t-statistics are provided in the 
annexure of this chapter 
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The third equation estimates fiscal response of Sindh after redefining transfers and grants into 
two categories conditional and unconditional. By combining unconditional grant and NFC 
unconditional transfers show that for a marginal rupee increase in unconditional federal 
transfers/grant boost Sindh province expenditure by 69 paisas, whereas remaining 31 paisas 
seems to have absorbed in reduction of provincial fiscal efforts. This result is in line with the 
earlier findings of this study, where NFC transfers and non-development grant, while used 
separately, have shown to increase provincial expenditure to be less than the increase in these 
Table  6.9 Province Response to Federal Transfers in Pakistan Sindh (TSLS) 
[Sindh Province , 1973-2009 – Method: TSLS] 
Dependent Variable: 
 
Real  Per Capita Total Expenditure 
Real Per Capita  
 
  Equations 
Explanatory Variables:  One Two Three 
  Estimated Coefficients 
GDP – Factor Cost Real Per Capita 0.016  0.031 ** 0.026 * 
All NFC Transfers Real Per Capita 0.795 *** 0.741 ***   
Provincial Borrowings Real Per Capita 0.930 *** 0.764 *** 0.712 ** 
Grant Receipts – Overall Real Per Capita 1.326 ***     
Grant Receipts – Development Real Per Capita   1.371 *** 1.488 ** 
Grant Receipts – Non-Development Real Per Capita   0.938 ***   
All NFC Transfers plus Non-
Development Grant Real Per Capita     0.729 *** 
Summary Statistics:       
Adjusted R-squared  0.968  0.974  0.973  
S.E. of regression  138.292  124.511  127.752  
Durbin-Watson statistics  1.691  1.983  1.781  
F-statistic  155.705  191.457  210.882  
 Notes: 
*                                      Denotes statistical significance at 10% 
** Denotes statistical significance at 5% 
*** Denotes statistical significance at 1%  
 
Equations are estimated with the constant term and corrected for auto-correlation 
 
Detail regression results with constant term, standard errors, t-statistics and list of instrumental variables 
are provided in the annexure of this chapter. 
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transfers. In Sindh the unconditional transfer/grant are mainly considered as a fungible 
revenue source to provide tax relief to residents. The impact of development (conditional) 
grant on provincial expenditure is elastic implying that for every one rupee increase in 
conditional grant transfer bring more than equal change in provincial expenditure (1.51). 
 
The results of all three equations of Table 6.8 lead to the conclusion that NFC revenue sharing 
transfers (unconditional transfers) increase provincial spending, ranging 0.65 to 0.72 rupees, in 
response to a one rupee rise in such transfers.  The remaining 28 to 35 paisas are utilized in 
subsidizing provincial services or in providing residents tax relief.  Similar to this 
phenomenon, when non development grant used as separate variable, brings a change (95 
paisas) in provincial expenditure, depicting that this source is also partly used as a fungible 
source.  The combined unconditional grant (NFC transfers plus non development grant) affect 
the provincial expenditure by 69 paisas and combined grant development (conditional) and 
non development by 94 paisas.  The solitary effect of development grant on provincial 
expenditure is higher than the solitary effect of non development and NFC transfer/grant. This 
implies that imposition of conditionality can influence provincial expenditure in activities 
carried high federal priorities for which specific purpose grant is provided.  The marginal 
effect of private income on provincial services shows that Sindh residents consider these 
services as normal goods. It augments provincial expenditure from 0.031 to 0.033 rupee, 
indicating that private income is excessively spent on private goods, a phenomenon which is 
commonly observed in the empirical literature.   
 
Overall, the findings affirm the hypothesis that “unconditional grant/transfers increases 
provincial expenditure and reduce provincial fiscal efforts”. The effect of conditional grant 
(development grant) is large as compared to unconditional grant (NFC and non-development 
grant, taken separately as well as jointly).  Thus it supports the hypothesis that “marginal effect 
of conditional transfer/grant on provincially provided goods/services is greater as compared to 
unconditional transfer/grant”.  Lastly, a phenomenon of fly paper effect is clearly visible in 
Sindh province as coefficient of private income is found consistently low as compared to 
coefficients of all forms of transfer/grants, depicting that money sticks where it hits.  Hence, 
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the results reject the hypothesis that private income and public funds (transfers/grants) equally 
influence the level of public expenditure. 
6.3.2.3 The Province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) 
This section examines the fiscal behavior of the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) in 
response to federal transfers/grants. Similar to the analysis undertaken for other provinces, 
three set of equations are estimated using various breakdown of intergovernmental 
grants/transfers. Table 6.10 and Table 6.11 report the results of all three equations using 
OLSQ and TSLS techniques respectively. However, results which are derived by using OLSQ 
are finally chosen for discussion, as all equations have relatively lower standard errors as 
compared with results derived from TSLS estimation technique.  
 
According to estimates (equation ‘one; Table 6.10), one rupee increase in NFC revenue 
sharing transfers enhances KPK provincial government expenditure by 0.82 rupee, whereas 
total grant (i.e. combined non development and development grant) augment these expenditure 
by 75 paisa. It is interesting to note that, contrary to Punjab province access of provincial 
borrowing is being served as fungible source as nearly 40 percent of the marginal increase 
seems to be utilized in tax relief provision to the resident living in the KPK jurisdiction. The 
remaining 60 percent, however, is being used in raising provincially provided services. The 
lower multiplier impact of borrowings is quite understandable in the case of KPK which is 
relatively a backward province. The borrowings are being utilized to finance current account 
deficit of the province and partly to fund development projects. More often, the federal 
government grants debt relief as province since long being a major victim of Afghan war 
against Soviet occupation (1979-1987) and since 2001 as a front line state  in war against 
terror that caused series of damages to its physical infrastructure. Thus, the provincial 
government confronts very limited financial accountability and monitoring from the 
federation. As such, these borrowings seem to be largely used in subsidizing provincial 
services and therefore, offer tax relief to their residents. The coefficient of real per capita gross 
domestic product of KPK is statistically insignificant143
                                                          
143  It indicates that private or resident income is not affecting provincial expenditure. KPK government mainly relies on 
federal transfers including federal borrowings. This phenomenon is observed in all equations (OLSQ as well as TSLS). 
.However, the magnitude shows that 
provincially provided goods/services are termed as normal goods. As with the rise in per 
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capita gross regional product by one rupee, provincial expenditure increases only by 0.016 
rupee. 
 
Table  6.10 Province Response to Federal Transfers in Pakistan KPK (OLS) 
 [Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province , 1973-2009 – Method: OLSQ] 
Dependent Variable:     
Total Expenditure      Real Per Capita      Equations 
    Estimated Coefficients 
Explanatory Variables: 
 
One Two Three 
  0.016 
 
0.013 
 
0.017 
 
GDP – Factor Cost Real Per Capita 
 
All NFC Transfers  Real Per Capita 0.823 *** 0.736 *** 
  
Provincial Borrowings Real Per Capita 0.604 *** 0.611 *** 0.551 *** 
Grant Receipts – Overall Real Per Capita 0.754 *** 
    
Grant Receipts – Development Real Per Capita 
  
0.564 * 0.526 ** 
Grant Receipts – Non-Development Real Per Capita 
  
0.666 *** 
  
        All NFC Transfers plus Non-Development 
Grant Real Per Capita     
0.843 
 
                
Summary Statistics:             
 
 
0.944 
 
0.931 
 
0.944 
 
Adjusted R-squared 
 
S.E. of regression 
 
140.22 
 
132.3
38  
133.72 
 
Durbin-Watson statistics 
 
1.689 
 
2.061 
 
1.979 
 
F-statistic   85.798   51.67   73.847   
 Notes: 
*                                      Denotes statistical significance at 10% 
** Denotes statistical significance at 5% 
*** Denotes statistical significance at 1% 
  
 Equations are estimated with the constant term and corrected for auto-correlation 
 Detail regression results with constant term, standard errors and t-statistics are provided in the annexure of this chapter. 
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Table  6.11 Province Response to Federal Transfers in Pakistan KPK (TSLS) 
[Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province , 1973-2009 – Method: TSLS] 
Dependent Variable: 
    
Total Expenditure Real Per Capita 
 
 
    Equations 
Explanatory Variables:  One   Two   Three   
  Estimated Coefficients 
  0.017   0.004   0.016   
Real Per Capita 
All NFC Transfers Real Per Capita 0.81 *** 0.943 ***   
Provincial Borrowings Real Per Capita 0.602 *** 0.577 *** 0.587 ** 
Grant Receipts Overall Real Per Capita 0.734 ***     
Grant Receipts Development Real Per Capita   0.693 * 0.632 ** 
Grant Receipts Non-
Development Real Per Capita   0.912 ***   
All NFC Transfers plus Non-
Development Grant Real Per Capita     0.839 *** 
                
Summary Statistics:               
 
 0.944  0.924  0.944  
S.E. of regression  140.252  156.033  134.157  
Durbin-Watson statistics  1.692  2.06  1.982  
F-statistic   83.801   71.248   73.428   
  Notes: 
*                                      Denotes statistical significance at 10% 
** Denotes statistical significance at 5% 
*** Denotes statistical significance at 1% 
 
Equations are estimated with the constant term and corrected for auto-correlation 
Detail regression results with constant term, standard errors, t-statistics and list of instrumental variables 
are provided in the annexure of this chapter. 
 
In terms of testing the study hypotheses, equation ‘one’ validates the first hypothesis because 
federal transfers/grant increases provincial government expenditures (0.82 and 0.75).  The 
second hypothesis that “federal transfer/grant reduces provincial fiscal effort or resident tax 
burden” also holds true. However, the magnitude is quite low as compared with other 
Intergovernmental Governmental Fiscal Relation – A Case Study of Pakistan 191 
provinces. The estimated coefficients however, do not certify the third hypothesis that “federal 
conditional grant, being specific purpose transfers should have a higher and/or more elastic 
expenditure response compared to federal unconditional grant”.  In case of KPK province, 
unconditional (NFC revenue sharing) transfers show a marginally higher effect on provincial 
expenditure (0.82) as compared to predominantly conditional (combined development and non 
development) transfers (0.75). Though it is hypothesized that conditional transfers have a 
higher effect on provincial expenditure as these are largely meant for financing specific 
purpose project but it does not hold true and shows the opposite. The phenomenon however is 
not evident in other provinces as well as in case of aggregate fiscal response to federal 
transfers.  The fourth hypothesis that “federal transfer/grants and per capita private income 
have an identical effect on provincial expenditure” also stand rejected as consumption of 
provincial services from private income found to be much lower (.016) compare to federal 
transfers grant whose coefficient is greater than 0.75. This reflects a phenomenon of fly paper 
effect implying that public funds disproportionately spent on public goods/services, whereas 
private income on private goods and services.  
  
Equation ‘two’ (Table 6.10) estimates the disaggregated effect of grant after decomposing 
total grant variable into development and non development. It affects the provincial fiscal 
behavior in two ways. First, from a total grant effect of 82 paisas in the equation with 
aggregate grant variable, the disaggregated coefficients of non-development and development 
grant variable are estimated at 67 paisas and 56 paisas respectively. However marginal effect 
of NFC formula transfers on provincial expenditures reduces to 0.74 compare to 0.82 earlier. 
Thus all three forms of federal transfer/grant essentially being used either to subsidize 
provincial services or being substituted by compromising provincial tax efforts. The resident 
tax relief or subsidy coefficient ranges from 0.26 to 0.44 rupee. This clearly shows that KPK 
government is treating receipts from NFC transfers, non development grant as well as  
development grant as a fungible source, of which it provide greater tax relief to the residents.  
Not only federal transfers/grants but also provincial borrowing depict a similar fiscal response 
of KPK government as this source also appeared to be used as fungible source given a 
marginal rupee increase in provincial borrowing. About 39 paisas have been used for 
providing tax relief to residents and 61 paisas on raising provincial expenditures. The 
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coefficient of real per capita gross domestic product turns out insignificant144 in this 
specification.  The economy of KPK is primarily service oriented and there is a limited 
industrial and agriculture base145
 
.  Therefore the economy is largely dependent on fiscal 
transfer, grants or federal borrowings. 
In the third step provincial fiscal response of government of KPK is examined by redefining 
federal transfers/grants flow into two categories. First, unconditional NFC formula 
transfer/grant, which is so far being treated as separate category is now combined with other 
non-development grant to form one variable that is expected to behave to that of unconditional 
grant. Second, development grant which is specific purpose grant for development projects 
and programs continue to be used as separate variable characterized as conditional behavior. 
As such per capita provincial expenditure (EXPTNR/POPXN) is modeled as a function of 
combined NFC revenue sharing transfers plus non development (unconditional) grant 
((NFCTNR + GNDNR)/POPXN), development (conditional) grant (GDNR/POPXN), 
provincial gross domestic product (GDPFCN01/POPN) and provincial borrowing 
(BORTNR/POPXN). All variables are measured in per capita terms and at real prices of 2001. 
 
After redefining unconditional transfers, the coefficient slightly moved up to 0.84 (0.82 in 
equation ‘one’) indicating that one rupee increase, enhances KPK province expenditure by 
0.84 paisa. The coefficient of development grant is estimated at 0.52 and of borrowing 0.55. 
This implies that bulk of these revenue receipts have been absorbed in provision of tax relief 
to inhabitants residing in KPK jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the magnitudes of coefficient 
associated with the development grants are quite high in case of Punjab and Sindh provinces.    
 
In KPK conditional transfer/grant and provincial borrowing has used as fungible revenue 
source from which province further subsidize its services and/or grant tax relief. This 
provincial behavior is the reflection of lack of effective monitoring and control system by the 
federation on the use of funds transfer under conditional grant and for provincial borrowing. 
                                                          
144 The phenomenon requires further investigations. It may be due to any problem in the construction of provincial GDP 
series. 
145Table 1.1 in the introduction chapter provides share of KPK in national sectoral GDP. However, the share of service sector 
in KPK GDP is about 54 percent. 
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Besides, federation also financed provincial deficits that encourage expenditure profligacy and 
lackluster attitude in provincial fiscal administration.          
 
In conclusion, results of Table 6.10 for all three equations indicate that unconditional grants 
(NFC Transfers) largely used by the KPK to increase provincial expenditure and is partly 
substituted for provincial fiscal efforts by providing tax relief to residents. Equation ‘three’ 
(Table 6.10), however, depicts an interesting phenomenon. Estimation of unconditional 
transfers, by merging NFC revenue sharing transfers and non-development grant, indicates a 
change in provincial expenditure of 84 paisas as compared to 66 paisas, when non-
development grant is treated separately (equation two). The effect of conditional grants 
(development grant) on provincial expenditure is inelastic and lower as compared to 
unconditional grant. Hence, in case of KPK a priori hypothesis that conditional grant stimulate 
greater public spending compare to unconditional grant stand rejected. Lastly a phenomenon 
of fly paper effect is clearly evident in KPK province. The coefficient of private income 
though turns out to be insignificant, is found to be consistently low to coefficients of all forms 
of transfer/grants. 
6.3.2.4 The Baluchistan Province 
This section examines the fiscal behavior of Province of Baluchistan in response to federal 
transfers/grants. Similar to earlier individual province analysis, three set of equations are 
estimated using various breakdown of federal grants/transfers to provinces. Table 6.12 and 
Table 6.13 report results of all three set of equations using OLSQ and TSLS techniques 
respectively. Only the equations in Table 6.12 are discussed here, as these depict relatively 
low standard errors.  
 
The results (equation ‘one’, Table 6.12) affirm that one rupee increase in NFC revenue sharing 
transfers (unconditional transfers – NFC divisible pool tax sharing and straight transfer 
receipts) enhances provincial government expenditure by 63 paisas, whereas total grant (i.e. 
combined non development and development grant) augment these expenditure by 81 paisa. 
Thus in case of Baluchistan, both unconditional and conditional grant intended to have been 
used as fungible revenue source and remaining 37 and 19 paisas respectively are absorbed in 
the reduction in provincial fiscal efforts. The findings suggest that in Baluchistan a higher 
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premium is attached to the rise in provincial expenditure rather than on a decline in fiscal 
efforts. Provincial borrowing also created a large multiplier impact on provincial expenditure 
as out of every one rupee increase in borrowing provincial expenditure boost up by 96 paisas. 
The coefficient of real per capita gross domestic products of Baluchistan show that 
provincially provided goods/services are termed as normal goods. As with the one rupee rise 
in per capita gross regional product, provincial expenditure increases by 0.06 rupee146
 
.  
Table  6.12 Province Response to Federal Transfers in Pakistan Baluchistan (OLS) 
[Baluchistan Province , 1973-2009 – Method: OLSQ] 
Dependent Variable: 
 
Total Expenditure  
  
Real Per Capita  
  Equations 
Explanatory Variables:  One Two Three 
  Estimated Coefficients 
GDP –Factor Cost Real Per Capita 0.064 *** 0.062 ** 0.061 ** 
All NFC Transfers  Real Per Capita 0.632 *** 0.702 ***   
Provincial Borrowings Real Per Capita 0.957 *** 0.906 *** 0.906 *** 
Grant Receipts – Overall Real Per Capita 0.810 ***     
Grant Receipts – Development Real Per Capita   0.947 ** 0.909 ** 
Grant Receipts – Non-
Development Real Per Capita   0.613 *   
All NFC Transfers plus Non-
Development Grant Real Per Capita     0.696 *** 
Summary Statistics:        
Adjusted R-squared  0.9981  0.9996  0.9996  
S.E. of regression  1294.082  419.885  413.210  
Durbin-Watson statistics  1.754  1.656  1.632  
F-statistic  3,620.313  12,392.780  15,355.69  
 Notes: 
*                                      Denotes statistical significance at 10% 
** Denotes statistical significance at 5% 
*** Denotes statistical significance at 1% 
 Equations are estimated with the constant term and corrected for auto-correlation 
 
Detail regression results with constant term, standard errors and t-statistics are provided in the annexure 
of this chapter. 
  
                                                          
146 The magnitude of resident income (GDP) is relatively high as compared with other provinces. This may be due to 
econometric problem of multicollinerity. Therefore this magnitude should be considered cautiously.  
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Table  6.13 Province Response to Federal Transfers in Pakistan Baluchistan (TSLS) 
[Baluchistan Province , 1973-2009 – Method: TSLS] 
Dependent Variable: 
 
Total Expenditure 
  
Real Per Capita  
  Equations 
Explanatory Variables:  One Two Three 
  Estimated Coefficients 
GDP Factor Cost Real Per Capita 0.060 *** 0.061 *** 0.059 *** 
All NFC Transfers  Real Per Capita 0.669 *** 0.648 ***   
Provincial Borrowings Real Per Capita 0.958 *** 0.959 *** 0.906 * 
Grant Receipts Overall Real Per Capita 0.876 ***     
Grant Receipts Development Real Per Capita   1.271 *** 0.999 *** 
Grant Receipts Non-Development Real Per Capita   0.473 ***   
All NFC Transfers plus Non-
Development Grant 
Real Per Capita 
 
 
 
 
0.705 
*** 
Summary Statistics:        
Adjusted R-squared  0.998  0.998  0.999  
S.E. of regression  1,296.98  1,283.925  413.538  
Durbin-Watson statistics  1.611  1.616  1.668  
F-statistic  3,003.65  2,627.342  15,331.03  
 Notes: 
*                                      Denotes statistical significance at 10% 
** Denotes statistical significance at 5% 
*** Denotes statistical significance at 1% 
 
 Equations are estimated with the constant term and corrected for auto-correlation 
 
Detail regression results with constant term, standard errors, t-statistics and list of instrumental variables 
are provided in the annexure of this chapter. 
 
The equation ‘two’ (Table 6.12) is estimated by decomposing total grant into development and 
non-development categories. The estimated equation shows that when total grant is 
decomposed, it affects the provincial fiscal behavior in two ways. First the marginal impact of 
NFC formula transfers on provincial expenditures is increased to 0.70 as compared with 0.63 
in equation one. The phenomenon reflects that provincial government expenditure response to 
NFC transfer receipts became relatively less inelastic and now 30 paisas are used to substitute 
provincial tax efforts as compared to 37 paisas earlier. Second, marginal effect of non-
development grant enhances provincial expenditures with 61 paisas. This shows that in 
Baluchistan province, non-development grant represents higher fungibility (39 paisa) 
compared to NFC transfers (30 paisa). Third the effects of development or conditional grant 
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when separated from total grant show a much higher expenditure response 0.94 as opposed to 
0.81 earlier in case of total grants. It implies that the province of Baluchistan is more 
responsive to federal conditional grants. From an increase of one rupee in federal conditional 
grants, 95 paisas are being spent on specific purpose projects. However, no significant change 
in the coefficient of provincial borrowings is observed while using this specification.  
 
The third equation, as similar in the case of other provinces, specifies provincial expenditure 
as a function of combined NFC revenue sharing transfers plus non-development 
(unconditional) grants (NFCTBR plus GNDBR), development (conditional) grants (GDBR), 
provincial gross domestic product (GDPFCB01) and provincial borrowings (BORTBR).  The 
reason to use this specification was to explore provincial fiscal response in terms of precise 
definition of conditional and unconditional transfers. The results show that for every one rupee 
increase in unconditional federal transfers (NFC transfers plus non-development grant) 
enhances province expenditure by 70 paisas, whereas remaining 30 paisas seems to have 
absorbed in the reduction of provincial fiscal efforts. It is evident from the table that there is 
no significant difference as compared with estimated derived in equation ‘two’. Therefore, 
unconditional transfers/grants are mainly used as a fungible revenue source, a devise of 
providing tax relief to residents. On the other hand, marginal rupee increase in development 
and/or conditional transfer/grant accelerated provincial expenditure with 91 paisas, implying 
that this source also being used to subsidize provincial services. 
 
The estimated equations in Table 6.12 indicate that NFC revenue sharing formula transfers 
which are purely unconditional transfers augment provincial spending in the range 0.0.63 - 
0.70 of every one rupee increase in these transfers. Remaining 37 to 30 paisas are used to 
substitute provincial fiscal efforts.  As such Baluchistan government considers this as a 
fungible source from which she grants tax relief to their residents. Similar when non 
development grant used as a separate variable, it bring a marginal change of 61 paisas in 
provincial expenditure depicting this source is also a key fungible source.  The combined 
unconditional transfers/grant (NFC transfers plus non development grant) affect the provincial 
expenditure by 70 and combined grant (development (conditional) and non development) by 
81 paisas. 
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The solitary effect of development grant on provincial expenditure is higher than the solitary 
effect of non development and NFC transfer/grant. This implies that imposition of 
conditionality can influence provincial expenditure in activities carried high federal priorities 
for which specific purpose grant is given. Marginal effect of private income on provincial 
services shows that residents consider these services as normal goods. It augments provincial 
expenditure from .061 to .064 rupee following a one rupee increase in private income. 
Contrary to other provinces, private income is excessively spent on private goods in 
Baluchistan.  
6.3.3 Inter-Provincial Comparisons 
This section presents the comparative analysis of the provincial fiscal behavior in response to 
federal transfers and grants. As mentioned earlier, there are four types of federal transfers and 
grants that flow towards provinces. These include, first, revenue sharing transfers from federal 
divisible pool of taxes on the basis of specified formula devised on the recommendation of 
National Finance Commission (NFC). Second, federal straight transfers (taxes on natural 
resources). These are shared among provinces on the basis of derivation principle. Third, 
historically, federal non-development grant had been offered to provinces on need basis and 
for financing provincial revenue deficits. Fourth, federal transfers under development grant are 
offered to finance provinces’ specific purpose projects and provincial development programs. 
Since it is a conditional grant, it may or may not come with matching requirements. 
 
Inter provincial comparative analysis explores whether there is a need to develop  a transfers 
strategy by making it more conditional147
 
, say on achievement of certain level of fiscal efforts, 
or for attainment of any other service level benchmark. By examining the relationship between 
provincial expenditure and federal transfers in all NFC award period will help to understand 
how the aggregate and individual province behaviors may be used to develop appropriate 
future award strategy. The comparative fiscal behavioral analysis, in the historical perspective, 
will help in setting the direction for future strategies of horizontal and vertical revenue 
sharing. 
                                                          
147 For instance, Shah (1997) advocated conditional transfers to sub-national government in Pakistan to ensure certain 
minimum standard of services across jurisdictions. 
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In the first specification, provincial fiscal response is estimated by combining all forms of 
federal transfer/grant (NFC divisible pool tax transfers, straight transfer, non development 
grant and development grant) including provincial borrowings. As such per capita provincial 
expenditure is modeled as a function of combined federal transfers (all forms) plus borrowing, 
and per capita gross regional products. Table 6.14 reports the estimated equations.  
 
Table  6.14 Inter Provincial Response to All Federal Transfers Combined 
Dependent Variable: 
 
Total Expenditure  
 
Real Per Capita  
  Provinces 
Explanatory Variables:  Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
  Estimated Coefficients 
GDP – Factor Cost Real Per Capita 0.0143 ** 0.038 *** 0.043 *** 0.031 * 
All NFC Transfers  Plus 
Borrowings Real Per Capita 0.933 *** 0.736 *** 0.928 *** 0.919 
**
* 
Summary Statistics:          
Adjusted R-square  0.954  0.965  0.934  0.999  
S.E. of regression  95.615  146.225  151.796  735.748  
Durbin-Watson statistics  1.885  1.817  1.842  2.176  
F-statistic  183.140  323.034  126.348  8065.323  
 Notes: 
*                                      Denotes statistical significance at 10%  
** Denotes statistical significance at 5% 
**
* 
Denotes statistical significance at 1% 
 
 
Equations are estimated with the constant term and corrected for auto-correlation 
 
Detail regression results with constant term, standard errors and t-statistics are provided in the annexure of 
this chapter. 
 
It is clear that three provinces Punjab, KPK (Formerly NWFP) and Baluchistan responded 
almost similarly to stimulate provincial expenditures in response to provincial transfers and 
borrowing combined. According to the table, one rupee increase in transfers/grants/borrowing 
augment provincial expenditure with 93 paisas. Response of Sindh province is however 
different148
                                                          
148 This may be due to the relatively poor and inefficient governance in Sindh. Often more cases of corrupt practices are used 
to surface in this Province due to the presence of strong nexus among ruling elites i.e. politicians predominantly landlords and 
provincial beaurocracy 
. The comparative figure for Sindh is 74 paisas reflecting remaining 26 paisas have 
been used to offer resident tax relief. This figure for other three provinces is 7 paisas. It is also 
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apparent that per capita gross regional product plays a trivial contribution in accelerating 
provincial expenditure, highest in KPK 4 paisas and lowest in Punjab 1 paisa for every one 
rupee of provincial expenditure.   
 
The hypothesis that “federal transfer/grant increases provincial government expenditure and 
also it reduces provincial fiscal efforts” is affirmed in the case of all provinces. All provincial 
government expenditures rise with the increase in federal transfer/grant. The estimated results 
do not validate the hypothesis that “per capita gross regional product and per capita transfers 
has an identical impact on provincial services”.  It implies that private income is primarily 
used for consumption of private goods and public money or income on consumption of public 
goods. 
 
In the next specification, combined NFC divisible pool tax sharing receipts and straight 
transfer receipts which categorized as unconditional transfers is used separately with the   
“total grant” that combines non development and development grant of conditional character. 
Provincial borrowing is also used separately in this specification. Table 6.15 portrays inter 
provincial picture.  
 
The estimates, presented in the Table clearly reveal that each province appears to use NFC 
revenue sharing (unconditional) transfer as fungible source though its extent differ across 
provinces. For example, Baluchistan province shows that one rupee marginal increase in NFC 
unconditional transfer brings a change of 63 paisas in provincially provided services, followed 
by Sindh province (65 paisas)149
 
. This implies that remaining 37 paisas and 35 paisas 
respectively, for these two provinces are used in providing tax relief to their inhabitants.  
In the case of KPK province, NFC transfers and total grant (development plus non-
development) are utilized to raise provincial output by 82 and 75 paisas on every one rupee’s 
marginal increase. Provincially borrowed funds are also served as a fungible revenue source to 
be as high as 40 paisas of the marginal rupee borrowings are absorbed in reducing fiscal 
                                                          
149The low response of NFC transfers is perhaps due to bad governance, corruption and financial leakages. Both provinces are 
in famous with respect to bad economic governance. 
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efforts.  This is, perhaps, due to the fact that KPK province is relatively a backward province. 
Also its role as a frontline state during the Afghan War (1979-87) and War against Terror after 
2001 lacked effective monitoring and control from the federal government on the utilization of 
borrowed funds. This may be an important cause of the small magnitude of estimated 
coefficient.  
 
Table  6.15 Inter Provincial Response to Various Forms of Federal Transfers 
[with NFC Transfers and  Combined Grant Variable] 
Dependent Variable: 
 
Total Expenditure  
  
 
Real Per Capita 
 
  Provinces 
Explanatory Variables:  Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
  Estimated Coefficients 
GDP – Factor Cost Real Per Capita 0.014 *** 0.033 ** 0.016  0.064 *** 
All NFC Transfers  Real Per Capita 0.870 *** 0.645 *** 0.823 *** 0.632 *** 
Provincial Borrowings Real Per Capita 1.292 *** 0.893     *** 0.604 *** 0.957 *** 
Grant Receipts – Overall Real Per Capita 1.092 *** 0.942 *** 0.754 *** 0.810 *** 
Summary Statistics:          
 
Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.961 
 
0.976  0.944 
 
0.9981 
 
S.E. of regression  89.384  117.791  140.222  1294.082  
Durbin-Watson statistics  1.844  2.039  1.689  1.754  
F-statistic  223.560  217.875  85.798  3,620.313  
 Note: 
*                                      Denotes statistical significance at 10%  
** Denotes statistical significance at 5% 
*** Denotes statistical significance at 1% 
 
 Equations are estimated with the constant term and corrected for auto-correlation 
Detail regression results with constant term, standard errors and t-statistics are provided in the annexure of 
this chapter 
 
The province of Punjab (the largest in terms of population and relatively more developed) has 
fiscal responses to NFC unconditional transfer, which indicates that one rupee increase from 
this source lead to augment provincial expenditure by 87 paisas and remaining 13 paisas are 
absorbed in reduction of fiscal effort. Total grant variable which characterized as conditional 
transfer shows an elastic (coefficient is more than one) expenditure response, indicating that 
the Punjab province is spending their own resources in meeting out federal policy objectives 
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of increase spending in specific purpose projects and development program. The elastic 
impact of total grant, in case of Punjab province is quite different than those observed in 
remaining other three provinces. These provinces are showing an inelastic expenditure 
response ranging from 75 paisas to 94 paisas, implying that their utilizing total grants to be as 
fungible revenue source. Provincial borrowings in case of Punjab also shows an elastic 
expenditure response (1.292) that points not only its full and effective utilization, but also the 
incorporation of its own funds in activities for which these loans have been acquired. In other 
provinces its effect is inelastic ranging between 0.60 and 0.95. 
 
The magnitudes of the coefficient of per capita gross regional product validate the notion that 
provincially provided services are viewed as normal goods though their coefficients vary 
across provinces, for example one rupee increase in per capita income brings a change in 
provincial expenditure of Baluchistan (0.064), Sindh (0.033), KPK (0.016) and Punjab 
(0.014). This finding asserts that private income is primarily used for consumption of private 
goods and a little on consumption of public goods, a behavior which is also evident in number 
of empirical studies150
 
.   
Summarizing the estimated results of Table 6.15 leads to the conclusion that NFC revenue 
sharing transfers, which are unconditional in character, increases provincial expenditure by an 
amount less than these transfer receipts? A part of this unconditional transfers substitute 
provincial own source revenues highlighting provincial governments’ tendency to provide tax 
relief to their residents. Barring Punjab province, federal total grants, generally show an 
inelastic provincial expenditure response, reflecting that specific purpose development grants 
also find ways to be absorbed in reduction of provincial fiscal efforts. Thus, conditional 
grants, with or without matching requirement (a useful tool in influencing specific purpose 
activities), is not working as incentives to provincial governments to match additional own 
resources. Provincial borrowings also play an important role in influencing provincially 
provided public goods.  The estimated magnitudes are; Punjab (1.29), Baluchistan (0.96), 
Sindh (0.89) and KPK (0.604). The KPK province uses provincial borrowing for subsidizing 
                                                          
150 See for example; Sour 2013, Lee and Vuletin 2013, Deller and Maher 2005,  Gamkhar and Oats 1996.  
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provincial services. The effect of per capita income on provincial expenditure is low and in 
line with most empirical findings reported in the literature. 
 
In terms of the study hypotheses, the results validate the hypothesis that “the effect of 
conditional grant is high and/or elastic and to that of unconditional grant lower and/or 
inelastic” in case of Punjab, Sindh and Baluchistan provinces. However for KPK province, the 
magnitude of unconditional NFC transfers is slightly higher as compared to the magnitude of 
total grant. The hypotheses that “unconditional grant, increases provincial expenditure but 
with an amount less than the federal grant/transfer and part of the unconditional transfers/grant 
is substituted for provincial fiscal efforts or is utilized for tax relief provision to resident 
population” are validated by the estimated relevant coefficients. The estimated coefficients 
however do not support the hypothesis that “federal transfer/grant has a similar impact on 
provincial expenditure to that of per capita private income”. The federal transfers/grants have 
a much higher stimulatory impact (unconditional ranging from 0.63 – 0.87) than the resident 
income ranging (0.014 - 0.064).  This finding is consistent and in line with earlier published 
research. 
 
For the third specification, the federal transfer flows are decomposed into three rather than two 
categories. Total grant is disaggregated into two separate categories: non development grant 
and development grant, as originally reflected in the provincial budgets, whereas NFC transfer 
is treated as separate variable. One would expect that non development grant and NFC transfer 
would illustrate behavior pattern to that of unconditional grant implying treatment as fungible 
revenue source and development grants is expected to depict responsiveness to that of 
conditional grant. Table 6.16 reports the estimates of this specification. 
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Table  6.16 Inter Provincial Response to Various Forms of Federal Transfers 
[with Separate Development and non-Development Grants] 
Dependent Variable: 
 
Total Expenditure  
  
 
Real Per 
Capita 
 
  Provinces 
Explanatory Variables:  Punjab Sindh* KPK Baluchistan 
  Estimated Coefficients 
GDP – Factor Cost Real Per Capita 0.021 *** 0.033 *** 0.013  0.062 ** 
All NFC Transfers  Real Per Capita 0.774 *** 0.725 *** 0.736 *** 0.702 *** 
Provincial Borrowings  Real Per Capita 1.173 *** 0.927 *** 0.611 *** 0.906 *** 
Grant Receipts – Development Real Per Capita 1.270 *** 1.322 *** 0.564 * 0.947 ** 
Grant Receipts – Non-
Development 
Real Per 
Capita 0.916 *** 0.948 *** 0.666 *** 0.613 * 
Summary Statistics:          
Adjusted R-squared  0.960  0.974  0.931  0.9996  
S.E. of regression  89.786  123.323  132.338  419.885  
Durbin-Watson statistics  1.829  1.995  2.061  1.656  
F-statistic  119.703  198.403  51.670  12,392.780  
 Note: 
*                                      Denotes statistical significance at 10%  
** Denotes statistical significance at 5% 
*** Denotes statistical significance at 1% 
 Equations are estimated with the constant term and corrected for auto-correlation 
 
Detail regression results with constant term, standard errors and t-statistics are provided in the annexure of 
this chapter. 
 
Table 6.16 shows that decomposition of total grant into development and non-development 
grant generally reduces difference in the magnitude of coefficient of NFC (unconditional) 
transfer across provinces. As one rupee NFC transfer increases provincial expenditure in the 
range of 70 -77 paisas and the remaining 23-30 paisas are used in subsidizing provincial 
services. The expenditure response of non-development grant indicates that two backward 
province Baluchistan and KPK use this grant as a key fungible source.  Since 1997, both these 
province have an access to special non-development grant based on their relative 
backwardness. The access to non-development grant enhances fungibility of this source and 
33 to 39 paisas are absorbed in providing resident tax relief in KPK and Baluchistan provinces 
respectively. The utilization of non-development grant is higher in the two relatively 
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developed provinces of Punjab and Sindh, where marginal rupee increase in non-development 
grant alters provincial government expenditure by 92 paisas in Punjab and 95 paisas in Sindh.  
 
Barring KPK province, the separate effects of development or conditional grant show a much 
higher expenditure response in all provinces; Punjab coefficient is 1.27 as opposed to total 
grant coefficient of 1.09, Sindh coefficient is 1.32 as against the coefficient of 0.94 associated 
with total grant and Baluchistan coefficient is 0.95 as against the coefficient of 0.81 associated 
with total grant. It implies that Punjab and Sindh province seem to be more responsive to 
federal conditional grants, reflecting with an elastic expenditure response by matching own 
resources to accelerate the provincial expenditure. The provinces of Baluchistan utilize the 
development grant almost of their contribution in size (95 paisas of a marginal rupee increase 
in development grant) on specific purpose projects.  
 
In KPK province the effect of development (conditional) grants is very low as only 56 paisas 
are used in increasing servicing provisions and 44 paisas in providing tax relief to residents. 
The borrowing effect on increase service provision in KPK is 61 paisas and remaining 39 
paisas are absorbed in reduction of provincial fiscal efforts. On the contrary, the Punjab 
province not only utilizes the amount of borrowed funds fully, but also employs its own 
resources to boost up the activities for which these loans have been acquired. 
 
The comparative coefficients of per capita private income or gross regional product of 
provinces shows that provincial public goods are normal goods but it size vary across 
provinces, for example, 0.013 for KPK to 0.062 for Baluchistan151
 
.  The coefficient of KPK 
however turns out statistically insignificant.  This implies that the resident or private income is 
neutral and not affecting provincial expenditure in case of KPK. The economy is wholly 
dependent either on federal transfers, grant or borrowings. 
                                                          
151The magnitude of income coefficient in case of Baluchistan is relatively high. As mentioned in the footnote above, this may 
be due to the econometric problem of multicollinearity most probably with the borrowing variable. The series (variable) of 
GDP is however behaving normally and comparably when regressed on all combined transfers including borrowing. See 
Table 6.14. 
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To recap the findings reported in Table 6.16 in terms of study hypotheses, NFC transfers and 
non-development grant increase provincial expenditure but with an amount less than the 
transfers/grants. The estimated coefficients show that both of these unconditional transfer 
sources are used by these provincial governments as a fungible revenue source with higher 
fungibility of non development grant in two backward provinces KPK (0.39 paisa) and 
Baluchistan (0.33 paisas). However, in two relatively developed provinces, higher fungible 
source is NFC transfers, Punjab 0.23 paisa and Sindh 0.27 paisa. Thus the hypothesis that the 
unconditional transfer receipts increase provincial expenditure and reduces provincial fiscal 
efforts is validated.  The hypothesis that “marginal effect of conditional transfer/grant on 
provincially provided goods/services is greater as compare to unconditional transfer/ grant” is 
also validated in case of Punjab, Sindh and Baluchistan provinces, but not for KPK province.  
Lastly, the hypothesis that “private income and public income or receipts from federal 
transfers have a similar effect on provincial expenditure” is rejected.  The findings clearly 
indicate that public income or federal transfers receipts are disproportionately spent on 
provincial public goods (provincial expenditures) reflecting by higher coefficients and private 
income excessively spent on private good as its coefficient of marginal increase in provincial 
expenditure is found to be consistently lower in all provinces.   
 
The next specification estimates fiscal response by re-defining unconditional transfers. Federal 
transfers/grants flow is decomposed into two categories. First, instead of using unconditional 
NFC formula transfer/grant as a separate category, it is combined with non-development grant 
variable to form one variable (NFC transfer plus non-development grant). This variable is 
expected to behave to that like unconditional grant. Second, development grant is used as 
separate variable characterize conditional behavior. As such total provincial expenditure is 
modeled as a function of combined NFC revenue sharing transfers plus non development  
grant(unconditional),  development grant (conditional), provincial gross domestic product and 
provincial borrowing (Table 6.17).  
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Table  6.17 Inter Provincial Response to Various Forms of Federal Transfers 
[with NFC Transfers Combined with Non-development Grants] 
Dependent Variable: 
 
Total Expenditure  
  
 
Real Per Capita  
  Provinces 
Explanatory Variables:  Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
  Estimated Coefficient 
GDP – Factor Cost Real Per Capita 0.017 *** 0.031 ** 0.017  0.061 ** 
Provincial Borrowings Real Per Capita 1.374 *** 0.975 ** 0.551 *** 0.906 *** 
Grant Receipts – 
Development 
Real Per Capita 1.513 *** 1.516 *** 0.526 ** 0.909 ** 
All NFC Transfers plus 
Non-Development Grant  
Real Per Capita 0.851 *** 0.694 *** 0.843 *** 0.695 *** 
Summary Statistics:          
Adjusted R-squared  0.958  0.972  0.944  0.9996  
S.E. of regression  91.216  128.059  133.719  413.210  
Durbin-Watson statistics  1.891  1.801  1.979  1.632  
F-statistic  161.796  214.146  73.847  15,355.69  
 Note: 
*                                      Denotes statistical significance at 10%  
** Denotes statistical significance at 5% 
*** Denotes statistical significance at 1% 
 
 Equations are estimated with the constant term and corrected for auto-correlation 
 
Detail regression results with constant term, standard errors and t-statistics are provided in the annexure of 
this chapter. 
 
As explained before the purpose of this specification is to examine whether federal transfers 
combined with unconditional non-development grants are used by provinces as a fungible 
source.  The estimated combined coefficients show that three province Punjab, Sindh and 
Baluchistan use these transfers as key fungible source from which they grant tax relief. Sindh 
and Baluchistan provide marginal tax relief equivalent to 30 paisas, followed by Punjab with 
15 paisas. This result is consistent and in line with the earlier study findings (Table 6.16) 
where NFC transfers and non development grant separately have shown to increase provincial 
expenditure less than the equal rise in these transfers. However, in case of KPK province the 
finding is quite different; as 16 paisas are utilized in providing resident tax relief from this 
source, while other sources i.e. conditional grant and provincial borrowing have larger impact 
on tax relief and are served as major fungible sources. 
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Conditional development grants show a more elastic and almost an equal expenditure response 
in case of two developed provinces, Punjab (1.57) and Sindh (1.51),  reflecting that 
conditional grant also attracted significant amount of additional provincial own source 
revenues. This explains that federal policy objective of providing development grant to 
increase provincial services seems to be effectively working in the Punjab and Sindh. In 
Baluchistan province, out of a marginal increase of one rupee from conditional grants, utilizes 
90 paisas on provincial services, while the comparative estimate for KPK province is 53paisas. 
Thus, the response of development grant in KPK province seems entirely different as 
compared with the other three provinces.  
 
The estimated coefficients of this specification also confirm that the Punjab province utilizes 
borrowed funds much more effectively, as one rupee increase in borrowing changes provincial 
expenditure by 1.37 paisas. This implies that provincial government beside full utilization of 
borrowed fund also matches additional own source financing to the programs and projects for 
which credit has been acquired. The Sindh province utilizes its borrowed amount almost 
entirely (98 paisas), though not able to pull additional financing to the projects for which these 
loans have been obtained. The marginal impact of borrowing on provincial expenditure is also 
almost equivalent to the coefficient of development grant (0.91 paisa) in case of Baluchistan. 
Whereas, for the KPK province the coefficients associated with provincial borrowings is as 
low as (0.51). It implies that this source is also being utilized in KPK for subsidizing 
provincial services. The phenomenon indicates not only lack of effective federal monitoring 
and control but also points towards lenient federal policy towards KPK as being considered 
the most disturbed province in the country and thus deserve soft federal instance. 
 
To sum-up, the estimates with different specifications, reported from table 6.15 to table 6.17 
indicate that NFC revenue sharing formula transfers (purely unconditional) augment 
provincial spending in the range 0.63 to 0.87 with every one rupee increase in such transfers.  
Remaining part of the transfers is used to substitute provincial fiscal efforts.  As such, all four 
provincial governments consider this as a fungible source from which they grant tax relief to 
their residents, although the extent of fungibility varies across provinces.  Similar to this 
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phenomenon, non-development grant either used as a solitary variable (Table 6.16), or 
combined with NFC transfers (Table 6.17) indicate a source of subsidizing provincial services.  
The effect of development grant on provincial expenditure is higher than the solitary effect of 
non-development and NFC transfer/grant. This implies that imposition of conditionality can 
influence provincial expenditure in activities carried high federal priorities for which specific 
purpose grant is given. However, the fiscal response of KPK province is not in line with the 
phenomenon explained above as it shows a slightly different trend (see Table 6.16 and 6.17).  
 
The marginal effects of private income on provincial services show that residents considered 
these services as normal goods. These augment provincial expenditure ranging from a low of 
0.013 to 0.064 paisa following a one rupee increase in private income. The phenomenon is 
commonly observed in the empirical literature which indicates that private income is 
excessively spent on private goods.  
6.4 Concluding Remarks  
The main objective of this chapter is to provide empirical evidence with respect to provincial 
fiscal behavior in response to federal transfers. The study evaluates the fiscal response of 
federating units in terms of various forms and combinations of federal transfers. In order to 
assess the differences and similarities in provincial responses to federal transfers, hypotheses 
described in the introduction of this chapter have been tested for each province separately and 
all four provinces combined, using time-series federal and provincial public finance and macro 
data for the period 1973-2009.  
 
Intergovernmental transfers have been the principal source of provincial government revenues 
in Pakistan.  Funds are provided to provinces though the following four forms: 
 
• First, revenue sharing transfers from federal divisible pool of taxes shared among 
provinces. The criteria of allocation is recommended by  the National Finance 
Commission Awards (NFC);  
• Second, straight transfer receipts from the federal government on origin principle. 
These transfers are also recommended by the NFC;  
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• Third, federal transfers under the head of non-development grant. These transfers have 
historically been provided for meeting provincial needs of emergent nature and to 
finance provincial current account deficit. Initially special provision of non-
development grant was recommended for two relatively backward provinces 
(Baluchistan and KPK). However, since 2006 NFC Award, all four provinces receive 
grant according to pre-defined deprivation and backwardness formula.    
• Fourth, federal transfers under development grant. This grant is primarily transferred 
for financing specific development projects and provincial annual development 
programme. 
 
Federal transfer flows to provinces can also be classified on the basis of conditional and 
unconditional characteristics of transfers.  For the purposes of this study, the transfer flows are 
divided into the following three broad categories:  
 
 Unconditional transfers which include NFC formula based divisible pool tax transfers 
and formula based straight transfers to provinces. These transfers are predetermined 
and provinces enjoy full expenditure autonomy;   
 Non-development grant, as reported in provincial budgets, may be normally 
categorized as unconditional. However, partly it caters some grant of conditional 
nature. Nonetheless, since 1997 NFC Award, non-development grants have been 
provided to provinces with full spending autonomy, and is, thus, obviously 
unconditional; and  
 Development grant are specific purpose transfers that may come with or without the 
matching requirements, and is categorized as conditional 
 
In addition to the above transfers, provinces also have access to federal borrowings, which are 
assumed to be exogenous as provincial governments can borrow funds from the Central Bank 
up to their prescribed limit to meet their recurring expenditure requirements. Provincial 
government borrowings also comprise of federal loans, allocated for financing annual 
development program (ADP) and net capital receipts.  
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Three different variants of transfers are specified for measuring aggregate and individual 
provincial fiscal response to federal transfers. The first specification decomposes total federal 
transfer/grant into two broad categories. Receipts from NFC divisible pool taxes combined 
with straight transfers is treated as one category. These unconditional transfers are formula 
based, pre determined and provinces enjoy full expenditure autonomy on the use of these 
funds. Second, total grant category is represented by combining development and non-
development grant with an expected behavior to that of conditional grant.  For the second 
specification, the model is extended by decomposing the federal transfer flows into three 
categories.  Besides NFC transfer (divisible pool taxes and straight transfers), total grants have 
now been decomposed into two categories: development and non-development grants, as 
originally reported in the provincial budgets. One would assume that non-development grant 
and NFC transfers would illustrate the behavior to that of unconditional grant.  Hence, 
provincial governments consider this as a fungible revenue source.  In contrast, development 
grants allocated for specific purposes depict responsiveness to that of conditional grant. In 
equation three – the third specification, NFC transfers and non-development grants are pooled 
in to form one category of unconditional grants, whereas development grants continue to be 
utilized as separate category of conditional nature.  
 
However, specification ‘two’ which is estimated through OLSQ and decomposes federal 
transfers/grants into three categories: NFC transfers, non-development grant and development 
grants, is finally chosen due to relatively low standard error of regression to conclude this 
chapter.  The selected final model estimates provincial per capita expenditure (aggregate as 
well as individual) by considering per capita GDP, per capita NFC plus straight transfers, per 
capita non-development grant, per capita development grant and per capita borrowing. Final 
estimated results are furnished in Table 6.18. 
 
The results of the table clearly establish that the aggregate fiscal response to various forms of 
federal transfers/grants and borrowings is different as compared to individual province’s fiscal 
behavior. According to aggregate provincial data (last column), unconditional NFC revenue 
sharing transfers have used as a key fungible source from which it provide tax relief. A rupee 
increase in NFC transfer (unconditional) altered provincial expenditure by 84 paisas, whereas 
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remaining 16 paisas have been absorbed in the provision of resident tax relief in the form of 
subsidizing provincial services. Non-development grants stimulate provincial expenditure 
almost equivalent to the size of grants.  As expected, the effect of development grant 
(conditional) brings an elastic change in the public services (1.18) provided by the provinces, 
implying that provincial governments adhere to federal policy objective to increase 
expenditure on particular services, for which conditional grant is offered. The estimated 
magnitude of borrowings also shows high stimulation in provincial expenditure (0.97). The 
marginal effect of per capita private income on provincial public goods is 0.02 and quite close 
to earlier findings. To sum up, it is observed that conditionality associated with specific 
purpose development grants and with its elastic expenditure response reveals that provincial 
governments responded positively to federal policy objectives of enhanced consumption of 
provincial public goods and services. 
 
Table  6.18 Comparative Estimates of the Selected Specification 
[Estimated Coefficients and Summary Statistics of Equation ‘Two’] 
Dependent Variable:     
Provinces 
All 
Provinces 
Combined Total Expenditure 
Explanatory Variables: Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan Pakistan 
GDP – Factor Cost 0.021 *** 0.033 *** 0.013  0.062 ** 0.020 *** 
All NFC Transfers 0.774 *** 0.725 *** 0.736 *** 0.702 *** 0.846 *** 
Provincial Borrowings 1.173 ***  0.927   *** 0.611 *** 0.906 *** 0.968 *** 
Grant Receipts -Development 1.270 *** 1.320 *** 0564 * 0.947 ** 1.176 *** 
Grant Receipts Non-
Development 0.916 
*** 
0.948 
*** 
0.666 
*** 
0.613 
* 0.989 *** 
Summary Statistics:          
Adjusted R-squared 0.960  0.974  0.931  0.9996  0.992 
S.E. of regression 89.786  123.323  132.338  419.885  102.619 
Durbin-Watson statistics 1.829  1.995  2.061  1.656  1.686 
F-statistic 119.703  198.403  51.670  12,392.780  868.206 
 Note: 
*                                      Denotes statistical significance at 10%  
** Denotes statistical significance at 5% 
*** Denotes statistical significance at 1% 
 
Interestingly, the individual province response to federal transfer/grant indicates that the 
behavior of two developed province Punjab and Sindh is quite similar and close to the 
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aggregate response, while this is not true in case of the remaining two relatively backward 
provinces KPK and Baluchistan. 
 
NFC transfer (unconditional) is used as a key fungible source in two relatively developed 
province of Punjab and Sindh as 23 paisas and 27 paisas are respectively absorbed in the 
provision of resident tax relief. Contrary, the expenditure response of two backward 
provinces: KPK and Baluchistan reveals that non-development grant (unconditional) as their 
major fungible source (0.33 and 0.39 paisa) respectively. Since 1997 both these provinces 
have a greater access to special non-development grant based on their relative backwardness 
that had caused increase fungibility of this source. The utilization of non-development grant is 
higher in the two relatively developed provinces, where the marginal rupee increase in non-
development grant altered provincial government expenditures by 92 and 95 paisas in Punjab 
and Sindh respectively.  
 
The marginal effect of development grant (conditional) on provincial expenditure of relatively 
developed province of Punjab and Sindh is highest and elastic. As one rupee increase in 
development grant raises Punjab government expenditure by 1.27 paisas and of Sindh 1.32 
paisas; implying that these two governments are more responsive to the federal conditional 
grant policy by matching own resources to accelerate provincial expenditure. Baluchistan 
province uses development grant on specific-purpose projects almost to its size (95 paisas of a 
marginal rupee increase in development grant). 
 
In KPK province the marginal effect of development (conditional) grant is low and only 56 
paisas are utilized in increasing servicing provision and 45 paisas in providing tax relief to 
resident population. Moreover, the borrowing effect on increase service provision is 61 paisas 
in KPK and remaining 39 paisas are absorbed in reduction in provincial fiscal efforts. On the 
contrary, the Punjab province not only utilizes the amount of borrowed funds fully but also 
employs their own resources to boost up activities for which these loans have been acquired 
thereby reflecting with an elastic expenditure response of 1.17. 
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The comparative coefficients of per capita private income or per capita gross regional product 
of provinces indicates that provincial public goods are normal goods but it size vary across 
provinces; for example 0.013 for KPK to 0.062 for Baluchistan.  The coefficient of KPK 
however turns out statistically insignificant and the magnitude of coefficient associated with 
income (GDP) in case of Baluchistan is relatively high.  The KPK economy is largely 
dependent on federal fiscal transfer, grants or borrowings as statistical causality between 
resident income and provincial expenditure is weak.  
 
NFC transfers and non-development grant are characterized as unconditional transfers/grants 
which increase provincial expenditure but with an amount less than the transfers/grants. The 
estimated coefficients show that both of these unconditional transfer sources are used by these 
provincial governments as a fungible revenue source. However, the relatively higher 
fungibility is observed in non development grant in two backward provinces KPK (0.39 paisa) 
and Baluchistan (0.33 paisa). Thus the hypothesis that these unconditional transfer receipts 
increases provincial expenditure and reduces provincial fiscal efforts is validated with varying 
magnitudes of coefficient. The hypothesis that “marginal effect of conditional transfer/grant 
on provincially provided goods/services is greater as compare to unconditional transfer/ grant” 
is validated in case of three provinces; Punjab, Sindh and Baluchistan and not for KPK 
province. Lastly, the hypothesis: "private income and public income or receipts from federal 
transfers have a similar effect on provincial expenditure" is rejected. The findings clearly 
indicate that public income or federal unconditional transfers receipts are disproportionately 
spent on provincial public goods (provincial expenditures) reflecting by higher coefficients 
and private income excessively spent on private good as its coefficient of marginal increase in 
provincial expenditure is find consistently lower in all provinces. All these results are in 
conformity in terms of validating study hypotheses with the findings of international literature 
as reported. 
 
The empirical results clearly establish the importance of this thesis. It was argued in Chapter 1 
that individual province fiscal response to various forms of federal transfers/grants would 
likely to vary across provinces given the diverse socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics of each province. The estimated fiscal response of individual province 
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evidently show varying behavior compared to that depicted by aggregate province data. 
Therefore earlier attempt to measure provincial fiscal behavior based on aggregate data (four 
provinces combined) have given biased picture regarding the fiscal response of provinces 
because these studies ignored the diverse nature of socio-economic characteristics and the 
level of development  of  the federating units. Thus to sum up, the findings of this study depict 
three phenomena. 
 
 First individual province fiscal response to various forms of transfers/grants varies 
across provinces. 
 Second, the magnitude of aggregate provincial fiscal response is quite different from 
the fiscal responses of individual provinces.  
 Third, overall provincial fiscal behavior is more close to the behavior of two relatively 
developed provinces Punjab and Sindh, while the magnitudes of coefficients 
measuring fiscal response of federal transfers for two underdeveloped or relatively 
backward provinces (KPK and Baluchistan provinces) are significantly lower and 
different. Therefore, to design transfer strategies, disaggregated analysis of fiscal 
behavior is imperative.  
 
Lastly, it is worth mentioning that the study applied classical econometric techniques on time-
series provincial and federal data to analyze the provincial fiscal behavior. Unfortunately, the 
advance time-series econometric techniques such as stationary, co-integration and causality 
are not considered due to data limitations. With the limited 37 observations, application of 
these and other stochastic time-series techniques was not feasible. Pooling time-series and 
cross-section data might be a way out, however pool data is not much helpful in analyzing the 
net disaggregated fiscal behavior of federating units which was the main objective of this 
thesis.  
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7 FISCAL EQUALIZATION 
7.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter three has described the intergovernmental fiscal relations and structure 
of federalism in Pakistan in detail with a focus on sharing of expenditure and revenue 
responsibilities. The revenue-expenditure allocations between levels of government (federal 
v/s all federating units) revealed a vertical fiscal gap of negative 24 percent152
 
  which is filled 
with the provision of federal transfers to provinces. Moreover, transfers  are also needed to 
bridge horizontal fiscal gap that varies across provinces due to differing fiscal capacity and 
needs reflected by provincial own source financing of its expenditures.  The province of 
Punjab finances about 16 percent of  its expenditures whereas backward province Baluchistan 
only has the capacity to finance about 4 percent of its expenditure obligations from own 
revenues resources.   
This chapter scrutinizes the equalization role of the federal transfers and grants to provinces to 
see whether these are intended to reduce inequality and disparity among federating units and 
thus fiscally equalizing or the system of transfers exacerbates inter jurisdictional inequities in 
the provision of public services. This will be an important addition in the existing empirical 
literature in Pakistan as it covers all four forms153
                                                          
152  In combined total revenue and total expenditures, federal share was 93 and 69 percent respectively and provincial share 
were 7% and 31% percent in provincial budgets.  
 of explicit federal fiscal transfers as well as 
four additional cumulative categories based on the conditional and unconditional 
characteristics of transfers.  In the context of Pakistan, Pasha, Pasha & Zubair (2010) has 
examined the equalization role of federal transfers available to provinces on the basis of the 
NFC Awards recommendations only and has ignored transfers which have been available to 
provinces from federal consolidated funds in the form of conditional development grants as 
well as unconditional non development grants. Non-development grant is generally intended 
to finance provincial revenue deficits. This analysis thus is an extension of previous work and 
focuses on all transfer funds allocated to provinces by federal government and also covers all 
NFC Awards during the period 1972-73 to 2008-09.   
153  These are transfers from NFC awards, straight transfers, non-development grant and development grant. For detail 
description see chapter 3 above.  
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To evaluate the nature of transfers in terms of its role as an instrument of fiscal equalization 
which is intended to reduce inter-provincial inequalities and disparities in the provision of 
public services, a Fiscal Equalization Index (FEI) is computed separately for each and every 
NFC award period.  
 
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief description of the flow 
of transfers by types, quantum and provincial shares.   Theoretical issues on fiscal equalization 
and the methodology for computing FEI are furnished in sections 7.4 and 7.5 respectively.  
Empirical estimates in terms of equalization are presented and discussed in section 7.5, while 
the last section concludes the chapter. 
7.2 Flow of Federal Transfers to Provinces 
As described in preceding chapters that there are four forms of federal transfers that were 
available to provinces during the study period from 1972-73 to 2008-09.  These are NFC 
divisible pool taxes, NFC straight transfers, non development grants (from NFC and from 
federal consolidated funds) and development grant from federal consolidated funds. Federal 
divisible pool taxes are shared among provinces on per capita basis, while straight transfer 
(royalties on natural gas, oil, on coal etc.) are distributed among provinces on origin principle 
after deducting 2 percent as cost of collection. In addition, profits on hydro electricity 
generation are being distributed on the location of power generation station. Further special 
non development grants as equalization payments are allocated to provinces with higher 
proportional share to backward provinces.  Apart from this non development grants to 
provinces which is allocated on discretionary basis,  special grants have also been extended 
from federal consolidated resources to meet provincial revenue deficit, to provide ad-hoc relief 
and for meeting provincial emergent needs as and when required. Similarly in order to reduce 
interprovincial disparity in provincial services development grants have also been given to 
provinces on formula basis154
  
 to finance their annual development programs and specific 
purpose projects (Ahmed and Wasti 2002). 
                                                          
154  From the total development allocations Baluchistan and KPK first get 5 % each and the remaining 90 % are shared among 
four provinces given their share in the national population as per the formula specified for allocations of development grant. 
But in practice this formula hardly practiced and it is largely being done on discretionary basis (Ahmed and Wasti, 2002). 
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Table 7.1 summarizes the magnitude and distribution of four forms of federal transfer and 
grants flows to provinces for the years just before and after the NFC awards at constant prices 
of 2001.  It is clear that federal divisible pool taxes (DP) has been the predominant source of 
federal transfer among all four transfer categories throughout the period. After the NFC 1991, 
DP share in total transfers partly dampened due to the formal commencement of straight 
transfers (ST) on origin principle. This ST benefits primarily smaller but the revenue swiftly 
increased of backward provinces (Baluchistan and KPK) from Rs. 2 billion to peak at Rs 53 
billion in 2006-07.   In addition to DP and ST, provinces also have access to non development 
grant (GND) which has registered a significant decline during NFC 1991 after its cessation 
and considerable extension in transfers from federal DP and ST. Moreover, the forth form of 
federal transfer viz., development grant (GD) which addresses the interprovincial inequities in 
public services has the lowest share in overall provincial transfer receipts.  
 
Table  7.1 Flows of Various Types of Federal Transfer and Grants to Provinces  
[Rs. In Millions] 
Years   DP ST GND GD Total  Transfers 
1974-75 
11,752  1,731  4,991  2,474  20,948  
56% 8% 24% 12% 100% 
1975-76 
18,942  1,930  2,736  1,852  25,460  
74% 8% 11% 7% 100% 
1990-91 
76,325  3,329  23,746  15,604  119,004  
64% 3% 20% 13% 100% 
1991-92 
104,191  34,351  5,176  12,780  156,498  
67% 22% 3% 8% 100% 
1996-97 
148,952  23,256  2,505  4,449  179,162  
83% 13% 1% 2% 100% 
1997-98 
122,025  28,068  9,225  4,014  163,332  
75% 17% 6% 2% 100% 
2005-06 
180,199  46,163  53,979  14,662  295,003  
61% 16% 18% 5% 100% 
2006-07 
192,669  53,705  50,553  28,607  325,534  
59% 16% 16% 9% 100% 
2008-09 
232,197  35,967  61,752  25,348  355,264  
65% 10% 17% 7% 100% 
Author’s own calculations using the budgetary data. 
Intergovernmental Governmental Fiscal Relation – A Case Study of Pakistan 219 
Federal intergovernmental fiscal transfer policy in Pakistan attempts to broaden the process of 
fiscal decentralization in Pakistan. This phenomenon reflects by the considerable increase in 
federal vertical transfers as a proportion of federal revenues (from 22 to 56 percent). However 
the revenue sharing criteria for federal divisible pool of taxes were remained unchanged 
throughout 1972-73 to 2008-09 periods which is on equal per capita basis. Also, there has 
been an attempt by federation to address inter provincial inequities through provision of 
special non-development grant to backward provinces of Baluchistan and KPK in NFC 1974 
and NFC 1997 awards and with larger share in NFC 2007 award155
 
. However federal 
provision of ad-hoc and need based non-development was continued to all provinces including 
developed province of Punjab and Sindh throughout these years. Further development 
(conditional) grant share has been low throughout and more so following the NFC 1991 award 
ranging between 2 to 9 percent. Given the discretionary and ad-hoc nature of federal 
development and non development grants it is worth exploring the quantum and effect of various 
transfer and grant sources in improving inter provincial disparities in public services.  
7.2.1 Arrangements for Federal Transfer to Provinces 
The patterns of federal transfers and grants to provinces are developed in terms of share of 
each province by the categories of transfers. These share are presented for the pre and post 
NFC award years for four core forms of federal transfers to provinces [i.e. transfers from 
divisible pool (DP), straight transfers (ST), development grant (GD) and non-development 
grant (GND)]  and for four additional categories by aggregating transfers; formula based 
unconditional NFC Transfer (NFCT= DP + ST), Unconditional Transfer (UT=NFCT+ GND), 
Total Grants (GT=GD+GND) and Total Transfers (TT=NFCT + GT).  
 
Table 7.2 shows that DP transfers constitutes main revenue source for the province of Punjab 
with its highest share among all provinces due to its largest population followed by Sindh, 
KPK and Baluchistan respectively. ST receipts are distributed on the origin principle have 
shown a disproportionately higher transfer in Baluchistan, KPK and Sindh because of better 
mineral and hydro resource base in these provinces. Further the provision of development 
                                                          
155 The share of backward provinces of Baluchistan and KPK were 33 % and 35 % respectively Whereas for Sindh and Punjab 
its share were 21 %, and  11 % respectively from a total of Rs.27.5 billion  nominal grant allocation  in 2006-07. 
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grant and non development grant are allocated proportionally more to Baluchistan and KPK.  
Since 1991, Sindh also get a comparatively larger share from transfers of development grants. 
Combined NFC formula based transfers (NFCT= DP + ST) benefits three smaller provinces 
more than the province of Punjab after the NFC 1991 award. The total unconditional transfers 
(UT) confirms its larger access to Baluchistan and KPK as reflected by the figures of post 
NFC award years (NFC 1991, 1997, 2006) compared to year  before these awards. The 
province of Punjab is the main beneficiary of the NFC 1974 award with its increased total 
transfers (TT=NFCT+GD+GND) share to 50 percent compare to the year before (44.7%).  In 
the remaining three awards, Punjab post NFC award share has registered a decline of almost 
an equal magnitude of 4.5 percent. This decline was largely due to provision of ST to other 
three provinces in 1991 award in which Punjab benefits the least compared to other provinces.  
The Baluchistan and KPK provinces which are relatively backward benefit mainly with its 
rising total transfer receipts after NFC 1991 and 1997. In the last decade the share of Sindh in 
the total transfers has accelerated to reach at its peak of 30.9 percent in the years of post NFC 
2006 award.  
 
7.2.2 Federal Transfers in Terms of Population Shares 
The patterns of federal transfers have been converted into relative per capita terms to see 
whether these various federal transfers and grants provide proportionally more or less per 
capita resources (i.e. ratio of transfer share to population share) to provinces. Table 7.3 
provides per capita federal transfer and grants in the years of pre and post NFC awards.  
   
The federal divisible pool transfer is distributed among provinces on equal per capita basis as 
reflected by its ratio equal or close to 1. The provision of ST primarily benefits three smaller 
provinces and it disproportionately favors backward Baluchistan and KPK in the 90’s. 
However, during the last decade the share of Sindh has reached to a peak of 2.5 in 2006-07. 
The federal development grant which has been provided to mitigate interprovincial disparities 
has shown greater per capita allocation to the backward provinces of Baluchistan and KPK 
consistently in all years. The largest province of Punjab has received less, while Sindh has 
received transfers through development grant slightly more than proportional in most years. 
Similarly non development grant also provided excessively to province of Baluchistan and 
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KPK reflected by its ratio (share of non development grant to share of population) of greater 
than one in all years. 
 
The combined NFC formula transfer (NFCT=DP+ST) have shown greater per capita access to 
province of Baluchistan throughout and to Sindh more recently. KPK also have been receiving 
incrementally greater per capita access of NFCT receipts after NFC 1991 compare to its 
preceding years. The NFCT figures of Punjab have revealed a declining trend after NFC 1991 
to decline at 0.82 in 2006-07. The combined grant which is obtained by summing provincial 
non development and development grant (GT=GND+GD) also have shown higher per capita 
access to backward province of Baluchistan and KPK with a high of 7.74 and 2.96 percent 
respectively in 1997-98. The total unconditional transfer (UT= DP+ST+GND) benefits mainly 
backward provinces of Baluchistan and KPK thus reflecting an attempt of federation to 
provide greater proportional access to unconditional funds to be used those province with full 
autonomy on priority sectors. The recent NFC 2006 also has shown an improvement in UT for 
Sindh reflected by its ratio of 1.29 in 2006-07.  
 
It is clear that relatively more developed province of Punjab has received less per capita total 
federal transfers (TT) and it has been declining in the remaining three awards except NFC 
1974 that recorded an increase from the preceding year (Table 7.3).  On the contrary Sindh 
province has received more than proportional transfers in all award including NFC 1991 and 
onwards. Major rise in TT is recorded in case of Baluchistan with a peak at 2.32 in 1991-92 
and of Sindh in 2006-07 with a magnitude of 1.29 due to significant increase in ST.  
 
The general pattern therefore indicates that two smaller provinces (Baluchistan and KPK) 
have received relatively larger per capita transfer in the post NFC Award years in NFC 1991, 
1997 and 2006 compare to the previous year of each award. The TT to population ratio of 
Sindh has also shown a major increase in the post NFC 2006 year to reach at 1.29.  In contrast, 
this ratio for the largest province of Punjab is low and declining in all awards except 1974 
award.  
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Due to the observed pattern of allocation of transfers, it may be argued that the fiscal awards 
in Pakistan have tried to enhance the limited fiscal capacity of smaller and relatively backward 
provinces.  Nonetheless, it is a crude analysis and does not provide the relative magnitudes of 
the extent of fiscal equalization across various NFC awards. Thus summary indices of fiscal 
equalization are developed in this study to quantify the effort of fiscal equalization across 
various types of transfers and over various financial awards. 
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Table  7.2 Provincial Share of Various Types of Federal Transfers and Grants 
[Pre and Post NFC Periods] 
 
1974-75 1975-76 1990-91 1991-92 1996-97 1997-98 2005-06 2006-07 2008-09 
         DIVISIBLE POOL TRANSFERS (%) 
DPT (Rs. mn)*   11,752    18,942     76,325    104,191    148,952    122,025    180,199    192,669  232,197 
Baluchistan        4.4         3.8           5.3           5.2           5.3           5.3           5.7           6.0  5.9 
KPK      15.2       13.2         13.4         13.4         13.5         13.5         13.7         14.9  15.1 
Punjab      56.2       59.5         58.0         57.2         57.9         57.9         57.0         56.4  55.9 
Sindh      24.2       23.6         23.3         24.2         23.3         23.3         23.6         22.7  23.1 
STRAIGHT TRANSFERS (%) 
ST (Rs. mn) 1,729 1,930 3,328 34,352 23,257 28,068 46,163 53,707 35,969 
Baluchistan 94.5 92.6 66.6 33.4 24.8 22.4 14.8 17 12.4 
KPK 0 0 0 37.7 32.2 39.4 12.4 11.2 16.3 
Punjab 5.5 7.4 3.6 8 9.3 8 13.9 11.5 11.8 
Sindh 0 0 29.8 20.9 33.7 30.2 58.9 60.4 59.4 
GRANT DEVELOPMENT (%) 
GD (Rs. mn)    2,474     1,852     15,604     12,780       4,449       4,014     14,662     28,607  25,348 
Baluchistan        7.5         6.9         19.6         12.7         18.1         11.4         23.3         21.4  28.1 
KPK      14.7       13.9           5.4         17.3         35.2         37.4         22.0         19.7  16.7 
Punjab      35.3       46.5         41.8         28.5         28.5         25.2           0.2         27.9  27.8 
Sindh      42.5       32.7         33.2         41.5         18.2         26.0         54.5         31.0  27.4 
 GRANT NON-DEVELOPMENT (%) 
GND (Rs. mn) 4,991 2,736 23,746 5,176 2,505 9,225 53,979 50,553 61,752 
Baluchistan 14.8 30.7 15.3 5.4 85.2 52 9 13 11.5 
KPK 31.6 50.5 41.6 16.8 0.2 42.3 26 19.6 18.5 
Punjab 35.8 16 26.6 48.5 1.6 5.7 46.8 36.9 40.8 
Sindh 17.8 2.8 16.5 29.3 13 0 18.2 30.5 29.2 
 CONDITIONAL TRANSFERS (%) 
CT = DPT+ST(Rs. mn)   13,481    20,872     79,652    138,543    172,209    150,095    226,362    246,375  268,164 
Baluchistan      16.0       12.0           7.9         12.2           7.9           8.5           7.5           8.4  6.7 
KPK      13.3       11.9         12.8         19.4         16.1         18.4         13.5         14.1  15.3 
Punjab      49.7       54.6         55.7         45.0         51.3         48.6         48.2         46.6  50.0 
Sindh      21.1       21.4         23.6         23.4         24.7         24.6         30.8         30.9  28.0 
 GRANTS TOTAL (%) 
GT =GD+GND(Rs. mn) 7,467 4,587 39,351 17,955 6,954 13,237 68,641 79,160 87,100 
Baluchistan 12.4 21.1 17 10.6 42.3 39.7 12 16 16.4 
KPK 26 35.8 27.3 17.1 22.6 40.8 25.1 19.6 18 
Punjab 35.6 28.3 32.6 34.3 18.8 11.6 36.9 33.7 37 
Sindh 26 14.8 23.1 38 16.3 7.9 26 30.7 28.7 
UNCONDITIONAL TRANSFERS (%) 
UT =CT+GND(Rs. mn)   18,473    23,609    103,400    143,718    174,714    159,319    280,341    296,928  329,917 
Baluchistan      15.6       14.2           9.6         12.0           9.0         11.0           7.8           9.1  7.6 
KPK      18.2       16.4         19.4         19.3         15.8         19.8         15.9         15.0  15.9 
Punjab      45.9       50.2         49.0         45.1         50.6         46.1         47.9         45.0  48.3 
Sindh      20.2       19.2         22.0         23.6         24.5         23.2         28.4         30.8  28.2 
 TOTAL TRANSFERS (%) 
TT =CT+GT (Rs. mn) 20,948 25,460 119,004 156,498 179,162 163,332 295,003 325,534 355,264 
Baluchistan 14.7 13.6 10.9 12 9.3 11 8.6 10.2 9.1 
KPK 17.8 16.2 17.6 19.1 16.3 20.2 16.2 15.5 15.9 
Punjab 44.7 49.9 48.1 43.8 50.1 45.6 45.6 43.5 46.8 
Sindh 22.9 20.2 23.4 25.1 24.4 23.2 29.7 30.9 28.2 
  
* Rs. in million 
Source: Author’s own calculation using data 
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Table  7.3 Comparative per Capita Federal Transfers and Grants to Provinces 
 Pre 
1974-75 
Post 
1975-76 
Pre 
1990-91 
Post 
1991-92 
Pre 
1996-97 
Post 
1997-98 
Pre 
2005-06 
Post 
2006-07 
Post 
2008-09 
DIVISIBLE POOL TRANSFERS (%) - DP 
Baluchistan 1.00 0.99 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.03 1.01 1.03 1.03 
KPK 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.07 1.08 
Punjab 0.99 1.00 1.01 0.99 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.02 1.02 
Sindh 1.02 1.01 0.99 1.01 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.95 0.96 
STRAIGHT TRANSFERS (%) - ST 
Baluchistan 22.69 21.47 12.79 6.44 4.83 4.38 2.94 3.37 2.48 
KPK 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.75 2.34 2.85 0.89 0.80 1.17 
Punjab 0.09 0.12 0.06 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.24 0.20 0.21 
Sindh 0.00 0.00 1.27 0.89 1.42 1.28 2.47 2.52 2.48 
GRANT DEVELOPMENT (%) - GD 
Baluchistan 1.80 1.60 3.76 2.44 3.53 2.23 4.62 4.26 5.62 
KPK 1.09 1.03 0.40 1.26 2.55 2.71 1.58 1.41 1.20 
Punjab 0.59 0.78 0.73 0.50 0.50 0.44 - 0.49 0.49 
Sindh 1.87 1.43 1.41 1.76 0.77 1.10 2.28 1.30 1.14 
GRANT NON-DEVELOPMENT (%) - GND 
Baluchistan 3.54 7.11 2.94 1.05 16.59 10.14 1.78 2.58 2.31 
KPK 2.35 3.76 3.04 1.23 0.02 3.07 1.86 1.40 1.32 
Punjab 0.60 0.27 0.46 0.84 0.03 0.10 0.82 0.65 0.72 
Sindh 0.78 0.12 0.70 1.24 0.55 0.00 0.76 1.28 1.22 
CONDITIONAL TRANSFERS (%) - CT = DPT + ST 
Baluchistan 3.83 2.78 1.51 2.35 1.54 1.65 1.50 1.66 1.34 
KPK 0.99 0.89 0.94 1.42 1.17 1.33 0.97 1.01 1.09 
Punjab 0.83 0.92 0.97 0.78 0.89 0.85 0.84 0.82 0.88 
Sindh 0.93 0.94 1.00 0.99 1.04 1.04 1.29 1.29 1.17 
GRANTS TOTAL (%) - GT = GD + GND 
Baluchistan 2.97 4.89 3.26 2.04 8.23 7.74 2.39 3.19 3.27 
KPK 1.93 2.66 1.99 1.25 1.64 2.96 1.80 1.41 1.28 
Punjab 0.60 0.48 0.57 0.60 0.33 0.20 0.65 0.59 0.65 
Sindh 1.14 0.65 0.98 1.61 0.69 0.33 1.09 1.28 1.20 
UNCONDITIONAL TRANSFERS (%) - UT = CT + GND 
Baluchistan 3.28 1.84 2.31 1.76 2.15 1.55 1.82 1.52 7.60 
KPK 1.22 1.42 1.41 1.15 1.43 1.14 1.08 1.14 15.90 
Punjab 0.84 0.85 0.78 0.88 0.80 0.84 0.79 0.85 48.30 
Sindh 0.84 0.93 1.00 1.04 0.98 1.19 1.29 1.18 28.20 
TOTAL TRANSFERS (%) - TT = CT + GT 
Baluchistan 3.52 3.16 2.09 2.32 1.80 2.15 1.70 2.03 1.82 
KPK 1.32 1.21 1.29 1.40 1.18 1.46 1.16 1.11 1.14 
Punjab 0.75 0.84 0.83 0.76 0.87 0.79 0.80 0.76 0.82 
Sindh 1.00 0.88 1.00 1.06 1.03 0.98 1.24 1.29 1.17 
Source: Author’s own calculation using data. 
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7.3 Theoretical Issues on Fiscal Equalization 
Fiscal equalization refers to the transfers of funds and grants from one jurisdiction to another 
with the objective of offsetting inter- jurisdictional differences between fiscal capacity and 
fiscal needs. It deals with both vertical fiscal imbalance (mismatch between revenue 
assignments and expenditure obligations between two tiers of government) as well as 
horizontal fiscal imbalance (difference in revenue raising authority and expenditure 
assignments between the governments at the similar level). The main purpose of fiscal 
equalization is to provide comparable level of public services at a comparable tax rate to 
identical households living in different regions in a country.   
 
In a theoretical perspective elimination of inter-jurisdictional fiscal disparities (i.e. Horizontal 
F i s c a l  Equalization) is warranted keeping in view equity and efficiency consideration. The 
accepted principle of horizontal fiscal equity, which is “equal treatment of equals”, was 
originally suggested by Buchanan (1950). According to him, identical residents living in 
different jurisdictions in a country given their local preferences should receive equal fiscal 
benefits (public services) at an equivalent level of tax burden.  
 
However contrary to the theoretical consideration, the actual situation varies across 
jurisdictions due to the differences in the economic and natural resource endowments and 
demographic factors which lead to differential access of public services to identical citizens 
living in different regions of the country. The main reason for this horizontal fiscal inequity 
across regions was due to the gap in fiscal benefits and tax incidence. This gap need to be 
bridge by central/federal government fiscal equalization transfers essentially to enable 
residents of low income regions to enjoy equivalent level of public services at par with the 
residents of high income regions.  
 
The efficiency argument of fiscal equalization suggests that equivalent households who 
resides in various regions in the country, for them to acquire comparable level of public 
services in the presence of horizontal fiscal inequity, the residents of poorer jurisdictions 
would have to bear a higher tax burden than the residents of richer jurisdictions in order to get 
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an equivalent level of public services.  This fiscal disparity induces migration of households 
living in poorer jurisdictions towards the richer regions essentially to reduce their higher 
current tax incidence or to acquire a higher provision of public services (Oates, 1972).  This 
regional migration would lead to the efficiency loss as migration is usually costly and 
dissipate resources. Migration however, results efficiency gains when it originates due to 
productivity considerations (i.e. due to factor of production like labor and technology and or 
due to the feature of effective exploitation of economic factor endowments) rather than fiscal.  
Thus fiscally induced regional migration due to the presence of fiscal disparity would be 
inefficient. 
 
The above theoretical arguments suggest that elimination of fiscal disparities across regions 
(or horizontal fiscal equalization) is crucial from both equity and efficiency perspectives. This 
led to further arguments that rather to make equalization payments for removing fiscal 
disparity would it not be appropriate to form a balance in allocation of functions and revenues 
sources across levels of governments? Moreover if equalization is unavoidable and have to 
deal with, how fiscal gap may be calculated and how equalization could preferably be 
addressed are the questions which require answers? 
 
Theoretical principles advocate that allocation of revenue resources and functional 
obligations in a federal state ideally should be balanced. In practice however, efficiency 
consideration assumes greater importance in allocation of functions across levels of 
governments. These considerations take into account the aspects of economies of scale, 
concerns of externalities or benefits spillovers and consideration of administrative costs in 
service provisions. On the contrary revenue sources in federal states are assigned keeping in 
view of mobility of tax base, tax collection efficiency and for ascertaining free movement of 
goods and services across regions. These concerns are vital and their mismatch causes fiscal 
disparity between levels of governments. Even if it is possible to eliminate fiscal disparity 
across levels of governments it remains difficult to eradicate it altogether between regions.  
 
How to correctly assess the fiscal disparities and extent of equalization payments are 
important considerations for addressing the financial equalization. For measuring fiscal 
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disparities, distinction need to be made whether it is arisen due to the local preferences of tax 
and expenditure combination or the result of little revenue base and larger expenditure 
requirements. In case of later it is beyond the control of regional governments and that is 
what it termed as fiscal disparity. For equalization payments literature has made distinction 
on the basis of revenue equalization and expenditure equalization that referred to as 
equalization of need-capacity gap. Boadway and Flatter (1982) argued for full equalization 
payments measured on the basis of differential in tax revenue across jurisdictions arisen due 
to differences in net fiscal benefits. Musgrave (1969) and Shah (1994) on the contrary argued 
in favor of equalization of transfers keeping in view both considerations of revenue sources 
and spending need. However, it is difficult to correctly asses the revenue means and 
expenditure needs of jurisdictions to observe the need–capacity gap due to conceptual 
complexities as highlighted by Dafflon (2007). 
 
Despite these complexities, fiscal equalization transfers to bridge the horizontal fiscal gap 
have practiced in number of countries (Faber and Otter, 2003). The magnitude of the fiscal 
gap and extent of financial transfers varies from country to country but it usually flow from 
central/federal governments to sub-national governments as higher governments generally 
occupy control of key revenue sources. These transfers usually takes the form of revenue 
sharing for general purpose/unconditional character and/or specific purpose conditional 
transfers for equalizing resources with open and closed ended features. Shah (1994) described 
the equalization arrangements in detail that have been pursued to address the issue of 
horizontal inequities adopted by various countries. 
7.4 Methodology to Compute Fiscal Equalization Index  
The concentration index and related concentration curve provide a means of quantifying the 
degree of income-related inequality in a specific variable (O'Donnell & Wagstaff 2008: Castro-
Leal, F et.al 2000). In our case, the concentration index or Fiscal Equalization Index (FEI) is 
used to assess whether or not federal transfers (NFC divisible pool transfers, straight transfers, 
development grants and non–development grants) to provinces are concentrating more 
towards relatively developed provinces of Punjab and Sindh or under developed and relatively 
backward provinces of Baluchistan and KPK. The negative value of index avows that a 
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relatively larger proportion of federal transfer is directed towards deprived provinces and 
therefore fiscally equalizing whereas positive value reveals the contrary. 
 
For this study, the concentration index is estimated with reference to the concentration curve 
which plots the cumulative percentage of the population on the x axis after ranking (least to 
most developed) provinces by living standard or development status. The y-axis graphs the 
cumulative percentage of federal transfer/grant corresponds to the rank of provinces by its 
development status.  
 
The concentration index or Fiscal Equalization index (FEI) in our case is defined as twice the 
area between the concentration curve, L(P), and the 45 degree diagonal line of equality. The 
general principle is that the FEI takes a negative (positive) value when the curve lies above 
(below) the 45 degree line of equality, indicating relatively greater (smaller) flow of  federal 
transfers to least (most) developed provinces and thus fiscally equalizing (dis-equalizing). The 
range of FEI varies between -1 to +1, the two extremes represents perfect equality and perfect 
inequality in federal redistribution policy respectively. The mathematical computation of the 
FEI is provided below. 
 
  
Figure 1: Concentration Curve for Federal Transfers 
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The Concentration Index or FEI, is computed using the following formula156
 
𝐹𝐸𝐼 = [𝑃1 ∗ 𝑇2 − 𝑃2 ∗ 𝑇1] + [𝑃2 ∗ 𝑇3 − 𝑃3 ∗ 𝑇2] +  … … … … [𝑃𝑇−1 ∗ 𝑇𝑇 − 𝑃𝑇 ∗ 𝑇𝑇−1] 
  
 
Where P157
Rank of Province in ascending order of development, Baluchistan (B) = 1, KPK (K) = 2, 
Punjab (P) = 3, and Sindh (S) =4  
=Population Share,    T=Share of Federal Transfer/Grants 
  
𝐹𝐸𝐼 = [𝑃𝐵 ∗ 𝑇𝐾 − 𝑃𝐾 ∗ 𝑇𝐵] + [𝑃𝐾 ∗ 𝑇𝑃 − 𝑃𝑃 ∗ 𝑇𝐾] + [𝑃𝑃 ∗ 𝑇𝑆 − 𝑃𝑆 ∗ 𝑇𝑃] + [𝑃𝑆 ∗ 0 − 0 ∗ 𝑇𝑆] 
 
The above generic formula for computing the FEI is customized using variable names of all 
categories of federal transfers and grants to provinces given as under: 
 
FISCAL EQUALIZATION INDEX [FEI] Various Types of NFC Transfers 
Divisible Pool Transfers (DP) 
𝐹𝐸𝐼 = [𝑃𝐵 ∗ 𝐷𝑃𝐾 − 𝑃𝐾 ∗ 𝐷𝑃𝐵] + [𝑃𝐾 ∗ 𝐷𝑃𝑃 − 𝑃𝑃 ∗ 𝐷𝑃𝐾] + [𝑃𝑃 ∗ 𝐷𝑃𝑆 − 𝑃𝑠 ∗ 𝐷𝑃𝑃]+ [𝑃𝑆 ∗ 0 − 0 ∗ 𝐷𝑃𝑆] 
Straight Transfers (ST) 
𝐹𝐸𝐼 = [𝑃𝐵 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐾 − 𝑃𝐾 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐵] + [𝑃𝐾 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝑃 − 𝑃𝑃 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐾] + [𝑃𝑃 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝑆 − 𝑃𝑠 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝑃]+ [𝑃𝑆 ∗ 0 − 0 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝑆] 
Total NFC Transfers  
𝐹𝐸𝐼 = [𝑃𝐵 ∗ 𝑁𝐹𝐶𝐾 − 𝑃𝐾 ∗ 𝑁𝐹𝐶𝐵] + [𝑃𝐾 ∗ 𝑁𝐹𝐶𝑃 − 𝑃𝑃 ∗ 𝑁𝐹𝐶𝐾] + [𝑃𝑃 ∗ 𝑁𝐹𝐶𝑆 − 𝑃𝑠 ∗ 𝑁𝐹𝐶𝑃]+ [𝑃𝑆 ∗ 0 − 0 ∗ 𝑁𝐹𝐶𝑆] 
Development (Conditional) Grant (GD) 
𝐹𝐸𝐼 = [𝑃𝐵 ∗ 𝐺𝐷𝐾 − 𝑃𝐾 ∗ 𝐺𝐷𝐵] + [𝑃𝐾 ∗ 𝐺𝐷𝑃 − 𝑃𝑃 ∗ 𝐺𝐷𝐾] + [𝑃𝑃 ∗ 𝐺𝐷𝑆 − 𝑃𝑠 ∗ 𝐺𝐷𝑃]+ [𝑃𝑆 ∗ 0 − 0 ∗ 𝐺𝐷𝑆] 
Non Development Grant (GND) 
𝐹𝐸𝐼 = [𝑃𝐵 ∗ 𝐺𝑁𝐷𝐾 − 𝑃𝐾 ∗ 𝐺𝑁𝐷𝐵] + [𝑃𝐾 ∗ 𝐺𝑁𝐷𝑃 − 𝑃𝑃 ∗ 𝐺𝑁𝐷𝐾] + [𝑃𝑃 ∗ 𝐺𝑁𝐷𝑆 − 𝑃𝑠 ∗ 𝐺𝑁𝐷𝑃]+ [𝑃𝑆 ∗ 0 − 0 ∗ 𝐺𝑁𝐷𝑆] 
Total Grants (GT) 
𝐹𝐸𝐼 = [𝑃𝐵 ∗ 𝐺𝑇𝐾 − 𝑃𝐾 ∗ 𝐺𝑇𝐵] + [𝑃𝐾 ∗ 𝐺𝑇𝑃 − 𝑃𝑃 ∗ 𝐺𝑇𝐾] + [𝑃𝑃 ∗ 𝐺𝑇𝑆 − 𝑃𝑠 ∗ 𝐺𝑇𝑃]+ [𝑃𝑆 ∗ 0 − 0 ∗ 𝐺𝑇𝑆] 
Unconditional Grant (UT) 
𝐹𝐸𝐼 = [𝑃𝐵 ∗ (𝑁𝐹𝐶 + 𝐺𝑁𝐷)𝐾 − 𝑃𝐾 ∗ (𝑁𝐹𝐶 + 𝐺𝑁𝐷)𝐵] + [𝑃𝐾 ∗ (𝑁𝐹𝐶 + 𝐺𝑁𝐷)𝑃 − 𝑃𝑃 ∗ (𝑁𝐹𝐶 + 𝐺𝑁𝐷)𝐾]+ [𝑃𝑃 ∗ (𝑁𝐹𝐶 + 𝐺𝑁𝐷)𝑆 − 𝑃𝑠 ∗ (𝑁𝐹𝐶 + 𝐺𝑁𝐷)𝑃] + [𝑃𝑆 ∗ 0 − 0 ∗ (𝑁𝐹𝐶 + 𝐺𝑁𝐷)𝑆] 
Total Transfers (TT) 
𝐹𝐸𝐼 = [𝑃𝐵 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝐾 − 𝑃𝐾 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝐵] + [𝑃𝐾 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑃 − 𝑃𝑃 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝐾] + [𝑃𝑃 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑆 − 𝑃𝑠 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑃]+ [𝑃𝑆 ∗ 0 − 0 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑆] 
                                                          
156 This formula has been used to compute the Concentration Index in case of group data.  
157 The percentages of population shares for the purpose of calculating fiscal equalization index in respect of divisible pool 
transfers are taken from NFC reports. 
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The computation of the FEI requires ranking of Provinces by development status. Six different 
studies have ranked provinces using various development indicators (Table 7.4). These studies 
reveal more or less consistent development ranking of provinces. Sindh have occupied the 
status of most developed province of Pakistan with rank 1 in all but one study whereas Punjab 
holds number 2 rank. The third and fourth ranks are interchange between KPK and 
Baluchistan. However final ranking of provinces in ascending order of development (from 
least to most developed province) are Baluchistan, KPK, Punjab and Sindh respectively158
 
 are 
chosen for this study.  
Table  7.4 Development Ranking of Provinces 
Indicators:   Punjab Sindh  KPK Baluchistan 
Average Household Income 1 II I IV III 
Per Capita GDP 2 II I III IV 
Human Development Index 3 I II III IV 
Deprivation Index 4 II I IV III 
Incidence of Poverty 5 II I IV III 
Vulnerability 6 II I III IV 
1. According to Household Income and Expenditure 
  2. According to Bengali [2003]  
   3. According to Hussain [2003] and Jamal [2007] 
  4. According to Jamal [2007] 
    5. According to Asian Development Bank [2003] 
  6. According to Jamal [2007] 
     
Source: Pasha, Pasha & Zubair (2010) 
7.5 Estimates of Fiscal Equalization 
The fiscal equalization Index (FEI) is estimated for the pre and post NFC awards years for 
four NFCs awards of 1974, 1991, 1997 and 2006.  FEI is estimated for all four forms of 
federal transfers and grants (i.e. DP, ST, GND and GD) as well as four additional categories 
                                                          
158 This development ranking of provinces is also used by Pasha, Pasha  & Zubair (2010). 
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obtained by aggregating these categories according to the nature of conditionality159
 
.  Table 
7.5 furnishes the estimated magnitudes of Fiscal Equalization Indices. 
Table  7.5 Indices of Fiscal Equalization Before and After Declaration of NFC Awards 
 
Type of Transfers: (ALL) 
NFC 1974 NFC 1991 NFC 1997 NFC 2006 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Post 
1975 1976 1991 1992 1997 1998 2006 2007 2009 
Divisible Pool (DP) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 
Straight Transfer (ST) -0.91 -0.89 -0.40 -0.45 -0.23 -0.29 0.21 0.21 0.20 
Development Grant (GD) 0.12 0.05 0.01 0.05 -0.31 -0.21 0.03 -0.13 -0.20 
Non Development Grant 
(GND) -0.27 -0.67 -0.35 0.02 -0.71 -0.82 -0.17 -0.06 -0.05 
NFC Transfer NFCT= DP+ST -0.12 -0.07 -0.02 -0.11 -0.03 -0.06 0.04 0.03 0.01 
Total Grants GT= GD+GND -0.14 -0.38 -0.21 0.04 -0.46 -0.63 -0.13 -0.08 -0.09 
Unconditional Transfers  
UT= NFCT+GND -0.16 -0.14 -0.09 -0.10 -0.04 -0.10 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Total Transfer TT= NFCT+TG -0.13 -0.13 -0.08 -0.09 -0.05 -0.10 0.00 0.00 -0.02 
Change in TT Due to the 
Award 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 --- 
Results of the Study by (Pasha. Pasha and Zubair (2010)   
Type of Transfers (ONLY 
NFC TRANSFERS) 
NFC 1974 NFC 1991 NFC 1997 FC 2006 
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Post 
1975 1976 1991 1992 1997 1998 2006 2007 2009 
Divisible Pool  --- --- 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 --- 
Straight Transfer --- --- -0.25 -0.35 -0.22 -0.21 0.21 0.17 --- 
Special Non Development --- --- --- 0.12 0.12 -0.63 -0.86 -0.42 --- 
Total NFC Transfer --- --- -0.01 -0.08 -0.03 -0.07 0.02 0.01 --- 
Change in TT Due to the 
Award --- -0.07 -0.04 0.01 --- 
 
                                                          
159  NFC formula based transfers by merging (NFCT=DP+ST), total grant by combining (GT=GND+GD), unconditional 
Transfer/grants by summing (UT=NFC\T+ GND) and finally total transfers category by aggregating all four forms of transfer 
and grants. 
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The magnitudes of FEIs clearly demonstrate that federal DP which is distributed among 
provinces on the basis of population is fiscally neutral as indicated by its value zero or close to 
zero. However fiscal arrangements have been revised in NFC award of 2006 that favored KPK 
and Punjab provinces and reduces the share of relatively developed Sindh province compared 
to what it had been receiving before. Thus, the award of 2006 is fiscally equalizing as 
reflected by the negative values in the post NFC 2006-07 years.  The provision of ST plays a 
greater equalizing role in the decade of 90s as reflected by higher negative value of FEI in the 
post NFC 1991 and NFC 1997 years. However in the last decade ST mostly benefits 
developed Sindh due to substantial increase of its receipts of “Gas Development Surcharge” 
from the larger gas production base which made ST fiscally dis-equalizing. The phenomenon 
is affirmed by positive magnitude of FEI (+0.21) during the pre and post NFC 2006 years. The 
effect of development or conditional grant on fiscal equalization varies in various NFC awards 
due to largely ad-hoc nature of its provision contrary to formula. For example earlier two 
awards (NFC 1974, NFC 1991) exacerbate inter provincial disparities through greater per 
capita provision of development grants to developed Sindh and Punjab. In contrast, NFC 1997 
and NFC 2006 awards appear to be fiscally equalizing as reflected by negative value of FEI in 
post award period. However the extent of equalization seems declining from -0.31 to -0.21 in 
NFC 1997 indicating relative decline in development grant to backward provinces in the post 
NFC year compare to earlier. The allocation of non development grant to provinces appears to 
be fiscally equalizing as in most years value of FEI is negative with highest post award change 
of -0.40 observed in 1974 award (from  -0.27 in 1974-75 to -0.67 in 1975-76). FEI achieved 
its peak at -0.82 in 1997-98 after the NFC 1997 award. However revised fixed GND 
arrangements in NFC 1991 award to all four provinces after its complete stoppage of other ad-
hoc/revenue deficit grants had made the FEI to be fiscally neutral (0.02). The NFC 2006 
arrangement has shown a declining incidence of extent of equalization. 
 
The aggregate effect of formula based transfer (NFCT=DP+ST) after NFC 1991 appears to be 
fiscally equalizing due to considerable expansion of ST proceeds from NFC 1991 that mainly 
benefited backward provinces of Baluchistan and KPK in the initial stage. However in the last 
decade due to substantial expansion in revenue base of Gas Development Surcharge in Sindh 
has made the FEI associated with NFCT from negative to positive highlighting aggravating 
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inequality in the pre and post NFC 2006. Further the combined total grant (GT=GND+GD) is 
playing an equalization role which is visible by negative values of FEI throughout these years. 
The highest equalization observed after the NFC 1991 award. Analysis also reveals that Total 
Unconditional Grants (i.e. UT = DP + ST + GND) appears to be fiscally equalizing in the 
three initial awards which has turned to fiscally neutral more recently in NFC 2006 award. 
 
The trend of overall fiscal transfers to provinces has shown it to be fiscally equalizing during 
the first three NFC awards (i.e. NFC 1974, 1991 and 1997) but overtime extent of equalization 
has been declining till it has reached to a stage of fiscal neutrality during the period of NFC 
2006 award. These results are more or less consistent with Pasha et al, (2010) study. However 
despite some variation in the magnitude of FEI in the two studies the direction is similar (see 
table 7.5). The reason for variation in equalization index being the coverage of transfers in the 
two studies. This thesis have included all four forms including development and non 
development grants of federal transfer flows to provinces, whereas development and non NFC 
related non development grants were completely ignored by Pasha, Pasha & Zubair (2010) 
while estimating FEI for the overall effect of federal to provincial government transfers.  
7.6 Concluding Remarks  
The chapter has examined the equalization role of federal fiscal transfer to provinces of 
Pakistan by covering all forms of transfer and all financial awards announced during the 
period 1972-73 to 2008-09.  
 
It may be concluded that the federal divisible pool (DP) which is the major component of 
federal transfer has been fiscally neutral throughout the analysis period barring exception of 
NFC 2006 that have shown slight improvement in fiscal equalization. It was due to the 
formula revision of the distribution of 1/6th of sales tax that favors three provinces other than 
most developed Sindh province. On the contrary ST plays an equalizing role and benefits 
backward provinces of Baluchistan and KPK in NFC 1991 and NFC 1997 awards primarily 
due to its better natural resource base in these provinces.ST however exacerbates inequities in 
the last decade due to significant increase share of Sindh (nearly 60 % of the total ST 
proceeds) and a corresponding declining share of Baluchistan and KPK.  
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The federal development grant (GD) led to divergent impact on provincial fiscal equalization 
in different awards. The earlier two awards (NFC 1974 and NFC 1991) worsened inter 
provincial inequities contrary to the last two awards (NFC 1997 and NFC 2006) which are 
fiscally equalizing. The phenomenon reveals that the provision of development grant was 
largely discretionary and its interprovincial allocation was not strictly adhered with the 
formula prescription.  This point was also highlighted by Shah (1997) and Ahmed and Wasti 
(2002).  
 
Non development grants (GND) has been tilted more towards backward or relatively deprived   
provinces and therefore equalizing in the three awards except NFC 1991 award when 
developed provinces have greater access to non development grants as reflected by positive 
FEI in 1991-92. The combined formula based NFC transfers (NFCT=DP +ST) helped reduced 
inter provincial fiscal disparities after the NFC 1991 award due to the inclusion of ST in 1991. 
Its equalization role is dampened in NFC 1997 and become dis-equalizing in NFC 2006 due to 
considerable expansion of ST revenue base of Sindh in proceeds of gas royalties and gas 
development surcharge.  
 
Unconditional transfers (UT=NFCT+GND) with no strings attached to its use  comprise above 
90 percent of total transfers to provinces has been fiscally equalizing in the first three NFC 
awards (1974, 1991, 1997) whereas after NFC award of 2006 it became slightly dis-
equalizing. 
 
The total federal transfer (TT) appears to be equalizing in the first three awards (NFC 1974, 
1991, 1997) with a highest change of -0.05 observed in NFC 1997, thus this award had played 
a greater impact in reducing the interprovincial inequities. NFC 2006 award however failed to 
improve the process of equalization in Pakistan as depicted by positive value of FEI and thus 
exacerbated inter provincial inequities. 
  
It is worth to compare the findings of our study with the study of Pasha et al, 2010. The scope 
of their study is limited as they examined the fiscal equalization impact of federal transfers 
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extended only by NFC awards contrary to our study that covers all forms of transfers. 
Nonetheless, the FEI estimates of our study are favorably compared with the findings of Pasha 
A. Ghaus (2010) in case of NFC divisible pool taxes and straight transfer that has shown more 
or less similar trend and direction with slight variation in FEI magnitude of ST. In case of non 
development grant and total transfers, FEI although revealed similar direction but different 
magnitudes.  According to our study the NFC 1997 award bring the largest over all change in 
the process of fiscal equalization in Pakistan contrary to NFC 1991 in their study. Further 
NFC 2006 award appears to have a fiscally neutral effect of TT in contrast to their findings of 
exacerbating inter provincial inequities across provinces.  The principle reasons for these 
differential results were the scope and coverage of the two studies as explained above. The 
results of both comparative studies clearly establish that inadequate coverage of federal fiscal 
transfers by ignoring development and non-development grants likely may mislead the overall 
conclusion regarding the fiscal equalization effect of federal transfers. Findings of this study 
suggests that the ad-hocism and discretionary nature of transfers must be avoided and should 
be replaced with the formula based equalization transfers to reduce interprovincial inequities 
in order to bring backward provinces gradually closer to the developed provinces of Pakistan. 
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8 SUMMARY & CONCLUSION 
The thesis evaluates revenue sharing arrangements between federal and provincial 
governments in Pakistan.  Provincial fiscal behaviour is statistically examined to find out how 
past fiscal arrangements for intergovernmental transfers influenced the fiscal environment and 
practice in different provinces of the country. Furthermore, impact of federal transfers to 
provinces in achieving the horizontal fiscal equalisation is also scrutinized by developing 
Fiscal Equalization Index.  The analysis is performed by using time series federal and 
provincial public finance and macro data for the period 1973-2009.  
 
Specifically, the study explores whether federal transfers were utilized for stimulating 
provincial public expenditures or have largely substituted for provincial fiscal efforts in order 
to provide residents tax relief. The impact of unconditional and conditional transfers to 
determine the varying effect on public spending is also investigated. In addition, it examines 
the accelerating or multiplier effects of federal transfers and resident income on provincial 
expenditures.  In terms of study hypotheses, the analysis is based around the following 
propositions:  
 
 Federal transfers/grants to provinces stimulate provincial government’s expenditures. 
This hypothesis will be rejected if there is no significant increase in the provision of 
public goods in the provinces as a result of receiving federal revenue transfers. 
 Federal transfers/grants to provinces reduce provincial fiscal efforts. This implies that 
provinces utilize federal transfers to equalize resources and to relieve tax burden of the 
residents. Hypothesis will be rejected if it is found that there is significant increase in 
provincial tax revenue collection in response to federal transfer receipts. 
 Federal Transfers under development grant (conditional) have a greater impact on 
provincial expenditure than non-development or unconditional transfers. This 
hypothesis will obviously be rejected for provinces if a decreasing impact of 
conditional or development grants as compared to other unconditional transfers is 
found. 
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 Federal transfers and resident income have similar accelerating effect on provincial 
expenditures. This hypothesis will be rejected if there is significant difference in the 
magnitudes of resident income of the provinces and federal transfers. 
In the context of Pakistan, it is the first attempt to carry out disaggregated analysis of fiscal 
behaviour of each of the four federating units in response to federal transfers and grants. Thus 
it is a noteworthy addition in the empirical literature in the context of a less developed and 
resource constraints country, where the sensitivities are always attached to the determination 
of distributional criteria and allocation of transfers among federating units. The analysis will 
facilitate policy makers and stake-holders in designing appropriate allocation strategies for 
future fiscal framework of federal transfers.  
 
In the next section, Pakistan’s fiscal environment is summarized, while the conclusions with 
respect to empirical findings are presented in section 8.2. In sections 8.3 and 8.4 remarks on 
the data limitations for this study and future areas of related research are provided. Comments 
on policy implications are furnished in the last section, i.e. 8.5.  
8.1 Fiscal Environment in Pakistan 
The basic framework of the management of public finance in Pakistan is enshrined in the 1973 
Constitution. This framework provides allocation of taxation and expenditure assignments, 
borrowing powers and intergovernmental transfer arrangements between the federal and 
provincial governments. Intergovernmental fiscal transfer arrangement between federal and 
provincial governments is declared by the National Finance Commission (NFC) which 
recommends the operation of federal divisible pool, borrowing powers, grants-in-aid, and 
other relevant matters.  
Due to the differences in the constitutional allocations and actual sharing of expenditure and 
revenue responsibilities between the federal and provincial governments in Pakistan, a 
significant vertical fiscal gap is observed which increased over time and reached at 24 percent 
more recently. It was mainly due to predominant share of federal government of above 90 
percent in the combined revenues as compared with their expenditure responsibility of about 
70 percent.  In addition, all four provincial governments combined generate less than 10 
percent revenues against their expenditure share of 31 percent. With the recent restructuring of 
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expenditures and revenue responsibilities after approval of 18th constitutional amendment this 
vertical fiscal gap may likely increase further. 
The thesis also found significantly horizontal imbalances that vary across provinces. The 
extent of horizontal imbalance in the most backward province of Baluchistan observed to be 
as high as 96 percent implying heavy provincial dependence on federal transfers.  In contrast, 
the relatively developed Punjab has observed a horizontal fiscal gap of 84 percent implying 
the extent of self financing is about 16 percent. This reflects a very high dependence of 
provinces on federal transfers and grants. 
The history of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements in Pakistan indicates that there were 9 
different NFC Awards in the country since 1951. The criteria served as a major point of 
conflict among provinces; as the NFC award commissions failed time and again in finding an 
appropriate resource sharing formula for federal resource distribution that could be acceptable 
to all federating units.  
One of the important factors for disintegration of Pakistan in 1971 was the issue of sharing of 
revenue resources from NFC awards and investment allocations between the two provinces; 
East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and West Pakistan (now Pakistan). The sharing arrangements 
were injudicious with a strong negative biased against the former East Pakistan and thus 
became a major point of conflict and hatred against central government dominated by West 
Pakistanis. Multiple other issues along with the sharing of revenue resources ultimately led to 
separation of East Pakistan. 
Following its separation, five awards were announced, first NFC Award was declared in 1974 
which distributes federal divisible pool revenues horizontally among provinces using the sole 
criteria of population contrary to parity and collection principles that followed earlier in 
United Pakistan. The proposed NFC 1974 revenue sharing arrangements greatly benefited 
Punjab due to its significantly high share in national population (60%) and relatively more 
developed economic and infrastructure base, with high population density and lower incidence 
of poverty and backwardness. This criterion became a major source of conflict among 
provinces and badly affects interprovincial harmony. No Awards were announced despite 
formation of NFC in 1979 and 1985 because of lack of consensus amongst the constituent 
Intergovernmental Governmental Fiscal Relation – A Case Study of Pakistan 240 
members on the horizontal resource sharing criteria. Thus NFC 1974 Award criteria of 
population based sharing was continued to enforce till 1991. 
 Realizing the discontent of smaller provinces on horizontal resource sharing arrangements the 
democratic government announced NFC 1991 Award with significant expansion in resource 
transfer by including new taxes and institution of natural resource taxes called “Straight 
Transfers” on origin principle that disproportionately benefits smaller and backward provinces 
of Baluchistan, KPK and Sindh. The federal divisible pool however continued on the 
population bases.  
NFC 1997 was declared in a caretaker setup and included all those taxes in the federal 
divisible pool which were earlier excluded. After proposed broadening of the size of federal 
divisible pool the vertical sharing proportions were also altered in NFC 1997 Award from an 
earlier ratio of 80:20 to 37.5:62.5 respectively for provincial and federal governments. This 
Award also allocated special backwardness grant to Baluchistan and KPK and have 
announced closed ended matching grant incentive for attaining provincial fiscal efforts of 14.2 
percent in provincial tax revenues. However this Award appeared to be disastrous for 
provinces. During the 5 year period (1997-2002) revenue transfer’s short fall of Rs. 374 
billion were observed compare to what has been forecasted at the time of NFC 1997 
declaration. It was estimated that if previous award (NFC 1991) arrangements were to be 
continued the provinces would have received Rs. 296 billions more revenues as compared to 
the Award criteria pursued in NFC 1997 of vertical and horizontal sharing that drastically 
altered by declining provincial vertical share from 80 to 37.5 percent. The main reasons for 
revenue and transfer short fall was inflationary projections as Pakistan pursuing the IMF 
structural adjustment reform program that had severe implications on federal revenue 
collection. Besides international sanctions on Pakistan following its nuclear detonation and   
international recession at that time also deteriorated Pakistan economy. 
NFC 2006 was announced in military controlled government of President Musharraf who 
declared revenue sharing arrangements after failure of getting the consensus on vertical and 
horizontal sharing arrangement among the constituent members. The NFC 2006 increased the 
provincial vertical share (to 42.5 from earlier 37.5 percent) with a proposed annual increment 
to arrive at the provincial share of 47.5 percent. It also instituted the provision of non 
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development grant for all four provinces with highest share of backward provinces and low to 
relatively developed Sindh and Punjab provinces. The award however severely criticized by 
the Sindh province due to its declining share in transfers compare to what it has getting earlier. 
NFC 2010 Award was announced under the then democratic government. This Award used 
multiple criteria for transfers from divisible pool and also enhances provincial vertical share in 
federal divisible pool transfer to 57.5 percent from an earlier 46 percent. The award was 
possible due to magnanimity shown by Punjab provinces for acceptance of multiple criteria 
for horizontal revenue sharing which incorporated; population, poverty/backwardness, 
population density and revenue collection/generation shares.  One of each criteria 
disproportionately benefits three smaller provinces and thus helped improve inter provincial 
harmony. Barring Punjab, other provinces have gained in terms of its overall share compare to 
what have been getting prior to this award. However due to substantial increase in vertical 
share, provinces including Punjab receive now much higher magnitude of transfers. The 
significant increments in provincial transfer receipts with restructuring of expenditure 
assignments (federal as well as provinces) have significant influence on federal and provincial 
fiscal behavior in future.  
The federal to provincial governments transfers and grants are of four types. First, revenue 
sharing transfers from federal divisible pool of taxes on the recommendations of the NFC.  
Second, straight transfer receipts from the federal government on origin principle which are 
also recommended by the NFC.  Third, federal transfers under non-development grant which 
have historically been provided to meet the provincial needs of emergent nature and to finance 
provincial current account deficits from federal consolidated fund. Also non development 
grants extended to provinces on the recommendation of various NFC Awards on the basis of 
backwardness or in some fixed portion to provinces. Some component of non development 
grants from federal consolidated funds has been conditional whereas remaining as 
unconditional including those recommended by NFC awards. Fourth, federal transfers under 
development grant for financing specific development projects and provincial annual 
development programme is conditional grant as it is tied with specific projects.  
The above four types of federal transfers are also classified on the basis of unconditional and 
conditional characteristics.  For the purposes of analysis these flows are divided into three 
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broad categories.  Firstly, unconditional transfers include NFC formula based divisible pool 
tax transfers and formula based straight transfers to provinces. These transfers are pre-
determined and provinces enjoy full autonomy in expenditure.  Secondly, development grants 
are for specific purposes and may come with or without the matching requirements. These 
transfers are categorized clearly as conditional. Thirdly, non-development grants from federal 
consolidated funds normally be categorized as unconditional but partly it caters some grant of 
conditional nature.  However all non development grants extended by federal government on 
the recommendation of NFC awards are unconditional as no strings are attached to its use. 
 
In addition to the above transfers, provinces also have access to federal borrowings. Since 
provincial governments can borrow funds from central bank up to their prescribed limit to 
meet their recurring expenditure requirements, these federal borrowings are assumed to be 
exogenous. Provincial government borrowings also comprise of federal loans for financing 
annual development programme (ADP) and net capital receipts. However, the extent of 
provincial access to federal borrowing is significantly varies across provinces.  
Altogether significant interprovincial differences exist in access and share of four categories 
of federal transfers, grants and flow of borrowing to provinces during the 37 years long period 
(1973-2009) covering five NFC awards. The formula based unconditional NFC transfers and 
straight transfers provide greater certainty and therefore more stable revenue source for 
provinces. Contrary greater fluctuation prevails in access to unconditional non development 
and conditional development grants across province due to its ad-hoc and discretionary nature. 
Further, its flow also depends upon the federal budgetary constraints. These transfers have a 
varying implication on the provision of provincial public goods and thus lay a solid base for 
an interesting analysis. 
8.2 Summary of Empirical Findings  
The government expenditure to measure the quantity of public service provision is used in this 
thesis. The data is adjusted using the GDP deflator.  Any change in input prices are controlled 
for and thus the analysis facilitate a more accurate representation of the quantity of provincial 
goods and services in terms of provincial expenditure.  
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To estimate the fiscal response to federal transfers, total provincial expenditure is modeled as 
a function of provincial gross domestic product at factor cost, transfers and total borrowings. 
All the variables are defined in per capita and at real prices of 2001, covering the period 
between 1973 and 2009.  Various specifications of expenditure function are used in this study 
for testing different hypothesis.  
 
Given that development grant may be endogenous to total provincial expenditure and may 
influence each other, expenditure functions are estimated by using both Ordinary Least Square 
(OLSQ) as well as Two Stage Least Square (TSLS) estimation techniques. Various 
instrumental variables are used for TSLS estimation. E-VIEWS software is employed to 
estimate all expenditure functions.  The results from both techniques are reported and 
compared to check the sensitivity of magnitudes and summary statistics.  Subsequently, the 
best results, according to the minimum standard error, are finally considered for discussion.  
 
The provincial fiscal response to federal transfers and grants is examined at aggregate and 
individual province level for the four provinces of Pakistan. Three different variants of 
transfers and grants are specified. First specification considers receipts from NFC divisible 
pool taxes and straight transfer combined as one category. These are unconditional transfers as 
these are formula based, pre determined and provinces enjoy full expenditure autonomy.  For 
the second specification, the model is extended by decomposing the federal transfer flows into 
three categories; besides NFC transfer (divisible pool taxes and straight transfers), total grants 
have now been decomposed into two categories: development and non-development grants, as 
originally reported in the provincial budgets. One would assume that non-development grant 
and NFC transfers illustrate the behaviour to that of unconditional grant.  Hence, provincial 
governments consider this as a fungible revenue source.  Development grants for specific 
purposes depict responsiveness to that of conditional grant. Third, NFC transfers and non-
development grants are pooled in to form one category of unconditional grants, whereas 
development grants continue to be utilized as separate category of conditional nature.  
 
The analyses of all three specifications are furnished in detail in the Chapter of empirical 
findings. However to summarize findings, second specification is finally chosen and is 
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discussed here. The selected final model estimates provincial per capita expenditure 
(aggregate as well as individual) by considering per capita GDP, per capita NFC plus straight 
transfers, per capita non development grant, per capita development grant and per capita 
borrowing.  The equation estimated though OLSQ technique is finally selected for discussion 
(Table 6.18) due to relatively low standard error of regression.  All estimated equations are 
corrected for auto correlation and are converted into real prices of 2001. 
 
The empirical findings affirm that aggregate (all provinces combined) fiscal response to 
various forms of federal transfers/grants and borrowings is different as compared to individual 
provincial fiscal response.  At aggregate province level unconditional NFC revenue sharing 
transfers have been used as a key fungible source from which it provide tax relief. It alters 
provincial expenditure by 84 paisas (0.84 rupees), whereas remaining 16 paisas are absorbed 
in the provision of resident tax relief in the form of subsidizing provincial services. Non-
development grants stimulates provincial expenditure almost equivalent to the size of grants 
where as development grant (conditional) brings an elastic change in the provincial public 
services (1.18), implying that provincial governments complying to federal policy objective to 
increase expenditure on particular services, for which conditional grant is offered. The 
estimated magnitude of borrowings also shows high stimulation in provincial expenditure 
(0.97). The marginal effect of per capita private income on provincial public goods is 0.02 and 
quite close to earlier findings.  
 
In contrast, the findings with regard to individual provincial fiscal response reveal that federal 
transfer/grant of two relatively developed provinces (Punjab and Sindh) is quite similar and 
close to the aggregate response, while this is not true in case of the remaining two backward 
provinces (KPK and Baluchistan). 
 
NFC transfer (unconditional) is used as a key fungible source in two relatively developed 
province of Punjab and Sindh as 23 and 27 paisas are respectively absorbed in provision of 
resident tax relief. Contrary, expenditure response of two backward provinces: KPK and 
Baluchistan reveals that non-development grant (unconditional) as their major fungible source 
(0.33 and 0.39 paisa) respectively. Since 1997 both these provinces have a greater access to 
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special non-development grant based on their relative backwardness that caused an increase 
fungibility of this source. The utilization of non-development grant is higher in the two 
relatively developed provinces with magnitude of above 0.9 (90 paisas).  
  
The marginal effect of development grant (conditional) on provincial expenditure of relatively 
developed province is highest and elastic with its respective coefficients of (1.27 and 1.23 
rupee) of a one rupee increase of development grant, implying that these two governments are 
more responsive to the federal conditional grant policy by matching own resources to 
accelerate the provincial expenditure. Baluchistan province uses development grant almost to 
its size (95 paisas of a marginal rupee increase in development grant) on specific-purpose 
projects. In KPK province however, the marginal effect of development (conditional) grant is 
low and only 56 paisas are utilized in increasing the provision of public services and 45 paisas 
out of one rupee in providing tax relief to resident population.  
 
The comparative coefficients of per capita private income or per capita gross regional product 
of provinces indicate that provincial public goods are normal goods but it size vary across 
provinces. The coefficient of KPK however turns out statistically insignificant, implying that 
private income of gross regional product does not affect the provision of public services. The 
province is entirely dependent on federal transfers. 
  
NFC transfers and non-development grant are characterized as unconditional transfers which 
increase provincial expenditure but with an amount less than the transfers/grants. The 
estimated coefficients show that both of these unconditional transfer sources are used by these 
provincial governments as a fungible revenue source with higher fungibility of non 
development grant in two backward provinces KPK (0.39 rupee) and Baluchistan (0.33 rupee). 
However, in two relatively developed provinces higher fungible source is NFC revenue 
sharing transfers (Punjab 0.23 and Sindh 0.27 rupee). In case of aggregate response, NFC 
unconditional transfer show fungibility of 0.16 rupee.  
 
The borrowing effect on service provision in KPK is quite surprising. Out of one rupee, 61 
paisas are used for the specific purpose, while remaining 39 paisas are absorbed in reduction 
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in provincial fiscal efforts. In contrast, the Punjab province not only utilizes the amount of 
borrowed funds fully but also employs their own resources to boost up activities for which 
these loans have been acquired thereby reflecting with an elastic expenditure response of 1.17. 
 
Results in terms of study hypothesis affirm that there are enough statistical evidences for not 
rejecting first three hypotheses (I, II and III) in case of all provinces except KPK province.  In 
the context of hypothesis III it is found that the effect of unconditional grant is higher in this 
province compare to development grant (conditional) in all three specifications of the model. 
Thus hypothesis III is thus rejected in case of KPK. Hypothesis IV is rejected in case of all 
four provinces and at aggregate province level as results clearly display  non-equivalence of 
provincial expenditure response to private income (gross domestic product) and provincial 
transfers  (public Income).  It is evident from the empirical findings that private income 
disproportionately spent on consumption of private goods and services and public income 
excessively spent on consumption of provincial public goods and services; a phenomenon of 
“Fly Paper Effect” that  “Money Sticks where it Hits”.  
 
The empirical results clearly establish the important value addition by our thesis. It was argued 
that the fiscal response of individual provinces to various forms of federal transfers/grants 
would likely to vary across provinces given the diverse socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics of each province. The estimated fiscal response of individual province 
evidently shows varying behavior as compared to that depicted by aggregate province data. 
Therefore earlier attempt in Pakistan to measure provincial fiscal behavior based on aggregate 
data (four provinces combined) have given biased picture regarding the fiscal response of 
provinces as it ignored diverse provincial socio-economic and demographic characteristics.  
 
To recap the findings of this study depict three phenomena. 
  
 First individual province fiscal response to various forms of transfers/grants varies 
across provinces. 
 Second, the magnitude of aggregate provincial fiscal response is quite different from 
the individual province fiscal response. Thus, any attempt to draw conclusions 
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regarding the responsiveness of individual province’s fiscal response to federal 
transfer/grant based on aggregate data may give a biased picture.  
 Third, overall provincial fiscal behavior is more close to the behavior of two relatively 
developed Punjab and Sindh provinces. The magnitudes of coefficients measuring 
fiscal response to federal transfers of these provinces are different (higher and larger) 
as compared to the other two underdeveloped or backward KPK and Baluchistan 
provinces. Therefore, to design transfer strategies, disaggregated analysis of fiscal 
behavior is imperative.  
 
In addition of empirically evaluating the study hypotheses, the role of federal transfers in 
fiscal equalization is also examined. It is attempted to assess whether these various forms of 
federal transfers and grants to provinces are fiscally equalizing or exacerbating inter-
provincial inequities. For this purpose, Fiscal Equalization Indices (FEI) are estimated for the 
pre and post NFC awards and for all four forms of federal transfers and grants as well as 
additional categories where were developed by combining transfer categories in terms of 
conditional and unconditional characteristics.   
 
The findings clearly reveal that federal divisible pool transfers have been fiscally neutral 
throughout the analysis period barring exception of NFC 2006 when it reflects slight 
improvement in fiscal equalization due to formula revision of sales tax component of federal 
divisible pool. On the contrary, straight transfers were strongly equalizing in the first three 
NFC awards (1974, 1991 and 1997). However, since the financial award of 2006 it turned into 
the fiscally dis-equalizing due to significant increase in the base of straight transfers in the 
relatively developed Sindh province. 
 
 Federal development grants (GD) playing an equalizing role after NFC 1997 award, prior to 
that Punjab and Sindh province (relatively more developed) had larger access to  GD. Thus 
FEI index reflect positive value.  Non development grant help reduce inter provincial 
inequalities throughout the period with its strong influence seen in NFC 1997 award, due to 
the provision of backwardness grants to Baluchistan and KPK.  
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The unconditional transfers, represented by NFC formula transfers plus straight transfers, on 
which no strings are attached for its use by the recipient provinces, and unconditional non-
development transfers illustrate more or less similar equalization trend in earlier three awards. 
However, these transfers are turned out to be mildly dis-equalizing after 2006.  
 
Total federal transfer appears to be equalizing in the first three awards (NFC 1974, 1991, 
1997) with a highest change of -0.05 observed in NFC 1997 award. Thus the award of 1997 
had played a greater impact in reducing the interprovincial inequalities. NFC 2006 award 
however failed to improve the process of equalization in Pakistan as depicted by the positive 
value of FEI in the immediate aftermath of this award and thus this award exacerbates inter 
provincial inequities. Based on the detailed results of FEI over the period of various financial 
awards, the thesis suggests that adhocizm and discretionary nature of transfers must be 
avoided and should be replaced with the formula based transfers to reduce interprovincial 
inequities in Pakistan. 
8.3 Contributions in the Empirics of Fiscal Federalism 
The thesis contributes to the empirical literature on fiscal federalism by exploring the effects 
of various categories of federal transfers for each federating units separately and jointly. This 
is the first attempt to carry out disaggregated analysis at individual province level which are 
distinct in terms of topology, geography, demography, socio-economic characteristics, ethnic 
and cultural characteristics and level of development. Thus to measure the fiscal behavior of 
individual provincial governments in response to various forms of federal transfers and grants 
is definitely be a value addition in the empirics of fiscal federalism in the context of a 
developing country.  
Moreover, studies on fiscal equalization role of transfers and grants are scarce for developing 
countries. This thesis also fills this gap by critically examining the role of diverse types of 
federal transfers under various arrangements of intergovernmental transfers and allocations. 
All financial awards are considered to determine the status of fiscal equalization in Pakistan. 
Thus the study will help in determining the appropriate future award strategy that would 
ensure fiscal equalization among federal units in less developed economies.   
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In addition, phenomenon of flypaper effect of federal transfers is scrutinized in the historical 
perspective to find out as to what extent federal transfer disproportionally spent on 
consumption of public goods and private income on consumption of private goods. The 
estimated magnitudes facilitate comparison with studies which explored flypaper effect in 
developing countries. 
 
In the context of Pakistan the expenditure functions are estimated with the help of two 
techniques, OLS and TSLS, using various instrumental variables to take care of grants and 
expenditure causality which may influence each other. The use of TSLS to measure the 
aggregate and individual province response to various forms of federal transfers is also an 
improvement in the existing empirical literature in Pakistan that has never been attempted 
before.  
 
Given that development grant may be endogenous to total provincial expenditure and may 
influence each other, the expenditure functions are estimated by using both Ordinary Least 
Square (OLSQ) as well as Two Stage Least Square (TSLS) estimation techniques. Various 
instrumental variables are used for TSLS estimation. E-VIEWS software is employed to 
estimate all expenditure functions.  The results from both techniques are reported and 
compared to check the sensitivity of magnitudes and summary statistics.  Subsequently, the 
best results, according to the minimum standard error, are finally considered for discussion.  
8.4 Limitations of the Data 
As highlighted earlier, there are certain components of federal non-development grants that 
have historically been extended for meeting some specific purpose provincial needs; like 
certain emergencies, financing of provincial current account deficit etc.  The decomposition of 
these transfers is not available to determine what part of it exactly constitute as unconditional 
and the component of it to be categorized as conditional. In fact this data is published at 
aggregate level. Thus the non-availability of disaggregated data restricts the study while 
estimating the effect of unconditional and conditional grant on provincial expenditures. 
Similarly lack of availability of detail breakdown of development grant into individual 
specific purpose projects and into routine budgeted provincial development programmes did 
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not permit us to examine the provincial fiscal response to specific purpose project separately. 
The comparative analyses across provinces to various projects will help in evaluating the 
effectiveness of these conditional grants policy and its future design; whether or not each 
province should treated differently in provision of these project grant allocations.  
Gross regional product estimated by Bengali and Sadaqat (2003) is used in this study to 
represent resident or private income of provinces. There are some criticisms on the estimated 
series, especially estimates developed for the relatively backward KPK and Baluchistan 
provinces. The criticism is believable due to non-availability of various types of micro data 
required to estimate regional income for these provinces. However, in the absence of any other 
estimates of regional GDP from official or academic sources, it was the only option available 
to finalize this study. 
8.5 Future Areas of Research 
The recent 18th constitutional amendment in Pakistan has significant implication on the overall 
structure of public finance as it eliminates concurrent list and devolved 41 functions out of the 
47 to provinces. This accounted for downloading of 15 federal ministries.  Thus it is probable 
to have significant budgetary implications in terms of rising provincial expenditures and also 
to federal governments spending behavior.  
In addition, NFC 2010 Award provided significant additional transfers to provinces, an overall 
raise of 11.5 percent transfers and consequential equal decline in federal retained amount in 
divisible pool taxes. This revenue-expenditures restructuring would also have significant 
budgetary implications on fiscal behaviors of federal and provincial governments. This 
restructuring in the structure of public finance clearly opens up a scope of future research as 
described below:  
• What would be the provincial government response to increase federal transfers 
following NFC 2010 and 18th constitutional amendment?  
• Will these transfers effectively increase the provincial expenditures as compared with 
the historical patterns provided in this study?  
• Will these huge transfers largely being use by the provincial government in increasing 
current non-development expenditures or will have significant positive implications on 
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provincial development budget that would help improve the quality of life of the 
people?  
• With the substantial increase in provincial expenditure responsibility, would the future 
role of local government now be emphasized?  Further, how provincial government 
would respond to this restructuring to improve the provincial and local service 
delivery? 
• How federal government will respond to the event of this fiscal restructuring and its 
effect on the federal fiscal behavior?  Would federal government increase its fiscal 
efforts for mobilizing more resources and in what sectors it expected to have a cut if 
any and to what extent?   
This thesis also found that the fiscal response of KPK to federal development grants is low 
compare to non-development grant which essentially reflect that KPK government has been 
using it as a main fungible source. This phenomenon needs to be studied to know the reasons 
of its lower multiplier impact on provincial expenditures.   
8.6 Policy Implications  
The following are the key findings which have policy implications on the future arrangements 
of intergovernmental fiscal transfer arrangements in Pakistan.  
• The history of intergovernmental fiscal transfer system in Pakistan is riddled with 
controversies and conflicts. Time and again (i.e. 1979, 1985, 2002) NFC failed to 
declare the appropriate revenue sharing arrangements that would be acceptable to all 
federating units.  
• The empirics of the thesis indicate a large vertical fiscal gap of about 24 percent.  This 
was due to the result of overwhelmingly centralized tax base structure. Provinces are 
left with either low yielding taxes or may be the result of lack of their fiscal efforts. 
With the recent restructuring of expenditures and revenue responsibilities this vertical 
fiscal gap may likely to increase further. 
• The empirical findings also reflect that the provincial fiscal response to federal 
transfers and grants are sensitive to the type of grant flow and vary by province. Its 
impact generally found to be higher and elastic in case of conditional grants as 
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compared to unconditional transfers and grants. These findings can also effectively be 
utilized for devising future NFC award strategy for sharing of federal divisible pool of 
taxes.  
• Estimation of Fiscal Equalization index by type of transfers and grants just prior and 
post NFC award years would provide the basis of examining the changing impact of a 
particular award on the fiscal equalization of provinces as a result of fiscal transfers 
and grants.  
Given the controversial history of NFC awards and repeated failures to reach an agreement on  
horizontal resource sharing arrangements among the constituents, it is argued that it is the 
result of structural deficiency which existed in the composition and working of NFC. At 
present NFC comprises of elected members from federal and provincial finance ministries and 
one representative of each provincial government only. All these stake holders assembled 
during the NFC sessions with an objective to maximize their own share from the federal 
divisible pool transfers. At times this has caused deadlock and non declaration of awards.  
Moreover, working and proceedings of the NFC also causes concerns. In the preliminary NFC 
sessions, federal government usually presented the paper on the overall macroeconomic and 
resource situation of the country and future growth potential and constraints it confronted. 
Provincial governments also present their papers on the macro economic and fiscal 
environment and its implications on their fiscal positions. The paper also includes key issues 
and likely future challenges for their respective provinces. In the subsequent proceedings a 
cursorily designed federal government paper came up for discussion by proposing minor 
tinkering in the future resource sharing transfers to provinces including the proposed vertical 
shares. Provinces on the contrary are arguing for their case to seek relatively higher vertical 
share from federal divisible pool taxes as compared to what federation has offered earlier. It is 
clear that an increase in the transfer share of one level of government must be associated with 
the declining transfer share of another level of government. Since all constituent members are 
part of the decision making and the key stakeholders, the agreement on the awards at times are 
difficult to obtain. The NFC composition does not include technocrats like economists’ 
auditors and accountants, judges as practiced in some other countries. These technocrats may 
propose an appropriate and likely unbiased revenue sharing arrangement keeping in view 
technical consideration of economic efficiency and equity and national and sub-national fiscal 
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environments. The correct assessment of constituents’ fiscal needs and fiscal capacities with 
the support of reliable statistics is necessary to seek consensus on the design of revenue 
sharing arrangements, the job which can be effectively discharge by these technocrats. 
Common Wealth Grants Commission of Australia and National Finance Commission of India 
include these technocrats as members of their commissions. These technical members prepare 
and present the case for revenue sharing transfers arrangements from higher to lower tiers of 
governments for the debate, discussions and finalization by the electorates. No such delays 
and stalemate ever observed in these countries in timely declaration of the awards. This was 
partly due to the inclusion of an appropriate criterion supported with reliable statistics and 
studies.  
Given the controversial history and delays in NFC award announcement in Pakistan, it is 
proposed that for improved decision making NFC may be reconstituted by including well 
reputed and non-controversial technocrats (Economists, Auditors/Accountant and may be 
retired Judges). They can facilitate decision making by proposing award draft using the most 
reliable and valid statistics and its rational and principles. The award is then presented before 
the federal and provincial governments’ stake holders for discussions, debates and finalization 
after incorporating their suggestions to the extent possible. It is also proposed that a permanent 
National Finance Commission should be setup with latest equipment and machinery and 
adequate database and library facilities beside sufficient office space for the support staff and 
members. The commission may conduct time to time studies related to fiscal federalism issues 
in Pakistan and other constituents’ members to strengthen the data base. Moreover a Sub-
Committee from the NFC members may be formed for addressing grievances/complaints of 
constituents that may related to flow of transfer/grants and undue deductions of amounts from 
it. If the system is implemented as it is proposed one can more likely see the positive results in 
the near future. 
The empirics of the thesis indicate a large vertical fiscal gap that is the result of over 
centralization of taxation power and significant expenditure responsibilities of provincial 
governments compared to their revenue assignments. Federation generally occupied more 
buoyant sources of revenues like taxation of international trade (custom duties), consumption 
taxes (general sales tax), income tax( income and corporate tax) and tax on production (federal 
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excise duties) The provinces either left with low yielding taxes and /or lack fiscal efforts by 
under exploiting their tax bases to the potential. Moreover, with recent restructuring of 
expenditures and revenue responsibilities this vertical fiscal gap may likely to increase further. 
It will also contribute to increase provincial reliance on federal transfers further. In order to 
reduce provincial fiscal dependence on federal transfers, there are two possible way to 
increase provincial resource mobilization. First as pointed out earlier that Agriculture income 
tax which is a provincial subject has a much higher potential for revenue growth compare to 
its current yield in provinces. This can be ideally exploited by documenting the provincial 
economy which has not yet been fully computerized. Similarly scope of provincial revenue 
generation from motor vehicle tax, stamp duties has also much higher potential compared to 
their existing yield. Many economic services are also not recovering their operation and 
maintenance costs (O & M), like irrigation services (covers only 24% of O & M costs). 
Provinces should not subsidize these economic services and instead full cost recovery should 
be ensured. Moreover significant revenue leakages in stamp duties, motor vehicle taxes, 
provincial excise duties, hotel taxes are also commonly observed which need to be plugged in 
by improving overall fiscal administration. If these steps are taken and revenue leakages are 
bridged provincial resource mobilization would significantly improved. Alternatively 
provinces may be assigned one relatively buoyant tax source from federation which is central 
excise duties (i.e. tax on production) with tax invoicing features. Earlier reforms also 
recommended central government to increase their reliance on income and corporate tax and 
value added tax. Due to the problem in introducing comprehensive value added tax (i.e. GST 
goods is in the federal domain whereas GST services is a provincial responsibility) which has 
a great potential of revenue generation it is recommended that provinces may relinquish their 
rights of general sales tax on services to federation. Some amicable resolution on value added 
tax sharing arrangements may be sorted out by the federation to provinces (Sindh and Punjab) 
who occupies relatively higher tax base of general sales tax on services.  Further, federal 
government may also permit provincial governments to piggyback federal income tax with a 
harmonious tax rates as practiced in many developed and developing countries. This would 
help improve provincial revenues and also reduce their heavy reliance on federal transfers. 
The empirical findings of this thesis also found a higher and elastic provincial expenditure 
response in the case of conditional federal transfers and relatively lower and inelastic 
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expenditure response in case of unconditional transfers. These responses also vary by 
province. The elastic expenditure response implies that attaching federal conditionality 
stimulates more than proportional increase in provincial spending as compared to actual 
amount of transfer. This suggests that provincial governments adhere to federal grant policy 
by matching their own resources with the federal grants and transfers to increase spending. 
However, unconditional grants partly utilized increase provision of provincial services and 
partly serve as their main fungible source to provide tax relief to the resident population.  
This finding serves as an effective policy tool for the future design of NFC revenue sharing 
transfer strategy from federal to provincial governments. The NFC 2010 award provides a 
significant jump to provincial vertical revenue transfers (from earlier 46% to 57.5% in 2010 
award). Although multiple criteria are used for sharing revenues but the award has failed to 
improve the fiscal efficiency.  All NFC (2010) transfers are characterized as unconditional, it 
is likely that provinces may treat these significant raise as “Manna from Heaven” for it may be 
partly spent on extravagance. Given the nature of provincial fiscal response in the thesis it is 
suggested that federal government may effectively use options of imposing conditionality in 
activities which carries high federal priorities. Therefore matching incentives may be given for 
the priority activities; e.g. increase in enrolment rates at primary or higher level education 
subject to achievement of certain appropriate and measurable performance benchmarks. Close 
ended matching incentives may be provided to all provinces to avoid its likely misuse. 
Alternatively only backward provinces which have a relatively higher service backlog may be 
considered for open ended matching incentives. It is also suggested that in design of future 
NFC awards part of the federal divisible pool share may be allocated for rewarding provincial 
fiscal efforts. The part of transfers may be tied with the attainment of certain performance 
bench marks or on achievement of certain targeted revenue growth with ceiling on the 
maximum matching rate. 
It is proposed that government may revamp the current structure of the grant design keeping in 
view the following considerations. First, there must be some fixed cost of running the 
government operations irrespective of the size of the province. As every province may require 
to sets up ministries/departments at the province levels to perform constitutionally assigned 
functions. After assessing the cost of running the government, say, one-third (33%) of the 
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horizontal transfers in a fixed equal proportion are allocated to each province for meeting their 
recurring expenditure requirements. Second, one third (33%) of the transfer may be reserved 
for provinces to share on equal per capita basis given their population size for meeting 
minimum service levels.  Third, one third (33%) of the remaining amount may be allocated 
using equity and efficiency principles. For example 5% of the transfers are reserved for 
provinces that have shown improvement in their fiscal efforts beyond certain bench mark 
target growth (say over and above 12% of the average revenue growth of all four provinces) 
that may be matched 100% or 50% level. About 10% of the transfers are set aside, on 
activities which federal government also considered high priority (for example; primary 
school enrollments, improvement in infant mortality rates) by setting their target rates. 
Matching grants (100% or 50%) of the target achievement of over and above these bench 
marks. These could only be granted to provinces who have high infant mortality or low 
primary enrollment rates. Similarly remaining 17% may be utilized using variation in the costs 
of public service provision (5%) on inverse population density or an area share) or level of 
poverty/ backwardness (12%) in each province. Various other combinations with conditional 
matching and non matching as well as unconditional grants share may be applied to device an 
award. Province specific incentives given their development status may also use to device a 
future award strategy. However the criteria must use the simple and most reliable published 
statistics to ensure transparency.   
In the end thesis has made some simulation for the years 2009-10 using the criteria which has 
been practiced in few selected countries like Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia and Mexico. The 
purpose of this exercise is to see how their horizontal distribution criteria for sharing revenues 
are compared with the Pakistan 2010 criteria and with the allocated shares to each province. 
Fiscal equalization index is also computed by application of their criteria on Pakistani 
provinces. Individual Countries have used criteria similar to that of Pakistan but using varying 
horizontal shares and number of indicators used. Some country has used one indicator, some 
two and some three. The common indicators of Pakistan and these countries are population 
share of each province, inverse population density, poverty/backwardness, revenue 
generation/collection. However development gap that has been used in Argentina criteria is 
computed with the income distance method in which the development gap is measured by 
calculating the distance from the highest per capita income of a province to the income of 
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other three provinces. Aggregate sum of the distance of these three provinces and divided by 
the total will give the share of these three provinces from the most developed province Sindh. 
The share is finally worked out for the three provinces by taking the percentage shares.. 
The simulation results demonstrates that Indonesian criteria that distribute transfers on the  
basis of revenue collection and Mexico criteria that distribute federal transfers on the basis of 
share in revenue collection (50%) and population (50%). Both these criteria significantly 
exacerbating fiscal equalization across provinces as compare to existing shares which they are 
getting from transfer arrangements (see summary Table 8.1 and Chart 8.1 where detail 
workings are provided in Appendix Table 8.1A). It demonstrates that the Sindh which 
considered being the relatively developed province in Pakistan, due to its higher share in 
federal revenue collection (70%) benefits disproportionately from the proposed arrangements. 
On the contrary following the Brazil criteria which distributes federal transfer on the basis of 
(population (33%), inverse population density(33%) and poverty/backwardness (33%), is 
more equalizing and highly beneficial for the least developed province of Baluchistan but 
significantly declines the share of more developed provinces of Sindh and Punjab.   
 
Table  8.1 Revenue Sharing Criterion of Different Countries Applied on Pakistan for Comparison  
Criteria Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan Total Equalization Index 
%age Share in Transfer    Pakistan 51% 26% 15% 9% 100% -0.028 
%age Share in Transfer    Brazil 28% 18% 16% 37% 100% -0.351 
%age Share in Transfer    Mexico 42% 46% 8% 3% 100% 0.238 
%age Share in Transfer    Indonesia 27% 69% 3% 1% 100% 0.479 
%age Share in Transfer    Argentina 45% 16% 17% 22% 100% -0.238 
 
For detailed working see APPENDIX CHAPTER 8 TABLE 8.1A 
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Chart 8.2 Revenue Sharing Criterion of Different Countries Applied on Pakistan for Comparison 
 
The index of fiscal equalization (FEI) shows that in the case of Pakistan formula it is 
equalizing as reflected by index value of (-0.028). If criteria of Indonesia and Mexico is 
applied on Pakistan it has a devastating impact on inter provincial equalities favoring 
developed provinces because of a higher weights of revenue generation in the formula (see 
appendix table 8.1A). Brazil formula is more equalizing with a value of FEI (-0.351) followed 
by Argentina formula also equalizing (-0.238) and favoring more backward province of 
Baluchistan and KPK. It can also be seen by the proportional share and Charts as depicted in 
Table 8.1 and Chart 8.1.  
Finally, in the light of the above proposed examples and recommendations future awards may 
be designed by setting different matching rates and imposing upper ceiling on the basis of 
provinces’ relative backwardness and development levels. Appropriate separate conditions for 
each province would help in reducing inter-provincial inequalities in the provisions of public 
services. Along with this strong system of provincial performance, monitoring and evaluation 
also need to be developed by the federal government for effective governance of provincial 
utilization of budgets and transfers.  
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Appendix Table 2.A 
CONCEPTUAL BASIS OF EXPENDITURE ASSIGNMENT 
  Responsibility for   
Expenditure Category Policy Standards & Oversights 
Provisional, 
Administration Comments 
Defense F F Benefits and costs are national in scope 
Foreign Affairs F F Benefits and costs are national in scope 
International Trade F F Benefits and costs are national in scope 
Monetary Policy, currency & 
Banking F F 
Benefits and costs are national in 
scope 
Interstate Commerce F F Benefits and costs are national in scope 
Transfer Payments to 
Persons F F Redistribution 
Subsidies to Business 
and Industry F F 
Regional development, Industrial 
Policy 
Immigration F F Benefits and costs are national in scope 
Unemployment Insurance F F Benefits and costs are national in scope 
Airlines and Railways F F Benefits and costs are national in scope 
Fiscal Policy F,S F,S,L Coordination is possible 
Regulation F F,S,L Internal common market 
Natural Resources F F,S,L Promotes common market 
Environment F,S,L S,L 
Benefits and costs may be 
national,  regional or local in 
scope 
Industry & Agriculture F,S,L S,L Significant inter-jurisdictional spillovers 
Education F,S,L S,L Transfers in kind 
Health F,S,L S,L Transfers in kind 
Social Welfare F,S,L S,L Transfers in kind 
Police S,L S,L Primarily local benefits 
Water, Sewage & Refuse L L Primarily local benefits 
Fire Protection L L Primarily local benefits 
Parks and Recreation F,S,L F,S,L 
Primarily local responsibility, but 
national and provincial 
governments may establish own 
parks 
Highways 
Interstate F S,L Internal common market 
Provincial S S,L Provincial benefits and costs 
Interregional S S,L Interregional benefits and costs 
Local L L Local benefits and costs 
Spending Power F,S F,S Fiscal transfers to advance own objectives 
Note: F is federal responsibility; S is state or provincial responsibility; and L is local responsibility 
Source: Shah, A (1994), The Reform of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations In Developing & Emerging Market Economies, 
Policy and Research Series No. 23, World Bank, 1994. 
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Appendix Table 2.B 
CONCEPTUAL BASIS OF TAX ASSIGNMENT 
Type of Tax 
Determination 
of 
Collection and 
Administration 
Comments 
Base Rate 
Customs F F F International Trade Taxes 
Corporate Income F F F Mobile factor, Stabilization tool 
Resources taxes, Resource 
rent[profits, income] tax F F F Highly unequally distributed tax bases 
Royalties, fees, charges, severance 
taxes, production output and 
property taxes 
S,L S,L S,L Benefit taxes charges for state-local services 
Conservation charges S,L S,L S,L To preserve local environment 
Personal Income F F,S,L F Redistributive, Mobile factor 
Wealth taxes [taxes on capital 
wealth, wealth transfers, inheritances 
and bequests] 
F F,S F Redistributive 
Payroll    Benefit charge e.g. social security coverage 
Multi Stage Sales Tax [VAT] F F F 
Border tax adjustment possible under 
federal assignments, potential 
stabilization tools 
Single-Stage Sales taxes [manufacturer , whole sale, retail] 
Option A S S,L S,L Higher Compliance cost 
Option B F S F Harmonized, lower compliance cost 
“Sin” taxes 
Excises on alcohol and Tobacco F F F Health care shared responsibility 
Betting, gambling S,L S,L S,L State and local responsibility 
Lotteries S,L S,L S,L State and local responsibility 
Race tracks S,L S,L S,L State and local responsibility 
Taxation of “bads” 
Carbon F F F To combat global/national pollution 
BTU taxes F,S,L F,S,L F,S,L Pollution impact may be national, regional or local 
Motor fuels F,S,L F,S,L F,S,L Tolls on federal/provincial or local roads 
Effluent charges F,S,L F,S,L F,S,L To deal with interstate, inter-municipal or local pollution issues 
Congestion tolls F,S,L F,S,L F,S,L Tolls on federal/provincial or local roads 
Parking fees L L L To control local congestion 
Motor vehicles 
Registration, transfer taxes and 
annual fees S S S State responsibility 
Driver’s licenses and fees S S S State responsibility 
Business taxes S S S Benefit tax 
Excises S,L S,L S,L Residence-based taxes 
Property S L L Completely immobile factor, benefit tax 
Land S L L Completely immobile factor, benefit tax 
Frontage, betterment S,L L L Cost recovery 
Poll F,S,L F,S,L F,S,L Payment for services 
User charges F,S,L F,S,L F,S,L Payment for services rendered 
Note: F = Federal Responsibility; S = State or provincial Responsibility; L = Local Responsibility 
Source: Shah. ,A (1994) The Reform of Intergovernmental Relations in Developing and Emerging Countries, Policy Research 
Paper No. 23, World Bank, 1994 
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Appendix Table 2.C 
EQUALIZATION GOALS, ALLOCATION FACTORS AND INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE 
Goals Factors Country examples 
Enable similar levels of 
service affordability 
Expenditure needs indicators 
[separately or in a combined 
indicator], or national expenditure 
standards 
India, Italy, Nigeria’s 
Federation Account, 
South Africa’s 
Equitable Shares, 
Spain, Uganda’s 
Unconditional Grant 
Enable similar levels of 
fiscal resource 
availability 
Fiscal capacity indicators or 
“representative revenue system” 
Canada’s Equalization 
Grant 
Enable similar levels of 
service at similar levels 
of Taxation 
Fiscal gap = Expenditure needs 
Fiscal capacity, OR some other 
combination of need and capacity 
Australia, China, 
Germany, Indonesia, 
Japan, Korea, Latvia, 
Netherlands, 
Municipal Fund 
Russia, Uganda’s 
Equalization Grant 
United Kingdom 
Distribution on an equal 
per capita basis Population 
Some transfers in 
Canada, Ecuador, 
Estonia, Germany, 
Hungary, and England 
Source: Boex, J., & Martinez-Vazquez, J., (2004).The Challenges in the Design of Fiscal Equalization and Intergovernmental 
Transfers, Conference Paper Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia. 
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Appendix Table 2.D 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCES OF THE EFFECTS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL TRANSFERS & GRANTS 
 
1 2013 Local Spending, Transfers, and Costly Tax Collection ---  PERU 
Author (s) 
Study Type of Grants 
Country, Sample, Study Period 
 
Type of Model/Technique 
 
Aragon, Fernando M (2013) 
Central Unconditional Equalization Grant 
PERU (District Municipalities),Panel data of 1558 Municipalities, 
1999 t0 2001  
Econometric Model/ OLS and 2SLS 
  Ln  (PC Spending) PC Spending 
Dependent 
Variable Independent Variable (1) OLS (2) 2SLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS 
Ln (Per Capita 
Spending) Ln (Per Capita Grant) 0.321*** 0.593***   
 Ln (Per Capita Grant *(H Cost) 0.169** 0.139*   
Per Capita l  
Spending Per Capita Grant   0.752*** 0.943*** 
 PC  Grant*(H Cost)   0.255* 0.238 
 Spending Elasticity (Grant* Low 
Cost) 0.515 0.951 0.752 0.943 
 Spending Elasticity (Grant * High 
Cost)  0.786 1.174 1.007 1.181 
Estimation Technique OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Remarks 
Asterisks show significance level at 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%.   
Grant in Peru called “Foncomun”. Column 2 uses variable ADDTRANSFER (all 
other transfers) as an instrument of Grant. It means expenditure elasticity is 
computed for low and high cost municipalities. Equations are estimated using 
sample of 1,445 observations of 4,025 municipalities. 
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2 2013 The Flypaper Effect in Mexican Local Governments (MEXICO) 
Authors/Year of Publication 
Type of Grant 
Country, Sample, Study Period 
Model Type 
Sour Laura (2013) 
Unconditional Grant 
Mexico Local Governments, panel  data of 19310 
observation of 2372 Local Government, 1990-2007 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent  
Variables Pooled Fixed Effect Random Effect 
Municipal 
Recurring 
Expenditures 
Per Capita   
Municipal Income PC  0.1880 0.1620 0.1695 
Unconditional  Transfer 
PC 0.8025 0.8251 0.8230 
Financial Resources PC 0.0416 0.0322 0.0335 
Symmetry Effect -0.6387 -0.6566 -0.6538 
Techniques Pooled, Fixed and Random Effect 
3 2012 The Fly paper and Teflon Effects: Evidence from China 
Authors ( Year of 
Publication)  
Type of Grant 
Country, Sample, Study 
Period 
Lee and Vuletin (2012) 
Unconditional Central Government transfers to Provinces 
China’s 31 Provinces,736 panel data, 1980-2008 and its 
decomposition  
Depende
nt 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable (1) (3) 
Provincia
l 
Expendit
ure PC 
GRP PC 0.127* 0.133* 
 Transfers PC 0.883* 0.772* 
 R2 0.934 0.928 
 Estimation 
Technique OLS FE 
Estimation Techniques/ 
Remarks 
(*)   significance at 1% level. 
OLS , Fixed Effect 
Control variable population density, year dummy to reduce omitted 
variable bias 
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4  2008 Fiscal Illusion at the Local Sphere: An Empirical Test of Flypaper 
Effect (South Africa)   
Author(s) Amusa Hammad, Mabunda Robert and Mabugu Ramos (2008) 
Study Type of Grants Unconditional Grant 
Country, Sample, Study 
Period 
South Africa, 237 Municipalities, 2006-07 
Type of Model/Technique Median Voter Model/ OLS 
Dependent Variable Independent Variable Coefficient Expenditure Elasticity 
Local Govt. Expenditure Per 
Capita (Ln) 
Own Source 
Revenues/Income 0.878**  
 Un conditional Grant 0.484***  
Expenditure Elasticity Own Source Revenues  0.885 
 Un conditional Grant  0.049 
Technique 
Remarks 
OLS 
Asterisk (***) and (**) respectively shows  significance level at 0.01 
and 0.05  
Control variables: Indicators of fiscal need, fiscal capacity and 
demographic Characteristics. 
 
5 1996   
Author(s) Gamkhar and Oates 
Study / Type of Grant Federal Welfare, Health and Hospital – Matching Grants and Other Federal 
Grants – Non Matching Grants 
Area, Sample, Study 
Period 
United States, State and Local Govt. Time Series Data for 1953-91 
Type of Model Standard Demand Model  
 
Dependent Variable Independent Variable Results 
State and Local 
government 
expenditures 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Grants 0.62 0.73 0.47 0.60 0.32 0.79 
Asymmetry  0.05 0.68 0.09 .26 0.63 0.02 
0.51 
0.20 
Private income 0.11 0.28 0.14 0.2 0.11 0.15 
       Estimation Technique OLS, TSLS and AR1 OLS TSLS 
Remarks Basic expenditure equation 1 2 
 
Disaggregated Grant Equation 3 4 
 
Welfare and other health 
spending equation 5 6 
Unemployment   
 
Share School Age in Total 
Population,    
 
Share of Total Population 
residing in Metro Area   
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  2013 Local Government Capital Spending and Impact of Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers (INDONESIA) 
Author(s) Lewis Blane D.  
Study / Type of Grant 
 Shared (Tax and Non Tax),Unconditional Grant (DAU) and Conditional Grant 
(DAK)  
Area, Sample, Study Period Indonesia , Sample ranges 1595  to 2089, No of Cross section units vary between 
379 and 453, # of Instruments 348, Data  2003-2009 
 Type of Model Budget Model or Benevolent Dictator Model 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE RESULTS 
  
Total LG Capital 
Spending 
LG Capital Spending by 
Type/Sectors-Delete 
  
FE GMM INFRA EDU/HELT 
OTHE
RS 
LG Total Capital Spending Shared Tax Revenues 0.006* 0.0001 0.297* -0.034* 0.380* 
 
Shared Non Tax 
Revenues 0.0265* 0.0001 0.103 0.031 0.195 
 
General Purpose Grant 
(DAU)  -0.0835* -0.0009 0.021* 0.011* 0.064* 
 
Specific Purpose Grant 
(DAK) 1.298* 1.208* 0.307* 0.545* 0.413* 
 
Gross Regional 
Domestic Prod. 0.001 0.001* 0.001* 0.000* 0.000* 
 Chi-Square Probability --- 0.580 0.377 0.451 0.535 
  
. 
Techniques/Remarks 
Fixed Effect (FE) and 
Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM),   
 
 
All economic and fiscal variables are taken at Real Per Capita level. Control 
variables are per capita real gross regional product, Population. Urban Population 
(%), Working age Population (%), Poor Population (%), 1st and 2nd Lag of LG 
Capital Spending, Own Source Revenues. 
 
(*) represent coefficient significance at 0.05 level. 
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7 1998  
Author(s) Duncombe and Yinger  
Study / Type of Grant State Education – Specific Purpose Non Matching Grants 
Area, Sample, Study Period United State New York State Govt. Cross Section Data of 631 Districts, 1991 
Type of Model Median Voter Model 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE RESULTS 
Cost Model:  
  Log of per pupil expenditures DEA efficiency index 1.67* 
 
Cost variables 0.33* 
Demand Model: 
  Education Outcome index  DEA efficiency index 
 
 
Operating aid 0.4637* 
 
Lump sum aid 3.4337* 
 
Matching aid 3.1814 
 
 
Income elasticity -7.8947 
 
Price/\Grant elasticity            0.8947* 
   
   Estimation Technique TSLS 
 
   
Remarks 
Cost variables: Teachers Salaries, Enrollment, Children in Poverty, Female 
Headed House Hold, Handicapped Students and Limited English Proficiency 
 
8 1989   
Author(s) Grossman 
Study / Type of Grant 
Federal Welfare – Specific Purpose Open Ended Matching / General Purpose  
Unconditional Grants 
   Area, Sample, Study 
Period 
United States, State Govt. Pooled Times Series and Cross Section Data Set of 1973-
77 
Type of Model ---- 
 
   DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE RESULTS 
   Direct General 
Expenditures by State 
Govt. Per Capita 
  Income 0.033* 
 
Federal Non Welfare Specific 
Purpose Grants. 1.513* 
 
 
Federal General Purpose 
Grants 1.14 
 
   Estimation Technique OLS 
 Remarks (Control 
variables) 
Population, % State Population in SMSAs, % reduction in state tax share, % urban 
pop.  
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10 1982 Federal Aid and Public Education: An Empirical Look at the New Fiscal Federalism 
Author(s) Craig and Inman  
Study / Type of Grant Federal Funding for Public Education – Conditional and Unconditional Grants 
Area, Sample, Study 
Period United States, 48 States, Pooled Cross-section time series1965 – 77 
Type of Model State budget model and local budget model 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE RESULTS 
   
  
 Local School Spending 
Local School Spending 
Pass Through Education 
Aid 
 0.734 
 
By Pass Education Aid  -0.251 Local School Taxes Matching Education Aid  0.896 
 
General Revenue 
Sharing Aid (Uncond),  -0.053 
   Estimation Technique GLS 
 Remarks Local school spending is sum of average school employee wages, total school 
personnel and non personnel expenditures and equipment purchase l.   
 
  
9 1985  Author(s) Craig and Inman  
Study / Type of Grant Federal Unconditional and Conditional Education and Welfare Specific Purpose Open Ended Matching Grants 
Area, Sample, Study Period United States, 44 states for 1966 – 80  
Type of Model Median Voter Model Conditional  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE                                              RESULTS 
   
    SWL State Welfare Spending (SWL)  Revenue Sharing 
Grant   -0.25* 
 
Lump Sum Education 
Aid   0.23 
Close Ended Matching  
Education and Welfare   0.05 
   
  
 
Lump Sum Welfare 
Aid   0.076 
 
Other Federal Aid   -0.06 
   
  
Estimation Technique GLS 
Remarks Working on real prices, Non aid variables included:  
Control Variables Tax Price, Taste, Political Structure and Fiscal Income. 
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11 1980 Local Fiscal Response to Intergovernmental Transfers 
Author(s) Slack 
Study / Type of Grant State Govt. – Unconditional Non Matching and Conditional Matching Grants 
Area, Sample, Study Period Canada, Ontario Pooled time series data of 50 upper tier municipalities for 
the period 1973 and 1974  
Type of Model Stone Geary Utility function and Translog Indirect Utility function 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE RESULTS 
  Stone Geary Translog  
Total Municipal Expenditures Income 0.014* 0.051* 
 Other Revenues 0.014* 0.051* 
 Unconditional Grants 0.014* 0.051* 
 Conditional Grants 2.28 0.428 
 
Price / Grant Elasticity -1.78 -0.334 
 
Income Elasticity 0.258 0.934 
   
 
Estimation Technique 3SLS 
 
Remarks 
For determination of grants, population, lagged taxes and % change in 
expenditures variables are used. Similarly population, tax burden and school 
taxes are used as instruments/control variables. 
 
 
12 1978  Author(s) McGuire  
Study / Type of Grant Education and Non Education Combined – Specific Purpose Closed Ended Matching Grants 
Area, Sample, Study Period United States, Local Govt., Pooled Time Series/Cross Section Data 1964- 71  
 Type of Model Fungibility Model 
    DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE RESULTS 
  Education (E) Non –Education (NE) Combined State-Local exp. 
On education using Own 
Source Revenues. (E) 
Income 
0.026* 0.069* 
 
 Education grants -0.494* 0.551* 
Combined State-Local Exp. 
from Own Source 
Revenues on Others except 
Education. (NE) 
Other Grants except 
Education 
0.283* -0.216* 
   
 
   Estimation Technique TSLS 
 Remarks Used Stone Geary Utility Function 
Instrumental variables:                                                                                                                               
Population, Students (#) Teachers (#), Students per teacher, Per capita income per teacher 
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14                    1973   
Author(s) Gramlich and Galper  
Study / Type of Grant Federal Lump Sum General Purpose Unconditional Grants 
Area, Sample, Study Period United States, Local Govt., Time series data for 1954 – 72  
Type of Model Standard Demand Analysis Frame work 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE                   RESULTS 
         EXP    ELASTICITY Total Current Expenditures 
(E) 
 Grants (Open-A+Lumpsum B) 0.428   
Negative Taxes (Reduction 
   
Grants Mandated C   0.799   
  Income  0.095          -1.08 
  Relative Price of Capital -1.93          (-0.04) 
Estimation Technique OLS   
Remarks Grant A: Open Ended 
   Grant B: Lump Sum Transfers 
  Grant C: Categorical Closed Ended 
  Budgetary Resources (Grant A & B Combined) 
  
Values in Parenthesis Indicate Elasticities 
 Relative Price of Capital, # School Children, # Female headed Households, 
Robbery Rate are used as Control Variables 
 
  
13 1977   
Author(s) Gramlich 
Study / Type of Grant Unconditional General Purpose grants  
Area, Sample, Study Period Survey depends upon  various studies 
Type of Model Reduce Form Equations (Various Models) 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE                         RESULTS 
   
    State Own Source Direct 
Expenditure Private Income ($)  0.05 ,      0.10 
 Government Grant ($)   0.25,      1.00 
    
   
 
   Estimation Technique Fixed Effect OLS 
 Remarks  
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16 
 2011 
Fungibility and the Impact of Development Assistance—Evidence from 
Vietnam’s Health Sector 
Author(s) Wagstaff, Adam  
Study / Type of Grant Oversea Health Sector Project and Other Development Assistance 
Area, Sample, Study Period Vietnam, 1997 and 2003  
Type of Model 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE RESULTS 
  
HEALT
H 
OTHE
RS 
Provincial Government Health Sector/Other 
Sectors Spending GDP (INCOME) -0.003** 0.000 
 ODA( GRANTS) 1.275*** 
1.060**
* 
    
    Estimation Technique 
Remarks 
  
 
Denotes (***) significance at 0.1, (**) at 0.05 
and (*) at 0.10 level.       
 
 
Net provincial revenues in case of Social Sector Expenditures (S) and 
net provincial expenditures in case of Others sectors (O) expenditures 
respectively are used as independent variables. 
 
 
15                          1972  Author(s) Weicher 
Study / Type of Grant Local Govt.(LG) – Specific and General Purpose Non Matching 
Grants 
Area, Sample, Study Period United States/LG Central Cities for 1962  
Type of Model Public Choice Model 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE RESULTS 
   
  E P F S H 
LG. Expenditures on Education (E)  State Aid to Municipal 
0.575
7 0.076 0.059 0.105 0.0987 
LG  Expenditures on  Police protection 
(P) 
State/local Aid to 
school districts. 
0.401
8 
0.053
3 
0.061
9 0.043 0.0328 
LG  Expenditures on Fire protection (F)  State/local Aid Muni. 
0.278
7 
0.027
8 
0.088
6 -0.008 0.0172 
  LG  Expenditures on Sanitation (S) Federal Aid school district. 
0.592
2 
0.041
8 -0.068 
0.085
4 0.0753 
LG  Expenditures on Highways (H)       
   
   Estimation Technique OLS 
 
Remarks 
Variables affecting various services are included as Control 
Variables. These include, retail sales, manufacturing establishment, 
population, unemployment rate, population growth, population 
density, housing characteristics, % of population school aged, less 
than age 21, nonwhite, foreign 
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17 2005 
Local Government Spending –Pre and Post Decentralization Fiscal 
Outcome (INDONESIA) 
Author(s) Lewis Blane D. 
Study / Type of Grant  Unconditional Shared Revenues plus General Purpose Grants (DAU) 
Area, Sample, Study Period Indonesia ,Local Government/1997-2002/ 
 
 Type of Model/Technique Budget Model  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE RESULTS 
  
Pre Decentralization  --------   Post Decentralization ---
------------- 
  
EXPPC 
NON 
RICH  RICH  
Total Exp Pre Decentralized 
EXPPPC       
Exp. NONRICH & RICH LG, 
Post Dec 
Shared 
Transfers/Grants PC 1.009* 0.936*  0.782*  
 Adjusted R
2 0.983 0.956  0.926  
   
Estimated Technique/ 
Remarks 2SLS 
 
 
  
Control Variables includes Per capita total household expenditures, % Poor 
population, % Urban population. Other includes, Log Population, Log Area, 
Cost of Construction Index, Log Gross Local Product and dummy for the Rich 
Local Government. 
 
18 2005                              A Model of Asymmetries in The Fly Paper Effect  
Author(s) Deller and Maher 
Study / Type of Grant Federal Aid – Unconditional Shared Revenues Program 
Area, Sample, Study Period Canada (Wisconsin), Cross section data of 1,778 Wisconsin cities, villages 
and towns for 1990-00 
 Type of Model Median Voter Model of Taxpayer 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE RESULTS 
   Model A 
 
P R S Q T 
∆ total expenditures T = P + R  
+ S+ Q 
Shared revenue 
/Grants 0.320* 
0.013* 
 
0.645* 
 
0.470* 
 3.42* 
P = Protective Services ∆ Shared revenue /Grant 0.876* 0.060* 0.702* 1.041* 5.84* 
R = Road Work Income -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0005 0.0042* -0.005 
S = Solid Waste ∆ Income 0.006* 0.0001 0.0105* 0.0057* 0.0462 
Q = Quality of Life       
   Remarks 
  
 
Used Two Period Dynamic Model using change in expenditure as dependent 
variable. 
Control Variables: Share of employment in professional industries, % of 
population with college degree,  % under age 20 years,% households having 
income <$15000,  no. of households, change in no. of house hold, per capita 
property tax revenue, and median value of house 
(All variables are in Per Capita 
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19 2004 Federal Government Title 1 Grant for Education  
Author(s) Gordon  
Study / Type of Grant Federal Education – Specific Purpose Non Matching Grant 
   Area, Sample, Study 
Period 
United States ,State Govt. 1992-95 (All values are in real 1992 Dollars) 
Type of Model Dynamic Median Voter Employment Model 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE RESULTS 
     SR (1992-93) LR (1993-94) LR (1994-95) 
Local School District 
Education Instructional 
Spending 
Total Revenues with 
Grant Title-1 0.98* 0.54 -0.04 
 Total Expenditure with 
Grant Title 1 1.4* 0.96* 0.119 
   Estimation Technique TSLS 
 Remarks Title 1 is Federal Government’s Single Most Important Education Grant for 
Economically Disadvantaged Children 
 
 
Total revenues includes; state (formula and categorical aid), local and federal 
revenues 
 
Total expenditures includes; Instructional spending, support services and capital 
outlays 
SR/Lr,  Short and Long Run respectively 
 
20 2003 United States  
Author(s) Gamkhar (2003)  
Study / Type of Grant Federal Government Highway Spending, Specific Purpose Closed ended matching  
Area, Sample, Study Period United States, State / Local Governments,  Pooled time series/cross section 1976 – 
90 
Type of Model Standard Demand Model  
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE  RESULTS 
State and Local 
Government Highway 
Expenditure 
Private Income ($) 0.01 
Government Grant ($) 0.37 
   Estimation Technique TSLS,  
Remarks   
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21 2003  Italy 
Author(s)  Levaggi and Zanola  
Study / Type of Grant Federal Health , Specific purpose Non Matching Grant  
   Area, Sample, Study Period Itlay, 18 regional governments, 1989-93 
Type of Model Pooled Time Series and Crosssection-- Utility Maximizing Median Voter Model 
  DEPENDENT VARIABLE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE RESULTS 
       State Health Spending Private Income ($)  0.01 
 Government Grant ($)  0.84 
 
Govt. Expenditure  
Elasticity (Income)  0.014 
    
   
 
   Estimation Technique TSLS  
 Remarks   
 
  
22 2002 The Flypaper Effect Unstuck: Evidence on Endogenous Grants from The Federal Highway Aid Program? United States 
Author(s) Knight Brian 
Study / Type of Grant Federal Highway Expenditures – Specific Purpose Closed Ended Matching Grants 
Area, Sample, Study 
Period United States, State Govt. Pooled time series and cross section data 1980-2000 
Type of Model Legislative Bargaining Model  
 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE RESULTS 
  TSLS LIML 
State Spending Grant Receipt  -0.87* -1.115* 
 
Income 0.01* 0.01* 
   
   Estimation Technique TSLS and LIML 
 
Remarks 
Instrument Variables States representation in US Senate Transportation Committee, 
Senate Majority Party, US Senate Committee Chair and House Tenure 
 
Preference vector 
 
All variables in terms of Per Capita 
Used Stone Geary utility function 
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24 1999 United States  
Author(s) Riber and Wilheim  
Study / Type of Grant Federal AFDC – Specific Purpose Open Ended Matching Grants  
   Area, Sample, Study Period United States, State Government data 1969-92 
 Type of Model Median voter model of Expenditure 
   
DEPENDENT VARIABLE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE RESULTS 
Maximum AFDC Benefit For A 
Family Of Four 
Specific Grant   0.26* 
Income 0.593* 
Maximum combined AFDC and Food 
Stamp 
Elasticity Price (Specific 
Grant) 0.027 
 
Elasticity Income 0.298* 
Estimation Technique OLS and TSLS 
 
Remarks 
 
All variables are in real values at 1987 personal consumption 
expenditure deflator  
OLS including State-Fixed Effects 
 
TSLS including State Fixed Effects (instrument: Average benefits in all 
other states) 
 
. 
 
  
23 2000 Is the Response of State and Local High Way Spending Symmetric To Increases and Decreases in Federal Highway Grants? 
Author(s) Gamkhar, Shama 
Study / Type of Grant Federal Highway Grants – Closed Ended Matching Grants 
Area, Sample, Study Period United States, State and Local Govt. 1976-90 Panel Data set for 45 
States  
 
Type of Model 
Standard Demand 
Model 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE RESULTS 
Per Capita Real State and Local 
Highway Expenditure (lagged) 
 Per Capita Federal 
Highway 
Obligations//Grant 
Symmetric Response Asymmetry Response 
0.76 
 
0.87 
 
0.81 
Per Capita Personal 
Income                          0.02*  
Estimation Technique AR1 
 Remarks Results show combined effect of current and lagged periods. 
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25 1996   
Author(s) Gamkhar and Oates 
Study / Type of Grant General Purpose Unconditional Grant 
   Area, Sample, Study Period United Sates, State Governments, Time Series 1952 – 1990 
Type of Model Standard Demand Model:  
   DEPENDENT VARIABLE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE RESULTS 
Combined State and Local 
Government Expenditure 
Private Income ($) 0.14 
Government Grant ($) 0.47 
Federal Non – Welfare Grants 
Govt. expenditure 
Elasticity (Income) 0.27 
Govt. expenditure 
Elasticity (Grant) 0.6 
   Estimation Technique OLS AR1, TSLS AR1 
 
Remarks 
Ordinary Least Squares-Autoregressive 1 Standard Demand Model; Time 
Series; Two-Stage Least Squares-Autoregressive 1 
Instrumental Variables unemployment, share of population school-aged, % 
of population urban 
 
 
 
  
26 1994 Pakistan  
Author(s) Pasha, Hafiz A. 
Study / Type of Grant 
  Aggregate provincial expenditure response to transfers/Total NFC unconditional 
Transfer 
Area, Sample, Study 
Period 
Pakistan, (Four Provinces combined). 1972-73 to 1992-93 
Type of Model Stone Geary Utility Function 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE RESULTS 
   
    Per Capita Total 
Provincial Expenditures Per Capita Income 0.0299 
 Transfers 0.6137 
 Borrowing 0.8967 
   
   Estimation Technique OLS 
 
Remarks 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) and  Public Expenditure Index are used as proxy for 
inflation, yearly dummy variable for Social Action Plan Period 
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27 1990   
Author(s) Moffitt  
Study / Type of Grant Federal AFDC – Specific Purpose Open Ended Matching Grants 
   Area, Sample, Study Period United States, State Govt. ,Pooled Times Series/Cross Section Data, 1960-84  
 Type of Model Mean Voter Model  
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE RESULTS 
State AFDC Guaranteed Benefits Income Effect 
79.6 
[+ve and significant in all the models] 
      
 
Price Effect/AFDC Grant 
          -14117.5 
[_Insignificant in all the models] 
   Estimation Technique OLS 
 Remarks AFDC benefit equation also estimated adding state variables; however results 
show same signs with different magnitude of explanatory variables. Variables 
are at Real Prices. 
  
 
28 1989 Canada?  
Author(s) Shah 
Type of Grant Specific Purpose Provincial Transportation and Non Transportation Grants to  Local Governments, 1966 – 78 
Area, Sample, Study Period Canada, Alberta, Local Governments, Pooled time series / Cross-section 
Data, 1966-78  
Type of Model Fungibility Model estimated by employing Stone Geary Utility Function 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE RESULTS 
  TR NTR Disaggregated Local 
Government Spending on 
Transportation (TR)  and Non -
Transportation Activities (NTR) 
 Private Income ($) 0.06 0.94 
Intergovernmental 
Grant ($) 3.17 -0.11 
    
   Estimation Technique Linear Expenditure System TR, Transportation Expenditures, NTR, Non Transportation Expenditures 
Remarks   
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29 1986   
Author(s) Craig and Inman 
 Type of Grant Federal Specific Purpose Open and Close Ended  Education and Welfare Grants 
Area, Sample, Study Period 
United States, State and Local Government, Pooled Time Series / Cross Section 
Data 1966-80 
Type of Model Representative voter utility maximization model  
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE RESULTS 
Federal Education 
Expenditure  Private Income ($) 0.003 
 Government Education Grant ($) 0.43 
 Govt. Expend. Elast. (Income) 0.13 Other State Expenditure  Private Income ($) 0.019 
 Government Welfare Grant ($) 1.19 
 Govt. Expend. Elast. (Income) 0.26 
   Estimation Technique OLS 
Remarks   
 
30 
 1973   
Author(s) Gramlich and Galper 
Study / Type of Grant Federal Lump Sum Grant (Unconditional) 
Area, Sample, Study Period United States Local Governments 1954-1972 
Type of Model Standard Demand Analysis Framework; Quarterly Time – Series Data 
  DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE RESULTS 
   State and Local 
Government Current 
Expenditures 
Private Income ($)  0.10 
 Government Grant ($)  0.43 Local Government 
Expenditures Private Income ($)   0.05 
 Govt.  Grant ($)  0.25 
   
 
   Estimation Technique Fixed Effects, OLS Control Variables; Grant price effect, suburban taxes 
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31              1969 State and Local Governments and Their Budget Constraint 
Author(s) Gramlich 
Study / Type of Grant Local Govt. – Specific purpose matching grants 
Area, Sample, Study Period United States, State-Local Govt., Quarterly Date for the period 1954 – 64  
Type of Model Budget Constraint Model 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE RESULTS 
  Const 
Other 
Pur 
Net 
Comp. 
Emp 
Transfers Total exp 
Expenditure Function includes 
Expenditures on Construction 
+ Other purchase + Net 
Compensation of Employees + 
Transfers = Total 
Expenditures. 
Federal Grant 0.303 0.368 0.451 -0.002 1.12 
Income 0.007 0.012 0.025 0.010 0.054 
Interest rate -11.78 -5.28 -0.23 0.29 -17.00 
  
    
 
     
Estimation Technique 
 
Indirect Least 
Square TSLS 
Price, Population, 
Interest rates 
 
 
 
are used as control 
variables.      
   
 
32 1968   
Author(s) Henderson  
Study / Type of Grant Unconditional Grant 
Area, Sample, Study Period 
United States, 100 metropolitan and 2980 non-metropolitan counties, 
Cross-section data, 1957 
Type of Model Community Welfare Maximization 
   
DEPENDENT VARIABLE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE RESULTS 
  Metropolitan Non Metropolitan 
Total General Expenditure Per Capita 
Per Capita Personal 
Income  0.0439 0.0819 
 
Federal and State 
Grants per capita. 1.4231 1.0371 
 
Population 0.0102 -0.2737 
   Estimation Technique OLS & TSLS 
 
Remarks 
Regression equations were fitted separately for 100 Metropolitan 
Counties and 2980 Non metropolitan Counties. 
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33 2001  Pakistan 
Author(s) Sabir, Mohammad  
 Type of Grant Total Transfers and Grants (conditional plus Unconditional)  
Area, Sample, Study Period Pakistan, (Four Provinces Combined), 1972-1999 
Stone Geary Utility Function 
Type of Model Median Voter Model 
  DEPENDENT VARIABLE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE RESULTS 
 
  
SOCIAL OTHERS 
Combined Province Expenditures Per Capita Per Capita Income 0.0264 0.015 
Social Sector (S) Transfers + Borrowing 0.1851 0.1635 
Other Sectors (O) Borrowing Dummy 0.3266 0.4215 
    
   Estimation Technique OLS 
 
Remarks 
Consumer Price Index, Social Action Programme Period Dummy 
and borrowing dummy are used as control variables.  
 
34 1998 Fiscal Illusion, Intergovernmental Grants and Local Spending  
Author(s) Islam 
Study / Type of Grant State Unconditional Grants to Local Government  
Area, Sample, Study Period Canada Ontario Pooled Times Series and Cross Section Data For 39 Upper Tier 
Municipalities 1977-91 
 Type of Model Stone Geary Utility Function 
 DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE RESULTS 
Local Expenditure Grants 
 
+ve Sig. for 10 Small Counties(0.004 
to 3.135) 
-ve Sig. for 11 Large Muni (0-.001 to 
0.421) 
Income +ve and Significant (0.03 to 0.88) 
     Estimation Technique GLS and ARCH Model 
 
Remarks 
All Variables in real terms 
Control Variables, Property and Business 
Tax,  Municipal Taxes/Total Revenue         
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35 2006 Using a Discontinuous Grant Rule to Identify The Effect Of Grants On Local Taxes and Spending 
Author(s) Dahlberg, Maork, Rattso and Agren  
Study / Type of Grant Local Taxes and Spending – Unconditional Block (Lump Sum) Grants 
Area, Sample, Study 
Period 
Sweden - Unbalanced Panel Data of 283 Municipalities for the period 1996-2004 
Type of Model Median Voter Model 
 DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE RESULTS 
Local Current Spending Cost Equalizing Grants Results using different specifications: 
Local Tax Rate Migration Grants 
Out migration has Positive significant effect on 
cost equalizing aid 
  
Federal grant shifted more local spending than 
reduced tax (Fly Paper) 
Estimation Technique TSLS 
 Remarks Control variables: 
 
 
· Net-out migration and ∆ in pop.  Age 7-18. 
 
 Municipal tax base, total population, share of population Age 0-6, Age 7-15, Age 80 
and above and share of population born abroad. 
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Appendix Table 3.A 
EXTENT OF FEDERAL TRANSFERS TO PROVINCES 
NFC Award Period 
Total 
Transfer 
(Nominal) 
Total 
Transfer 
(Real, 
2001 
Prices) 
Per Capita 
(Nominal) 
Per 
Capita 
(Real) 
As % of 
National 
GDP 
As % of 
Federal 
Revenues 
As % of 
Provincial Own 
Source 
Revenues 
As % of 
Provincial 
Expenditures 
Year 
  
Rs Rs % % % % 
1972-73 1,166 14,968 19 239 1.9 13.8 84.9 519.5 
1973-74 1,587 16,447 24 247 1.9 13.4 81.0 579.1 
1974-75 2,665 22,582 37 316 2.4 17.0 102.6 2267.9 
1975-76 3,605 27,248 49 372 2.8 19.3 125.4 2033.5 
1976-77 4,353 29,734 58 399 3.0 19.9 151.2 1193.6 
1977-78 5,960 37,346 79 492 3.5 22.5 188.6 613.3 
1978-79 7,300 43,350 94 559 3.9 23.2 211.2 589.4 
1979-80 9,025 48,524 111 598 4.1 22.1 222.8 525.2 
1980-81 12,764 61,929 154 746 4.9 26.0 263.2 475.4 
1981-82 12,749 56,535 148 658 4.1 23.8 234.5 462.2 
1982-83 13,910 58,592 158 667 4.0 22.2 230.1 494.9 
1983-84 17,366 66,717 192 738 4.4 22.6 254.5 483.2 
1984-85 21,132 77,664 229 843 4.8 26.1 281.5 495.6 
1985-86 28,792 102,427 305 1,084 5.9 29.6 341.0 573.6 
1986-87 35,080 119,400 365 1,242 6.6 33.3 364.6 616.8 
1987-88 48,091 149,352 492 1,527 7.8 38.9 479.9 724.4 
1988-89 49,580 141,780 495 1,415 7.1 33.9 524.0 728.5 
1989-90 42,325 113,715 409 1,099 5.5 25.7 401.9 709.6 
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NFC Award Period 
Total 
Transfer 
(Nominal) 
Total 
Transfer 
(Real, 
2001 
Prices) 
Per Capita 
(Nominal) 
Per 
Capita 
(Real) 
As % of 
National 
GDP 
As % of 
Federal 
Revenues 
As % of 
Provincial Own 
Source 
Revenues 
As % of 
Provincial 
Expenditures 
1990-91 51,021 121,220 483 1,147 5.5 27.2 370.8 666.9 
1991-92 77,691 167,979 679 1,468 6.8 32.5 351.3 535.8 
1992-93 86,065 170,900 731 1,452 6.7 32.0 377.0 588.6 
1993-94 101,235 178,451 846 1,492 6.8 32.6 404.7 562.1 
1994-95 125,083 194,077 1,026 1,592 7.1 36.5 455.7 624.3 
1995-96 149,739 214,557 1,208 1,730 7.4 37.5 444.1 600.3 
1996-97 147,945 184,931 1,177 1,472 6.4 36.9 421.0 570.5 
1997-98 144,576 169,630 1,114 1,307 5.6 31.0 365.7 551.4 
1998-99 145,493 161,283 1,088 1,206 5.1 27.8 317.2 503.0 
1999-00 187,850 202,577 1,372 1,479 5.1 34.8 442.0 634.5 
2000-01 211,804 211,804 1,492 1,492 5.1 36.2 466.5 633.4 
2001-02 236,001 230,312 1,632 1,593 5.5 35.9 508.2 682.4 
2002-03 253,833 237,316 1,715 1,603 5.4 34.9 533.7 754.3 
2003-04 275,759 239,084 1,832 1,588 5.1 35.3 445.1 685.5 
2004-05 338,476 273,826 2,187 1,769 5.4 37.6 521.1 746.4 
2005-06 412,228 301,844 2,606 1,908 5.6 39.4 544.5 776.4 
2006-07 493,470 334,647 3,023 2,050 5.8 39.5 473.6 705.6 
2007-08 567,850 339,562 3,418 2,044 5.6 39.8 484.1 698.1 
2008-09 686,399 359,729 4,048 2,121 5.6 40.4 553.7 711.6 
Source: Author’s own calculations using data. 
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Appendix Table 3.B 
REVENUE SHARING ARRANGEMENTS UNDER 1951 RAISMAN AWARD 
 
Province/State Income Taxb Share Sales taxc Share Kard Excise Duty Share 
 % % % 
East Pakistan 45.0 Rs. 18 Millions 45.0 
Punjab 27.0 54.0 27.0 
Sindh 12.0 16.0 12.0 
KPK (former NWFP) 8.0 10.0 8.0 
Bahawalpur 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Khairpur 0.6 0.1 0.6 
Baluchistan States 
Union 0.6 1.5 0.6 
    
Remaindera 2.8 14.4 2.8 
Total 100.0  100.0 
a Kept for other princely states which might accede to Pakistan, presently this amount was allocated to existing units in the 
given proportion.   
b From proceeds of income tax (excluding corporation tax and those pertaining to the Federal Capital and taxes payable in 
respect of federal emoluments), 50% was distributed amongst the Provinces and to the Federated States in the reported 
proportions 
c Federal government continued to collect sales tax and Provinces received 50% of collection on derivation principle 
d Half of the collection in Karachi was to be distributed amongst various units in West Pakistan in the reported proportion 
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THE MODEL 
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APPENDIX 4.A 
MATHEMATICAL DERIVATION OF THE MODEL AND ITS APPICATION WITH 
CLASSIFICATION OF TRANSFER AND GRANTS 
Stone – Geary Utility Function 
 
𝑈(𝐺 − 𝐺0,𝐶) = (𝐺 − 𝐺0)𝛽𝐶𝛼 
𝐺 is Stone – Geary utility over public goods, 𝐺0is the Stone Geary minimum consumption 
parameter160
Where α > 0, β > 0 and α + β =1 therefore α = 1-β 
𝑈(𝐺 − 𝐺0,𝐶) = (𝐺 − 𝐺0)𝛽𝐶1−𝛽 
and  𝐶 Stone – Geary utility over private good. 
Taking L𝑛 of above mentioned function 
𝑈(𝐺 − 𝐺0,𝐶) = 𝐿𝑛 [(𝐺 − 𝐺0)𝛽𝐶1−𝛽] 
𝑈(𝐺 − 𝐺0,𝐶) = 𝐿𝑛(𝐺 − 𝐺0)𝛽 + 𝑙𝑛𝐶1−𝛽 
 
𝑈(𝐺 − 𝐺0,𝐶) = 𝛽 𝐿𝑛(𝐺 − 𝐺0) + (1 − 𝛽)𝐿𝑛𝐶  (1) 
𝐶𝑖 = 𝑌 − 𝑡 (2) 
Disposable income of a resident  
𝑁𝐶𝐼 = 𝑁𝑦 − 𝑁𝑡 (3) 
 
Disposable income of a all residents in a province  
𝐶 = 𝑌 − 𝑁𝑡 (4) 
Where  C is the disposable income Y is individual private income and 𝑁𝑡 is total taxes paid by 
the residents 
𝑃𝐺 = 𝑁𝑡 + 𝐹𝑇 (5) 
                                                          
160Stone Geary Function also employed by knight (2000, 2002), Shah (1989), Slack (1980), Pasha and Ghous (1994) and 
many others in their studies to examined the sub-national government response to intergovernmental transfers. Cobb Douglas 
utility gives a linear expenditure function in income and federal transfers/grants. Stone–Geary, a generalization allows for 
heterogeneity across provinces for public goods through minimum consumption parameter “𝐺0”, .Knight (2000). 
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𝑃𝐺 + 𝐶 = 𝑌 + 𝐹𝑇 (6) 
𝑃 is the price of public good, 𝐺 is utility over a public good, 𝑌 is individual private income, 
𝐹𝑇 = Federal Transfers to provinces 
Combined resource constraint for a sub-national government 
Assuming house hold preferences, maximize Stone-Geary Utility function  
Ui = U (G, Ci), G, Ci ≥ 0,   ∂U/∂G > 0 and ∂U/∂Ci > 0 and ∂2U/∂G2 ≤ 0 and ∂U2/∂Ci2 ≤0 
i=1….N 
Maximize Utility                               𝑈(𝐺 − 𝐺0,𝐶) = 𝛽 𝐿𝑛(𝐺 − 𝐺0) + (1 − 𝛽)𝐿𝑛𝐶 
Subject to constraint                       𝑃𝐺 + 𝐶 = 𝑌 + 𝐹𝑇 
Constructing Langrangian function 
𝑙 = 𝛽 𝐿𝑛(𝐺 − 𝐺0) + (1 − 𝛽)𝐿𝑛𝐶 + 𝜆[(𝑌 + 𝐹𝑇) − 𝑃𝐺 − 𝐶)]------ (7) 
Establishing first order conditions 
Taking partial derivative of ‘l’ with respect to G and C we get 
𝜕𝑙
𝜕𝐺
=  𝛽(𝐺 − 𝐺0) − 𝑃𝜆 = 0 = 𝛽 
𝜕𝑙
𝜕𝐶
=  1 − 𝛽
𝐶
− 𝜆 = 0 
𝐶 = (1 − 𝛽)𝑃(𝐺 − 𝐺0)
𝛽
 
Substituting the value of ‘C’ in the constraint equation 
𝑃𝐺 + (1 − 𝛽)𝑃(𝐺 − 𝐺0)
𝛽
= 𝑌 + 𝐹𝑇 
𝛽𝑃𝐺 + (1 − 𝛽)𝑃(𝐺 − 𝐺0) = 𝛽(𝑌 + 𝐹𝑇) 
𝛽𝑃𝐺 + (1 − 𝛽)(𝑃𝐺 − 𝑃𝐺0) = 𝛽(𝑌 + 𝐹𝑇) 
𝛽𝑃𝐺 + 𝑃𝐺 − 𝛽𝑃𝐺 − 𝑃𝐺0 + 𝛽𝑃𝐺0  = 𝛽(𝑌 + 𝐹𝑇) 
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𝑃𝐺 − 𝑃𝐺0 + 𝛽𝑃𝐺0  = 𝛽(𝑌 + 𝐹𝑇) 
𝑃𝐺 − 𝑃𝐺0(1 − 𝛽)  = 𝛽(𝑌 + 𝐹𝑇) 
𝑃𝐺 = 𝛽𝑌 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇 + (1 − 𝛽) 𝑃𝐺0 (8) 
The remainder term 𝑃𝐺0(1 − 𝛽)in above equation is an unabsorbed random heterogeneity 
exists across state/provinces. Knight (2000) 
Taking partial derivative with respect to Y i.e. Individual Private Income and FT Federal 
Transfers 
𝜕𝑃𝐺
𝜕𝑌
= 𝛽 
𝜕𝑃𝐺
𝜕𝐹𝑇
= 𝛽 
𝐺0is variable factor of 𝐺, therefore can be written as  
𝐺0 = 𝑣𝐺 (9) 
 
Substituting in equation 8 results as  
𝑃𝐺 = 𝛽𝑌 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇 + (1 − 𝛽)𝑣𝑃𝐺 (10) 
𝑃𝐺 − (1 − 𝛽)𝑣𝑃𝐺 = 𝛽𝑌 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇 [10(a)] 
𝑃𝐺[1 − (1 − 𝛽)𝑣] = 𝛽𝑌 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇 [10(b)] 
𝑃𝐺 = 𝛽[1 − (1 − 𝛽)𝑣]𝑌 + 𝛽[1 − (1 − 𝛽)𝑣]𝐹𝑇 
𝑃𝐺 = 𝛽𝑌 ∗ 𝑌 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇 ∗ 𝐹𝑇 (11) 
Now as explained in the model, total grants are broken down in two broad categories; 
conditional and unconditional grants. The equation will transform to 
𝑃𝐺 = 𝛽𝑌 ∗ 𝑌 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝑐 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝐶 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝑈𝐶 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝑈𝐶 (12) 
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Individual Models for Provinces and Aggregate Model for Country 
𝑃𝐺𝐴  = 𝑃𝐺0(1 − 𝛽) + 𝛽𝑌𝐴 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝐶 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝐶𝐴 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝑈𝐶 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝑈𝐶𝐴 A All ““A” Provinces 
𝑃𝐺𝑃  = 𝑃𝐺0(1 − 𝛽) + 𝛽𝑌𝑃 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝐶 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝐶𝑃 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝑈𝑃 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝑈𝐶𝑃 P Punjab 
𝑃𝐺𝑆  = 𝑃𝐺0(1 − 𝛽) + 𝛽𝑌𝑆 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝐶 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝐶𝑆 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝑈𝑆 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝑈𝐶𝑆 S Sindh 
𝑃𝐺𝐾  = 𝑃𝐺0(1 − 𝛽) + 𝛽𝑌𝐾 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝐶 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝐶𝐾 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝑈𝐶 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝑈𝐶𝐾 K Khyber Pakh. 
𝑃𝐺𝐵  = 𝑃𝐺0(1 − 𝛽) + 𝛽𝑌𝐵 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝐶 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝐶𝐵 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝑈𝐵 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝑈𝐶𝐵 B Baluchistan 
 
Borrowing as a Variable for Provision of Public Goods 
The above model is extended and borrowing is taken as an additional exogenous variable constituting 
combined resource constraint of provincial government with respect to public expenditure. Where 𝑃𝐵 
is the provincial borrowing from the federal government. 
𝑃𝐺 + 𝐶 = 𝑌 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝐶 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝐶 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝑈𝐶 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝑈𝐶 + 𝑃𝐵 (i) 
Constructing Langrangian function  
 
Maximize Utility                               𝑈(𝐺 − 𝐺0,𝐶) = 𝛽 𝐿𝑛(𝐺 − 𝐺0) + (1 − 𝛽)𝐿𝑛𝐶 
 
Subject to extended constraint   𝑃𝐺 + 𝐶 = 𝑌 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝐶 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝐶 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝑈𝐶 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝑈𝐶𝐹𝑇 + 𝑃𝐵 
 
Constructing Langrangian function 
 
𝑙 = 𝛽 𝐿𝑛(𝐺 − 𝐺0) + (1 − 𝛽)𝐿𝑛𝐶 + 𝜆[(𝑌 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝐶 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝐶 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝑈𝐶 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝑈𝐶𝐹𝑇𝑇 + 𝑃𝐵) − 𝑃𝐺 − 𝐶)] (ii) 
 
Establishing first order condition  
 
Taking partial derivative of Langrangian function ‘l’ with respect to 𝐺 and 𝐶 we get 
𝜕𝑙
𝜕𝐺
=  𝛽(𝐺 − 𝐺0) − 𝑃 𝜆 = 0 =  𝛽 
𝜕𝑙
𝜕𝐶
=  1 − 𝛽
𝐶
− 𝜆 = 0 
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𝐶 = (1 − 𝛽)𝑃(𝐺 − 𝐺0)
𝛽
 
Substituting the value of C into the extended combined budget constraint 
𝑃𝐺 + (1 − 𝛽)𝑃(𝐺 − 𝐺0)
𝛽
= 𝑌 + 𝐹𝑇 + 𝑃𝐵 
Multiply both sides by β 
𝛽𝑃𝐺 + (1 − 𝛽)𝑃(𝐺 − 𝐺0) = 𝛽𝑌 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇 + 𝛽𝑃𝐵 
 
𝛽𝑃𝐺 + (1 − 𝛽)(𝑃𝐺 − 𝑃𝐺0) = 𝛽𝑌 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇 + 𝛽𝑃𝐵 
 
𝛽𝑃𝐺 +  𝑃𝐺 −  𝑃𝐺0 − 𝛽𝑃𝐺 + 𝛽𝑃𝐺0 = 𝛽𝑌 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇 + 𝛽𝑃𝐵 
 
𝑃𝐺 − 𝑃𝐺0(1 − 𝛽) = 𝛽𝑌 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇 + 𝛽𝑃𝐵 
 
𝑃𝐺 = 𝛽𝑌 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇 + 𝛽𝑃𝐵 + 𝑃𝐺0(1 − 𝛽) 
 
Taking partial derivative of above equation by 𝑌 i.e. private income of residents, 𝐹𝑇 i.e. Federal 
transfers and 𝑃𝐵  provincial borrowing 
 
𝜕𝑃𝐺
𝜕𝑌
= 𝛽 
𝜕𝑃𝐺
𝜕𝐹𝑇
= 𝛽 
𝜕𝑃𝐺
𝜕𝑃𝐵
= 𝛽 
Individual and Aggregate Model of Provinces with Borrowing 
𝑃𝐺𝐴  = 𝑃𝐺0(1 − 𝛽) + 𝛽𝑌𝐴 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝐶 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝐶𝐴 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝑈𝐶 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝑈𝐶𝐴 +  𝛽𝑃𝐵𝐴 A All ““A” Provinces 
𝑃𝐺𝑃  = 𝑃𝐺0(1 − 𝛽) + 𝛽𝑌𝑃 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝐶 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝐶𝑃 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝑈𝑃 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝑈𝐶𝑃 +  𝛽𝑃𝐵𝐴 P Punjab 
𝑃𝐺𝑆  = 𝑃𝐺0(1 − 𝛽) + 𝛽𝑌𝑆 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝐶 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝐶𝑆 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝑈𝑆 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝑈𝐶𝑆 +  𝛽𝑃𝐵𝐴 S Sindh 
𝑃𝐺𝐾  = 𝑃𝐺0(1 − 𝛽) + 𝛽𝑌𝐾 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝐶 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝐶𝐾 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝑈𝐶 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝑈𝐶𝐾 +  𝛽𝑃𝐵𝐴 K Khyber Pakh. 
𝑃𝐺𝐵  = 𝑃𝐺0(1 − 𝛽) + 𝛽𝑌𝐵 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝐶 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝐶𝐵 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝑈𝐵 ∗ 𝐹𝑇𝑈𝐶𝐵 +  𝛽𝑃𝐵𝐴 B Baluchistan 
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DATA DESCRIPTION 
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APPENDIX 5.1.1A-DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES BY NAME AND DATA SOURCES 
VARIABLES 
CODE DESCRIPTION 
UNIT OF 
MEASUREMENT SOURCE DOCUMENT OF DATA DOMAIN 
POPULATION 
POPXA All provinces excluding FATA & Islamabad Million 
 Provincial Census Reports 
 National Census Report 
Federal & Provincial 
Government 
POPA All provinces Million 
POPP Punjab Million 
POPXP Punjab excluding Islamabad Million 
POPS Sindh Million 
POPN Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Million 
POPXN Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa excluding FATA Million 
POPB Baluchistan Million 
FEDERAL TRANSFERS 
DP Divisible Pool  Rs in million  Explanatory Memorandum on Federal 
Receipts  
 Annual Budgets Statements (F and P) 
 Budget Memorandum Volumes 
Federal& Provincial  
Government 
ST Straight Transfers Rs in million 
DG Development Grant Rs in million 
NDG Non-Development Grant Rs in million 
TOTAL EXPENDITURES – NOMINAL 
TEXPA All provinces  Rs in million  Explanatory Memorandum on Federal 
Receipts  
 Annual Budgets Statements (F and P) 
 Budget Memorandum Volumes 
Federal and 
Provincial 
Governments 
TEXPP Punjab Rs in million 
TEXPS Sindh Rs in million 
TEXPN Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million 
TEXPB Baluchistan Rs in million 
TOTAL EXPENDITURES – REAL 
TEXPAR All provinces  Rs in million 
Author’s own calculations based own data collected from above 
mentioned sources, for details refer the methodology and data 
specification chapter 
TEXPPR Punjab Rs in million 
TEXPSR Sindh Rs in million 
TEXPNR Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million 
TEXPBR Baluchistan Rs in million 
TOTAL OWN SOURCE REVENUE – NOMINAL 
REVOWNTA All provinces  Rs in million  Explanatory Memorandum on Federal 
Receipts  
 Annual Budgets Statements (F and P) 
 Budget Memorandum Volumes 
Federal & Provincial 
Governments 
REVOWNTP Punjab Rs in million 
REVOWNTS Sindh Rs in million 
REVOWNTN Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million 
REVOWNTB Baluchistan Rs in million 
TOTAL OWN SOURCE REVENUE – REAL 
REVOWNTAR All provinces  Rs in million 
Author’s own calculations based own data collected from above 
mentioned sources, for details refer the methodology and data 
specification chapter 
REVOWNTPR Punjab Rs in million 
REVOWNTSR Sindh Rs in million 
REVOWNTNR Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million 
REVOWNTBR Baluchistan Rs in million 
NFC DIVISIBLE POOL TRANSFERS – NOMINAL 
NFCDPA All provinces  Rs in million 
 Explanatory Memorandum on Federal 
Receipts  
 Annual Budgets Statements(F and P) 
 Budget Memorandum Volumes 
Federal & Provincial 
Governments 
NFCDPP Punjab Rs in million 
NFCDPS Sindh Rs in million 
NFCDPN Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million 
NFCDPB Baluchistan Rs in million 
NFC DIVISIBLE POOL TRANSFERS – REAL 
NFCDPAR All provinces  Rs in million 
Author’s own calculations based own data collected from above 
mentioned sources, for details refer the methodology and data 
specification chapter 
NFCDPPR Punjab Rs in million 
NFCDPSR Sindh Rs in million 
NFCDPNR Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million 
NFCDPBR Baluchistan Rs in million 
NFC STRAIGHT TRANSFERS – NOMINAL 
NFCSTA All provinces  Rs in million 
 Explanatory Memorandum on Federal 
Receipts  
 Annual Budgets Statements (F and P) 
 Budget Memorandum Volumes 
Federal & Provincial 
Governments 
NFCSTP Punjab Rs in million 
NFCSTS Sindh Rs in million 
NFCSTN Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million 
NFCSTB Baluchistan Rs in million 
F= Federal, P=Provincial 
NFC STRAIGHT TRANSFERS – REAL 
NFCSTAR All provinces  Rs in million Author’s own calculations based own data collected from above 
mentioned sources, for details refer the methodology and data 
specification chapter 
NFCSTPR Punjab Rs in million 
NFCSTSR Sindh Rs in million 
Intergovernmental Governmental Fiscal Relation – A Case Study of Pakistan 295 
VARIABLES 
CODE DESCRIPTION 
UNIT OF 
MEASUREMENT SOURCE DOCUMENT OF DATA DOMAIN 
NFCSTNR Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million 
NFCSTBR Baluchistan Rs in million 
NFC TOTAL TRANSFERS (DIVISIBLE POOL + STRAIGHT TRANSFERS) – NOMINAL 
NFCTA All provinces  Rs in million 
 Explanatory Memorandum on Federal 
Receipts  
 Annual Budgets Statements (F and P) 
 Budget Memorandum Volumes 
Federal & Provincial 
Governments 
NFCTP Punjab Rs in million 
NFCTS Sindh Rs in million 
NFCTN Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million 
NFCTB Baluchistan Rs in million 
NFC TOTAL TRANSFERS (DIVISIBLE POOL + STRAIGHT TRANSFERS) –REAL 
NFCTAR All provinces  Rs in million 
Author’s own calculations based own data collected from above 
mentioned sources, for details refer the methodology and data 
specification chapter 
NFCTPR Punjab Rs in million 
NFCTSR Sindh Rs in million 
NFCTNR Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million 
NFCTBR Baluchistan Rs in million 
DEVELOPMENT GRANTS – NOMINAL 
GDA All provinces  Rs in million 
 Explanatory Memorandum on Federal 
Receipts  
 Annual Budgets Statements (F and P) 
 Budget Memorandum Volumes 
Federal & Provincial 
Governments 
GDP Punjab Rs in million 
GDS Sindh Rs in million 
GDN Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million 
GDB Baluchistan Rs in million 
DEVELOPMENT GRANTS – REAL 
GDAR All provinces  Rs in million 
Author’s own calculations based own data collected from above 
mentioned sources, for details refer the methodology and data 
specification chapter 
GDPR Punjab Rs in million 
GDSR Sindh Rs in million 
GDNR Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million 
GDBR Baluchistan Rs in million 
NON-DEVELOPMENT GRANTS – NOMINAL 
GNDA All provinces  Rs in million 
 Explanatory Memorandum on Federal 
Receipts  
 Annual Budgets Statements (F and P) 
 Budget Memorandum Volumes 
Federal & Provincial 
Governments 
GNDP Punjab Rs in million 
GNDS Sindh Rs in million 
GNDN Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million 
GNDB Baluchistan Rs in million 
NON-DEVELOPMENT GRANTS – REAL 
GNDAR All provinces  Rs in million 
Author’s own calculations based own data collected from above 
mentioned sources, for details refer the methodology and data 
specification chapter 
GNDPR Punjab Rs in million 
GNDSR Sindh Rs in million 
GNDNR Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million 
GNDBR Baluchistan Rs in million 
TOTAL GRANTS – NOMINAL 
GTA All provinces  Rs in million 
 Explanatory Memorandum on Federal 
Receipts  
 Annual Budgets Statements (F and P) 
Budget Memorandum Volumes 
Federal & Provincial 
Governments 
GTP Punjab Rs in million 
GTS Sindh Rs in million 
GTN Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million 
GTB Baluchistan Rs in million 
TOTAL GRANTS – REAL 
GTAR All provinces  Rs in million 
Author’s own calculations based own data collected from above 
mentioned sources, for details refer the methodology and data 
specification chapter 
GTPR Punjab Rs in million 
GTSR Sindh Rs in million 
GTNR Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million 
GTBR Baluchistan Rs in million 
F=Federal, P=Provincial 
NFC TRANSFERS (DIVISIBLE POOL + STRAIGHT TRANSFERS) + NON DEVELOPMENT GRANTS – NOMINAL 
NFCTGNDA All provinces  Rs in million 
 Explanatory Memorandum on Federal 
Receipts  
 Annual Budgets Statements (F and P) 
 Budget Memorandum Volumes 
Federal & Provincial 
Governments 
NFCTGNDP Punjab Rs in million 
NFCTGNDS Sindh Rs in million 
NFCTGNDN Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million 
NFCTGNDB Baluchistan Rs in million 
NFC TRANSFERS (DIVISIBLE POOL + STRAIGHT TRANSFERS) + NON DEVELOPMENT GRANTS – REAL 
NFCTGNDAR All provinces  Rs in million 
Author’s own calculations based own data collected from above 
mentioned sources, for details refer the methodology and data 
specification chapter 
NFCTGNDPR Punjab Rs in million 
NFCTGNDSR Sindh Rs in million 
NFCTGNDNR Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million 
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VARIABLES 
CODE DESCRIPTION 
UNIT OF 
MEASUREMENT SOURCE DOCUMENT OF DATA DOMAIN 
NFCTGNDBR Baluchistan Rs in million 
PROVINCIAL BORROWINGS – NOMINAL 
BORTA All provinces  Rs in million 
 Explanatory Memorandum on Federal 
Receipts  
 Annual Budgets Statements (F and P) 
 Budget Memorandum Volumes 
Federal & Provincial 
Governments 
BORTP Punjab Rs in million 
BORTS Sindh Rs in million 
BORTN Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million 
BORTB Baluchistan Rs in million 
PROVINCIAL BORROWINGS – REAL 
BORTAR All provinces  Rs in million 
Author’s own calculations based own data collected from above 
mentioned sources, for details refer the methodology and data 
specification chapter 
BORTPR Punjab Rs in million 
BORTSR Sindh Rs in million 
BORTNR Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million 
BORTBR Baluchistan Rs in million 
PROVINCIAL DEBT SERVICING – NOMINAL 
DSA All provinces  Rs in million 
 Explanatory Memorandum on Federal 
Receipts  
 Annual Budgets Statements (F and P) 
 Budget Memorandum Volumes 
Federal & Provincial 
Governments 
DSP Punjab Rs in million 
DSS Sindh Rs in million 
DSN Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million 
DSB Baluchistan Rs in million 
PROVINCIAL DEBT SERVICING – REAL 
DSAR All provinces  Rs in million 
Author’s own calculations based own data collected from above 
mentioned sources, for details refer the methodology and data 
specification chapter 
DSPR Punjab Rs in million 
DSSR Sindh Rs in million 
DSNR Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million 
DSBR Baluchistan Rs in million 
F=Federal, P=Provincial 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INDICATORS OF FISCAL POLICY – NOMINAL 
FTOTREV Federal  Total Revenue (Tax + Non Tax + 
Surcharges )  Rs in million  Explanatory Memorandum on Federal 
Receipts  
 Annual Budgets Statements (F and P) 
 Budget Memorandum Volumes 
Federal & Provincial 
Governments 
FNETREV Federal  Total Revenue – Federal Transfers Rs in million 
FTOTTEX Federal Total Tax (Tax + Non Tax) Rs in million 
FTOTEXP Federal Total Expenditure Rs in million 
FBD Federal Budget Deficit  Rs in million 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INDICATORS OF FISCAL POLICY – REAL 
FTOTREVR Federal  Total Revenue (Tax + Non Tax + 
Surcharges )  
Rs in million 
 Explanatory Memorandum on Federal 
Receipts  
 Annual Budgets Statements (F and P) 
 Budget Memorandum Volumes 
Federal & Provincial 
Governments 
FNETREVR Federal  Total Revenue – Federal Transfers Rs in million 
FTOTTEXR Federal Total Tax (Tax + Non Tax) Rs in million 
FTOTEXPR Federal Total Expenditure Rs in million 
FBDR Federal Budget Deficit  Rs in million 
FBDGDP1 Federal Budget Deficit to GDP ratio   % 
SOCIAL INDICTORS OF PAKISTAN 
HBA Number Hospital Beds In numbers 
Development Statistics of Pakistan 
(Sum up of all provinces) 
Author’s own computation  
Federal & Provincial 
Governments 
HDA Number of Doctors In numbers 
HHA Number of Hospital In numbers 
HIA Number of Health Institutions In numbers 
HNA Number of Nurses  In numbers 
HPA Number of Health Personal  In numbers 
PSA Primary School In numbers 
PSEA Primary School Enrolment In numbers 
PSTA Primary School Teacher In numbers 
SOCIAL INDICTORS OF PUNJAB 
HBP Number Hospital Beds In numbers 
Development Statistics of Punjab Provincial Government 
HAP Number of Doctors In numbers 
HHP Number of Hospital In numbers 
HIP Number of Health Institutions In numbers 
HNP Number of Nurses  In numbers 
HPP Number of Health Personal  In numbers 
SOCIAL INDICTORS OF SINDH 
HBS Number Hospital Beds In numbers 
Development Statistics of  Sindh Provincial Government HAS Number of Doctors In numbers 
HHS Number of Hospital In numbers 
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HIS Number of Health Institutions In numbers 
HNS Number of Nurses  In numbers 
HPS Number of Health Personal  In numbers 
SOCIAL INDICTORS OF KPK 
HBN Number Hospital Beds In numbers 
Development Statistics of    KPK Provincial Government 
HAN Number of Doctors In numbers 
HHN Number of Hospital In numbers 
HIN Number of Health Institutions In numbers 
HNN Number of Nurses  In numbers 
HPN Number of Health Personal  In numbers 
SOCIAL INDICTORS OF BALUCHISTAN 
HBB Number Hospital Beds In numbers 
Development Statistics of Baluchistan Provincial Government 
HAB Number of Doctors In numbers 
HHB Number of Hospital In numbers 
HIB Number of Health Institutions In numbers 
HNB Number of Nurses  In numbers 
HPB Number of Health Personal  In numbers 
DUMMY VARIBLES FOR NFC AWARD DURATION 
DUMNFC74 1 represents period of 1975-91, otherwise 0  1 & 0 
NOT APPLICABLE DUMNFC91 1 represents period of 1992-97, otherwise 0 1 & 0 DUMNFC97 1 represents period of 1998-06, otherwise 0 1 & 0 
DUMNFC07 1 represents period of 2007-09, otherwise 0 1 & 0 
OTHER DUMMY VARIBLES* 
DUM75 1 represents serious political disturbance in the country  
1 & 0 
NOT APPLICABLE 
DUM7576 1 represents serious political disturbance in the country 
1 & 0 
DUM76 1 represents serious political disturbance in the country 
1 & 0 
DUMBALOCH97 1 represents 1 & 0 
DUMNFC07 1 represents 2007-2009 else 0 1 & 0 
DUMPUN04 1 represents 2004 else 0 1 & 0 
DUMPUN07 1 represents 2007 else 0 1 & 0 
DUMPUN09 1 represents 2009 else 0 1 & 0 
DUMPUN94 1 represents 1994 else 0 1 & 0 
DUMPUN9407 1 represents 1994 and 2007 else 0 1 & 0 
DUMPUN9495 1 represents 1994 and 1995 else 0 1 & 0 
DUMPUN9409 1 represents 1994 and 2009 else 0 1 & 0 
DUMPUN95 1 represents 1995 else 0 1 & 0 
DUMSINDH87 1 represents 1987 else 0 1 & 0 
DUMSINDH91 1 represents 1991 else 0 1 & 0 
* These dummy variables are used to control the white noise effect. 
Intergovernmental Governmental Fiscal Relation – A Case Study of Pakistan 298 
APPENDIX TABLE 5.1.2A- DATA DESRIPTION AND SOURCES 
DATA DESCRIPTION AND SOURCES 
Variable 
Name Province/Territory Unit Data Source Government 
POPULATION 
POPXA All provinces excluding FATA & Islamabad Million  Provincial Census Reports 
Federal & 
Provincial 
Government 
POPA All provinces Million  National Census Report 
POPP Punjab Million   
POPXP Punjab excluding Islamabad Million   
POPS Sindh Million   
POPN Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Million   
POPXN Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa excluding FATA Million   
POPB Baluchistan Million   
FEDERAL TRANSFERS 
DP Divisible Pool  Rs in million  Explanatory Memorandum on Federal Receipts  Federal& 
Provincial  
Government 
ST Straight Transfers Rs in million  Annual Budgets Statements (F and P) 
GD Development Grant Rs in million  Budget Memorandum Volumes 
GND Non-Development Grant Rs in million   
TOTAL EXPENDITURES – NOMINAL 
EXPTA All provinces  Rs in million  Explanatory Memorandum on Federal Receipts  
Federal and 
Provincial 
Governments 
EXPTP Punjab Rs in million  Annual Budgets Statements (F and P) 
EXPTS Sindh Rs in million  Budget Memorandum Volumes 
EXPTN Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million   
EXPTB Baluchistan Rs in million   
TOTAL EXPENDITURES – REAL 
EXPTAR All provinces  Rs in million 
Author’s own calculations using above sources data, for details 
refer Chapter of Data Description  
EXPTPR Punjab Rs in million 
EXPTSR Sindh Rs in million 
EXPTNR Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million 
EXPTBR Baluchistan Rs in million 
TOTAL OWN SOURCE REVENUE – NOMINAL 
REVOWNTA All provinces  Rs in million  Explanatory Memorandum on Federal Receipts  
Federal & 
Provincial 
Governments 
REVOWNTP Punjab Rs in million  Annual Budgets Statements (F and P) 
REVOWNTS Sindh Rs in million  Budget Memorandum Volumes 
REVOWNTN Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million   
REVOWNTB Baluchistan Rs in million   
TOTAL OWN SOURCE REVENUE – REAL 
REVOWNTAR All provinces  Rs in million 
Author’s own calculations using above sources data, for details 
refer Chapter of Data Description 
REVOWNTPR Punjab Rs in million 
REVOWNTSR Sindh Rs in million 
REVOWNTNR Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million 
REVOWNTBR Baluchistan Rs in million 
NFC DIVISIBLE POOL TRANSFERS – NOMINAL 
NFCDPA All provinces  Rs in million  Explanatory Memorandum on Federal Receipts  
Federal & 
Provincial 
Governments 
NFCDPP Punjab Rs in million  Annual Budgets Statements(F and P) 
NFCDPS Sindh Rs in million  Budget Memorandum Volumes 
NFCDPN Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million   
NFCDPB Baluchistan Rs in million   
NFC DIVISIBLE POOL TRANSFERS – REAL 
NFCDPAR All provinces  Rs in million 
Author’s own calculations using above sources data, for details 
refer Chapter of Data Description  
NFCDPPR Punjab Rs in million 
NFCDPSR Sindh Rs in million 
NFCDPNR Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million 
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Variable 
Name Province/Territory Unit Data Source Government 
NFCDPBR Baluchistan Rs in million 
NFC STRAIGHT TRANSFERS – NOMINAL 
NFCSTA All provinces  Rs in million  Explanatory Memorandum on Federal Receipts  
Federal & 
Provincial 
Governments 
NFCSTP Punjab Rs in million  Annual Budgets Statements (F and P) 
NFCSTS Sindh Rs in million  Budget Memorandum Volumes 
NFCSTN Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million   
NFCSTB Baluchistan Rs in million   
F = Federal & P = Provincial 
NFC STRAIGHT TRANSFERS – REAL 
NFCSTAR All provinces  Rs in million 
Author’s own calculations using above sources data, for details 
refer Chapter of Data Description  
NFCSTPR Punjab Rs in million 
NFCSTSR Sindh Rs in million 
NFCSTNR Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million 
NFCSTBR Baluchistan Rs in million 
NFC TOTAL TRANSFERS (DIVISIBLE POOL + STRAIGHT TRANSFERS) – NOMINAL 
NFCTA All provinces  Rs in million  Explanatory Memorandum on Federal Receipts  
Federal & 
Provincial 
Governments 
NFCTP Punjab Rs in million  Annual Budgets Statements (F and P) 
NFCTS Sindh Rs in million  Budget Memorandum Volumes 
NFCTN Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million   
NFCTB Baluchistan Rs in million   
NFC TOTAL TRANSFERS (DIVISIBLE POOL + STRAIGHT TRANSFERS) –REAL 
NFCTAR All provinces  Rs in million 
Author’s own calculations using above sources data, for details 
refer Chapter of Data Description 
NFCTPR Punjab Rs in million 
NFCTSR Sindh Rs in million 
NFCTNR Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million 
NFCTBR Baluchistan Rs in million 
DEVELOPMENT GRANTS – NOMINAL 
GDA All provinces  Rs in million  Explanatory Memorandum on Federal Receipts  
Federal & 
Provincial 
Governments 
GDP Punjab Rs in million  Annual Budgets Statements (F and P) 
GDS Sindh Rs in million  Budget Memorandum Volumes 
GDN Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million   
GDB Baluchistan Rs in million   
DEVELOPMENT GRANTS – REAL 
GDAR All provinces  Rs in million 
Author’s own calculations using above sources data, for details 
refer Chapter of Data Description  
GDPR Punjab Rs in million 
GDSR Sindh Rs in million 
GDNR Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million 
GDBR Baluchistan Rs in million 
NON-DEVELOPMENT GRANTS – NOMINAL 
GNDA All provinces  Rs in million  Explanatory Memorandum on Federal Receipts  
Federal & 
Provincial 
Governments 
GNDP Punjab Rs in million  Annual Budgets Statements (F and P) 
GNDS Sindh Rs in million  Budget Memorandum Volumes 
GNDN Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million   
GNDB Baluchistan Rs in million   
NON-DEVELOPMENT GRANTS – REAL 
GNDAR All provinces  Rs in million 
Author’s own calculations using above sources data, for details 
refer Chapter of Data Description 
GNDPR Punjab Rs in million 
GNDSR Sindh Rs in million 
GNDNR Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million 
GNDBR Baluchistan Rs in million 
TOTAL GRANTS – NOMINAL 
GTA All provinces  Rs in million  Explanatory Memorandum on Federal Receipts  
Federal & 
Provincial 
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Variable 
Name Province/Territory Unit Data Source Government 
GTP Punjab Rs in million  Annual Budgets Statements (F and P) Governments 
GTS Sindh Rs in million Budget Memorandum Volumes 
GTN Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million   
GTB Baluchistan Rs in million   
TOTAL GRANTS – REAL 
GTAR All provinces  Rs in million 
Author’s own calculations using above sources data, for details 
refer Chapter of Data Description 
GTPR Punjab Rs in million 
GTSR Sindh Rs in million 
GTNR Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million 
GTBR Baluchistan Rs in million 
F=Federal, P=Provincial 
UNCONDITIONAL TRANSFERS (DIVISIBLE POOL + STRAIGHT TRANSFERS+ NON DEVELOPMENT GRANTS) – 
NOMINAL 
NFCTGNDA All provinces  Rs in million  Explanatory Memorandum on Federal Receipts  
Federal & 
Provincial 
Governments 
NFCTGNDP Punjab Rs in million  Annual Budgets Statements (F and P) 
NFCTGNDS Sindh Rs in million  Budget Memorandum Volumes 
NFCTGNDN Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million   
NFCTGNDB Baluchistan Rs in million   
UNCONDITIONAL TRANSFERS (DIVISIBLE POOL + STRAIGHT TRANSFERS + NON DEVELOPMENT GRANTS) – REAL 
NFCTGNDAR All provinces  Rs in million 
Author’s own calculations using above sources data, for details 
refer Chapter of Data Description 
NFCTGNDPR Punjab Rs in million 
NFCTGNDSR Sindh Rs in million 
NFCTGNDNR Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million 
NFCTGNDBR Baluchistan Rs in million 
TOTAL TRANSFERS (DIVISIBLE POOL +STRAIGHT TRANSFERS+GRANT TOTAL)- NOMINAL 
NFCTTTGA All provinces  Rs in million  Explanatory Memorandum on Federal Receipts  
Federal & 
Provincial 
Governments 
NFCTTTGP Punjab Rs in million  Annual Budgets Statements (F and P) 
NFCTTTGS Sindh Rs in million  Budget Memorandum Volumes 
NFCTTTGN Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million   
NFCTTTGB Baluchistan Rs in million   
TOTAL TRANSFERS  (DIVISIBLE POOL +STRAIGHT TRANSFERS+GRANT TOTAL)- REAL 
NFCTTTGAR All provinces  Rs in million  Explanatory Memorandum on Federal Receipts  
Federal & 
Provincial 
Governments 
NFCTTTGPR Punjab Rs in million  Annual Budgets Statements (F and P) 
NFCTTTGSR Sindh Rs in million  Budget Memorandum Volumes 
NFCTTTGNR Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million   
NFCTTTGBR Baluchistan Rs in million   
PROVINCIAL BORROWINGS – NOMINAL 
BORTA All provinces  Rs in million 
Author’s own calculations using above sources data, for details 
refer Chapter of Data Description  
BORTP Punjab Rs in million 
BORTS Sindh Rs in million 
BORTN Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million 
BORTB Baluchistan Rs in million 
PROVINCIAL BORROWINGS – REAL 
BORTAR All provinces  Rs in million 
Author’s own calculations using above sources data, for details 
refer Chapter of Data Description  
BORTPR Punjab Rs in million 
BORTSR Sindh Rs in million 
BORTNR Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million 
BORTBR Baluchistan Rs in million 
PROVINCIAL DEBT SERVICING – NOMINAL 
DSA All provinces  Rs in million  Explanatory Memorandum on Federal Receipts  Federal & Provincial 
Governments DSP Punjab Rs in million  Annual Budgets Statements (F and P) DSS Sindh Rs in million  Budget Memorandum Volumes 
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Variable 
Name Province/Territory Unit Data Source Government 
DSN Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million   
DSB Baluchistan Rs in million   
PROVINCIAL DEBT SERVICING – REAL 
DSAR All provinces  Rs in million 
Author’s own calculations using above sources data, for details 
refer Chapter of Data Description 
DSPR Punjab Rs in million 
DSSR Sindh Rs in million 
DSNR Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa formerly NWFP Rs in million 
DSBR Baluchistan Rs in million 
F=Federal, P=Provincial 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INDICATORS OF FISCAL POLICY – NOMINAL 
FTOTREV Federal  Total Revenue (Tax + Non 
Tax + Surcharges )  
Rs in 
million 
 Explanatory Memorandum on Federal 
Receipts  
 Annual Budgets Statements (F and P) 
 Budget Memorandum Volumes 
Federal & 
Provincial 
Governments 
FNETREV Federal  Total Revenue – Federal 
Transfers 
Rs in 
million 
FTOTTEX Federal Total Tax (Tax + Non Tax) Rs in 
million 
FTOTEXP Federal Total Expenditure Rs in 
million 
FBD Federal Budget Deficit  Rs in 
million 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INDICATORS OF FISCAL POLICY – REAL 
FTOTREVR Federal  Total Revenue (Tax + Non 
Tax + Surcharges )  
Rs in 
million 
 Explanatory Memorandum on Federal 
Receipts  
 Annual Budgets Statements (F and P) 
 Budget Memorandum Volumes 
Federal & 
Provincial 
Governments 
FNETREVR Federal  Total Revenue – Federal 
Transfers 
Rs in 
million 
FTOTTEXR Federal Total Tax (Tax + Non Tax) Rs in 
million 
FTOTEXPR Federal Total Expenditure Rs in 
million 
FBDR Federal Budget Deficit  Rs in 
million 
FBDGDP1 Federal Budget Deficit to GDP ratio   % 
SOCIAL INDICTORS OF PAKISTAN 
HBA Number Hospital Beds In numbers 
Development Statistics of Pakistan                                          
(Sum up of all provinces) 
Author’s own computation  
Federal &
Provincial 
Governments 
HAD Number of Doctors In numbers 
HHA Number of Hospital In numbers 
HIA Number of Health Institutions In numbers 
HNA Number of Nurses  In numbers 
HPA Number of Health Personal  In numbers 
PSA Primary School In numbers 
PSEA Primary School Enrolment In numbers 
PSTA Primary School Teacher In numbers 
SOCIAL INDICTORS OF PUNJAB 
HBP Number Hospital Beds In numbers 
Development Statistics of Punjab Provincial Government 
HAP Number of Doctors In numbers 
HHP Number of Hospital In numbers 
HIP Number of Health Institutions In numbers 
HNP Number of Nurses  In numbers 
HPP Number of Health Personal  In numbers 
SOCIAL INDICTORS OF SINDH 
HBS Number Hospital Beds In numbers 
Development Statistics of  Sindh Provincial Government 
HAS Number of Doctors In numbers 
HHS Number of Hospital In numbers 
HIS Number of Health Institutions In numbers 
HNS Number of Nurses  In numbers 
HPS Number of Health Personal  In numbers 
SOCIAL INDICTORS OF KPK 
HBN Number Hospital Beds In numbers 
Development Statistics of    KPK Provincial Government 
HAN Number of Doctors In numbers 
HHN Number of Hospital In numbers 
HIN Number of Health Institutions In numbers 
HNN Number of Nurses  In numbers 
HPN Number of Health Personal  In numbers 
Intergovernmental Governmental Fiscal Relation – A Case Study of Pakistan 302 
* These dummy variables are used to represent some important events or natural calamity or disaster beside for controlling the white noise 
effect. 
  
SOCIAL INDICTORS OF BALUCHISTAN 
HBB Number Hospital Beds In numbers 
Development Statistics of Baluchistan Provincial Government 
HAB Number of Doctors In numbers 
HHB Number of Hospital In numbers 
HIB Number of Health Institutions In numbers 
HNB Number of Nurses  In numbers 
HPB Number of Health Personal  In numbers 
DUMMY VARIBLES FOR NFC AWARD DURATION 
DUMNFC74 1 represents period of 1975-91, otherwise 0  1 & 0 
NOT 
APPLICABLE 
DUMNFC91 1 represents period of 1992-97, otherwise 0 1 & 0 
DUMNFC97 1 represents period of 1998-06, otherwise 0 1 & 0 
DUMNFC07 1 represents period of 2007-09, otherwise 0 1 & 0 
OTHER DUMMY VARIBLES* 
DUM75 1 represents serious political disturbance in particular in Province of Baluchistan  
1 & 0 
NOT 
APPLICABLE 
DUM7576 1 represents serious political disturbance in particular in province of Baluchistan 
1 & 0 
DUM76 1 represents serious political disturbance in province of Baluchistan 
1 & 0 
DUMBALOCH97 1 represents 1 & 0 
DUMNFC07 1 represents 2007-2009 else 0 1 & 0 
DUMPUN04 1 represents 2004 else 0 1 & 0 
DUMPUN07 1 represents 2007 else 0 1 & 0 
DUMPUN09 1 represents 2009 else 0 1 & 0 
DUMPUN94 1 represents 1994 else 0 1 & 0 
DUMPUN9407 1 represents 1994 and 2007 else 0 1 & 0 
DUMPUN9495 1 represents 1994 and 1995 else 0 1 & 0 
DUMPUN9409 1 represents 1994 and 2009 else 0 1 & 0 
DUMPUN95 1 represents 1995 else 0 1 & 0 
DUMSINDH87 1 represents 1987 else 0 1 & 0 
DUMSINDH91 1 represents 1991 else 0 1 & 0 
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APPENDIX TABLE 5.2A- (INCLUDES TABLE 5,2.1A TO TABLE 5.3.5A) 
DESRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF KEY VARIABLES BY PERIOD OF NFC AWARED 
 
Appendix Table 5.2.1A 
PER CAPITA TOTAL EXPENDITURE – REAL 
NFC AWARD 1972-1975 
 
TOTEXPAR     TOTEXPPR TOTEX[SR TOTEXPNR TOTEXPBR 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 3,401 947 1,300 1,202 57,525 
Std. Dev. 2,530 53 281 130 60,558 
Maximum 6,974 1,021 1,696 1,366 142,882 
Minimum 1,462 900 1,090 1,048 8,808 
NFC AWARD 1976-1980 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 2,751 1,044 1,145 1,345 38,263 
Std. Dev. 1,761 50 46 31 40,709 
Maximum 6,038 1,104 1,196 1,387 114,761 
Minimum 1,408 963 1,065 1,291 7,706 
NFC AWARD 1981-1991 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 1,742 1,463 1,710 2,050 4,160 
Std. Dev. 341 318 446 443 771 
Maximum 2,305 2,027 2,357 2,642 5,989 
Minimum 1,296 1,012 1,136 1,389 2,984 
NFC AWARD 1992-1997 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 2,182 1,705 2,364 2,728 5,204 
Std. Dev. 117 92 222 157 905 
Maximum 2,339 1,826 2,746 2,891 6,842 
Minimum 1,994 1,589 2,147 2,410 4,162 
NFC AWRAD 1998-2006 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 2,237 1,755 2,707 2,536 4,656 
Std. Dev. 260 229 421 227 514 
Maximum 2,721 2,187 3,258 3,045 5,486 
Minimum 1,912 1,527 2,000 2,272 3,928 
NFC AWARD 2007-2009 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 2,910 2,505 3,425 2,654 5,760 
Std. Dev. 638 693 763 568 1,388 
Maximum 3,055 2,647 3,578 2,821 6,162 
Minimum 2,727 2,376 3,186 2,535 5,059 
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Appendix Table 5.2.2A  
PER CAPITA OWN SOURCE REVENUE – REAL 
NFC AWARD 1972-1975 
 
REVOWN
TAR REVOWNTPR REVOWNTSR REVOWNTNR REVOWNTBR 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 298 301 350 171 383 
Std. Dev. 12 11 13 25 225 
Maximum 307 315 360 205 683 
Minimum 281 289 331 145 143 
NFC AWARD 1976-1980 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 271 251 318 152 642 
Std. Dev. 13 12 26 19 78 
Maximum 297 273 367 175 753 
Minimum 261 237 299 127 545 
NFC AWARD 1981-1991 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 297 280 319 209 629 
Std. Dev. 21 27 18 29 297 
Maximum 341 322 353 292 958 
Minimum 270 246 290 182 146 
NFC AWARD 1992-1997 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 265 275 286 232 154 
Std. Dev. 18 26 24 72 32 
Maximum 285 310 315 392 223 
Minimum 235 234 253 191 123 
NFC AWRAD 1998-2006 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 285 290 340 216 162 
Std. Dev. 25 37 21 106 32 
Maximum 323 349 369 507 220 
Minimum 252 249 301 148 109 
NFC AWARD 2007-2009 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 386 444 409 167 235 
Std. Dev. 48 72 38 18 42 
Maximum 403 480 436 173 251 
Minimum 361 405 395 157 217 
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Appendix Table 5.2.3.1A 
PER CAPITA NFC DIVISBLE POOL TRANSFERS (DPT)– REAL 
NFC AWARD 1972-1975 
 
NFCDPAR NFCDPPR NFCDPSR NFCDPNR NFCDPBR 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 167 156 177 191 184 
Std. Dev. 17 16 20 18 19 
Maximum 181 169 194 206 206 
Minimum 143 134 149 166 160 
NFC AWARD 1976-1980 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 303 309 301 299 251 
Std. Dev. 42 46 38 43 25 
Maximum 385 397 375 381 300 
Minimum 274 276 270 269 230 
NFC AWARD 1981-1991 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 535 542 529 526 506 
Std. Dev. 120 119 120 116 153 
Maximum 781 786 776 765 794 
Minimum 440 442 439 433 335 
NFC AWARD 1992-1997 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 1,117 1,121 1,114 1,097 1,143 
Std. Dev. 112 117 101 111 122 
Maximum 1,281 1,290 1,261 1,259 1,319 
Minimum 978 971 975 954 986 
NFC AWRAD 1998-2006 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 1,037 1,041 1,017 1,017 1,140 
Std. Dev. 67 64 65 67 121 
Maximum 1,165 1,163 1,150 1,148 1,349 
Minimum 929 938 913 911 951 
NFC AWARD 2007-2009 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 1,272 1,240 1,233 1,385 1,516 
Std. Dev. 478 470 455 516 571 
Maximum 1,387 1,359 1,337 1,499 1,620 
Minimum 1,213 1,161 1,152 1,298 1,436 
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Appendix Table 5.2.3.2A 
PER CAPITA NFC STRAIGHT TRANSFERS (ST) – REAL 
NFC AWARD 1972-1975 
 
NFCSTAR NFCSTPR NFCSTSR NFCSTNR NFCSTBR 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 12 1 - - 264 
Std. Dev. 11 1 - - 245 
Maximum 26 2 - - 591 
Minimum - - - - - 
NFC AWARD 1976-1980 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 29 4 6 - 544 
Std. Dev. 5 - 5 - 80 
Maximum 37 4 10 - 663 
Minimum 25 3 - - 445 
NFC AWARD 1981-1991 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 42 3 33 - 618 
Std. Dev. 5 1 5 - 112 
Maximum 52 3 41 - 817 
Minimum 32 2 24 - 410 
NFC AWARD 1992-1997 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 282 37 298 739 1,709 
Std. Dev. 44 6 28 150 402 
Maximum 322 45 358 899 2,118 
Minimum 191 31 272 447 923 
NFC AWRAD 1998-2006 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 248 53 485 348 1,072 
Std. Dev. 37 16 155 110 179 
Maximum 299 72 736 641 1,429 
Minimum 173 26 235 266 845 
NFC AWARD 2007-2009 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 273 56 678 269 813 
Std. Dev. 126 26 315 117 414 
Maximum 338 68 854 286 1,141 
Minimum 215 45 533 250 532 
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Appendix Table 5.2.3.3A 
PER CAPITA NON DEVELOPMENT GRANT  (GND) – REAL 
NFC AWARD 1972-1975 
 
GNDAR GNDPR GNDSR GNDNR GNDBR 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 44 27 23 79 292 
Std. Dev. 26 16 25 69 199 
Maximum 75 45 59 177 547 
Minimum 11 6 3 29 63 
NFC AWARD 1976-1980 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 92 39 60 275 396 
Std. Dev. 35 28 43 65 100 
Maximum 141 80 108 340 495 
Minimum 40 11 5 150 265 
NFC AWARD 1981-1991 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 313 202 276 723 643 
Std. Dev. 210 180 227 295 317 
Maximum 672 523 628 1,185 1,229 
Minimum 52 7 3 251 238 
NFC AWARD 1992-1997 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 39 24 75 19 94 
Std. Dev. 18 25 41 21 114 
Maximum 73 64 130 59 341 
Minimum 21 0 11 0 2 
NFC AWRAD 1998-2006 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 191 106 200 270 894 
Std. Dev. 84 91 124 135 194 
Maximum 349 286 418 651 1,229 
Minimum 71 0 - 198 621 
NFC AWARD 2007-2009 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 369 258 462 489 856 
Std. Dev. 159 115 204 201 345 
Maximum 421 305 532 532 897 
Minimum 318 206 406 447 822 
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Appendix Table 5.2.3.4A 
PER CAPITA DEVELOPMENT GRANT (GD) – REAL 
NFC AWARD 1972-1975 
 
GDAR GDPR GDSR GDNR GDBR 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 45 34 68 36 102 
Std. Dev. 5 9 13 7 34 
Maximum 50 45 83 41 148 
Minimum 37 22 52 26 67 
NFC AWARD 1976-1980 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 60 47 63 77 161 
Std. Dev. 30 23 29 43 92 
Maximum 92 74 99 116 262 
Minimum 22 18 22 21 43 
NFC AWARD 1981-1991 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 125 92 156 122 361 
Std. Dev. 99 87 110 122 201 
Maximum 349 307 399 388 794 
Minimum 28 6 53 4 156 
NFC AWARD 1992-1997 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 97 54 138 158 214 
Std. Dev. 40 24 74 77 63 
Maximum 143 81 216 278 293 
Minimum 37 18 28 87 129 
NFC AWRAD 1998-2006 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 73 39 90 133 212 
Std. Dev. 43 33 72 96 131 
Maximum 144 122 216 365 438 
Minimum 32 0 1 54 66 
NFC AWARD 2007-2009 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 157 74 206 201 755 
Std. Dev. 50 16 70 77 297 
Maximum 180 88 234 254 851 
Minimum 141 60 173 168 648 
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Appendix Table 5.2.3.5A 
PER CAPITA TOTAL NFC FORMULLA BASED TRANSFERS (DP + ST) – REAL 
NFC AWARD 1972-1975 
 
NFCTAR NFCTPR NFCTSR NFCTNR NFCTBR 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 178 158 177 191 448 
Std. Dev. 21 16 20 18 242 
Maximum 203 169 194 206 778 
Minimum 151 135 149 166 206 
NFC AWARD 1976-1980 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 332 313 307 299 795 
Std. Dev. 47 46 40 43 100 
Maximum 423 401 385 381 963 
Minimum 299 280 278 269 691 
NFC AWARD 1981-1991 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 577 545 562 526 1,125 
Std. Dev. 115 119 122 116 107 
Maximum 817 789 809 765 1,295 
Minimum 488 445 469 433 930 
NFC AWARD 1992-1997 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 1,399 1,159 1,412 1,836 2,853 
Std. Dev. 89 117 116 95 311 
Maximum 1,567 1,335 1,619 1,959 3,127 
Minimum 1,300 1,016 1,274 1,648 2,185 
NFC AWRAD 1998-2006 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 1,285 1,094 1,502 1,366 2,212 
Std. Dev. 99 76 216 89 190 
Maximum 1,464 1,235 1,886 1,598 2,544 
Minimum 1,102 964 1,148 1,286 1,940 
NFC AWARD 2007-2009 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 1,545 1,296 1,911 1,655 2,329 
Std. Dev. 592 493 746 630 933 
Maximum 1,601 1,404 2,006 1,749 2,578 
Minimum 1,482 1,217 1,857 1,569 2,153 
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Appendix Table 5.2.3.6A 
PER CAPITA UNCONDITIONAL GRANT (DPT + ST + GND) – REAL 
NFC AWARD 1972-1975 
 NFCGNDAR NFCGNDPR NFCGNDSR NFCGNDNR NFCGNDBR 
 Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 233 185 200 270 1,004 
Std. Dev. 50 21 37 78 563 
Maximum 303 214 247 377 1,636 
Minimum 192 165 157 196 269 
NFC AWARD 1976-1980 
 Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 449 352 367 574 1,734 
Std. Dev. 61 48 73 89 89 
Maximum 539 415 479 681 1,891 
Minimum 371 292 291 421 1,620 
NFC AWARD 1981-1991 
 Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 922 746 839 1,249 2,386 
Std. Dev. 225 183 254 325 368 
Maximum 1,209 978 1,208 1,656 3,052 
Minimum 611 500 480 731 1,865 
NFC AWARD 1992-1997 
 Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 1,526 1,182 1,487 1,855 4,656 
Std. Dev. 70 96 112 99 606 
Maximum 1,672 1,336 1,703 1,959 5,286 
Minimum 1,456 1,057 1,352 1,649 3,449 
NFC AWRAD 1998-2006 
 Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 1,531 1,200 1,701 1,635 4,178 
Std. Dev. 175 163 315 177 503 
Maximum 1,857 1,521 2,152 2,065 5,104 
Minimum 1,224 965 1,148 1,503 3,689 
NFC AWARD 2007-2009 
 Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 1,955 1,554 2,373 2,143 3,999 
Std. Dev. 764 602 943 830 1,654 
Maximum 1,997 1,667 2,412 2,236 4,540 
Minimum 1,927 1,473 2,319 2,016 3,536 
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Appendix Table 5.2.3.7A 
PER CAPITA TOTAL GRANT (GD + GND) – REAL 
NFC AWARD 1972-1975 
 GTAR GTPR GTSR GTNR GTBR 
 Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 89 61 91 115 394 
Std. Dev. 23 7 30 73 225 
Maximum 112 67 128 218 695 
Minimum 58 51 54 56 153 
NFC AWARD 1976-1980 
 Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 152 86 123 351 557 
Std. Dev. 60 43 71 99 146 
Maximum 229 143 207 456 748 
Minimum 67 32 36 178 328 
NFC AWARD 1981-1991 
 Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 438 293 433 845 1,004 
Std. Dev. 269 230 298 354 473 
Maximum 1,004 798 954 1,571 2,023 
Minimum 157 54 94 470 468 
NFC AWARD 1992-1997 
 Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 135 78 212 177 308 
Std. Dev. 41 33 95 72 100 
Maximum 172 126 334 279 470 
Minimum 57 19 39 94 165 
NFC AWRAD 1998-2006 
 Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 264 145 290 403 1,107 
Std. Dev. 109 89 164 170 211 
Maximum 444 286 483 801 1,465 
Minimum 104 18 35 258 819 
NFC AWARD 2007-2009 
 Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 527 332 668 690 1,612 
Std. Dev. 204 124 270 269 634 
Maximum 562 365 743 701 1,701 
Minimum 499 294 622 668 1,546 
 
  
Intergovernmental Governmental Fiscal Relation – A Case Study of Pakistan 312 
Appendix Table 5.2.3.8A 
PER CAPITA TOTAL TRANSFERS (DPT + ST + GD +GND) – REAL 
NFC AWARD 1972-1975 
 
NFCTGAR 
All Pakistan 
NFCTGPR 
Punjab 
NFCTGSR 
Sindh 
NFCTGNR 
KPK 
NFCTGBR 
Baluchistan 
Mean 267 219 268 306 842 
Std. Dev. 34 15 34 82 342 
Maximum 316 236 317 418 1,112 
Minimum 239 201 240 223 359 
NFC AWARD 1976-1980 
 All Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 484 399 430 651 1,352 
Std. Dev. 87 70 100 124 112 
Maximum 598 489 569 792 1,481 
Minimum 372 313 314 449 1,178 
NFC AWARD 1981-1991 
 All Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 1,015 838 995 1,371 2,129 
Std. Dev. 291 238 335 384 505 
Maximum 1,527 1,285 1,607 2,043 3,104 
Minimum 658 535 563 942 1,449 
NFC AWARD 1992-1997 
 All Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 1,534 1,237 1,624 2,013 3,160 
Std. Dev. 99 99 148 154 249 
Maximum 1,730 1,417 1,892 2,207 3,405 
Minimum 1,452 1,116 1,458 1,742 2,656 
NFC AWRAD 1998-2006 
 All Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 1,549 1,239 1,791 1,769 3,319 
Std. Dev. 202 161 369 202 367 
Maximum 1,908 1,522 2,369 2,215 3,837 
Minimum 1,206 982 1,185 1,590 2,772 
NFC AWARD 2007-2009 
 All Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 2,072 1,628 2,579 2,344 3,941 
Std. Dev. 794 614 1,011 897 1,557 
Maximum 2,122 1,741 2,646 2,417 4,166 
Minimum 2,044 1,561 2,492 2,270 3,803 
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Appendix Table 5.2.4A 
PER CAPITA BORROWING – REAL 
NFC AWARD 1972-1975 
 BORTAR BORTPR BORTSR BORTNR BORTBR 
 Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 2,764 358 611 568 56,431 
Std. Dev. 2,528 48 353 16 60,901 
Maximum 6,335 407 1,109 585 142,278 
Minimum 842 292 343 548 7,504 
NFC AWARD 1976-1980 
 Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 2,103 348 363 686 39,063 
Std. Dev. 1,968 96 62 196 44,725 
Maximum 5,786 469 477 981 124,046 
Minimum 574 206 308 383 6,648 
NFC AWARD 1981-1991 
 Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 360 265 265 373 1,796 
Std. Dev. 69 89 75 91 1,186 
Maximum 457 380 404 526 4,630 
Minimum 185 79 140 236 732 
NFC AWARD 1992-1997 
 Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 315 179 308 341 1,798 
Std. Dev. 108 92 60 114 1,032 
Maximum 447 294 414 528 3,883 
Minimum 176 42 245 225 939 
NFC AWRAD 1998-2006 
 Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 204 149 129 275 977 
Std. Dev. 71 45 87 136 396 
Maximum 319 213 292 480 1,804 
Minimum 92 91 45 - 527 
NFC AWARD 2007-2009 
 Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 264 267 188 129 978 
Std. Dev. 251 73 400 183 2,857 
Maximum 295 352 224 172 1,549 
Minimum 230 196 134 94 356 
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Appendix Table 5.2.5A 
PER CAPITA DEBT SERVICING – REAL 
NFC AWARD 1972-1975 
 
DSAR DSPR DSSR DSNR DSBR 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 49 45 55 37 112 
Std. Dev. 15 15 15 14 35 
Maximum 66 64 73 51 160 
Minimum 30 27 36 19 78 
NFC AWARD 1976-1980 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 123 107 119 156 255 
Std. Dev. 25 23 22 39 19 
Maximum 155 136 143 211 280 
Minimum 86 72 84 101 231 
NFC AWARD 1981-1991 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 236 203 234 320 396 
Std. Dev. 106 90 108 156 132 
Maximum 356 312 376 514 549 
Minimum 86 72 84 101 231 
NFC AWARD 1992-1997 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 357 294 381 502 552 
Std. Dev. 33 34 31 35 53 
Maximum 392 331 436 544 626 
Minimum 301 238 333 443 482 
NFC AWRAD 1998-2006 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 251 180 322 369 397 
Std. Dev. 53 40 72 60 101 
Maximum 319 227 412 445 573 
Minimum 154 99 194 275 252 
NFC AWARD 2007-2009 
 
Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan 
Mean 119 83 144 172 247 
Std. Dev. 25 11 37 57 83 
Maximum 129 95 178 211 324 
Minimum 102 76 120 147 178 
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APPENDIX CHAPTER – 6 
 
 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
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APPENDIX TABLE 6.1 EXPLANATION OF CONSTRUCTED VARIABLES USED IN THE MODEL 
Table Reference Construction of Variables Dependent/ Independent Description 
Table 6.1 EXPTAR / POPXA Real Per capita161 Total Provincial Expenditure   
ALL PROVINCES 
COMBINED 
GDPFCA / POPXA Real Per capita GDP Factor Cost 
(NFCTAR+GTAR) / POPXA Real Per capita All Federal Transfers 
BORTAR / POPXA Real Per capita Provincial Borrowings 
Table 6.2    
ALL PROVINCES 
COMBINED 
(EXPTAR-DSAR) / POPXA Real Per capita Total Provincial Expenditure Less Debt Servicing  
GDPFCA / POPXA Real Per capita GDP Factor Cost 
(NFCTAR+GTAR) / POPXA Real Per capita All Federal Transfers 
BORTAR / POPXA Real Per capita Provincial Borrowings 
Table 6.3    
ALL PROVINCES 
COMBINED 
EXPTAR / POPXA Real Per capita Total Provincial Expenditure 
GDPFCA/POPXA Real Per capita GDP Factor Cost 
NFCTAR/POPXA Real Per capita All NFC Transfers 
BORTAR/POPXA Real Per capita Provincial Borrowings 
GTAR/POPXA Real Per capita Grant Receipts Development + Non Development 
Table 6.4    
ALL PROVINCES 
COMBINED 
EXPTAR / POPXA Real Per capita Total Provincial Expenditure Less Debt Servicing  
GDPFCA/POPXA Real Per capita GDP Factor Cost 
NFCTAR/POXA Real Per capita All NFC Transfers 
BORTAR/POPXA Real Per capita Provincial Borrowings 
GDAR/POPXA Real Per capita Grant Receipts – Development 
GNDRA/POPXA Real Per capita Grant Receipts – Non Development 
Table 6.5    
ALL PROVINCES 
COMBINED 
EXPTAR / POPXA Real Per capita Total Provincial Expenditure Less Debt Servicing  
GDPFCA/POPXA Real Per capita GDP Factor Cost  
(NFCTAR+GNDAR) / POPXA Real Per capita NFC Transfers + Non Development Grant 
BORTAR/POPXA Real Per capita Provincial Borrowings 
GDAR/POPXA Real Per capita Grant Receipts – Development 
Table 6.6 OLS (Eq. 1,2,3) & Table 6.7 TSLS (Eq. 1,2,3)   
PUNJAB 
EXPTPR / POPXP Real Per capita Total Provincial Expenditure Less Debt Servicing  
GDPFCP/ POPXP Real Per capita GDP Factor Cost 
NFCTPR / POXP Real Per capita All NFC Transfers 
BORTPR / POPXP Real Per capita Provincial Borrowings 
GTPR / POPXP Real Per capita Grant Receipts – Overall 
GDPR / POPXP Real Per capita Grant Receipts – Development 
GNDPR / POPXP Real Per capita Grant Receipts – Non Development 
                                                          
161  All variables converted into real per capita using GDP deflator 2001. 
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Table Reference Construction of Variables Dependent/ Independent Description 
(NFCTPR+ GDNDPR) / POPXP Real Per capita All NFC Transfers + Non Development Grants 
Table 6.8 OLS (Eq. 1,2,3) & Table 6.9 TSLS (Eq. 1,2,3)   
SINDH 
GDPFCS/POPS Real Per capita GDP Factor Cost 
NFCTSR / POPS Real Per capita All NFC Transfers 
GTSR / POPS Real Per capita Grant Receipts – Overall 
GDSR / POPS Real Per capita Grant Receipts – Development 
GNDSR / POPS Real Per capita Grant Receipts – Non Development 
(NFCTSR+ GDNDSR) / POPS Real Per capita All NFC Transfers + Non Development Grants 
Table 6.10.1 OLS (Eq. 1,2,3) & Table 6.11 TSLS (Eq. 1,2,3)   
KHYBER 
PAKHTUNKHWA 
GDPFCN / POPXN Real Per capita GDP Factor Cost 
NFCTNR / POXN Real Per capita All NFC Transfers 
BORTNR / POXN Real Per capita Provincial Borrowings 
GTNR / POXN Real Per capita Grant Receipts – Overall 
GDNR / POXN Real Per capita Grant Receipts – Development 
GNDNR / POPXN Real Per capita Grant Receipts – Non Development 
(NFCTNR+ GDNDNR) / POXN Real Per capita All NFC Transfers + Non Development Grants 
Table 6.12 OLS (Eq. 1,2,3) & Table 6.13 TSLS (Eq. 1,2,3)   
BALUCHISTAN 
GDPFCB / POPB Real Per capita GDP Factor Cost 
NFCTBR / POPB Real Per capita All NFC Transfers 
BORTBR / POPB Real Per capita Provincial Borrowings 
GTBR / POPB  Real Per capita Grant Receipts – Overall 
GDBR / POPB Real Per capita Grant Receipts – Development 
GNDBR / POPB Real Per capita Grant Receipts – Non Development 
(NFCTBR+GTBR)/ POPB Real Per capita All NFC Transfers + Non Development Grants 
Table 6.14 GDPFC?162 Real Per capita /POP? GDP Factor Cost 
Inter Provincial Response (NFCT?R+GT?R+BORT?R)/POP? Real Per capita All NFC Transfers + Borrowings 
Table 6.15    
Inter Provincial Response 
to Various Forms of 
Federal Transfers 
GDPFC?/POP? Real Per capita GDP Factor Cost 
(NFCT?R+GTAR) / POP? Real Per capita All NFC Transfers 
BORT?R / POP? Real Per capita Provincial Borrowings 
GT?R/POP? Real Per capita Grant Receipts – Overall 
Table 6.16    
Inter Provincial Response 
to Various Forms of 
Federal Transfers 
GDPFC?/POP? Real Per capita GDP Factor Cost 
(NFCT?R+GTAR) / POP? Real Per capita All NFC Transfers 
BORT?R / POP? Real Per capita Provincial Borrowings 
                                                          
162 Tables 6.14 to 6.17 provide interprovincial comparisons and due to space constraint individual province variable are not mentioned 
separately. Sign ‘?’. Can be read for Punjab “P” Sindh “S”, KPK “K”and Baluchistan with letters B.respectively and inequation 6.19 All 
Provinces combined represent with letter “A”. 
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Table Reference Construction of Variables Dependent/ Independent Description 
GD?R/POP? Real Per capita Grant Receipts – Development 
GND?R/POP? Real Per capita Grant Receipts – Non Development 
Table 6.17    
Inter Provincial Response 
to Various Forms of 
Federal Transfers 
GDPFC?/POP? Real Per capita GDP Factor Cost 
BORT?R / POP? Real Per capita Provincial Borrowings 
GD?R/POP? Real Per capita Grant Receipts – Development 
(NFCT?R+GTBR)/ POP? Real Per capita All NFC Transfers + Non Development Grants 
Table 6.19    
Inter Provincial Response 
to Various Forms of 
Federal Transfers 
GDPFC?/POP? Real Per capita GDP Factor Cost 
(NFCT?R+GTAR) / POP? Real Per capita All NFC Transfers 
BORT 
?R / POP? 
Real Per capita Provincial Borrowings 
GD?R/POP? Real Per capita Grant Receipts – Development 
GND?R/POP? Real Per capita Grant Receipts – Non Development 
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APPENDIX TABLE 6.2 
ESTIMATED EQUATIONS WITH VARIOUS CLASSIFICATIONS OF TRANSFERS AND GRANTS 
 
Table     
6.1 All Provinces Combined OLS TSLS 𝑃𝐺𝐴  = 𝐶𝐴 + 𝛽𝑌𝐴 + 𝐹𝑇1𝐶𝐴 + 𝛽𝑃𝐵𝐴 
6.2 
Comparison with Earlier Empirical 
Work [Comparison of Author’s and 
Pasha’s Estimates] 
OLS (𝑃𝐺𝐴 − 𝐷𝑆𝐴)  = 𝐶𝐴 + 𝛽𝑌𝐴 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇1𝐴 + 𝛽𝑃𝐵𝐴 
6.3 All Provinces Combined OLS TSLS 𝑃𝐺𝐴 = 𝐶𝐴  + 𝛽𝑌𝐴 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽𝑃𝐵𝐴 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝑇𝐴 
6.4 All Provinces Combined OLS TSLS 𝑃𝐺𝐴 = 𝐶𝐴  + 𝛽𝑌𝐴 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝐴 + 𝛽𝑃𝐵𝐴 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝐷𝐴 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝑁𝐷𝐴 
6.5 All Provinces Combined OLS TSLS 𝑃𝐺𝐴 = 𝐶𝐴  + 𝛽𝑌𝐴 + 𝛽(𝐹𝑇𝐴 + 𝐺𝑅𝑁𝐷𝐴) + 𝛽𝑃𝐵𝐴 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝐷𝐴 
PUNJAB – RESPONSE TO FEDERAL TRANSFERS 
6.6 
Equation 1 
OLS 
𝑃𝐺𝑃 = 𝐶𝑃  + 𝛽𝑌𝑃 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝑃 + 𝛽𝑃𝐵𝑃 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝑇𝑃) 
Equation 2 𝑃𝐺𝑃 = 𝐶𝑃  + 𝛽𝑌𝑃 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝑃 + 𝛽𝑃𝐵𝑃 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝑁𝐷𝑃 
Equation 3 𝑃𝐺𝑃 = 𝐶𝑃  + 𝛽𝑌𝑃 + 𝛽𝑃𝐵𝑃 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽(𝐹𝑇𝑃 + 𝐺𝑅𝑁𝐷𝑃) 
PUNJAB – RESPONSE TO FEDERAL TRANSFERS 
6.7 
Equation 1 
TSLS 
𝑃𝐺𝑃 = 𝐶𝑃  + 𝛽𝑌𝑃 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝑃 + 𝛽𝑃𝐵𝑃 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝑇𝑃) 
Equation 2 𝑃𝐺𝑃 = 𝐶𝑃  + 𝛽𝑌𝑃 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝑃 + 𝛽𝑃𝐵𝑃 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝑁𝐷𝑃 
Equation 3 𝑃𝐺𝑃 = 𝐶𝑃  + 𝛽𝑌𝑃 + 𝛽𝑃𝐵𝑃 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽(𝐹𝑇𝑃 + 𝐺𝑅𝑁𝐷𝑃) 
SINDH – RESPONSE TO FEDERAL TRANSFERS 
6.8 
Equation 1 
OLS 
𝑃𝐺𝑆 = 𝐶𝑆  + 𝛽𝑌𝑆 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝑆 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝑇𝑆 
Equation 2 𝑃𝐺𝑆 = 𝐶𝑆  + 𝛽𝑌𝑆 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝑆 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑆 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝑁𝐷𝑠 
Equation 3 𝑃𝐺𝑆 = 𝐶𝑆  + 𝛽𝑌𝑆 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑆 + 𝛽(𝐹𝑇𝑃 + 𝐺𝑅𝑁𝐷𝑆) 
SINDH – RESPONSE TO FEDERAL TRANSFERS 
6.9 
Equation 1 
TSLS 
𝑃𝐺𝑆 = 𝐶𝑆  + 𝛽𝑌𝑆 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝑆 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝑇𝑆) 
Equation 2 𝑃𝐺𝑆 = 𝐶𝑆  + 𝛽𝑌𝑆 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝑆 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑆 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝑁𝐷𝑠 
Equation 3 𝑃𝐺𝑆 = 𝐶𝑆  + 𝛽𝑌𝑆 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑆 + 𝛽(𝐹𝑇𝑃 + 𝐺𝑅𝑁𝐷𝑆) 
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Table     
KPK – RESPONSE TO FEDERAL TRANSFERS 
6.10 
Equation 1 
OLS 
𝑃𝐺𝑁 = 𝐶𝑁  + 𝛽𝑌𝑁 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝑁 + 𝛽𝑃𝐵𝑁 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝑇𝑁) 
Equation 2 𝑃𝐺𝑁 = 𝐶𝑁  + 𝛽𝑌𝑁 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝑁 + 𝛽𝑃𝐵𝑁 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑁 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝑁𝐷𝑁 
Equation 3 𝑃𝐺𝑁 = 𝐶𝑁  + 𝛽𝑌𝑁 + 𝛽𝑃𝐵𝑁 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑁 + 𝛽(𝐹𝑇𝑁 + 𝐺𝑅𝑁𝐷𝑁) 
KPK – RESPONSE TO FEDERAL TRANSFERS 
6.11 
Equation 1 
TSLS 
𝑃𝐺𝑁 = 𝐶𝑁  + 𝛽𝑌𝑁 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝑁 + 𝛽𝑃𝐵𝑁 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝑇𝑁) 
Equation 2 𝑃𝐺𝑁 = 𝐶𝑁  + 𝛽𝑌𝑁 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝑁 + 𝛽𝑃𝐵𝑁 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑁 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝑁𝐷𝑁 
Equation 3 𝑃𝐺𝑁 = 𝐶𝑁  + 𝛽𝑌𝑁 + 𝛽𝑃𝐵𝑁 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝐷𝑁 + 𝛽(𝐹𝑇𝑁 + 𝐺𝑅𝑁𝐷𝑁) 
BALUCHISTAN – RESPONSE TO FEDERAL TRANSFERS 
6.12 
Equation 1 
OLS 
𝑃𝐺𝐵 = 𝐶𝐵  + 𝛽𝑌𝐵 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝐵 + 𝛽𝑃𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝑇𝐵) 
Equation 2 𝑃𝐺𝐵 = 𝐶𝐵  + 𝛽𝑌𝐵 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝐵 + 𝛽𝑃𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝐷𝐵 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝑁𝐷𝐵  
Equation 3 𝑃𝐺𝐵 = 𝐶𝐵  + 𝛽𝑌𝐵 + 𝛽𝑃𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝐷𝐵 + 𝛽(𝐹𝑇𝐵 + 𝐺𝑅𝑁𝐷𝐵) 
BALUCHISTAN – RESPONSE TO FEDERAL TRANSFERS 
6.13 
Equation 1 
TSLS 
𝑃𝐺𝐵 = 𝐶𝐵  + 𝛽𝑌𝐵 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝐵 + 𝛽𝑃𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝑇𝐵) 
Equation 2 𝑃𝐺𝐵 = 𝐶𝐵  + 𝛽𝑌𝐵 + 𝛽𝐹𝑇𝐵 + 𝛽𝑃𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝐷𝐵 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝑁𝐷𝐵  
Equation 3 𝑃𝐺𝐵 = 𝐶𝐵  + 𝛽𝑌𝐵 + 𝛽𝑃𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽𝐺𝑅𝐷𝐵 + 𝛽(𝐹𝑇𝐵 + 𝐺𝑅𝑁𝐷𝐵) 
INTER PROVINCIAL RESPONSE TO 
FEDERAL TRANSFERS OLS and 
TSLS 
Tables 6.14 to 6.17 are comparative analysis of all provinces of Pakistan and 
results reported are based on above models. 
6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 and 7.1 
C = 𝑃𝐺0(1 − 𝛽) heterogeneity across provinces, Y = GDPFC, FT1 All Federal Transfers, FT = NFC Transfers, PB = Provincial Borrowings, GRT = 
Total Grant (Development + Non Development), GRD = Development Grant, GRND = Non Development Grant, (FT + GRND) = NFC Transfers  + Non 
Development Grant  
Subscript ‘A’ stands for all provinces combined, ‘P’ for Punjab, ‘N’ for KPK and ‘B’ for Baluchistan. 
Note: All variables are in per capita and real terms using GDP deflator 2001. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 6.4 
 
DETAILED EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF OLSQ AND TSLS TECHNIQUES AS REPORTED 
IN THE MAIN TEXT FROM TABLE 6.1 TO 6.17 
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(ALL PROVINCES COMBINED) 
 
Table 6.1 
(Results of OLSQ) 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTAR/POPXA  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1973 2009   
Included observations: 37   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 121.0315 66.95699 1.807601 0.0798 
GDPFCA01/POPXA 0.016649 0.005915 2.814696 0.0082 
(NFCTAR+GTAR)/POPXA 0.929601 0.083927 11.07631 0.0000 
BORTAR/POPXA 0.967281 0.015495 62.42665 0.0000 
     
     
R-squared 0.991966     Mean dependent variable 2299.418 
Adjusted R-squared 0.991236     S.D. dependent variable 1130.892 
S.E. of regression 105.8722     Akaike info criterion 12.26415 
Sum squared residual 369894.3     Schwarz criterion 12.43830 
Log likelihood -222.8867     F-statistic 1358.179 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.571158     Probability(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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(ALL PROVINCES COMBINED) 
 
Table 6.1 
(Results of TSLS) 
  
Dependent Variable: EXPTAR/POPXA  
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares  
Sample (adjusted): 1975 2009   
Included observations: 35 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 25 iterations  
Instrument list: C (GDPFCA01/POPXA) (BORTAR/POPXA) FTOTTAXR/POPXA 
FBDGDP1(-1)     
Lagged dependent variable & regressors added to instrument list 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 88.47798 84.12827 1.051703 0.3016 
GDPFCA01/POPXA 0.016876 0.007984 2.113707 0.0433 
(NFCTAR+GTAR)/POPXA 0.944290 0.131666 7.171874 0.0000 
BORTAR/POPXA 0.970420 0.022937 42.30824 0.0000 
AR(1) 0.117622 0.226663 0.518928 0.6077 
AR(2) -0.022495 0.216185 -0.104052 0.9178 
     
     R-squared 0.992498     Mean dependent variable 2338.552 
Adjusted R-squared 0.991204     S.D. dependent variable 1150.486 
S.E. of regression 107.8981     Sum squared residual 337618.3 
F-statistic 760.5599     Durbin-Watson stat 1.878410 
Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     Inverted AR Roots  .06+.14i      .06-.14i  
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(ALL PROVINCES COMBINED) 
 
Table 6.2 
(Author’s Estimate) 
(Results of OLSQ) 
 
Dependent Variable: (EXPTAR-DSAR)/POPXA  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1974 2009   
Included observations: 36 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 13 iterations  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -192.9828 118.6796 -1.626083 0.1141 
GDPFCA01/POPXA 0.032620 0.009701 3.362612 0.0021 
(NFCTAR+GTAR)/POPXA 0.689276 0.136006 5.067994 0.0000 
BORTAR/POPXA 0.981008 0.023062 42.53843 0.0000 
AR(1) 0.384945 0.185733 2.072572 0.0466 
     
     R-squared 0.990997     Mean dependent variable 2090.637 
Adjusted R-squared 0.989835     S.D. dependent variable 1180.111 
S.E. of regression 118.9803     Akaike info criterion 12.52404 
Sum squared residual 438845.9     Schwarz criterion 12.74397 
Log likelihood -220.4327     F-statistic 853.0518 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.994216     Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     Inverted AR Roots       .38   
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(ALL PROVINCES COMBINED) 
 
Table 6.3 
(Results of OLSQ) 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTAR/POPXA  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1973 2009   
Included observations: 37   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 85.94252 66.46365 1.293076 0.2052 
GDPFCA01/POPXA 0.019354 0.005823 3.324013 0.0022 
NFCTAR/POPXA 0.864908 0.086620 9.985089 0.0000 
BORTAR/POPXA 0.967984 0.014839 65.23173 0.0000 
GTAR/POPXA 1.044859 0.098882 10.56671 0.0000 
     
     
R-squared 0.992859     Mean dependent variable 2299.418 
Adjusted R-squared 0.991966     S.D. dependent variable 1130.892 
S.E. of regression 101.3647     Akaike info criterion 12.20041 
Sum squared residual 328793.5     Schwarz criterion 12.41811 
Log likelihood -220.7077     F-statistic 1112.242 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.671978     Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000 
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(ALL PROVINCES COMBINED) 
 
Table 6.3 
(Results of TSLS) 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTAR/POPXA  
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares  
Sample (adjusted): 1975 2009   
Included observations: 35 after adjustments  
Instrument list: C (GDPFCA01/POPXA) (NFCTAR/POPXA) (BORTAR/POPXA)   
FBDR/POPXA(-1)   FBDR/POPXA(-2) 
           
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 48.64475 68.64401 0.708652 0.4840 
GDPFCA01/POPXA 0.015562 0.007062 2.203525 0.0354 
NFCTAR/POPXA 0.950057 0.111059 8.554547 0.0000 
BORTAR/POPXA 0.977011 0.016371 59.67816 0.0000 
GTAR/POPXA 1.145802 0.153580 7.460617 0.0000 
     
     
R-squared 0.993394     Mean dependent variable 2338.552 
Adjusted R-squared 0.992513     S.D. dependent variable 1150.486 
S.E. of regression 99.55011     Sum squared residual 297306.7 
F-statistic 1113.273     Durbin-Watson stat 1.901372 
Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000    
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(ALL PROVINCES COMBINED) 
 
Table 6.4 
(Results of OLSQ) 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTAR/POPXA  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1973 2009   
Included observations: 37   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 74.42572 71.59718 1.039506 0.3066 
GDPFCA01/POPXA 0.020553 0.006421 3.200765 0.0032 
NFCTAR/POPXA 0.846280 0.096212 8.796000 0.0000 
BORTAR/POPXA 0.967856 0.015025 64.41507 0.0000 
GDAR/POPXA 1.176511 0.297092 3.960085 0.0004 
GNDAR/POPXA 0.989797 0.153972 6.428421 0.0000 
     
     
R-squared 0.992909     Mean dependent variable 2299.418 
Adjusted R-squared 0.991766     S.D. dependent variable 1130.892 
S.E. of regression 102.6197     Akaike info criterion 12.24733 
Sum squared residual 326455.0     Schwarz criterion 12.50856 
Log likelihood -220.5756     F-statistic 868.2066 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.685991     Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000 
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(ALL PROVINCES COMBINED) 
 
Table 6.4 
(Results of TSLS) 
 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTAR/POPXA  
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares  
Sample (adjusted): 1975 2009   
Included observations: 35 after adjustments  
Instrument list: C (GDPFCA01/POPXA) (NFCTAR/POPXA) 
(GNDAR  /POPXA)(BORTAR/POPXA) PSA PSTA PSEA FBDGDP1(-2) 
FBDGDP1(-1)  FTOTTAXR/POPXA HBA  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 30.98319 80.04175 0.387088 0.7015 
GDPFCA01/POPXA 0.018084 0.007025 2.574118 0.0154 
NFCTAR/POPXA 0.908254 0.112687 8.059979 0.0000 
BORTAR/POPXA 0.975977 0.015656 62.33870 0.0000 
GDAR/POPXA 1.380764 0.530746 2.601551 0.0145 
GNDAR/POPXA 1.035995 0.203944 5.079806 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.993275   Mean dependent variable 2338.552 
Adjusted R-squared 0.992116   S.D. dependent variable 1150.486 
S.E. of regression 102.1564   Sum squared residual 302642.0 
F-statistic 855.1326   Durbin-Watson stat 1.896537 
Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000    
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(ALL PROVINCES COMBINED) 
Table 6.5 
(Results of OLSQ) 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTAR/POPXA  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1973 2009   
Included observations: 37   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 71.65258 72.05190 0.994458 0.3275 
GDPFCA01/POPXA 0.021280 0.006437 3.306120 0.0023 
(NFCTAR+GNDAR)/POPXA 0.845466 0.096871 8.727752 0.0000 
BORTAR/POPXA 0.967320 0.015122 63.96804 0.0000 
GDAR/POPXA 1.340610 0.265600 5.047478 0.0000 
     
     
R-squared 0.992580     Mean dependent variable 2299.418 
Adjusted R-squared 0.991652     S.D. dependent variable 1130.892 
S.E. of regression 103.3252     Akaike info criterion 12.23873 
Sum squared residual 341635.4     Schwarz criterion 12.45642 
Log likelihood -221.4165     F-statistic 1070.133 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.675840     Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000 
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(ALL PROVINCES COMBINED) 
 
Table 6.5 
(Results of TSLS) 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTAR/POPXA  
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares  
Sample (adjusted): 1975 2009   
Included observations: 35 after adjustments  
Instrument list: C (GDPFCA01/POPXA) (NFCTAR/POPXA) 
(NFCTAR+GNDAR/POPXA)(BORTAR/POPXA) PSA PSTA PSEA FBDGDP1 
FBDGDP1(-2) FTOTREVR/POPXA 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 30.52952 80.43595 0.379551 0.7070 
GDPFCA01/POPXA 0.016757 0.007259 2.308435 0.0280 
(NFCTAR+GNDAR)/POPXA 0.938939 0.117256 8.007583 0.0000 
BORTAR/POPXA 0.977986 0.016681 58.62968 0.0000 
GDAR/POPXA 1.581172 0.438761 3.603724 0.0011 
     
     
R-squared 0.992717     Mean dependent variable 2338.552 
Adjusted R-squared 0.991746     S.D. dependent variable 1150.486 
S.E. of regression 104.5231     Sum squared residual 327752.1 
F-statistic 1014.167     Durbin-Watson stat 1.882081 
Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000    
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PUNJAB 
 
Table 6.6 
(Equation One) 
(Results of OLSQ) 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTPR/POPXP  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1973 2009   
Included observations: 37   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 72.38201 75.18660 0.962698 0.3429 
GDPFCP01/POPXP 0.014682 0.004522 3.246709 0.0027 
NFCTPR/POPXP 0.870840 0.094658 9.199808 0.0000 
BORTPR/POPXP 1.292719 0.181954 7.104646 0.0000 
GTPR/POPXP 1.092225 0.098635 11.07339 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.965452     Mean dependent variable 1559.366 
Adjusted R-squared 0.961133     S.D. dependent variable 453.3883 
S.E. of regression 89.38409     Akaike info criterion 11.94885 
Sum squared residual 255664.5     Schwarz criterion 12.16654 
Log likelihood -216.0537     F-statistic 223.5596 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.844002     Probability(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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PUNJAB 
Table 6.6 
(Equation Two) 
(Results of OLSQ) 
 
 
Dependent Variable: (EXPTPR)/POPXP  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1974 2009   
Included observations: 36 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 18 iterations  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 65.73442 107.4537 0.611746 0.5456 
GDPFCP01/POPXP 0.021483 0.006326 3.396057 0.0021 
NFCTPR/POPXP 0.774773 0.119267 6.496119 0.0000 
GDPR/POPXP 1.270496 0.328275 3.870221 0.0006 
GNDPR/POPXP 0.916198 0.176247 5.198373 0.0000 
BORTPR/POPXP 1.173052 0.251512 4.663992 0.0001 
DUMNFC97 -84.58252 52.89535 -1.599054 0.1210 
AR(1) 0.153024 0.229733 0.666095 0.5108 
     
     R-squared 0.967664     Mean dependent variable 1577.113 
Adjusted R-squared 0.959581     S.D. dependent variable 446.5963 
S.E. of regression 89.78628     Akaike info criterion 12.02587 
Sum squared residual 225724.1     Schwarz criterion 12.37776 
Log likelihood -208.4657     F-statistic 119.7030 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.828647     Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     Inverted AR Roots       .15   
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Table 6.6 
(Equation Three) 
(Results of OLSQ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Dependent Variable: EXPTPR/POPXP  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1974 2009   
Included observations: 36 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 9 iterations  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 21.23563 101.4011 0.209422 0.8355 
GDPFCP01/POPXP 0.017080 0.005933 2.878587 0.0073 
(NFCTPR+GNDPR)/POPXP 0.851524 0.114408 7.442840 0.0000 
GDPR/POPXP 1.513490 0.283443 5.339670 0.0000 
BORTPR/POPXP 1.374159 0.219449 6.261852 0.0000 
AR(1) 0.192122 0.220025 0.873183 0.3895 
     
     R-squared 0.964242     Mean dependent variable 1577.113 
Adjusted R-squared 0.958283     S.D. dependent variable 446.5963 
S.E. of regression 91.21641     Akaike info criterion 12.01536 
Sum squared residual 249613.0     Schwarz criterion 12.27928 
Log likelihood -210.2765     F-statistic 161.7963 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.890658     Probability(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     Inverted AR Roots       .19   
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Table 6.7 
(Equation One) 
(Results of TSLS) 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTPR/POPXP  
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares  
Sample (adjusted): 1975 2009   
Included observations: 35 after adjustments  
Instrument list: C (GDPFCP01/POPXP) (NFCTPR/POPXP) (BORTPR/POPXP)  
DUMNFC07  FTOTTAXR/POPXA  FBDGDP1 FBDGDP1(-1)  HBP HDP HHP 
HIP PSP PSTP PSEP  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 53.04683 78.65784 0.674400 0.5052 
GDPFCP01/POPXP 0.013326 0.004843 2.751572 0.0100 
NFCTPR/POPXP 0.910901 0.104213 8.740750 0.0000 
BORTPR/POPXP 1.316692 0.186765 7.049981 0.0000 
GTPR/POPXP 1.132563 0.118372 9.567794 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.962087     Mean dependent variable 1596.465 
Adjusted R-squared 0.957032     S.D. dependent variable 437.5338 
S.E. of regression 90.69509     Sum squared residual 246768.0 
F-statistic 184.2197     Durbin-Watson stat 1.878497 
Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 6.7 
(Equation Two) 
(Results of TSLS) 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTPR/POPXP  
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares  
Sample (adjusted): 1975 2009   
Included observations: 35 after adjustments  
Instrument list:  (GDPFCP01/POPXP) (NFCTPR/POPXP) (BORTPR/POPXP)  
(GNDPR/POPXP)  HBP HDP HHP  HNP PSP  PSEP FBDGDP1 POPDENP  HPP  
POPGP 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 27.95007 112.9956 0.247355 0.8064 
GDPFCP01/POPXP 0.014979 0.005320 2.815675 0.0087 
(NFCTPR)/POPXP 0.890904 0.104203 8.549666 0.0000 
BORTPR/POPXP 1.360952 0.225379 6.038500 0.0000 
GDPR/POPXP 1.256629 0.537974 2.335855 0.0266 
GNDPR/POPXP 1.036722 0.198463 5.223742 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.962840     Mean dependent variable 1596.465 
Adjusted R-squared 0.956433     S.D. dependent variable 437.5338 
S.E. of regression 91.32509     Sum squared residual 241867.9 
F-statistic 147.8221     Durbin-Watson stat 1.819029 
Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 6.7 
(Equation Three) 
(Results of TSLS) 
 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTPR/POPXP  
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares  
Sample (adjusted): 1976 2009   
Included observations: 34 after adjustments  
Instrument list: C (GDPFCP01/POPXA) ((NFCTPR+GNDPR)/POPXP) 
BORTPR/POPXP HBP HDP HHP HNP PSTP    FBDGDP1(-1) FBDGDP1 POPGP  
FNETREVR/POPXA FTOTEXPR/POPXA PSP PSEP(-1) DUMNFC97  DUMNFC07 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.904621 83.80057 0.010795 0.9915 
GDPFCP01/POPXP 0.013878 0.005366 2.586249 0.0150 
(NFCTPR+GNDPR)/POPXP 0.943688 0.105983 8.904124 0.0000 
GDPR/POPXP 1.195655 0.358843 3.331974 0.0024 
BORTPR/POPXP 1.453156 0.171126 8.491734 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.958872     Mean dependent variable 1613.403 
Adjusted R-squared 0.953199     S.D. dependent variable 432.3095 
S.E. of regression 93.52373     Sum squared residual 253653.9 
F-statistic 165.1836     Durbin-Watson stat 1.773614 
Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 6.8 
(Equation One) 
(Results of OLSQ) 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTSR/POPS  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 07/24/12   Time: 23:06   
Sample: 1973 2009   
Included observations: 37   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     C 4466.092 1012.897 4.409227 0.0001 
GDPFCS01/POPS 0.033399 0.012629 2.644550 0.0131 
NFCTSR/POPS 0.645769 0.131610 4.906673 0.0000 
BORTSR/POPS 0.893733 0.138097 6.471758 0.0000 
GTSR/POPS 0.942509 0.115850 8.135631 0.0000 
RPCGDPS -3192.861 675.5261 -4.726480 0.0001 
HDS 0.048549 0.013113 3.702307 0.0009 
HNS -0.406482 0.135217 -3.006146 0.0054 
     
     R-squared 0.981340 Mean dependent var 2088.072 
Adjusted R-squared 0.976836 S.D. dependent var 773.9348 
S.E. of regression 117.7910 Akaike info criterion 12.56451 
Sum squared resid 402366.9 Schwarz criterion 12.91282 
Log likelihood -224.4435 Hannan-Quinn criter. 12.68731 
F-statistic 217.8755 Durbin-Watson stat 2.039009 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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                          Table 6.8 
                             (Equation-Two) 
                             (Results of OLS)   
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTSR/POPS  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1973 2009   
Included observations: 37   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 2792.534 786.0527 3.552604 0.0013 
GDPFCS01/POPS 0.033491 0.012128 2.761390 0.0099 
NFCTSR/POPS 0.725723 0.139999 5.183753 0.0000 
BORTSR/POPS 0.927406 0.149302 6.211613 0.0000 
GDSR/POPS 1.322749 0.295815 4.471536 0.0001 
GNDSR/POPS 0.948342 0.192266 4.932447 0.0000 
RGDPS -9539.540 2366.729 -4.030686 0.0004 
DUMNFC07 -402.2542 106.3691 -3.781682 0.0007 
     
     R-squared 0.979546    Mean dependent var 2088.072 
Adjusted R-squared 0.974609    S.D. dependent var 773.9348 
S.E. of regression 123.3232    Akaike info criterion 12.65631 
Sum squared resid 441050.0    Schwarz criterion 13.00461 
Log likelihood -226.1416    Hannan-Quinn criter. 12.77910 
F-statistic 198.4030    Durbin-Watson stat 1.995961 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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                                                   Table 6.8 
                                                     (Equation Three) 
                                                      (Results of OLS) 
 
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 07/24/12   Time: 22:35   
Sample: 1973 2009   
Included observations: 37   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 3002.908 953.0167 3.150950 0.0037 
GDPFCS01/POPS 0.031006 0.012673 2.446522 0.0205 
(NFCTSR+GNDSR)/POPS 0.693520 0.147319 4.707595 0.0001 
BORTSR/POPS 0.975869 0.156925 6.218678 0.0000 
GDSR/POPS 1.516317 0.303544 4.995380 0.0000 
RPCGDPS -2240.980 638.8882 -3.507624 0.0014 
DUMNFC07 -344.6033 105.2382 -3.274507 0.0027 
     
     R-squared 0.977184    Mean dependent var 2088.072 
Adjusted R-squared 0.972621    S.D. dependent var 773.9348 
S.E. of regression 128.0597    Akaike info criterion 12.71153 
Sum squared resid 491978.6    Schwarz criterion 13.01630 
Log likelihood -228.1633    Hannan-Quinn criter. 12.81897 
F-statistic 214.1467    Durbin-Watson stat 1.801165 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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                     (Equation-One) 
                       (Results of TSLS) 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTSR/POPS  
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares  
Sample: 1973 2009   
Included observations: 37   
Instrument specification: C (GDPFCS01/POPS) (NFCTSR/POPS) 
(BORTSR/POPS) RPCGDPS HDS HNS POPDENS REVOWNEXPSR 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     C 5517.465 1301.656 4.238805 0.0002 
GDPFCS01/POPS 0.006247 0.020166 0.309783 0.7589 
NFCTSR/POPS 0.795443 0.171909 4.627109 0.0001 
BORTSR/POPS 0.930380 0.163180 5.701559 0.0000 
GTSR/POPS 1.326278 0.236268 5.613451 0.0000 
RPCGDPS -3686.640 831.1446 -4.435619 0.0001 
HDS 0.055473 0.015785 3.514246 0.0015 
HNS -0.339642 0.162278 -2.092956 0.0452 
     
     R-squared 0.974279 Mean dependent var 2088.072 
Adjusted R-squared 0.968071 S.D. dependent var 773.9348 
S.E. of regression 138.2929 Sum squared resid 554623.2 
F-statistic 155.7057 Durbin-Watson stat 1.691329 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 Second-Stage SSR 718071.1 
J-statistic 4.170029 Instrument rank 9 
Prob(J-statistic) 0.041145    
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                          Table 6.9 
                             (Equation-Two) 
                              (Results of TSLS) 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTSR/POPS  
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares  
Sample (adjusted): 1974 2009   
Included observations: 36 after adjustments  
Instrument specification: C (GDPFCS01/POPS) (NFCTSR/POPS) 
(BORTSR/POPS) (GNDSR/POPS) RGDPS DUMNFC07 FBDGDP1(-1) 
DUMNFC91  FTOTTAXR/POPXA(-1) HNS  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     C 2801.776 853.2457 3.283668 0.0028 
GDPFCS01/POPS 0.030890 0.013908 2.220958 0.0346 
NFCTSR/POPS 0.741657 0.160385 4.624226 0.0001 
BORTSR/POPS 0.764196 0.308050 2.480751 0.0194 
GDSR/POPS 1.370865 0.551213 2.486998 0.0191 
GNDSR/POPS 0.938734 0.232294 4.041145 0.0004 
RGDPS -9267.860 2856.524 -3.244454 0.0030 
DUMNFC07 -382.2045 122.0299 -3.132056 0.0040 
     
     R-squared 0.979708 Mean dependent var 2098.952 
Adjusted R-squared 0.974634 S.D. dependent var 782.0381 
S.E. of regression 124.5518 Sum squared resid 434368.0 
F-statistic 191.4573 Durbin-Watson stat 1.983003 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 Second-Stage SSR 614690.3 
J-statistic 0.760353 Instrument rank 11 
Prob(J-statistic) 0.858925    
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                         Table 6.9 
                             (Equation-Three) 
                              (Results of TSLS) 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTSR/POPS  
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares  
Sample (adjusted): 1974 2009   
Included observations: 36 after adjustments  
Instrument specification: C (GDPFCS01/POPS) ((NFCTSR+GNDSR)/POPS) 
        (BORTSR/POPS) RPCGDPS  DUMNFC07 POPDENS ROWNGDPSR 
        FBDGDP1(-1) FBDGDP1   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 3005.225 1231.234 2.440825 0.0210 
GDPFCS01/POPS 0.026304 0.014598 1.801864 0.0820 
(NFCTSR+GNDSR)/POPS 0.729030 0.193886 3.760099 0.0008 
BORTSR/POPS 0.712121 0.347674 2.048245 0.0497 
GDSR/POPS 1.488674 0.699704 2.127575 0.0420 
RPCGDPS -2126.022 942.6188 -2.255442 0.0318 
DUMNFC07 -314.6826 136.8334 -2.299749 0.0289 
     
     R-squared 0.977889    Mean dependent var 2098.952 
Adjusted R-squared 0.973314    S.D. dependent var 782.0381 
S.E. of regression 127.7527    Sum squared resid 473301.7 
F-statistic 210.8822    Durbin-Watson stat 1.781055 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    Second-Stage SSR 754893.4 
J-statistic 3.465506    Instrument rank 10 
Prob(J-statistic) 0.325263    
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Table 6.10 
(Equation One) 
(Results of OLSQ) 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTNR/POPXN  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1974 2009   
Included observations: 36 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 20 iterations  
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 448.2105 328.3447 1.365061 0.1831 
GDPFCN01/POPN 0.016495 0.023100 0.714081 0.4811 
NFCTNR/POPXN 0.822963 0.140245 5.868023 0.0000 
BORTNR/POPXN 0.603715 0.197885 3.050833 0.0050 
GTNR/POPXN 0.754377 0.177525 4.249412 0.0002 
DUMNWFP03 338.4142 28.82402 11.74070 0.0000 
DUMNWFP05 -159.7639 71.21801 -2.243308 0.0330 
AR(1) 0.771653 0.135050 5.713846 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.955456     Mean dependent variable 2185.337 
Adjusted R-squared 0.944320     S.D. dependent variable 594.2474 
S.E. of regression 140.2228     Akaike info criterion 12.91747 
Sum squared residual 550548.0     Schwarz criterion 13.26937 
Log likelihood -224.5145     F-statistic 85.79817 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.689719     Probability(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     Inverted AR Roots       .77   
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Table 6.10 
(Equation Two) 
(Results of OLSQ) 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTNR/POPN  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1975 2009   
Included observations: 35 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 23 iterations  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 538.4447 524.5027 1.026581 0.3144 
GDPFCN01/POPN 0.013803 0.028489 0.484494 0.6323 
NFCTNR/POPN 0.736234 0.206037 3.573310 0.0015 
BORTNR/POPN 0.611749 0.218045 2.805609 0.0096 
GDNR/POPN 0.564264 0.338570 1.666610 0.1081 
GNDNR/POPN 0.666114 0.276644 2.407837 0.0238 
DUMNWFP85 78.33790 102.8607 0.761592 0.4534 
DUMNWFP05 -138.9385 148.4024 -0.936228 0.3581 
AR(1) 0.632173 0.217414 2.907687 0.0075 
AR(2) 0.201247 0.211664 0.950786 0.3508 
     
     R-squared 0.948983     Mean dependent variable 1866.027 
Adjusted R-squared 0.930617     S.D. dependent variable 502.4093 
S.E. of regression 132.3379     Akaike info criterion 12.84355 
Sum squared residual 437833.2     Schwarz criterion 13.28794 
Log likelihood -214.7621     F-statistic 51.67035 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.061064     Probability(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     Inverted AR Roots       .86          -.23  
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Table 6.10 
(Equation Three) 
(Results of OLSQ) 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTNR/POPXN  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1975 2009   
Included observations: 35 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 244 iterations  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 451.6675 391.5348 1.153582 0.2592 
GDPFCN01/POPN 0.016590 0.022758 0.728984 0.4725 
(NFCTNR+GNDNR)/POPXN 0.843223 0.164132 5.137462 0.0000 
GDNR/POPXN 0.526085 0.265189 1.983814 0.0579 
BORTNR/POPXN 0.551089 0.194393 2.834920 0.0088 
DUMNWFP99 179.4310 116.4602 1.540707 0.1355 
DUMNWFP03 310.4920 112.7301 2.754297 0.0106 
AR(1) 0.799877 0.209460 3.818752 0.0007 
AR(2) -0.003091 0.226491 -0.013646 0.9892 
     
     R-squared 0.957845     Mean dependent variable 2217.839 
Adjusted R-squared 0.944874     S.D. dependent variable 569.5319 
S.E. of regression 133.7194     Akaike info criterion 12.84640 
Sum squared residual 464902.9     Schwarz criterion 13.24635 
Log likelihood -215.8120     F-statistic 73.84676 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.979117     Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     Inverted AR Roots       .80           .00  
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Table 6.11 
(Equation One) 
(Results of TSLS) 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTNR/POPXN  
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares  
Sample (adjusted): 1974 2009   
Included observations: 36 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 58 iterations  
Instrument list: C (GDPFCN01/POPN) (NFCTNR/POPXN)  (BORTNR/POPXN) 
DUMNWFP03 DUMNWFP05 FTOTTAXR FBDGDP1(-1) REVOWNTNR 
Lagged dependent variable & regressors added to instrument list 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 455.2188 368.9557 1.233804 0.2275 
GDPFCN01/POPN 0.017469 0.024839 0.703307 0.4877 
NFCTNR/POPXN 0.810371 0.178595 4.537472 0.0001 
BORTNR/POPXN 0.601804 0.178389 3.373540 0.0022 
GTNR/POPXN 0.734785 0.270908 2.712302 0.0113 
DUMNWFP03 337.4899 111.9790 3.013867 0.0054 
DUMNWFP05 -159.8689 115.1761 -1.388039 0.1761 
AR(1) 0.780425 0.148389 5.259311 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.955438     Mean dependent variable 2185.337 
Adjusted R-squared 0.944298     S.D. dependent variable 594.2474 
S.E. of regression 140.2502     Sum squared residual 550763.5 
F-statistic 83.80128     Durbin-Watson stat 1.691929 
Probability(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     Inverted AR Roots       .78   
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Table 6.11 
(Equation Two) 
(Results of TSLS) 
 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTNR/POPXN  
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares  
Sample (adjusted): 1975 2009   
Included observations: 35 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 19 iterations  
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Instrument list:  C (GDPFCN01/POPN) (NFCTNR/POPXN) (BORTNR/POPXN) 
FTOTTAXR/POPXA (GNDNR/POPN)  FBDGDP1(-2)FBDGDP1 (-1)  
DUMNFC07 
Lagged dependent variable & regressors added to instrument list 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 520.1796 298.4244 1.743087 0.0923 
GDPFCN01/POPN 0.003866 0.024864 0.155471 0.8776 
NFCTNR/POPXN 0.943528 0.160424 5.881445 0.0000 
BORTNR/POPXN 0.577150 0.285562 2.021103 0.0529 
GDNR/POPXN 0.693299 0.383519 1.807732 0.0814 
GNDNR/POPXN 0.912457 0.223247 4.087204 0.0003 
AR(1) 0.657935 0.182601 3.603131 0.0012 
     
     R-squared 0.938187     Mean dependent variable 2217.839 
Adjusted R-squared 0.924941     S.D. dependent variable 569.5319 
S.E. of regression 156.0339     Sum squared residual 681704.5 
F-statistic 71.24882     Durbin-Watson stat 2.058463 
Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     Inverted AR Roots       .66   
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Table 6.11 
(Equation Three) 
(Results of TSLS) 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTNR/POPXN  
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares  
Sample (adjusted): 1975 2009   
Included observations: 35 after adjustments  
Convergence not achieved after 500 iterations 
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=3) 
Instrument list: C (GDPFCN01/POPN) ((NFCTNR+GNDNR)/POPXN) 
(BORTNR/POPXN)  DUMNWFP99 DUMNWFP03 FTOTTAXR(-1) 
Lagged dependent variable & regressors added to instrument list 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 437.8097 470.0339 0.931443 0.3602 
GDPFCN01/POPN 0.016196 0.036525 0.443414 0.6611 
(NFCTNR+GNDNR)/POPXN 0.839489 0.174949 4.798480 0.0001 
GDNR/POPXN 0.632106 0.279967 2.257787 0.0326 
BORTNR/POPXN 0.587268 0.263071 2.232354 0.0344 
DUMNWFP99 176.4558 103.1158 1.711239 0.0989 
DUMNWFP03 322.5290 64.84739 4.973663 0.0000 
AR(1) 0.800706 0.219453 3.648642 0.0012 
AR(2) -0.005679 0.259526 -0.021883 0.9827 
     
     R-squared 0.957569     Mean dependent variable 2217.839 
Adjusted R-squared 0.944513     S.D. dependent variable 569.5319 
S.E. of regression 134.1572     Sum squared residual 467951.7 
F-statistic 73.42866     Durbin-Watson stat 1.981764 
Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     Inverted AR Roots       .79           .01  
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Table 6.12 
(Equation One) 
(Results of OLSQ) 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTBR/POPB  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1975 2009   
Included observations: 35   
Convergence achieved after 17 iterations  
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 33.12961 303.5537 0.109139 0.9138 
GDPFCB01/POPB 0.064008 0.016701 3.832462 0.0006 
NFCTBR/POPB 0.632706 0.164519 3.845805 0.0006 
BORTBR/POPB 0.957067 0.015831 60.45669 0.0000 
GTBR/POPB 0.810878 0.234380 3.459671 0.0017 
AR(1) -0.512015 0.281516 -1.818780 0.0793 
     
     R-squared 0.998400     Mean dependent variable 13439.02 
Adjusted R-squared 0.998125     S.D. dependent variable 29883.26 
S.E. of regression 1294.082     Akaike info criterion 17.32380 
Sum squared residual 48564787     Schwarz criterion 17.59043 
Log likelihood -297.1664     F-statistic 3620.313 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.754079     Probability(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     Inverted AR Roots      -.51   
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Table 6.12 
(Equation Two) 
(Results of OLSQ) 
 
Dependent Variable: (EXPTBR)/POPB  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1976 2009   
Included observations: 34   
Convergence achieved after 7 iterations  
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 44.86635 364.8035 0.122988 0.9030 
GDPFCB01/POPB 0.062326 0.025095 2.483638 0.0195 
NFCTBR/POPB 0.701907 0.168140 4.174546 0.0003 
GDBR/POPB 0.947224 0.446083 2.123427 0.0430 
GNDBR/POPB 0.613421 0.319141 1.922099 0.0652 
BORTBR/POPB 0.906098 0.002188 414.1233 0.0000 
AR(2) 0.293673 0.019701 14.90669 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.999637     Mean dependent variable 9631.883 
Adjusted R-squared 0.999556     S.D. dependent variable 19934.83 
S.E. of regression 419.8853     Akaike info criterion 15.09908 
Sum squared residual 4760199.     Schwarz criterion 15.41333 
Log likelihood -249.6844     F-statistic 12392.78 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.655813     Probability(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     Inverted AR Roots       .54          -.54  
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Table 6.12 
(Equation Three) 
(Results of OLSQ) 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTBR/POPB  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1976 2009   
Included observations: 34   
Convergence achieved after 7 iterations  
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 32.25540 357.3628 0.090260 0.9287 
GDPFCB01/POPB 0.061593 0.023769 2.591268 0.0150 
(NFCTBR+GNDBR)/POPB 0.695749 0.168679 4.124683 0.0003 
GDBR/POPB 0.909193 0.397204 2.288982 0.0298 
BORTBR/POPB 0.906225 0.002121 427.3048 0.0000 
AR(2) 0.293200 0.019036 15.40259 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.999635     Mean dependent variable 9631.883 
Adjusted R-squared 0.999570     S.D. dependent variable 19934.83 
S.E. of regression 413.2099     Akaike info criterion 15.04457 
Sum squared residual 4780787.     Schwarz criterion 15.31393 
Log likelihood -249.7578     F-statistic 15355.69 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.632257     Probability(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     Inverted AR Roots       .54          -.54  
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Table 6.13 
(Equation One) 
(Results of TSLS) 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTBR/POPB  
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares  
Sample (adjusted): 1975 2009   
Included observations: 35 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 69 iterations  
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Instrument list: C (GDPFCB01/POPB) (NFCTBR/POPB) (BORTBR 
        /POPB) FBDGDP1(-2)FBDGDP1 (-1)  DUMNFC07       
Lagged dependent variable & regressors added to instrument list 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -26.95479 291.8117 -0.092371 0.9271 
GDPFCB01/POPB 0.060157 0.019670 3.058384 0.0049 
NFCTBR/POPB 0.669855 0.182594 3.668556 0.0010 
BORTBR/POPB 0.958367 0.012303 77.89917 0.0000 
GTBR/POPB 0.876128 0.288511 3.036720 0.0051 
AR(1) -0.597494 0.295424 -2.022494 0.0528 
AR(2) -0.177572 0.126797 -1.400437 0.1724 
     
     R-squared 0.998449     Mean dependent variable 13439.02 
Adjusted R-squared 0.998116     S.D. dependent variable 29883.26 
S.E. of regression 1296.980     Sum squared residual 47100391 
F-statistic 3003.650     Durbin-Watson stat 1.610822 
Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     Inverted AR Roots -.30-.30i     -.30+.30i  
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Table 6.13 
(Equation Two) 
(Results of TSLS) 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTBR/POPB  
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares  
Sample (adjusted): 1975 2009   
Included observations: 35 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 61 iterations  
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Instrument list:  C (GDPFCB01/POPB) (NFCTBR/POPB) (BORTBR/POPB) 
FBDGDP1(-2)FBDGDP1 (-1)  DUMNFC07  (GNDBR/POPB) DUM76 
Lagged dependent variable & regressors added to instrument list 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -33.01830 304.2762 -0.108514 0.9144 
GDPFCB01/POPB 0.061713 0.019856 3.108097 0.0044 
NFCTBR/POPB 0.648018 0.175780 3.686531 0.0010 
BORTBR/POPB 0.959245 0.010350 92.68268 0.0000 
GDBR/POPB 1.721995 0.443960 3.878714 0.0006 
GNDBR/POPB 0.473065 0.265332 1.782916 0.0858 
AR(1) -0.658547 0.294676 -2.234820 0.0339 
AR(2) -0.240996 0.130999 -1.839685 0.0768 
     
     R-squared 0.998534     Mean dependent variable 13439.02 
Adjusted R-squared 0.998154     S.D. dependent variable 29883.26 
S.E. of regression 1283.925     Sum squared residual 44508534 
F-statistic 2627.342     Durbin-Watson stat 1.616027 
Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     Inverted AR Roots -.33+.36i     -.33-.36i  
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Table 6.13 
(Equation Three) 
(Results of TSLS) 
  
Dependent Variable: EXPTBR/POPB  
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares  
Sample: 1976 2009   
Included observations: 34   
Convergence achieved after 7 iterations  
Instrument list:  C (GDPFCB01/POPB) ((NFCTBR+GNDBR)/POPB) 
(BORTBR/POPB) FBDGDP1(-2)FBDGDP1 (-1)  DUMNFC07 (GNDBR/POPB) 
DUM76   PSB HHB PSEB 
Lagged dependent variable & regressors added to instrument list 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 18.52427 356.7521 0.051925 0.9590 
GDPFCB01/POPB 0.059550 0.022378 2.661138 0.0127 
(NFCTBR+GNDBR)/POPB 0.705588 0.179683 3.926842 0.0005 
GDBR/POPB 0.999167 0.572083 1.746543 0.0917 
BORTBR/POPB 0.906399 0.003695 245.2975 0.0000 
AR(2) 0.293806 0.035634 8.244985 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.999635     Mean dependent variable 9631.883 
Adjusted R-squared 0.999570     S.D. dependent variable 19934.83 
S.E. of regression 413.5382     Sum squared residual 4788388. 
F-statistic 15331.03     Durbin-Watson stat 1.668395 
Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     Inverted AR Roots       .54          -.54  
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Table 6.14 
 
 
 
 
  
Dependent Variable: EXPTPR/POPXP  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1974 2009   
Included observations: 36 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 10 iterations  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 185.2821 79.96928 2.316916 0.0273 
GDPFCP01/POPP 0.014327 0.006883 2.081533 0.0457 
(NFCTPR+GTPR+BORTPR)/POPP 0.933088 0.122073 7.643701 0.0000 
DUMNFC97 -110.5325 62.17316 -1.777818 0.0852 
AR(1) 0.322878 0.184229 1.752591 0.0896 
     
     R-squared 0.959401     Mean dependent variable 1577.113 
Adjusted R-squared 0.954162     S.D. dependent variable 446.5963 
S.E. of regression 95.61528     Akaike info criterion 12.08679 
Sum squared residual 283410.8     Schwarz criterion 12.30672 
Log likelihood -212.5622     F-statistic 183.1402 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.884589     Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     Inverted AR Roots       .32   
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Table 6.14 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTSR/POPS  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1974 2009   
Included observations: 36 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 7 iterations  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -144.3417 164.7801 -0.875966 0.3876 
GDPFCS01/POPS 0.038091 0.011159 3.413370 0.0018 
(NFCTSR+GTSR+BORTSR)/POPS 0.736351 0.129321 5.693980 0.0000 
AR(1) 0.322002 0.184889 1.741595 0.0912 
     
     R-squared 0.968035     Mean dependent variable 2098.952 
Adjusted R-squared 0.965039     S.D. dependent variable 782.0381 
S.E. of regression 146.2254     Akaike info criterion 12.91261 
Sum squared residual 684219.6     Schwarz criterion 13.08856 
Log likelihood -228.4271     F-statistic 323.0340 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.816641     Probability(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     Inverted AR Roots       .32   
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Table 6.14 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTNR/POPXN  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1974 2009   
Included observations: 36   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -174.8923 111.4552 -1.569171 0.1268 
GDPFCN01/POPN 0.043815 0.009164 4.781325 0.0000 
(NFCTNR+GTNR+BORTNR)/POPXN 0.928013 0.073710 12.59011 0.0000 
DUMNFC07 -528.9317 114.8242 -4.606449 0.0001 
DUMNWFP05 -359.1366 164.7285 -2.180173 0.0370 
     
     R-squared 0.942206     Mean dependent variable 2185.337 
Adjusted R-squared 0.934749     S.D. dependent variable 594.2474 
S.E. of regression 151.7961     Akaike info criterion 13.01120 
Sum squared residual 714304.2     Schwarz criterion 13.23113 
Log likelihood -229.2016     F-statistic 126.3477 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.841933     Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Table 6.14 
Dependent Variable: EXPTBR/POPB  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1976 2009   
Included observations: 34 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 4 iterations  
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 139.3716 336.6368 0.414012 0.6818 
GDPFCB01/POPB 0.030984 0.017363 1.784447 0.0845 
(NFCTBR+GTBR+BORTBR)/POPB 0.919011 0.010704 85.86066 0.0000 
AR(3) 0.061186 0.022079 2.771209 0.0095 
     
     R-squared 0.998762     Mean dependent variable 9631.883 
Adjusted R-squared 0.998638     S.D. dependent variable 19934.83 
S.E. of regression 735.7478     Akaike info criterion 16.14978 
Sum squared residual 16239745     Schwarz criterion 16.32935 
Log likelihood -270.5463     F-statistic 8065.323 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.175760     Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     Inverted AR Roots       .39     -.20-.34i   -.20+.34i 
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Table 6.15 
 (Results of OLSQ) 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTPR/POPXP  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1973 2009   
Included observations: 37   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 72.38201 75.18660 0.962698 0.3429 
GDPFCP01/POPXP 0.014682 0.004522 3.246709 0.0027 
NFCTPR/POPXP 0.870840 0.094658 9.199808 0.0000 
BORTPR/POPXP 1.292719 0.181954 7.104646 0.0000 
GTPR/POPXP 1.092225 0.098635 11.07339 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.965452     Mean dependent variable 1559.366 
Adjusted R-squared 0.961133     S.D. dependent variable 453.3883 
S.E. of regression 89.38409     Akaike info criterion 11.94885 
Sum squared residual 255664.5     Schwarz criterion 12.16654 
Log likelihood -216.0537     F-statistic 223.5596 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.844002     Probability(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Table 6.15 
 (Results of OLSQ) 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTSR/POPS  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 07/24/12   Time: 23:06   
Sample: 1973 2009   
Included observations: 37   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     C 4466.092 1012.897 4.409227 0.0001 
GDPFCS01/POPS 0.033399 0.012629 2.644550 0.0131 
NFCTSR/POPS 0.645769 0.131610 4.906673 0.0000 
BORTSR/POPS 0.893733 0.138097 6.471758 0.0000 
GTSR/POPS 0.942509 0.115850 8.135631 0.0000 
RPCGDPS -3192.861 675.5261 -4.726480 0.0001 
HDS 0.048549 0.013113 3.702307 0.0009 
HNS -0.406482 0.135217 -3.006146 0.0054 
     
     R-squared 0.981340 Mean dependent var 2088.072 
Adjusted R-squared 0.976836 S.D. dependent var 773.9348 
S.E. of regression 117.7910 Akaike info criterion 12.56451 
Sum squared resid 402366.9 Schwarz criterion 12.91282 
Log likelihood -224.4435 Hannan-Quinn criter. 12.68731 
F-statistic 217.8755 Durbin-Watson stat 2.039009 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 6.15 
 (Results of OLSQ) 
 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTNR/POPXN  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1974 2009   
Included observations: 36 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 20 iterations  
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 448.2105 328.3447 1.365061 0.1831 
GDPFCN01/POPN 0.016495 0.023100 0.714081 0.4811 
NFCTNR/POPXN 0.822963 0.140245 5.868023 0.0000 
BORTNR/POPXN 0.603715 0.197885 3.050833 0.0050 
GTNR/POPXN 0.754377 0.177525 4.249412 0.0002 
DUMNWFP03 338.4142 28.82402 11.74070 0.0000 
DUMNWFP05 -159.7639 71.21801 -2.243308 0.0330 
AR(1) 0.771653 0.135050 5.713846 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.955456     Mean dependent variable 2185.337 
Adjusted R-squared 0.944320     S.D. dependent variable 594.2474 
S.E. of regression 140.2228     Akaike info criterion 12.91747 
Sum squared residual 550548.0     Schwarz criterion 13.26937 
Log likelihood -224.5145     F-statistic 85.79817 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.689719     Probability(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     Inverted AR Roots       .77   
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Table 6.15 
 (Results of OLSQ) 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTBR/POPB  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1975 2009   
Included observations: 35   
Convergence achieved after 17 iterations  
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 33.12961 303.5537 0.109139 0.9138 
GDPFCB01/POPB 0.064008 0.016701 3.832462 0.0006 
NFCTBR/POPB 0.632706 0.164519 3.845805 0.0006 
BORTBR/POPB 0.957067 0.015831 60.45669 0.0000 
GTBR/POPB 0.810878 0.234380 3.459671 0.0017 
AR(1) -0.512015 0.281516 -1.818780 0.0793 
     
     R-squared 0.998400     Mean dependent variable 13439.02 
Adjusted R-squared 0.998125     S.D. dependent variable 29883.26 
S.E. of regression 1294.082     Akaike info criterion 17.32380 
Sum squared residual 48564787     Schwarz criterion 17.59043 
Log likelihood -297.1664     F-statistic 3620.313 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.754079     Probability(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     Inverted AR Roots      -.51   
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Table 6.16 
 (Results of OLSQ) 
 
Dependent Variable: (EXPTPR)/POPXP  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1974 2009   
Included observations: 36 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 18 iterations  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 65.73442 107.4537 0.611746 0.5456 
GDPFCP01/POPXP 0.021483 0.006326 3.396057 0.0021 
NFCTPR/POPXP 0.774773 0.119267 6.496119 0.0000 
GDPR/POPXP 1.270496 0.328275 3.870221 0.0006 
GNDPR/POPXP 0.916198 0.176247 5.198373 0.0000 
BORTPR/POPXP 1.173052 0.251512 4.663992 0.0001 
DUMNFC97 -84.58252 52.89535 -1.599054 0.1210 
AR(1) 0.153024 0.229733 0.666095 0.5108 
     
     R-squared 0.967664     Mean dependent variable 1577.113 
Adjusted R-squared 0.959581     S.D. dependent variable 446.5963 
S.E. of regression 89.78628     Akaike info criterion 12.02587 
Sum squared residual 225724.1     Schwarz criterion 12.37776 
Log likelihood -208.4657     F-statistic 119.7030 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.828647     Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     Inverted AR Roots       .15   
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                             (Results of OLS)   
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTSR/POPS  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1973 2009   
Included observations: 37   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 2792.534 786.0527 3.552604 0.0013 
GDPFCS01/POPS 0.033491 0.012128 2.761390 0.0099 
NFCTSR/POPS 0.725723 0.139999 5.183753 0.0000 
BORTSR/POPS 0.927406 0.149302 6.211613 0.0000 
GDSR/POPS 1.322749 0.295815 4.471536 0.0001 
GNDSR/POPS 0.948342 0.192266 4.932447 0.0000 
RGDPS -9539.540 2366.729 -4.030686 0.0004 
DUMNFC07 -402.2542 106.3691 -3.781682 0.0007 
     
     R-squared 0.979546    Mean dependent var 2088.072 
Adjusted R-squared 0.974609    S.D. dependent var 773.9348 
S.E. of regression 123.3232    Akaike info criterion 12.65631 
Sum squared resid 441050.0    Schwarz criterion 13.00461 
Log likelihood -226.1416    Hannan-Quinn criter. 12.77910 
F-statistic 198.4030    Durbin-Watson stat 1.995961 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 6.16 
 (Results of OLSQ) 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTNR/POPN  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1975 2009   
Included observations: 35 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 23 iterations  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 538.4447 524.5027 1.026581 0.3144 
GDPFCN01/POPN 0.013803 0.028489 0.484494 0.6323 
NFCTNR/POPN 0.736234 0.206037 3.573310 0.0015 
BORTNR/POPN 0.611749 0.218045 2.805609 0.0096 
GDNR/POPN 0.564264 0.338570 1.666610 0.1081 
GNDNR/POPN 0.666114 0.276644 2.407837 0.0238 
DUMNWFP85 78.33790 102.8607 0.761592 0.4534 
DUMNWFP05 -138.9385 148.4024 -0.936228 0.3581 
AR(1) 0.632173 0.217414 2.907687 0.0075 
AR(2) 0.201247 0.211664 0.950786 0.3508 
     
     R-squared 0.948983     Mean dependent variable 1866.027 
Adjusted R-squared 0.930617     S.D. dependent variable 502.4093 
S.E. of regression 132.3379     Akaike info criterion 12.84355 
Sum squared residual 437833.2     Schwarz criterion 13.28794 
Log likelihood -214.7621     F-statistic 51.67035 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.061064     Probability(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     Inverted AR Roots       .86          -.23  
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Table 6.16 
 (Results of OLSQ) 
 
 
Dependent Variable: (EXPTBR)/POPB  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1976 2009   
Included observations: 34   
Convergence achieved after 7 iterations  
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 44.86635 364.8035 0.122988 0.9030 
GDPFCB01/POPB 0.062326 0.025095 2.483638 0.0195 
NFCTBR/POPB 0.701907 0.168140 4.174546 0.0003 
GDBR/POPB 0.947224 0.446083 2.123427 0.0430 
GNDBR/POPB 0.613421 0.319141 1.922099 0.0652 
BORTBR/POPB 0.906098 0.002188 414.1233 0.0000 
AR(2) 0.293673 0.019701 14.90669 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.999637     Mean dependent variable 9631.883 
Adjusted R-squared 0.999556     S.D. dependent variable 19934.83 
S.E. of regression 419.8853     Akaike info criterion 15.09908 
Sum squared residual 4760199.     Schwarz criterion 15.41333 
Log likelihood -249.6844     F-statistic 12392.78 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.655813     Probability(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     Inverted AR Roots       .54          -.54  
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Table 6.17 
 (Results of OLSQ) 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTPR/POPXP  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1974 2009   
Included observations: 36 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 9 iterations  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 21.23563 101.4011 0.209422 0.8355 
GDPFCP01/POPXP 0.017080 0.005933 2.878587 0.0073 
(NFCTPR+GNDPR)/POPXP 0.851524 0.114408 7.442840 0.0000 
GDPR/POPXP 1.513490 0.283443 5.339670 0.0000 
BORTPR/POPXP 1.374159 0.219449 6.261852 0.0000 
AR(1) 0.192122 0.220025 0.873183 0.3895 
     
     R-squared 0.964242     Mean dependent variable 1577.113 
Adjusted R-squared 0.958283     S.D. dependent variable 446.5963 
S.E. of regression 91.21641     Akaike info criterion 12.01536 
Sum squared residual 249613.0     Schwarz criterion 12.27928 
Log likelihood -210.2765     F-statistic 161.7963 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.890658     Probability(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     Inverted AR Roots       .19   
     
 
  
Intergovernmental Governmental Fiscal Relation – A Case Study of Pakistan 368 
SINDH 
Table 6.17 
(Results of OLSQ) 
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 07/24/12   Time: 22:35   
Sample: 1973 2009   
Included observations: 37   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 3002.908 953.0167 3.150950 0.0037 
GDPFCS01/POPS 0.031006 0.012673 2.446522 0.0205 
(NFCTSR+GNDSR)/POPS 0.693520 0.147319 4.707595 0.0001 
BORTSR/POPS 0.975869 0.156925 6.218678 0.0000 
GDSR/POPS 1.516317 0.303544 4.995380 0.0000 
RPCGDPS -2240.980 638.8882 -3.507624 0.0014 
DUMNFC07 -344.6033 105.2382 -3.274507 0.0027 
     
     R-squared 0.977184    Mean dependent var 2088.072 
Adjusted R-squared 0.972621    S.D. dependent var 773.9348 
S.E. of regression 128.0597    Akaike info criterion 12.71153 
Sum squared resid 491978.6    Schwarz criterion 13.01630 
Log likelihood -228.1633    Hannan-Quinn criter. 12.81897 
F-statistic 214.1467    Durbin-Watson stat 1.801165 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA (KPK) 
Table 6.17 
 (Results of OLSQ) 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTNR/POPXN  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 1975 2009   
Included observations: 35 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 244 iterations  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 451.6675 391.5348 1.153582 0.2592 
GDPFCN01/POPN 0.016590 0.022758 0.728984 0.4725 
(NFCTNR+GNDNR)/POPXN 0.843223 0.164132 5.137462 0.0000 
GDNR/POPXN 0.526085 0.265189 1.983814 0.0579 
BORTNR/POPXN 0.551089 0.194393 2.834920 0.0088 
DUMNWFP99 179.4310 116.4602 1.540707 0.1355 
DUMNWFP03 310.4920 112.7301 2.754297 0.0106 
AR(1) 0.799877 0.209460 3.818752 0.0007 
AR(2) -0.003091 0.226491 -0.013646 0.9892 
     
     R-squared 0.957845     Mean dependent variable 2217.839 
Adjusted R-squared 0.944874     S.D. dependent variable 569.5319 
S.E. of regression 133.7194     Akaike info criterion 12.84640 
Sum squared residual 464902.9     Schwarz criterion 13.24635 
Log likelihood -215.8120     F-statistic 73.84676 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.979117     Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     Inverted AR Roots       .80           .00  
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BALUCHISTAN 
 
Table 6.17 
 (Results of OLSQ) 
 
Dependent Variable: EXPTBR/POPB  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1976 2009   
Included observations: 34   
Convergence achieved after 7 iterations  
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 32.25540 357.3628 0.090260 0.9287 
GDPFCB01/POPB 0.061593 0.023769 2.591268 0.0150 
(NFCTBR+GNDBR)/POPB 0.695749 0.168679 4.124683 0.0003 
GDBR/POPB 0.909193 0.397204 2.288982 0.0298 
BORTBR/POPB 0.906225 0.002121 427.3048 0.0000 
AR(2) 0.293200 0.019036 15.40259 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.999635     Mean dependent variable 9631.883 
Adjusted R-squared 0.999570     S.D. dependent variable 19934.83 
S.E. of regression 413.2099     Akaike info criterion 15.04457 
Sum squared residual 4780787.     Schwarz criterion 15.31393 
Log likelihood -249.7578     F-statistic 15355.69 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.632257     Probability(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     Inverted AR Roots       .54          -.54  
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APPENDIX CHAPTER – 8 
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Appendix Table 8.1A APPLICATION OF THE FORMULLA OF SHARING INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL TRANSFER  AS PRACTICED IN 
VARIOUS COUNTRIES AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON PROVINCIAL SHARE AND FISCAL EQUALIZATION IN PAKISTAN 
 
Pakistan Criteria 
 
Pakistan 
 
Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan Total 
 
Criteria % of Transfer 
Population                 319,064                131,739                76,709                28,349                 555,861  
 
82%                 555,861  
Inv. Pop Density                       824                    1,418                 1,235                14,825                  18,303  
 
3%                   18,303  
Backwardness                   16,199                  16,338                19,410                17,874                  69,822  
 
10%                   69,822  
Revenue Generation / Collection                     9,151                  23,387                 1,017                    339                  33,894  
 
5%                   33,894  
Sharing Arrangement                345,238               172,883              98,371              61,387               677,879  
 
Total               677,879  
%age Share in Transfer 51% 26% 15% 9% 100% 
   
         
 
Brazil Criteria 
 
Brazil 
 
Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan Total 
 
Criteria % of Transfer 
Population                 129,688                  53,547                31,179                11,523                 225,937  
 
33%                 225,937  
Inv. Pop Density                   10,167                  17,510                15,251              183,009                 225,937  
 
33%                 225,937  
Backwardness                   52,433                  52,885                62,829                57,857                 226,005  
 
33%                 226,005  
Revenue Generation / Collection  -   -   -   -                         -    
 
-  -  
Sharing Arrangement                192,288               123,942            109,259            252,389               677,879  
  
              677,879  
%age Share in Transfer 28% 18% 16% 37% 100% 
   
  
 
 
      
 
Mexico Criteria 
 
Mexico 
 
Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan Total 
 
Criteria % of Transfer 
Population                 194,551                  80,329                46,774                17,286                 338,940  
 
50%                 338,940  
Inv. Pop Density  -   -   -   -                         -    
 
-  -  
Backwardness  -   -   -   -                         -    
 
-  -  
Revenue Generation / Collection                   91,514                233,868                10,168                 3,389                 338,940  
 
50%                 338,940  
Sharing Arrangement                286,065               314,197              56,942              20,675               677,879  
  
              677,879  
%age Share in Transfer 42% 46% 8% 3% 100% 
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Indonesia Criteria 
 
Indonesia 
 
Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan Total 
 
Criteria % of Transfer 
Population  -   -   -   -                         -    
 
-  -  
Inv. Pop Density  -   -   -   -                         -    
 
-  -  
Backwardness  -   -   -   -                         -    
 
-  -  
Revenue Generation / Collection                 183,027                467,737                20,336                 6,779                 677,879  
 
100%                 677,879  
Sharing Arrangement                183,027               467,737              20,336                6,779               677,879  
  
              677,879  
%age Share in Transfer 27% 69% 3% 1% 100% 
   
 
Argentina Criteria 
 
Argentina 
 
Punjab Sindh KPK Baluchistan Total 
 
Criteria % of Transfer 
Population             252,916.65            104,427.26           60,805.75           22,471.69                 440,621  
 
65%            440,621.35  
Inv. Pop Density                3,050.46               5,253.56             4,575.68           54,908.20                  67,788  
 
10%              67,787.90  
Development Gap               49,106.09                        -             51,829.84           68,533.82                 169,470  
 
25%            169,469.75  
Revenue Generation / Collection  -   -   -   -                         -    
 
-  -  
Sharing Arrangement                305,073               109,681            117,211            145,914               677,879  
  
              677,879  
%age Share in Transfer 45% 16% 17% 22% 100% 
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